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Abstract 
The thesis examines the role of accounting in configuring innovation as the driver of 
economic progress in modern Britain. Set against a context of changing 
governmental rationalities and greater attention of economic theory upon issues of 
R&D productivity, University-Industry interrelations have come to represent, since 
the 1980s, a laboratory where British government has experimented with 
programmes for both promoting and decentralising innovation, while maintaining at 
a distance control through mandated calculations and calculative devices.The thesis 
brings accounting into the discussion of how private and public agencies of 
governance steer innovation by exploring the paradoxical phrase: “controlling 
innovation, innovating control”. The phrase questions the extent to which accounting 
discipline and practices have changed in order to keep pace with the progressive 
economic and social agenda of innovation.  
By means of an in-depth study of accounting practices, corroborated by forty 
semi-structured interviews, the thesis explores the action of controlling innovation 
across three main sites where university-industry interrelations are enacted, namely 
technology transfer, technology incubation, and corporate R&D. Drawing on the 
concept of socio-technical agencement (Callon 2005) the thesis seeks to identify and 
analyse the economic agencies that configure and assemble innovation as an actor 
capable of influencing government policies, corporate strategies, and universities’ 
mission. The thesis shows that controlling innovation involves calculative action that 
is mainly distributed across accounting devices (e.g. Discounted Cash Flow, R&D 
budget, and input-output performance indicators), non-accounting devices, and 
human entities. Drawing on, and expanding, the work of Beunza & Garud (2007) on 
calculative frames, the thesis finds patterns of regularity occurring in the 
mechanisms through which economic action within innovation is organized and 
distributed. The thesis also accounts for the tensions arising in the negotiation of 
different versions of the value of innovation. Finally, while controlling innovation is 
performed through a variety of accounting devices, the thesis shows that such 
devices are not new to the accounting discipline and practice, but rather are 
traditional accounting tools that adapted to the innovation rationale in virtue of their 
fluid and combinable properties. 
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1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
To what extent has accounting agenda progressed toward the so-called “innovation 
economy” and “knowledge society” (Drucker 1993)? Since the second half of the 
20th century, the British economy has been the object of a growing number of 
policies and programmes aimed at promoting innovation while addressing issues of 
economic growth and national competitiveness (DIUS and BERR 2008). 
Increasingly, innovation is pictured as a major economic actor capable of driving 
entire economies toward the much sought-after economic growth, while informing 
corporate strategies, universities’ missions, and other domains of economic life. 
Parallel to the construction of innovation as an economic driver, the past three 
decades have witnessed the expansion of innovation measures, national and global 
indexes, and surveys aimed at measuring, managing, hence controlling, innovation as 
a phenomenon. 
Seemingly, controlling innovation while promoting innovation has become the 
mantra of a society that is constantly oriented not only to investing on innovation 
(and knowledge) in order to progress, but also to realizing the economic effects of 
innovation. Nevertheless, the rationalistic aspiration of a modern society that relies 
on instrumental knowledge in order to progress offers only a partial explanation for 
the variety of collective efforts performed to both promote and control innovation. 
Traditionally, studies in economics have focused on the effects of innovation on 
economic growth, in so taking for granted the agentic content of innovation, i.e. what 
gives innovation the capacity to influence the courses of action of other actors in the 
economy (e.g. government, corporations, universities, and scientists). Similarly, 
traditional accounting concerns for realising the value of innovation and for 
managing innovation through the structures of accounting have often been casted in 
normative terms (Davila 2010; Davila and Ditillo 2013; Edvinsson and Malone 
1997), in so overlooking the content of the economic action involved in innovation 
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as a socio-technical phenomenon. This thesis advances that in order to understand the 
social and technical phenomenon that is innovation and its effects, we need to attend 
to the accounting infrastructure that contributes to configuring and assembling 
innovation as major economic driver and economic actor. It is by seeking and 
identifying the content of innovation in the circumstances of action that we can 
account for the varieties of arrangements that fall beneath the umbrella of innovation. 
This thesis positions the analysis of the calculative and economic content of the 
agencies of innovation within social studies of accounting.  For the latter advance 
that accounting does not merely constitute a neutral device through which the 
supposed reality of innovation is realised (Hopwood and Miller 1994), but rather is 
capable of configuring domains, creating spaces of possibilities within which 
economic action can be exerted by individuals, organisations, and the State. Based on 
this view of how accounting shapes economy and society, the thesis advances that it 
is both by measuring the value of innovation and by managing it through accounting 
devices and principles that the economic entities of innovation comes into being.  
While investigating the content, forms, and effects of the accounting involved in 
configuring the economic agencies of innovation this thesis aims to address the 
paradox presented in the title of the thesis: “controlling innovation, innovating 
control”. The phrase aims to provoke a discussion as to whether the ‘progressive’ 
agenda of accounting has moved toward developing ‘new’ ideas and instruments for 
measuring, managing, and ultimately controlling innovation. Investigating the nature 
of and the conditions for accounting changes triggered by the innovation 
phenomenon is important because it allows us to identify: a) the forms of accounting 
mobilised in the action of controlling innovation and b) the qualities/properties of 
accounting tools that are involved in innovation. In short, the thesis aims to explore 
how accounting has become what it was not in the name of innovation (Hopwood 
1987). Whether new economic rationales, with innovation being a case in point, 
trigger changes or adaptations in the accounting discipline and practice (Andon, 
Baxter, and Chua 2007; Briers and Chua 2001; Robson 1991) and what makes such 
changes possible are issues that this thesis aims to contribute to. With regard to this, 
there has been a wide debate over the recent years, in both academic and practitioner 
oriented literature (Granstrand 2000; Edvinsson and Malone 1997; Romer 1998), as 
to whether accounting has to ‘invent’ new tools in order to measure and manage the 
knowledge base of organisations. Innovation has been  often represented in academic 
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and policy-oriented literature as a problem for accounting because of the challenges 
it poses in terms of measurement and coordination (NESTA 2008). In an effort to 
trace the multiple modalities of problematizing innovation, Chapter 1 attends to the 
different styles of problematizing innovation that have emerged in the accounting 
literature of the past three decades. The literature review identifies immateriality and 
accounting and organisational structures as two distinctive styles of problematizing 
the relation between innovation and accounting. On the one hand, the literature on 
immateriality has frequently discussed the problem of realising and visualising the 
value of the immaterial resources of the firm. Within this stream of research, the 
debate usually centres on whether the supposed mathematical and logical rigour 
attributed to accounting numbers is challenged by more narrative forms of disclosing 
the immaterial resources of the firm (Mouritsen, Larsen, and Bukh 2001a). On the 
other hand, the literature on accounting and organisational structures (e.g. 
management control systems, networks, etc.) has debated for long time whether 
management accounting and control systems contributed to hindering or enabling 
innovation and whether traditional management accounting systems have been 
supplanted by ‘new’ forms of accounting and control (Davila 2010). Within those 
studies focusing on organisational structures such as networks and inter-firm 
relations, the debate usually revolved around the roles and types of accounting in 
networks, but without paying specific attention to innovation contexts (Håkansson 
and Lind 2004).  
Although these literatures do address the relation between innovation and 
accounting, the fundamental question of how different forms of accounting 
contribute to configuring economic action within the realm of innovation, and the 
consequences of such configuring, remains relatively unexplored. More needs to be 
done in terms of understanding the sources, content, effects (both intended and 
unintended), and distribution of economic action within the field of innovation. Past 
accounting scholarship (Burchell et al. 1980; Hopwood 1983) has poignantly 
observed how accounting devices, far from being neutral, contributes to configuring 
the objects they aim to measure and control. For this reason, the investigation of how 
economic action is configured and the role of accounting in this process of 
configuration is critically important.  
To understand the role of accounting in the dramatic expansion of the innovation-
driven economy the thesis aims to address the following questions:  
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1. What is the role of accounting in qualifying the entities of innovation as 
economic?  
2. What qualifies an entity as economic in the realm of innovation?  
3. What are the effects of this process of qualification/configuring?  
4. Since innovation is said to drive economies, then how is the economic 
action of innovation (and its configuring) to be understood?   
In the context of this thesis, economizing means to translate the entities of innovation 
(e.g. new technologies, incubation projects, new scientific ideas, new drugs) into 
economic entities that possess economic value(s), that is into entities that can 
circulate and be exchanged in the economy precisely because of that economic 
value(s). 
The urge to attend to the origins, content, distribution, and effects of economic 
action within social and technical phenomena (e.g. financial markets) has been 
recently put forward by the performativity programme in social studies of science 
and technology (Callon 1998c; Çalışkan and Callon 2009). Drawing on this 
approach, the thesis seeks to identify the economic entities of innovation by 
observing the practices of controlling innovation, with no assumptions about content, 
forms and effects of control. Controlling innovation is analysed in the circumstances 
of action because this allows tracing how the same types of action and device are 
performed in different ways, depending on the context in which they are mobilised. 
Nevertheless, understanding how accounting economizes innovation depends also 
on how we conceptualize accounting (e.g. accounting as standard and rational 
models or as practices). In order to show how different conceptualisations of 
accounting impact on our knowledge of the phenomenon innovation, Chapter 2 
compares, for analytical purposes, different theoretical approaches to studying 
economization. Part 1 of Chapter 2 discusses how new institutional theory and the 
performativity programme in social studies of science both contribute to the study of 
economization. In new institutional theory, accounting models and standards 
contribute to constructing individuals, organisations, nation states as rational 
economic actors. Under this conceptualization, accounting models diffuse across 
society, but while diffusing they remain “the same” and do not adapt or change to 
local settings. In the performativity programme instead the quality of being economic 
is highly contingent to the network of people and resources mobilised around the 
entity to be economized. The conclusion that is drawn at the end of such analytical 
5 
 
comparison is the following. The two literatures centre on apparently different 
phenomena: the origins of isomorphic and normalising tendency within a field and 
the origins of multiplicities and differences within and across arrangements, 
respectively. Chapter 7 will show that at an empirical level such theoretical 
differences might slightly blur.  In this respect, the findings will show that, while 
accounting materialities play a central role in producing differences and 
multiplicities within the agencements of innovation, patterns of regularity in the 
processes of distributing calculative action within the field of innovation have also 
been found. 
The research methods deployed in this study are discussed in Part 2 of Chapter 2. 
The empirical investigation was carried out principally by means of semi-structured 
interviews conducted across multiple sites. Interview data was integrated by 
companies’ internal documentation and public documentation available from 
institutional websites. The empirical research focused on the interplays between 
innovation and accounting in the context of university-industry interrelations in the 
UK. Since the 1980s university-industry interrelations have been constructed as a 
laboratory for innovation where the UK government has unremittingly devised and 
implemented programmes for bringing about the so called innovation-driven 
economy and knowledge-based society. Among all these programmes, this study 
focuses on technology transfer and incubation programmes because the latter 
represent a significant and growing arena where problematics of economic growth 
have been linked to innovation.  
The linking of economic growth to innovation is not self-evident, but rather the 
outcome of a number of economic and political conditions, whose understanding 
helps us contextualise the accounting practices in place within the arena of 
university-industry interrelations. Put differently, the rise and spread of performance 
indicators aimed at evaluating research performances of universities was not an event 
that had necessarily to happen, but rather was the outcome of processes of 
managerialization and increased accountability toward the use of public spending. 
Therefore, the reason for attending to the historical and political conditions that gave 
rise to research commercialisation in the UK is to provide not only a historical 
background for the thesis, but a plausible explanation for the changes in the type of 
accounting instruments deployed through time to configure economic action. To this 
aim, Chapter 3 provides a historical analysis of the economic and political conditions 
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that have led to the emergence of research commercialisation discourses across the 
arenas of economic theory and UK policy making. An extensive work of 
problematization , to which economic theory has largely contributed, took place from 
1950s onward and contributed to changing the role of the State within the arena of 
research commercialization. Chapter 3 shows that a major shift was from direct 
intervention and control over scientific research toward exerting control at a distance. 
Instruments of control such as State’s rights of first refusal over the inventions 
developed by public universities disappeared in the 1980s amid the rise of 
programmes for decentralizing research commercialisation. A progressive shift in the 
principles for governing the allocation of public funding to science (e.g. the 1971 
Rothschild contractor-customer principle) together with regimes of increased 
accountability created the conditions for the spread of instruments of control such as 
research assessment exercises.  
In an effort to trace the multiple forces that produce changes in accounting for 
innovation, the empirical chapters, i.e. Ch. 4, Ch. 5, and Ch. 6, take the analysis from 
the arenas of economic theory and policy making to the arena of organisational 
practices by observing corporate R&D, technology transfer, and incubation practices 
respectively. Overall, the three chapters explore the accounting practices in place 
within university incubators, technology transfer offices, and a corporate R&D unit. 
The objective is to investigate the extent to which accounting operates in contexts 
where scientific ideas are discovered, developed, transferred, and incubated. In other 
words, the objective is to investigate how the circulation of innovative scientific 
ideas is influenced by measurement practices. The actions and entities implicated in 
controlling innovation are analysed according to the following three questions: what 
is the content of economic action within innovation (e.g. within corporate R&D, 
university technology transfer, and incubation)? What are the mechanisms for 
attributing economic action within innovation? What are the effects of economic 
action within innovation? Each question then leads to a series of categorizations of 
economic action that are discussed below. Such categories aim to contribute to the 
understanding of how the action of controlling innovation is configured, that is what 
its content, mechanisms of attribution, and effects are. First, in relation to the content 
of action, the analysis focuses mainly on calculative action, since this is the form of 
action in which accounting is mostly implicated. Second, as to the sources and 
mechanisms of organisation of action, these can vary according to the specific 
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circumstances of action and can consist in accounting devices, principles, non-
accounting devices, etc. In this respect, the thesis mobilises the notion of calculative 
frames to account for regularities in the mechanisms for organising action. Originally 
developed by Beunza and Garud (2007) to account for the striking regularities 
observed in the choice of categories, analogies, and key metrics made by financial 
analysts, the concept of calculative frame developed in this thesis identifies patterns 
of regularity in the mechanisms for attributing economic action. Third, the effects of 
economic action are conceptualised in terms of tensions arising between different 
ways of calculating the value of innovation. By adopting such categorization in the 
analysis of the empirical evidence presented in Chapters 4, 5, and 6, this study seeks 
to identify and analyse the economic agencies of innovation. In so investigating the 
role of accounting in assembling innovation as a major actor of the economy. 
In the light of the thematic organization of the empirical chapters above 
enunciated, Chapter 4 investigates the interplays between innovation and accounting 
in the context of drug discovery and development activities at a big pharmaceutical 
company headquartered in the UK. While the national problem of R&D productivity 
examined in Chapter 3 is made visible within the domain of pharmaceutical industry 
through the problem of growing failure rates in the development of drugs, Chapter 4 
explores how BigPharma1 has translated the problem of drug development failure 
rates, i.e. R&D productivity, into a problem of how to re-organize their R&D efforts. 
Consequently, in the past two decades the organisation underwent waves of 
organisational reforms aimed at re-structuring their R&D activities. The chapter 
explores how the enactment of organisational forms arising from such restructuring 
(i.e. Drug Discovery Centres, Performance units, and Incubator#1) was made 
possible by multiple accounting devices, such as wish lists, budgets, financial 
attrition, discounted cash flow, financial models, and performance indicators. 
Overall, the chapter shows how accounting devices made it possible to translate 
innovative scientific ideas into economic entities, that is into entities that are 
expressed according to categories of cost and value. The chapter shows how financial 
and non-financial resources could be mobilised precisely because of the economic 
visibility granted by accounting to scientific discovery. 
While Chapter 4 analyses the processes of economizing drug discovery and 
incubation from the perspective of the private corporation, Chapter 5 maintains the 
focus on the accounting practices mobilised to economize innovation programmes, 
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but shifts the perspective from the corporation to universities and technology transfer 
offices within universities. The underlying idea is that, while shifting the 
observations from private to public contexts, the content, sources, and effects of 
economic action are likely to change. The empirical evidence presented in Chapter 5 
shows how universities concerns for commercialising research have been translated 
into performance indicators aimed at making the innovativeness and inventiveness of 
the research base visible. The chapter shows how, following chains of calculations, 
innovation performances of individual universities become linked to the allocation of 
public funding. A central role here is played by the formula-based funding device. 
The latter functions through a system of weights that are imposed on different 
sources of universities’ performance (e.g. research impact, external incomes). The 
chapter discusses both the effects of measuring innovation performances through 
indicators and the effects of linking funding to performances.  
While maintaining the focus on the role of accounting in controlling innovation in 
the context of universities’ commercialisation practices, Chapter 6 takes the analysis 
to the arena of technology incubation programmes. Compared to technology transfer 
offices, which operate predominantly in the context of universities, the technology 
incubators observed in this study are characterised by multiple stakeholders from 
both public (e.g. universities, government) and private (e.g. corporations) sectors. 
Realizing the value of incubation programmes is often presented as a problematic 
exercise because of the variety of concerns at play within each setting. The 
distribution of such concerns across multiple calculative frames (e.g. public 
intervention, quality, and investment frames) and the role of accounting in translating 
them into numbers is the focus of the chapter. Accounting devices constitute spaces 
in which different calculative frames come to confront and compete with each other, 
giving rise to tensions and paradoxes.  
In discussing the findings from the empirical chapters, Chapter 7 addresses the 
following question: to what extent has accounting innovated in order to control 
innovation? The question aimed to trigger a discussion of the types of action 
involved in controlling innovation and the types of accounting devices mobilised 
therein. Drawing on the notion of economic agency put forward by Callon (2005), 
Chapter 7 offers first an analysis of the forms of economic agencies involved in 
controlling innovation by categorizing action in terms of the sources, content, and 
effects. There is no a priori assumption of what constitutes controlling innovation. 
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On the contrary, the source/content/effect categorization is based on observing the 
circumstances of action. Second, the chapter discusses whether the forms of 
accounting mobilised to control innovation are new to the accounting discipline and 
practice, or whether it is more the case that traditional forms of accounting have 
adapted to new accounting rationales, i.e. innovation, and how they adapted.  
The findings related to the action of controlling innovation indicate that the latter 
involves a range of calculative actions, i.e. monitoring, assessing, budgeting, 
evaluating innovation, which are performed in a distributed fashion. Public R&D 
programmes, financial models, and budgets are not merely neutral devices, but rather 
have the capacity to organise and influence the myriad of entities participating in the 
collective actions of monitoring, budgeting, forecasting, and assessing innovation. 
Depending on the specific arrangements, the mechanisms for organising and 
distributing action are found in the interaction between different types of entities. In 
this respect, interactions have been found to occur between managerial principles and 
accounting devices, between accounting principles and non-accounting devices, and 
between accounting devices and principles.  Furthermore, regularities have been 
found in the mechanisms for distributing action, which tend to recur across different 
arrangements. Such regularities have been conceptualised as calculative frames 
(Beunza and Garud 2007). The thesis found that, in the context of the exchange of 
money (e.g. public or private investments) for value, different calculative frames can 
overlap and give rise to tensions between different forms of value (e.g. value 
performed in terms of jobs creation, value performed in terms of research 
publications, etc.) 
The findings presented in the second part of the discussion chapter show that the 
forms of control deployed in the context of innovation are not new to the accounting 
practice and discipline. Devices such as discounted cash flow formula, R&D budget, 
financial attrition, and input-output performance indicators are, after all, traditional 
accounting tools which, in the circumstance of action, adapt some of their features to 
new rationales such as innovation. However, the findings show that the process of 
adaptation is made possible by a number of qualities/properties of accounting tools, 
namely fluidity and combinability. Furthermore, such qualities of accounting devices 
make it possible interactions among the heterogeneous entities 
composing/assembling innovation. While contributing to create such tensions, 
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however, accounting can also mediate them by creating spaces of calculability (e.g. 
ratios, weights) where actors can negotiate their respective interests. 
Finally, while emphasizing how this study centres on the assembling of 
innovation by means of multiple economic agencies, and should not be understood as 
a comparative study, the concluding chapter presents the main contribution and 
implications of the thesis and sketches avenues for future research. 
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CHAPTER  1  A LITERATURE REVIEW 
ON ACCOUNTING, IMMATERIALITY AND 
THE STRUCTURES OF INNOVATION 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
It has been more than thirty years since the call of Burchell et al. (1980) to study the 
roles that accounting plays at both societal and organisational level. Today the urge 
to investigate the contingent forces (or programmes) that inspire and shape changes, 
progress and innovations in accounting ideas and practices finds a compelling field 
of analysis in the programmatic and calculative impetuses towards the construction 
of an innovation-driven and knowledge-based economy.  
As Burchell et al. (Ibid.) suggested, the pressure for change is not an inherent 
mission or essence of accounting. Accounting change is rather the outcome of a 
process of co-production of multiple and often distant social, institutional and 
organisational forces. What has come to be seen as a problem in accounting for 
innovation and how the ‘progressive’ agenda of accounting for innovation has been 
shaped, are the result of a process of problematization carried out at different locales 
and propelled by distant actors within society. At the heart of such problematizing 
activity there lies a conceptualization of knowledge as instrumental to the 
achievement of wider economic and social goals (Drucker 1993) such that some 
scholars advanced the idea of a shift toward a form of capitalism called intellectual 
capitalism (Granstrand 2000).  
This chapter will explore the sources of innovation problematization that can be 
found in academic work. The way in which innovation and knowledge are often 
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framed within such domains points to two aspects at least1. One has to do with the 
immaterial quality of the objects to be measured and the other one with the structures 
that enable and constrain innovation as a space (e.g. management control systems, 
markets and networks of innovation, and inter-organizational relations) (Fincham 
and Roslender 2003).  
The domains where these forms of problematization first appeared are located at 
the margins of accounting practices and pertain to academic disciplines such as 
knowledge and innovation management and economics. Another arena where the 
problematization of innovation has taken place is within political institutions (e.g. 
national and international policy making and regulation) and will be explored in 
Chapter 3. Regulators and policy makers can determine matters of urgency within the 
political and scientific agendas and influence other domains. Priority setting in 
science budget has been historically an area of wide political debate (Stichweh 1994) 
and tends normally to have consequences beyond the arena of policy-making itself 
(e.g. corporations, public and private research laboratories etc.). 
How these forms of problematizing innovation have come to inform accounting 
thought, and how accounting has contributed to their development are questions 
investigated in this review chapter. How the problems of measuring immateriality 
and providing the structures for innovation have been treated in the accounting 
literature is therefore the object of this review. The review will analyse the 
accounting literature that has investigated the challenge of measuring the value of 
innovation on the one hand, and the challenge of structuring the space of innovation 
on the other hand.  
In reviewing such literature, emphasis will be given to a number of aspects. First, 
the review will investigate the extent to which the selected studies have analysed the 
roles of accounting within organizations and whether such roles have provided a base 
for change in the practice. Second, the review will discuss whether the selected 
studies have investigated the sources of emergence of accounting roles (e.g. 
organizational, institutional, or social). Third, the review will investigate the extent to 
which the accounting literature has addressed the dialectic relation between 
                                                          
1
 Sources of representation can be multiple: scientific domains, policy making arenas, 
professional bodies, etc. The two aspects of the problematization highlighted here are indeed 
only two aspects. These do not exclude the future analysis of further ways of problematizing 
innovation. 
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accounting roles and accounting practices (and in turn accounting change) in the 
specific context of the so called knowledge-based society and innovation-driven 
economy. 
The chapter is organized as follows: the accounting literature addressing the issue 
of measuring (and managing) immateriality is first presented. The discussion will 
include accounting studies on intangible assets and intellectual capital carried out at 
level of organizational practices and those carried out at a more institutional and 
societal level. Then studies on the structures of innovation such as networks and 
management accounting systems in creative and innovative settings will be 
presented. Finally, the chapter will discuss the extent to which the existing styles of 
problematizing innovation in accounting has addressed the issue of whether and how 
accounting has progressed in order to account for innovation. 
1.1    The problem of immateriality and the roles 
of accounting 
The problem posed to accounting while dealing with innovation and knowledge is 
often presented as a problem of measurement and control over the immaterial 
resources of an organization (van der Meer‐Kooistra and Siebren 2001). 
Accounting’s mission of providing information for decision making while applying 
mathematical and logical rigour started to be challenged in the 1990s by discourses 
concerning the immaterial quality of knowledge. The problem of measuring 
knowledge and innovation was said to lie in the immaterial qualities of the objects to 
be measured (e.g. knowledge, skills, etc.). Measuring knowledge was in turn 
motivated by the aspiration toward “realising the true value” of firms (Edvinsson and 
Malone 1997). The issue of immateriality gained visibility in the context of the huge 
market-to-book ratios found in some industries during the 1990s. Where market-to-
book ratio was regarded by some scholars (Lev and Zarowin 1999; Stewart 1997) as 
a measure of companies’ intellectual capital. As Stewart (1997) stated “everything 
left in the market value after accounting for the fixed assets must be intangible 
assets” (Ibid., p. 224). 
The studies reviewed under this section all engage with the emergence and 
operationalization of a category that since the late 1990s has contributed to the 
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framing of innovation and knowledge in organizations, i.e. “Intellectual Capital” 
(Edvinsson and Malone 1997; Sveiby 1997). The latter is not usually regarded as an 
accounting concept or ‘invention’ as such, despite the term ‘capital’ might resemble 
familiarity with conventional accounting terms. Its roots trace back to fields like 
knowledge management, human resources management and management of 
information technology.  
The remainder of the section will review first the accounting literature that has 
investigated how a non-accounting idea, such as Intellectual Capital, has become part 
of organizations’ managerial practices and reporting. Then we look at how in turn the 
accounting imperative (Burchell et al. 1980) of providing useful information for 
decision making on the basis of mathematical and logical rigour has been challenged 
by a new narrative. Second, the section will explore the extent to which the 
accounting literature has investigated how social and institutional contexts have 
contributed to shaping the roles of accounting in the so called knowledge-based and 
innovation-driven society. 
1.1.1   The sources of accounting roles and accounting 
change: intellectual capital statements as an 
organisational practice  
A first group of studies  (Mouritsen, Larsen, and Bukh 2001b, 2001a; Larsen, 
Mouritsen, and Bukh 1999) contends that intellectual capital (IC) statement 
represents a new tool for communicating to stakeholders the attempts of the 
management and employees to create value and to be a ‘capable’ firm. In these 
studies it is contended that intellectual statements are new tools because of three 
aspects (i.e. the role of accounting numbers, the referents of IC narratives, and the 
concept of value) that will explicated in the following. 
A first element of novelty emphasised in this literature lies in the role of 
accounting numbers. At the level of practices the role that accounting numbers play 
in IC reporting is different from the role that they usually play in the context of 
financial reporting. By studying intellectual capital reporting practices at Skandia, 
i.e. one of the earliest companies to develop intellectual capital supplements to 
financial reporting, Mouritsen et al. (2001b) show how the innovative character of 
such tools lies in the network of story-lines, sketches/visualizations, and 
15 
 
numbers/indicators. Looking more closely, of the 87 indicators reported in Skandia’s 
supplements, 46 are financial. Mouritsen et al. hence suggest that such indicators are 
relatively routine and that there is nothing that makes them intrinsically related to 
intellectual capital. What makes them extra-ordinary is the way in which they are 
brought into a story line and made relevant to Skandia’s knowledge narrative. In 
intellectual capital statements there is not a set formula or an integrated model 
culminating in one number that can be said to quantify intellectual capital. What 
counts is not the ability to quantify intellectual capital, nor is the mathematical rigor 
behind the indicators. What counts –the authors point out- is rather the presence of a 
numerical component in the intellectual capital statement which can be mobilized at 
any time in order to legitimise managers and show how “serious” they can be about 
the future knowledge strategies of the firm. In other words, intellectual capital 
functions as an accountability and reputation device.  
Elsewhere, Larsen et al. (1999) emphasized how intellectual capital statement is 
not about quantifying intellectual capital. Intellectual capital statements are not 
measuring devices. Rather the object of IC statements is the set of knowledge 
management activities. The cases analysed by Larsen et al. encompass a range of 
knowledge management objects which are mobilized through IC statements’ 
sketches, numbers and narratives. One case, for example, is the story of a 
recombination and modularization through IT and therefore a story of structural and 
organizational capital. Another case is centred instead on human capital and its re-
qualification in order to be able to invent and develop relations with customers and 
technologies. Once more, far from being measuring devices, IC statements provide a 
tool for managing knowledge inside the organization. 
A second element of novelty brought about by intellectual capital statement is 
related to its referents. A number of studies have suggested how, at the level of 
practices, intellectual capital statements are tools of communication mainly oriented 
to internal stakeholders (e.g. employees) rather than external stakeholders. In this 
regard, Mouritsen et al. (2001b) point to the nature of intellectual capital statement 
as an accounting mechanism employed to mobilize, persuade, and motivate the 
individual employee to render knowledge to the firm and in turn help management to 
achieve the strategic objectives. Far from being neutral devices, intellectual capital 
statements have a performative effect because they construct the reality they aim to 
represent (Mouritsen 2006). Similarly, Johanson et al. (2001) found out that the 
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management control of intangibles through organizational routines and activities has 
an instrumental role in mobilizing change within the organization.  
Overall, the studies above show that the referents of IC statements can be only 
understood in the local settings where the intellectual capital reporting is developed. 
For example, in the three cases that Mouritsen et al. (2001a) investigate, management 
action ties (the narrative of) knowledge to different referents. As a consequence the 
ways in which numbers, sketches and narratives are combined depend on the 
priorities characterizing each setting. In the first of the three cases investigated the 
referents of knowledge are persons. In the second case the referents of knowledge 
narrative are efficient and high quality processes. In the third case the referent is the 
collective ability to create solutions.  
A third element of change operates at a more conceptual level and is related to the 
concept of value embedded in IC statements. According to some scholars  
(Mouritsen 1998; Mouritsen, Larsen, and Bukh 2001b) there are fundamental 
differences between value as conceptualised in financial accounting and finance 
theory and value/valuing as conceptualised in the intellectual capital approach. Value 
as conceptualised in finance theory is mainly concerned with the past and valuing 
coincides with assigning numbers mostly based on historical costs of acquisition. 
The attempt to account for immaterial assets has resulted in the creation of a new 
accounting category such as intangible assets whose recognition and measurement 
are regulated under the IAS38 accounting standard.  
Nevertheless, intangible as defined in accounting standards represent only a little 
part of the immaterial resources of the firm, the authors hold. In finance theory 
valuing means predicting the future cash flows of the firm and discounting them to 
the present. In this respect the authors point out that the “number is not based on the 
verifiability found in receipt, but more in the trustworthiness of the procedures that 
the financial analysts make use of” (Mouritsen et al. 2001b, p. 402). 
Under the intellectual capital approach valuing is future oriented too, but it does 
not present the net present value of the firm as a pre-given. The authors argue that 
valuing is more concerned with moving value and increasing it. In other words 
valuing is about identifying the mechanisms through which value is created and 
transformed, rather than culminating in one single number. The intellectual capital 
statement is a network of narratives, sketches and numbers which far from having a 
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logical/mathematical closure are rather “composed and bundled” in order to create 
value. 
A second group of studies is, however, critical of the role that accounting numbers 
has come to play in the context of intellectual capital statements and question 
whether accounting for IC is really something ‘new’. At a more conceptual level 
Roslender and Fincham (2001) question whether the intellectual capital (and related 
statements) really represents a progress in the accounting agenda, or whether 
contemporary accounting practices for IC are only variants of pre-existing models. 
To address this point, the authors observe how the one-page, non-financial 
supplements constituting the so called Skandia Navigator (i.e. Skandia Group’s 
intellectual capital model) can be viewed as a variant of the Balance Scorecard 
(Kaplan and Norton 1992). Roslender and Fincham (2001) illustrate this point 
showing that both the Navigator and the Balance Scorecard identify a number of 
focus areas or perspectives and, for each of them, a small number of key strategic 
indicators. Navigator and Balance Scorecard are both part of the same financial 
management paradigm that in recent history has aimed to impose structure of metrics 
on objects, with intellectual capital being the latest of such objects (Roslender and 
Fincham 2001). In this sense, one can argue that Navigator device borrows existing 
accounting tools, i.e. Balance Scorecard, while imbuing them with new rationales 
such as innovation. 
In a similar vein Mårtensson (2009) discusses how the attempts to quantify human 
qualities and the idea of balance embedded in the balance scorecard and in the IC 
statement are not entirely new. More specifically Mårtensson offers an historical 
reflection on the rationales that has characterized the era of political arithmetic in the 
17th century on one hand, and the contemporary practices of intellectual capital and 
human resources accounting on the other hand. She observes how the ideas of 
balance and quantification of human qualities seem to characterize the era of political 
arithmetic as well as contemporary management control models such as human 
resource costing and accounting (Gröjer and Johanson 1991), balance scorecards 
(Kaplan and Norton 1992) and intellectual capital (Edvinsson and Malone 1997). 
The aspirations driving contemporary measurement exercises are directed toward 
increasing organizational transparency to reveal where value creation takes place, 
Mårtensson suggests. Whereas political arithmetic aspired to the construction of an 
effective and rational society.  
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The idea that human qualities’ quantifications are antecedent to the emergence of 
IC resonates with the hypothesis put forward by Roslender et al. (2001) according to 
which accounting for IC might be suffering the same fate as the project of Human 
Resource Accounting. The latter, Roslender et al. argue, progressively ended up 
being “imprisoned within the paradigm underpinning financial accounting and 
reporting” (p. 389) and subjected to “the prevailing financial mind set of periodic 
reporting, short termism and a “hard” accounting calculus” (p. 389). Accounting –
and the critical accounting agenda- can have a role in avoiding such fate, the authors 
suggest. Hence, the authors argue for the importance of paying attention to how 
intellectual capital might account for itself. By empowering the employee through 
emancipative accounts of her lived organisational experience, organisations could 
manage more effectively their intellectual capital. Mechanisms of self-appraisal such 
as employee’s accounts of the sacrifices, costs, benefits, and promises related to 
programs of skills development could constitute a contribution to changing direction 
in IC accounting practices, the authors argue. 
In summary, the past two decades have witnessed the emergence of a number of 
studies that have analysed the accounting practices underlying the problem of 
measuring immaterial resources within the organisation. In this regard Intellectual 
Capital statements constitute an example of how metrics and indicators are used in 
conjunction with narratives and sketches and act as reputational devices. Parallel to 
such developments, proposals for employees’ empowerment and employees’ self-
accounts in ever more individualized organizations, where the individual gains a 
stage role, begin to emerge in the accounting agenda.  
Overall, the reviewed studies on immateriality show how contentious the idea of 
novelty surrounding Intellectual Capital Statements can be, and how organisations 
come to attach different roles to the same accounting tool (e.g. IC statements as 
reputational devices or as a tool for internal communication, etc.). By preparing and 
presenting IC statements, organisations are not just implementing essentialist ideas of 
accounting and innovation, but they continuously negotiate meanings and attach 
them to practices. 
Intellectual Capital accounting is only one amongst the accounting tools that has 
come to be linked to the ideas of knowledge-based and innovation-driven society. IC 
reporting is only the latest accounting technology, where R&D accounting, human 
resources accounting, and human resources costing are other illustrative examples. 
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The history of quantification of immateriality –as Mårtensson (2009) reminds us- is 
older than IC developments and is characterized by cycles of failures and successes. 
These cycles are also reflected in the discursive patterns observable within the 
accounting literature (e.g. Human Resource accounting, R&D accounting, 
Intellectual Capital accounting, etc.). As Burchell et al. (1980) suggest, to better 
understand the development of the relation between accounting discourses and 
accounting practices we need to attend not only to practices within organisations, but 
also to their social and institutional context. To this aim the next section will review 
those accounting studies that have discussed the practices and concepts around 
immateriality and innovation within institutional and social domains. 
 
1.1.2   The sources of accounting roles and accounting 
change in social and institutional domains: the 
emergence of R&D accounting 
 
“Given that the sources of accounting change were 
increasingly distant from the arenas in which the new 
practices were to function, there was no reason to expect 
why those rationales which had been used in the initial 
justification and development of any change should 
provide effective rationales for its public implementation. 
For in a social context, public actions need to have either a 
political means for their enforcement (Moonitz, 1974) or a 
wider social significance and legitimacy (Posner, 1974)”  
(Burchell et al. 1980, p. 9) 
 
This section will discuss how the accounting literature has investigated the 
institutional and social forces that contributed to shaping ‘new’ practices for 
measuring, managing, and reporting the immaterial resources of firms. As discussed 
in the previous section, example of such practices are IC statements and accounting 
for Research and Development (R&D).  
One set of studies has focused on the contingent forces which shaped and gave 
political significance to accounting for Research and Development (R&D). In this 
regard, Robson (1994) explores how the desires for economic growth and 
competitiveness emerged in the post-war United Kingdom, in the context of the neo-
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liberalist pressure for privatizing previously nationalized services and industries. The 
concern for economic growth and competiveness was linked to discourses about 
science and technology through the development of R&D statistics. The latter made 
it possible to identify a gap in R&D levels between the UK and other countries (e.g. 
Japan and Germany). The gap constituted a problem that needed to be addressed by 
leveraging science and technology investments in the private sector while furthering 
ideals of deregulation and responsibilization. As Robson points out:  
“Science and technology came to be perceived as a private sector 
problem, and the solutions proposed aimed at the self-regulation or 
responsibilization (Foucault 1982, 1988) of managers by “revealing” and 
rendering calculable R&D practices at the level of organization.” (1994, 
p. 166)  
The problem of science and technology shifted to the private sector, where managers 
were to be made responsible for R&D within the organisation/firm. Tools for 
calculating science and technology activity at organisational level were also devised:  
“The development of ‘stable and combinable mobiles’ representing R&D 
has created the space within the organizations for the calculation of 
science and technology, and given or created visibility to such practices 
within the organization” (Ibid., p. 167) 
Accounting for R&D provided the link between science and economy, by installing 
calculative devices (R&D expenditures, etc.) within organisations. Chains of 
calculations, Robson (1992) argues, increasingly surrounded the practices of science 
and technology with the aim of making them calculable and governable. 
In an effort to trace the origins of R&D calculative devices beyond the arena of 
UK policy making, Robson’s (1993a) study shows how the definition of R&D was 
initially proposed by the OECD in the “Frascati Manual” (OECD 1963), and only 
then translated into the arena of accounting standards in the UK. The standardization 
of R&D definition and its modalities of collection (OECD 1997) provided visibility 
to R&D activities in the UK and made it possible to make international comparisons. 
The level of R&D (expressed as percentage of R&D expenditure on Gross Domestic 
Product) became itself an issue to be concerned about and became intertwined with 
problems of economic growth and competitiveness. 
Further explorations of the institutional and social context of accounting for R&D 
are provided in the comparative work of Willmott et al. (1992). Their analysis 
centres on the regulation of the disclosure and treatment of R&D in the financial 
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statements (i.e. accounting for R&D) in four advanced capitalist countries (the UK, 
Germany, Sweden; the US) and aimed to investigate the processes of accounting 
regulation and the processes of social and political regulation generally. The authors 
mainly draw on the corporatist framework and on the role of accounting in 
constructing and mediating different interests. Their findings reveal how the different 
and complex institutional arrangements in place within each of the four advanced 
capitalist countries investigated, differences which in turn can be ascribed to 
different cultural historical and socio-political structures, ended up in a process of 
convergence toward the final outcomes. Nevertheless, the authors argue that national 
corporatist arrangements are not enough to explain such process of convergence, 
which rather might be explained in the light of the “forces of internationalization (of 
capitalism)” (Ibid., p. 50). 
However, the analysis of social and institutional contexts of innovation is not 
limited to accounting for R&D. There have been in fact attempts to account for IC 
practices beyond the space of the firm. Fincham and Roslender (2003) analyse the 
status of development of IC practices in the UK as compared to those contexts where 
IC was first advanced (e.g. Denmark, Sweden etc.). They also draw linkages between 
knowledge management repertoires and accounting, calling for more dialogue 
between the two fields in order to tackle the measurement, management and 
reporting of IC holistically.  
Fincham and Roslender’s study looks also at the origins of IC conceptualization 
and set its emergence in the context of wider changes in the economy and society and 
in accounting’s neighbour disciplines. The ‘cultural’ turn in business and 
management, the shift to the information society and a new economy are central, 
they argue, in understanding the origins of IC practices. Other scholars in the field of 
economics (Granstrand 2000), similarly to Fincham and Roslender’s discussion, 
point to a shift towards intellectual capitalism, defined as a mode of capitalist 
economic system where: 
“The basic capitalist institutions (private property rights, private profit 
motives, competitive markets and free enterprises) in which productive 
assets and processes, as well as commercial transactions and products, are 
predominantly intellectual or non-material rather than physical in nature” 
(Ibid., p. 1063) 
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Overall, a systematic historical analysis of the emergence of intellectual capital in 
locales distant from where practices are implemented is missing. As it is also missing 
in the literature an account of the contingent network of mediators and intermediaries 
(Latour 2005; Miller and O'Leary 2007) that has connected different arenas where 
intellectual capital discourses and practices take place. 
In summary, many studies have offered a rich account of the organisational 
practices which mainly go under the umbrella of intellectual capital. The accounting 
literature provides also a number of studies on the historical and contingent 
emergence of R&D discourses and practices within regulatory and institutional 
arenas (Robson 1993a, 1994). What seems to be missing is an investigation of how 
these different locales become (or do not become) connected and form assemblages. 
In Miller and O’Leary’s (1994) words: 
“it is through the relations formed between the local conditions and those 
that are distant that the assemblage begins to form, not as a hierarchically 
ordered entity but as a complex of relays and relations that link together 
events on the same horizontal plane” (Ibid., p. 131) 
This gap in the literature could be addressed by tracing the connections between 
social, institutional and organizational locales that form accounting problematics. It 
is in such domains that the forces that shape the progress of accounting agenda 
toward accounting for innovation need to be jointly investigated.  
After discussing immateriality as a form of problematizing innovation in the 
accounting literature, the chapter now turns to discuss another form of research 
problematization focused upon the structures of innovation. There seem to be at least 
two types of structure that are often discussed in the literature, i.e. organisational and 
management accounting structures. In the past decades, an emerging trend in 
sociologically–oriented studies of organisations has regarded ‘new’ organisational 
forms, such as networks and inter-firm collaboration, as a locus of innovation and 
creativity (Powell, Koput, and Smith-Doerr 1996b). Networks and inter-firm 
collaboration have been investigated also in the accounting literature. The next 
section will argue, however, that the accounting literature has not focused very much 
on networks understood as organisational structures of innovation. The second type 
of structure often discussed in the accounting literature consists in management 
accounting and management control tools. The focus in this type of literature is 
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usually on the role of management accounting tools in enabling or constraining 
creativity and innovation. 
The reminder of the chapter will discuss how accounting and other organisational 
structures are mobilised in the study of innovation. The literature has showed 
increasing interest for topics such as networks and inter-firm relations. While 
sociological literature has explored the interplay between innovation and network 
structures (Powell, Koput, and Smith-Doerr 1996b; Powell et al. 2005), the 
accounting literature has studied predominantly networks in contexts different from 
innovation (e.g. postal systems, public sector, corruption, port industry, etc.). 
Another recurrent trend in the accounting literature, while exploring the structures of 
innovation, centres on the enabling and constraining properties of management 
control systems. Where traditionally past literature saw management control systems 
as an obstacle to innovation, more recent trends have re-considered the role of 
management accounting and control and stressed instead their enabling properties. 
1.2    The organisational structures of innovation: 
networks and inter-firm relations in the 
accounting literature 
Beyond the accounting problematization of innovation in terms of measurement 
challenges, innovation is often problematized in a sense of posing coordination 
challenges to the participants involved in its production and diffusion. Markets and 
hierarchies are said not to be the only forms under which economic transactions take 
place and innovation is certainly an area in which the dichotomy market-hierarchy is 
most challenged (Powell 1990; Powell, Koput, and Smith-Doerr 1996b). In 
management and practitioner oriented work, networks and collaborative models of 
innovation gained momentum in the early 2000s with the work of Henry Chesbrough 
on open innovation (Chesbrough 2003).  
The accounting literature has been discussing network and inter-organisational 
relations since Hopwood’s call (1996) to go beyond the “vertical imperative” (Ibid., 
p. 589) and investigate accounting in the lateral and horizontal processing of 
information. This resulted in a relative burgeoning of studies which questioned the 
role of management accounting within networks and inter-firm relations. Within this 
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group of studies, attempts to conceptualize accounting in network as a field of study 
in its own right have been put forward (Håkansson, Kraus, and Lind 2010). The line 
of enquiry mostly featured within such literature investigates the accounting 
practices that are deployed in network forms of organisation, and questions whether 
new forms of accounting are emerging from the field. 
In order to account for these trends in the literature, a number of scholars 
reviewed the literature on networks and inter-organizational relations. Caglio and 
Ditillo (2008) conducted an extensive review of the literature on inter-firm 
collaboration. The authors classified the past research in the area of inter-firm 
relationships on the basis of the inter-organizational control solutions (Ibid., p. 866) 
discussed in the literature. They organized the literature according to the object of 
analysis: control archetypes (e.g. market, hierarchy, and network), management 
controls, cost and accounting controls. Other literature reviews were also conducted 
in order to analyse the state of the art in relation to management accounting in 
horizontal organizations (Chenhall 2008). 
Nevertheless collaborative forms and networks in accounting literature have 
seldom been studied with specific regard to “innovation” as a phenomenon. Much of 
the accounting literature has looked at the role of accounting within networks in the 
context of corruption (Neu et al. 2012), health service providers (Lowe 2000), 
consultancies services (Mouritsen and Thrane 2006), international postal system 
(Richardson and Kilfoyle 2009), inter-firm collaboration (Håkansson and Lind 
2004), port industry (Marques, Ribeiro, and Scapens 2011), and public sector 
(Barretta and Busco 2011) etc. None has specifically studied networks as forms for 
organising innovation. 
The next two sections will gather and review a number of studies focusing on 
accounting in networks and inter-firm relations. Attention will be paid to a number of 
aspects. First, the next sections will discuss the extent to which accounting studies 
have investigated the changes in accounting practices brought about by the 
emergence of networks. Second, the next sections will discuss the extent to which the 
accounting literature has analysed the contribution of accounting practices to shaping 
the idea of network and coordination within networks. Third, the next two sections 
will explore the extent to which the accounting literature has looked at the social and 
institutional conditions that led to the emergence and development of new 
organizational forms. 
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1.2.1   The roles of accounting in networks and inter-
firm relationships 
The majority of accounting studies on network addresses, more or less explicitly, the 
question of whether network arrangements require a change in accounting practices 
so that the traditional accounting mission, i.e. providing useful information for 
decision, can continue to be fulfilled. The critical mass of these studies focuses on 
the accounting practices performed by organisations (i.e. predominantly firms) 
within networks. Other than accounting change, another recurrent theme within such 
studies is related to the co-existence of competition and collaboration forces, and the 
distribution of market, hierarchy and network structures within the same field. The 
remainder will review the studies at the intersection between accounting change and 
networks and explore whether and how these studies have studied innovation as a 
phenomenon.  
While investigating the role of accounting in alliances and close cooperation 
between companies, Håkansson and Lind (2004) conducted a case study research of 
the interrelations between Ericsson and Telia mobile, their respective sub-units, and 
other related parties. As accountancy has been developed in accordance with the 
hierarchy-market dichotomy, the authors advance the hypothesis that there must be a 
need to change accounting when used in networks. However, their findings support 
Tomkins’s argument (2001) whereby existing accounting techniques are still 
adequate in business alliances and networks. In fact, as the authors emphasize, no 
need for more formalized accounting information about the relationship or the 
counterpart seemed to arise in the Ericsson-Telia alliance. Another interesting aspect 
highlighted in Håkansson & Lind’s study is that the same sub-unit did not always 
represent the interest of the parent company when interacting with different parties. 
In this sense, accounting helped to create a decoupling between the organizational 
boundaries as defined by the ownership structure and the boundaries of the actual 
alliance. In relation to the theme of collaboration and competition, the author 
emphasize that inter-firm relations should not be considered as a totality, rather they 
can entail different coordination mechanisms, i.e. market, interrelations amongst sub-
units, and hierarchy. 
Consonant with the findings of Håkansson and Lind (2004) and Tomkin (2001) 
concerning the absence of ‘new’ or ‘more’ accounting in network, is the study 
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conducted by Richardson and Kilfoyle (2009) on the changes in the governance 
structure of the international postal system between 1840 and 1875. Markets are 
based – the authors argue- on contracts between parties and the latter entail a great 
deal of mundane transaction costs to define and measure the goods and services 
exchanged and compensate the parties accordingly. Accounting information 
performs the role of mundane transaction costs in market settings. When the form of 
governance changes from market to other forms (e.g. networks), the role and the 
amount of accounting required might decrease, the authors suggest. In the case of the 
international postal system, changes in the governance were concerned with reducing 
transaction costs. This concern determined the transition from a unit (job) costing 
approach to a batch (process) costing approach. This meant that by using a small 
number of distance classes -rather than actual mileage travelled by each letter- or by 
designing the postage as either fully prepaid or fully postage due, the number of 
accounting entries was reduced and accounting progressively eliminated.  
Rather than questioning whether there is more or less accounting in network 
settings (compared to market settings), Mouritsen and Thrane (2006) trace the 
changes in accounting roles within networks of partners. The authors find out that the 
traditional roles of accounting systems, such as ensuring accuracy and perfection, are 
displaced by the mediating role of accounting systems. The authors argue that 
previous studies on accounting and network identify accounting controls as 
distinguished from trust relations, or accounting as contrasted by forms of social 
control and overall tend to assume coordination and integration mechanisms within 
the network. In contrast, Mouritsen and Thrane aim to show how management 
technologies contribute to develop relations between the partners in the network. In 
all the three cases presented in Mouritsen and Thrane’s analysis, the stable elements 
of the network are the management control technologies that outlive partners and 
organize the ways partners can engage with each other. In this sense the network is 
the management control technologies and not the partners, which instead can come 
and go. More specifically management control technologies contribute to develop 
and mobilize complementarities (i.e. customer information, marketing, sourcing, and 
learning complements) among partners within the networks. In other words, 
management control mechanisms influence the ways in which partners interact and 
determine how their obligations, activities, and freedoms are distributed. 
Complementarities are aided, facilitated and developed by means of two control 
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mechanisms: self-regulation and orchestration. Self-regulation mechanisms facilitate 
a smooth running of network interactions by separating financial from knowledge 
concerns. For example, intellectual property, brand name, and participation fees (i.e. 
financial concerns) are settled and agreed before interactions on projects and with 
customers take place. Orchestration mechanisms ensure the creation of a common 
and network-wide objective (or strategy). In the three cases presented, orchestration 
was achieved by means of competency map, intellectual capital statement, the 
construction of events aimed to build relations within the network, the setting up of 
self-regulating mechanisms during network-wide board meetings. 
In conclusion, these studies contribute to analysing the roles played by accounting 
in networks and/or in the transition to network forms of governance. They look at 
accounting practices as developed within organizations and across networks. 
However, the accounting literature on networks and inter-firm relationship has not 
focused very much on networks understood as organisational structures of 
innovation. 
The next section will consider the accounting literature that goes beyond the 
practices developed within networks and attends to the social and institutional 
contexts of accounting and networks. 
1.2.2   The social and institutional context of accounting 
and networks 
This section questions whether accounting rationales and practices mobilised within 
networks (e.g. innovation rationale) have been investigated as the outcome of 
historically contingent social and institutional forces (Burchell et al. 1980). Only a 
few studies in accounting have paid attention to accounting and networks in their 
social and institutional contexts. For example, concerned with the mediating role of 
accounting is the study conducted by Miller and O’Leary (2007). Portraying the case 
of the microprocessor industry, the authors “argue for greater attention to investment 
as an inter-firm and inter-agency process, thus lessening the fixation in studies of 
capital budgeting on the traditional hierarchical and bounded organization” (Ibid., 
p. 701). Miller and O’Leary make a case for studying accounting and calculations as 
intermediaries that connect different arenas and social actors and in so doing link 
science and the economy and ultimately make the construction of markets possible. 
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The rather invisible linkages connecting the social and institutional contexts of 
accounting on one hand and the organizational context on the other hand are here 
made visible through the mediating role of accounting instruments.  
Lowe’s analysis (2000) is also concerned with bringing the social and institutional 
context into the analysis of accounting change. The paper narrates the story of Health 
Waikato Hospital (HW) in a problematic stage of its running. Following an operating 
loss of $16 million in its first year of operation, which –it was feared- could have 
compromised the HW’s ability to invest in equipment and technology in the 
following years, the government incorporated the hospital in a workout scheme. As a 
consequence of such scheme a lot of pressure was put on the regional health 
providers in order to improve profitability and efficiency performances. In the case 
presented in the paper, accounting practices within the organisations are justified and 
developed by discourses which take place beyond the hospital and the network of 
health service providers strictly speaking and connect to political concerns for 
efficiency at the level of the government.  
Overall, the review of accounting studies that looked at the social and institutional 
context of accounting in networks suggests that little is known about the interplay 
between networks as a structure and innovation as a phenomenon. Accounting 
studies seem to be almost silent on the relation between innovation and network 
structures, and how the latter contribute to shaping the former. As showed earlier, 
most part of the literature in accounting analyses networks in contexts different from 
innovation, such as postal systems, corruption, and public sector.  
One has to move from accounting literature to studies conducted in the field of 
sociology in order to see the theme of network discussed as an emerging structure 
that shapes innovation (Powell, Koput, and Smith-Doerr 1996b; Padgett and Powell 
2012; Oliver 2004). The contribution of this stream of sociological literature to the 
study of innovation and networks, and the role played by accounting, will be 
discussed in Chapter 2 as part of a broader discussion on the theoretical perspective 
adopted in the study of processes of economizing innovation.  
Nevertheless, even within this stream of sociological-oriented literature on 
networks of innovation the focus is not on the role that accounting practices play in 
configuring innovation. Thus, there seems to be a gap in the study of the triad 
accounting, network, and innovation. Addressing this gap would allow us to 
understand the extent to which accounting discipline and practice have changed in 
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order to keep pace with the coordination and measurement challenges imposed by 
innovation as a phenomenon. 
After reviewing networks and inter-firm relations both understood as 
organisational structures of innovation, the next section will consider management 
accounting and control tools as forms of structuring innovation and creativity. This 
style of problematization often originates from those parts of the accounting 
literature concerned with the effects that management control systems have on 
creativity and innovation. 
1.3    The accounting structures of innovation and 
creativity: management control systems 
Another style of problematizing innovation, other than the problem of realizing the 
value of immaterial resources of the firm, is in terms of the organisational and 
management accounting structures that either expand or constrain the space of 
innovation and creativity. In this respect there are at least two different approaches 
used in the accounting literature for studying the relation between management 
accounting structures and innovation/creativity. 
A first approach investigates whether management control systems either hinder 
or facilitate innovation and creativity within organisations. Scholars have studied the 
effect of management control mechanisms in new product development (Davila 
2000) and more generally in activities which combine formal controls and creative 
tasks (Adler and Chen 2011). Under this approach management control systems 
(MCSs) are defined following Simons’ notion of MCSs, i.e. “formal, information-
based routines and procedures managers use to maintain or alter pattern in 
organizational activities” (Simons 1995, p. 5). While innovation, under this 
approach, is usually associated with “taking advantage of unexpected opportunities, 
exceptions, new relationships, uncertain outputs, risk and the possibility of failure” 
(Davila, Foster, and Oyon 2009, p. 282). Yet, creativity in this literature is often 
presented as a driver of innovation(s) and is problematized in terms of how 
accounting contributes to expanding or contracting it. Where past accounting 
scholarship considered MCSs as an obstacle to innovation (Abernethy and Brownell 
1997; Rockness and Shields 1984), more recent studies have stressed the enabling 
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role of accounting in ‘creative’ and ‘innovative’ settings. In this regard Davila (2010) 
points to a recent “shift in paradigm” from organizational efficiency to organizational 
creativity. According to the author, efficiency seems to become integrated with or 
replaced by concerns for organizational creativity. 
According to Davila (2010) the shift from the efficiency paradigm to the creativity 
paradigm has determined not much a change in management control tools, but rather 
a change in the use of the ‘traditional’ management control tools. In this sense, 
budgets are not to be regarded as blaming devices, but as boundary systems. Yet, 
behavioural controls are not about limiting opportunistic behaviour, differently they 
contribute to defining the space of creation (Ibid., p.77). 
Elsewhere Davila et al (2009) show how MCSs are vital to start-up growth, and 
the roles that the MCSs play are different from traditional roles. In this respect, the 
authors argue, MCSs help provide sense-making and a stable frame of reference, 
capture learning through time, and coordinate when informal systems break down, 
and legitimize the company. Davila et al provide a framework for analysing the roles 
of MCs in innovation. They classify the types of control systems in relation to the 
source of innovation (top management, rest of the organisation) and the type of 
impact on strategy (radical, incremental innovation).  
Davila and Ditillo (2013) investigate the types of management control system 
adopted in working environments characterised by creative projects aimed at 
developing stylistic innovation. They find that traditional controls were integrated 
with mechanisms peculiar to creative settings, such as directional controls and 
inspirational controls. Directional controls were relevant in defining the creative 
space and the interfaces between the creative department and the rest of the 
organisation. The creative space was defined by means of accounting (e.g. expenses 
budgets and cost cards), behavioural and personnel (e.g. collection brief, collection 
calendar, and selection of designers) mechanisms. The authors find that directional 
controls configured the organizational setting to stimulate creative people, in contrast 
with past literature that saw direct controls as tools addressing goals divergence and 
executing pre-defined plans. Davila and Ditillo also observe that directional controls 
provide the structure of the creative processes while enhancing the novelty of the 
end results. Inspirational controls (e.g. ideational, aesthetic, and social networking 
controls) instead had the role of guiding the creative process in a sense of balancing 
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inspiration, compatibility of ideas, and external constraints, ultimately stimulating 
people “to create novel concepts that fit together” (Davila and Ditillo 2013, p. 3). 
The common tread linking these studies is the way of conceptualizing the relation 
between managing accounting and controls and innovation. Management controls are 
said to enhance, guide, and stimulate the innovation and creativity process. Or 
conversely management controls are said to hinder and constrain innovation and 
creativity. Either way, the mutual production between structures (accounting tools) 
and the phenomenon observed is not investigated.  
A second approach found in the accounting literature that studies the structures for 
innovation and creativity sheds light on the processes of co-production between 
accounting as a structure and innovation as a phenomenon. The processes of mutual 
shaping between the structures of accounting and innovation have been studied by 
Christner and Strömsten (2015). The authors investigate the process of new product 
development in the context of a biotechnological innovation (i.e. the Pyrosequencing 
technology). They trace the accounting devices mobilized along the different stages 
of technology development from the emergence of the scientific idea to the 
formation of a commercial company which then went public. The authors show how 
devices such as market share, Internal Rate of Return (IRR), and market valuation 
(by means of discouted cash flow) contributed to mediating  and forging linkages 
between scientific and economic ideas, and different actors (e.g. venture capitalists, 
scientists, and managers) and their concerns. Christner and Strömsten’s study shows 
how accounting devices can shape technology trajectories and in so they enable 
particular developments while constraining alternative courses of actions in new 
product development.  
Other studies such as Revellino and Mouritsen (2009) contribute to the 
enabling/constraining debate around management control systems in the context of 
innovation, by looking at the development of a technology –Telepass: a smart system 
of electronic toll collection in Italian motorways. Telepass functioned through 
communication between a terminal installed on board of vehicles and the ground 
machinery integrated in the facilities of the toll collection booths. The system was 
proposed to regulate traffic and toll-collecting operation while promoting fast, 
smooth, safe, and informed mobility. Revellino and Mouritsen show that there were a 
number of technical and organizational trials that the technology had to face 
throughout its development. In each trial management control tools, such as “toll 
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collection dashboard”, “sales volume”, “mapping external contributions” and “Total 
Quality System”, were deployed in order to enroll stakeholders into fast, smooth, 
safe, and informed mobility programmes. In so doing management control tools 
contributed to the shaping of the innovation by relating organizational and social 
concerns (or challenges) to the technology.  
Elsewhere Revellino and Mouritsen (2015) expanded the Telepass story to show 
how calculative practices, such as calculations about labour productivity and road 
safety acted as engines for the progressive construction of the innovation and the 
transformation of the company from service provider to financial institution. By 
accumulating knowledge and traces about motorists’ behavior, tool booth workers’ 
behavior, etc. the technology did not simply ‘record’ reality as camera would do. 
Differently the technology acted as an engine that lured actors into doing things (e.g. 
motorists reducing speed, weakening of collectors, increasing power of IT engineers 
etc.) and in so doing the technology performed certain ideas of safe, smooth and 
informed mobility. 
Overall, what seems overlooked in the literature that explores the accounting 
structures of innovation (and creativity) is a discussion of what is known about 
innovation as a socio-technical phenomenon. The reviewed literature on the 
accounting structures of innovation sheds light on whether MCSs hinder or enable 
innovation. Such literature also provides insights on how management tools 
contribute to constructing and performing the object they aim to represent (e.g. 
innovations, new products, etc.). However, the questions of what configures 
innovation as an economic actor capable of driving an economy and influencing 
government policies, corporate strategies, and university’s mission seems to be 
overlooked. In other words, the economic content of innovation as a social and 
technical phenomenon and how innovation is enacted through accounting devices 
across different sites are issues to be further investigated. 
Conclusion 
What do we know about the social, institutional, and organizational conditions and 
forces that made accounting progress toward the so called “innovation economy” 
and “knowledge society”? What do we know about the emergence and functioning of 
the metrological infrastructure that sustains and mediates the programmatic and 
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collective endeavours toward the knowledge-based and innovation-driven society)? 
In order to address these questions, the chapter has reviewed the accounting literature 
on innovation, or rather, it has reviewed how the accounting literature has 
contributed to problematizing and shaping the agendas underlying the innovation 
economy and knowledge society. Work conducted by past accounting scholarship 
has been collected and organised according to the different styles of problematization 
that usually characterise the wider notions of “innovation economy” and “knowledge 
society”.  
The chapter has identified two main styles of problematizing and framing 
innovation within the accounting literature. One is the problem of immateriality (e.g. 
value creation, intangibles, R&D, intellectual capital), while the other is the problem 
of structures and their effects on innovation. Where structures are to be understood 
both as organisational structures (e.g. networks) and management accounting 
structures (e.g. management control systems) which can potentially enable or 
constrain innovation and creativity as a space. The chapter was structured around a 
group of accounting studies on immateriality and a group studies on accounting and 
organisational structures. These two groups were then analysed according to their 
focus on the institutional, social and organizational aspects of accounting and their 
focus on the sources of accounting change.  
The first group of studies has addressed the role of accounting in measuring, 
managing and reporting intellectual capital, R&D and intangibles. They have done so 
either by looking at organisational practices like intellectual capital statements, or by 
investigating the institutional and social conditions at the origins of such practices. 
The findings from these studies reveal that intellectual capital statements constitute 
an example of how the mathematical and logical rigor traditionally associated with 
the accounting model has been supplemented with more ‘loose’ and narrative forms 
of reporting. At the same time metrics and indicators are employed in conjunction 
with narratives and sketches and fulfil the role of reputational and accountability 
devices. Besides, proposals for employees’ empowerment and employees’ self-
accounts in ever more individualized organizations, where the individual and his 
knowledge both gain a stage role, begin to influence the accounting agenda.  
While accounting literature does provide a number of studies on the historical and 
contingent emergence of R&D discourses and practices within wider regulatory and 
institutional arenas, a systematic historical analysis of the emergence of intellectual 
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capital in locales (e.g. economic theory) distant from where practices are 
implemented seems to be missing. What also seems to be missing in the literature 
that problematizes innovation in terms of immateriality, is an account of the 
contingent network of mediators and intermediaries or assemblage (Latour 2005; 
Miller and O'Leary 2007, 1994) that keep connected and aligned the different arenas 
where the practices and concepts related to R&D and Intellectual Capital are at work.  
The second group of accounting studies has looked at the structures which 
characterise innovation and creativity. One type of structure emerging from the 
literature is mainly organisational and comprises networks and various forms of 
inter-firm collaboration (e.g. consortia, alliances etc.). Another type of structure 
emerging from the literature consists in management accounting and management 
control tools in creative contexts.  
In relation to accounting studies of networks, none of the gathered studies has 
specifically studied networks as a form of structuring and coordinating innovation. 
Rather, existing studies have focused on corruption, postal transactions, public sector 
etc. Overall the research agenda of the existing studies in accounting and networks 
seems to be twofold: on one hand there are studies concerned with the nature (and 
the quantity) of accounting information employed within networks, on the other hand 
there are studies more concerned with the role that accounting plays in 
making/mediating network of firms.  
Nevertheless, we know little about the conditions that led to the emergence of 
networks as “new” forms of structuring and organising innovation. More research 
needs to be done on networks and innovation as the outcome of processes of co-
production at play across social, institutional and organisational arenas. In addition, 
more emphasis needs to be put on the effects of accounting in networks (e.g. 
decoupling between the formal representation of networks and their actual 
functioning). 
Besides, the literature on the role of management accounting and management 
controls in enabling and constraining innovation (and also new product development 
and creativity) overlooks the fundamental issue of what constitutes innovation as a 
social and technical phenomenon. What is the role of accounting in configuring and 
assembling innovation as an economic actor capable of influencing universities’ 
mission, corporate strategies, and government policies? 
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Since different forms of measuring and managing innovation have origins and 
sources that can be distant in time and space, then accounting practices might be 
influenced by (and also influence) different ways of framing innovation (e.g. 
innovation as financial sustainability, innovation as quality, innovation as public 
intervention). Different ways of problematizing innovation, other than immateriality 
and accounting/organisational structures, might emerge also at practice level. 
Therefore, research needs to be conducted in order to investigate the roles of 
accounting within and beyond different social, institutional and organizational 
locales in which innovation is implicated.  
The proposition that this thesis aims to explore is whether accounting has 
innovated in order to measure, hence control, innovation as a phenomenon. To 
understand the role of accounting in the dramatic expansion of the innovation-driven 
economy the thesis aims to address the following questions:  
1. What is the role of accounting in qualifying the entities of innovation as 
economic?  
2. What qualifies an entity as economic in the realm of innovation?  
3. What are the effects of this process of qualification/configuring?  
4. Since innovation is said to drive economies, then how is the economic 
action of innovation (and its configuring) to be understood?   
The thesis investigates the mutually constitutive relation between accounting and 
innovation by looking at the different modalities of configuring innovation in 
economic terms, as they are enacted across social, institutional and organizational 
locales. 
The empirical focus of this thesis is on the development and enacting of 
University-Business interactions and more specifically on technology transfer and 
incubation programmes. As Chapter 3 will discuss, University-Industry interrelations 
in the UK have been constructed as a laboratory where the UK government has 
unremittingly devised and operationalized programmes for bringing about the 
innovation-driven economy and knowledge-based society. University-Industry 
interrelations resemble a laboratory whose survival and functioning rely on the 
coordination of a heterogeneous network of multiple actors (e.g. government, 
university, and industry), their aspirations, accounting practices, economic and social 
imperatives and technological artefacts. 
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The next chapter (Chapter 2) will discuss the theoretical tools and concepts 
employed to identify and analyse how accounting is involved in configuring 
innovation in economic terms. Economizing innovation is understood here as a 
multiple process during which accounting contributes to translating innovative 
scientific ideas into goods or services that can be exchanged and circulate in the 
economy. To the aim of identifying the entities of innovation that are being 
economised, the thesis proposes to change the focus from the study of the economy 
to the study of what is regarded as economic in the realm of innovation. This 
approach allows us to gain insights on the different practices that lead to the 
construction of economic markets. In this sense, social studies of science help to map 
out the differences and multiplicity emerging while calculating innovation and their 
consequences too. The performativity programme (within social studies of science) 
in this respect has long argued for the distributed and inherently variable 
configuration of economic agency. Their conceptualization of accounting as central 
in formatting different forms of economic agency seems therefore central to the 
investigation of different ways of measuring and organising innovation. This implies 
that accounting has a role in creating different modes of thinking about (and 
practicing) innovation in economic terms. The thesis argues that such differences 
matter because, in turn, they co-produce the content of innovation as a phenomenon.  
The next chapter will also discuss how the process of rendering innovation 
actionable and thinkable in economic terms also presents patterns of regularity in the 
principles and devices that organise economic action within the field of innovation. 
In this respect new institutional theory provides the mechanisms (e.g. isomorphism) 
for interpreting such patterns. The next chapter will the theoretical and 
methodological issues and research methods involved in the study of economizing 
processes in innovation. The methods section will motivate and discuss how this 
thesis has investigated innovation across multiple sites, by means of semi-structured 
interviews with managers and scientists, while maintaining a non-essentialist view of 
what constitutes accounting and “a constructivist symmetry” in the treatment of 
innovation and accounting (Power 1996, p. 3). 
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CHAPTER  2  ECONOMIZING 
INNOVATION THROUGH ACCOUNTING: 
THEORY AND METHODS 
 
 
 
Introduction 
What is the role of accounting in translating innovative scientific ideas and 
technologies into goods and services that can circulate, be exchanged, and acted 
upon? The thesis investigates the entanglements between innovation, as a 
phenomenon, and the economy by attending to the role that accounting plays in 
economizing innovation. As highlighted by Çalışkan and Callon (2009, p. 391), in 
order to understand economization processes one has first to identify the entities that 
have been economised. In the context of this thesis, economizing means to translate 
the entities of innovation (e.g. new technologies, incubation projects, new scientific 
ideas, new drugs) into economic entities that possess economic value(s), that is into 
entities that can circulate and be exchanged within the economy precisely because of 
that economic value(s). 
With this research agenda in mind, the chapter will discuss the theoretical and 
methodological implications of investigating the processes of economizing 
innovation. Part 1 will discuss how the performativity programme in social studies of 
science and new institutionalism in organisational analysis illuminate different 
aspects of economization processes. Part 1 will suggest that performativity 
programme sheds light on the emergence of multiple ways of making innovation 
visible in economic terms, while new institutional theory helps to interpret the 
emergence and diffusion of standardized ways of measuring and managing 
innovation. In Part 2 the research design, strategy and methods are presented. The 
methodological tools for addressing the interplay between theory and evidence are 
then discussed. Finally, a section on the process of data analysis is presented.  
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PART 1: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: THE STUDY OF 
ECONOMIZATION ACROSS ACADEMIC LITERATURES 
 
 
2.1    Translating innovation into economic value 
through accounting 
The escalating political concern for economic growth and for closing the productivity 
gap between the UK economy and other so-called advanced economies (e.g. US and 
Japan), has provided the conditions for the creation of new spaces of economic 
calculability, such as the one of scientific discovery and innovation. Against this 
backdrop, the topic developed throughout the thesis centres on the question of how 
accounting has translated scientific research developed within universities and 
corporations, into economic entities and how this has implicitly involved multiple 
efforts to realize and appropriate the economic value of innovative scientific ideas. In 
other words, the thesis investigates how the domain of scientific discovery and 
academic research has been problematized in economic terms, what economic terms 
mean, and what actors and instruments are involved in such problematization. To be 
more specific, the thesis will investigate the extent to which economics has become 
increasingly entangled with innovation and scientific discovery, and how accounting 
has made this intertwining possible.   
Following and expanding existing lines of enquiry in new institutional sociology, 
social studies of science and technology, and social studies of accounting, the thesis 
advances that it is through accounting that innovation has been translated into 
multiple forms of value, of which economic value is the dominant form. This section 
will discuss the academic traditions that have brought economization at the centre of 
the research agenda, i.e. the performativity programme in social studies of science 
and new institutionalism in organisational analysis. The reasons for exploring these 
two literatures are several. First, both literatures regard economization as a central 
process in the construction of modern actorhood and economic markets. Second, 
both literatures contribute to the understanding of what qualifies a specific 
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behaviour, object, or institution as economic. Third, despite the different assumptions 
on agency, they both regard accounting as central in the construction and formatting 
of agency. Fourth, they attend to the mechanisms of circulation of accounting 
practices. Finally, both literatures have been investigating, albeit to different extents, 
topics of innovation and academic research commercialisation. 
Why to examine economizing processes?  
In their 2013 paper aimed at bridging accounting to organizational theory, Miller and 
Power (2013) developed the claim initially made by Burchell et al. (1980) according 
to which multiple are the roles that accounting has come to play within society. 
Building on a broad definition of accounting which includes a range of calculative 
efforts which extend to disciplines of statistics and economics, Miller and Power 
argued that accounting metrics and representations can shape people, practices, and 
organisations. They also argued that “accounting is a mechanism by which the 
economization of organizational life becomes elaborated and institutionalized” 
(Ibid., p. 558). They offered a conceptualization of accounting as “a frame of 
meaning for actors rather than being purely external to it” (ibidem, 2013, p. 579). 
Such approach “draws attention to the rationales, such as efficiency, sustainability, 
and accountability, which motivate the production of accounting numbers” (ibidem, 
2013, p. 579). In such guise accounting does not merely inform economic decision-
making, but it constitutes the domain of economic activity itself, a process this one 
that the authors refer to as economization. 
In this sense, studies of economization challenge the often taken-for-granted ideas 
of ‘neutrality’ and ‘objectivity’ that surround accounting representations of economic 
and social reality. Studying how accounting contributes to economizing innovation 
does not mean, therefore, to assess how effectively and efficiently accounting tools 
are in capturing the value of innovation. Rather, it means to attend to the contingent 
interplays between the social and technical aspects of accounting practices and the 
implications of such interplays for the domain under study (i.e. innovation). Without 
this type of analysis, we fail to appreciate not only the multiple forms of accounting 
involved in innovation, but also the effects of such multiplicity on innovation as a 
phenomenon. 
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A first step of such research programme consists in raising the question of what 
qualifies an object or behaviour as ‘economic’. This question has been also addressed 
within more sociological lines of enquiry. This chapter will look not only at how 
economization has been discussed in some parts of sociological literature, but will 
also attend to the ways in which accounting has been conceptualized within the 
frameworks developed therein. If on the one hand scholars in social studies of 
accounting have argued that accounting has come to play multiple roles in the 
construction and linking of economy, science and society (Power 1996), on the other 
hand different nuances in the sociological conceptualization of accounting generate 
different interpretations of the roles of accounting in organisations and society. In 
other words, not only does accounting represent a frame of meanings for participants 
(Miller and Power 2013), but also the way in which we frame accounting through 
different literatures lends itself to different (albeit not necessarily conflicting) 
insights about economizing and accounting. 
New institutional theory regards accounting as a cultural model, as an institution. 
As the chapter will show, this way of conceptualizing accounting leads to 
investigating economization in terms of how accounting become institutionalized, 
how different models or standards of accounting diffuse across different societies, 
and how accounting norms and scripts contribute to the formatting of modern 
rational actorhood. The worldwide expansion of accounting as a structure 
contributes, in new institutional view, to an ongoing process of rationalization of 
modern actors (Meyer and Jepperson 2000).  In the context of scientific 
discovery/research commercialization, the insights we gain from new institutional 
literature have to do more with how accounting contributes to: the construction of 
universities as organizational rational actors (Krücken and Meier 2006; Ramirez 
2006), the institutionalization of technology transfer models within universities 
(Colyvas and Powell 2006), and the construction of networks of university-industry 
collaboration (Powell 1990; Powell, Koput, and Smith-Doerr 1996a).  
Studies of economization carried out in the context of the performativity 
programme, (Callon 1998c) within social studies of science, implies a 
conceptualization of accounting that emphasizes its material aspects. In this sense 
accounting is understood as know-how, set of practices and methods which 
contribute to equipping calculative agents and enable them to undertake certain types 
of actions, i.e. economic actions (Çalışkan and Callon 2010). Such conceptualisation 
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of accounting leads to investigating economization in terms of differences in the 
distribution of competencies, know-how, knowledge, material devices, and forms of 
organization across society. According to Çalışkan & Callon, by attending to such 
differences we can understand how economic markets are constituted. In this respect 
they stress the role of disciplines such as accounting and management science in 
providing the know-how, methods, and tools for agents to calculate, hence construct, 
tradable goods and values. In that context accounting is not understood as a mere 
instrument to achieve certain ends, but it also has the power of creating the very 
object it aims to represent (Hopwood and Miller 1994).  
In turn, the chapter will argue that different approaches to the study of 
economization, and related conceptualizations of accounting, draw our attention to 
distinct aspects of innovation. For example, the performativity programme attends to 
the specificity of the markets’ arrangements, to the differences that arise between 
markets, to agencies and their asymmetries (Callon 2005, p. 17). In the context of 
this thesis, the performativity programme helps to analyse how accounting 
configures the economic agencies of innovation. It also helps to identify and make 
sense of the differences arising in configuring incubation projects, new drugs, and 
new technologies as economic entities. Whereas in the new institutional framework 
differences seem to be flatten (Latour 2005), and the focus shifts toward those micro 
and macro level mechanisms (Nee 2005, p. 76) such as isomorphism and 
standardization that enable the emergence and diffusion of cultural institution (e.g. 
markets).  
While the performativity programme is the main approach used in this thesis, the 
attention of new institutional theory to processes of normalization and isomorphism 
is also relevant to the study of innovation. For isomorphism can help to interpret the 
patterns of regularity in the modalities of formatting the economic agencies of 
innovation. 
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. New institutional theory in 
sociology is discussed first, followed by a discussion of the performativity program 
in social studies of science. Both literatures will be analysed in relation to 
economization processes and in relation to three main themes: agency and action, 
circulation, and the conceptualization of accounting and economization. Finally, the 
conclusion will highlight arenas of synergy and collaboration between the two 
literatures and analyse the extent to which they address the issues of multiplicity and 
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similarities. In this respect the notions of accounting complex (Miller and Power 
2013) and socio-technical agencement (Çalışkan and Callon 2010) will be discussed. 
Despite the differences, what one can gain from the analytical exercise of contrasting 
the two literatures is a better understanding of the multiple roles that accounting 
plays in economizing processes and in the construction of economic markets. 
2.1.1   Economization and accounting in new 
institutionalism 
The organizational research carried out within new institutional scholarship since the 
late 1970s has examined organizations and how their behaviour is shaped by 
institutional environment, cultural beliefs, and networks (DiMaggio and Powell 
1983; Powell and DiMaggio 1991), and how institutions interact with social 
networks and norms to shape and direct economic action (Nee 2005). New 
institutionalism in organizational analysis takes as starting point the increasing 
homogeneity of practices and arrangements found in the labour market, in schools, 
states, and corporations. New institutional scholarship holds that such homogenizing 
tendency, i.e. isomorphism, in organizational life cannot be explained in terms of 
individual utility maximizing actors, but in taken for granted quality of practices and 
their reproduction in self-sustaining cognitive structures. New institutional scholars 
argue that individuals do not choose freely among institutions, conventions, social 
norms or legal procedures but they rather seek guidance from the experience of 
others in comparable situations and by reference to standards of obligations 
(DiMaggio and Powell 1991). 
Economization is understood here as a process which contributes to the cultural 
construction of modern actor as a rational actor (Drori et al. 2003). Indeed, new 
institutional and world society scholars have long argued for processes of 
rationalization at play within society (Meyer and Jepperson 2000). In other words, 
economization is part of a broader rationalization process and it is also engrained in 
the proliferation of organisations across different domains of social life, among 
which we find universities. In this context accounting is viewed as a set of features 
that contribute to the legitimation of organizations through “the construction of an 
appearance as rational and efficient actors” (Carruthers 1995, p. 313) 
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The conceptualization of agency and actors in new institutionalism 
New institutionalism in organizational analysis affirms that actors –whether 
individuals, organizations, or nation states- are culturally constructed and their 
agentic properties are constituted by institutional norms and scripts which have 
increasingly, and in an isomorphic fashion (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Meyer and 
Jepperson 2000), diffused throughout societies. Modern organizations as much as 
individuals are becoming progressively equipped with authorized agentic 
capabilities, i.e. the capacity and responsibility to act as an “other” to themselves, to 
each other, and for the wider cultural frame (Meyer and Jepperson 2000, pp. 101-
102) (e.g. corporations have ‘social responsibility’ and ‘reputation’). In other words, 
an increasing isomorphic tendency characterises the agentic structure of individuals, 
organizations, and states (Meyer and Jepperson 2000, p. 112). New institutionalism 
in sociology also regards human ontology and material (non-human) ontology as 
fundamentally asymmetric, which means that their agentic statuses are not treated 
equally.  This will constitute, as discussed later on, a fundamental point of departure 
from the definition of agency proposed under the performativity programme within 
social studies of science.  
Mechanisms of diffusion: from isomorphism to translation 
In their 1983 seminal work, DiMaggio and Powell (1983) advanced the concept of 
institutional isomorphism in order to illuminate on the ceremonial character and the 
politics of modern organizational life. They identified three analytical typologies of 
isomorphism, i.e. mimetic, normative, and coercive and shed light on the processes 
through which ideas and practices flow. They also stressed the importance of 
professions, higher education, and media in furthering ideas and model embedded in 
modern organizations. 
More recent trends in new institutionalism in organizational analysis have 
attempted to go beyond isomorphism as central mechanism of diffusion, and looked 
at more micro-level mechanisms. A number of scholars have attended to the ways in 
which individuals place themselves in social relations and how they interpret and 
respond to their institutional context (Powell and Colyvas 2008). To address this line 
of enquiry, they set a research agenda that employed, among the others, tools 
borrowed from the sense-making literature (Weick 1995). According to Powell and 
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Colyvas (2008) sense-making works as a key micro-mechanism of 
institutionalization in that it regards the process by which institutional material is 
“pulled down” by individuals and translated within the organizations, as being 
multiple and highly contextual. Mechanisms such as retrospection mediate between 
identities and the enacted environment in so creating multiple modes of meaning-
making. 
Another trend in new institutional scholarship has questioned the traditional 
mechanisms of diffusion (i.e. isomorphism) and introduced the concepts of editing 
and translation, to go beyond the idea that models of how to better manage and 
measure knowledge, education, and science are simply ‘carried’ across different 
institutional settings. While travelling the world, institutional practices, their 
adoption, and reception are influenced, they argued, by local contingencies  
(Czarniawska-Joerges and Sevón 1996). Carriers of ideas and models are not simply 
passive mediators, but they are actively involved in activities that are crucial for the 
flow and development of ideas such as interpreting, advising, suggesting, 
pronouncing (Sahlin-Andersson and Engwall 2002). 
In turn, the analysis of the mechanisms of diffusion of institutional practices and 
models has been addressed at both micro and macro level. The next section will 
discuss a number of micro and macro level studies of processes of economization 
and their relevance for accounting and innovation. 
Accounting, Economizing, and the Construction of Rational Organizational Actors 
This section will look at a selection of studies that have specifically addressed the 
issues of economization, marketization and the role of accounting. Studies which 
operate at a more macro level of analysis are presented first and then the section will 
move to those studies that attempt to investigate how macro trends institutionalize at 
a more micro level. 
At a more macro level of analysis, attention has been devoted to the expansion of 
organisations across different societal domains (Drori, Meyer, and Hwang 2006). In 
this respect, scholarly work conducted under the new institutional tradition looked at 
the processes of economizing education across the world system and the role of the 
nation state in spreading standardized models of education through policy-making. 
For example, Krücken and Meier (2006) looked at how universities have become 
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progressively constructed as organisational rational actors. They identified four main 
features which characterise the transition of universities to organisational actors. 
Increased accountability, the definition of goals (e.g. mission of teaching and 
research), the creation of formal structures (e.g. technology transfer offices) and the 
rise of management profession within universities have transformed, they argued, the 
space of higher education into an organisational space. Accountability in particular, 
has contributed according to Krücken and Meier, to create an environment where 
more demand for “university auditability” is the norm. In other words universities 
have increasingly become the object of assessment, evaluation, and accreditation 
processes. This has entailed the (problematic) proliferation of indicators (e.g. 
bibliometric indicators) designed to formally measure knowledge and education.  
If on the one hand Krücken and Meier’s study shows how increased structuration 
and managerialization have contributed to ‘organizing’ universities as rational actors, 
on the other hand their study sheds light on how accountability mechanisms have 
contributed to the economization of universities. Assessments and evaluations 
processes –and the related proliferation of accounting measures- have constituted 
universities as actors endowed with agentic properties, such as responsibility and 
auditability, and ultimately have rendered them increasingly similar to business 
corporations. 
Other scholars (Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson 2006) looked at the institutional 
forces shaping the field of transnational regulation. Djelic (2006) analysed the 
processes of marketization that have characterised the space of transnational 
regulation. Referring to marketization both as market ideologies and market-oriented 
reforms, Djelic discussed the origins of contemporary marketization, its ideological 
sustainability, and the global diffusion of market-oriented reforms. She identified a 
number of carriers or transmission channels that enabled the global diffusion of 
marketization. These channels were represented by organizational carriers (e.g. 
International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organization), routines and 
institutionalized practices (e.g. accreditation and rankings), relational or social 
networks, and normative and symbolic systems (e.g. ideas such as competition, 
transparency, maximizing shareholder value, etc). Djelic also identified mechanisms 
and logics for the diffusion of liberalism, alongside the classical typologies of 
isomorphism. She found structuration, socialization, and political logics to be at play 
in processes of diffusion of marketization as a cultural model. Djelic’s work is 
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relevant in that it shows how a specific form of economization –that is the creation 
economic markets- had its origins in liberal school of economic thought. It also 
showed how the diffusion of economic markets found an ally in disciplines/expertise 
such as auditing/accounting and management which in turn contributed to the 
privatization of state regulation and the managerialization of state bureaucracy.  
Moving from macro-level studies of organizing and economizing to studies that 
looked at the micro-level instantiations of broader trends, Colyvas and Powell (2006) 
showed how an institutional transformation such as the joining of science and 
property –two formerly distinct spheres- contributed to redefine the boundaries 
between public and private science. In particular, the authors argued that the process 
of institutionalization is the outcome of “self-reinforcing feedback dynamics of 
heightened legitimacy and deeper taken-for-granted” (p. 306). The empirical settings 
were based on Stanford University model of technology transfer. Colyvas and Powell 
(2006) found that, at Stanford University technology transfer office, legitimacy 
entailed a question of appropriateness which in turn was translated into different 
questions according to the different stages of legitimacy. In the most recent stage the 
questions were related to the preferences about the industry partner. Colyvas and 
Powell also found that, in the case of technology transfer at Stanford University, 
what came to be taken for granted was the concept of confidentiality when disclosing 
university inventions to industry. The authors therefore elaborated on those shared 
activities and conventions which define the way things (technology transfer) are or 
should be done. They found that such activities and conventions involved interaction 
rituals between university and industry, social learning and the development of 
collective understanding, elaboration of roles and activities (e.g. university licensing 
‘liaison’ or industry’s academic coordinator),  definition of social and technical 
categories like inventor and invention.  
In conclusion, Colyvas and Powell’s study enriches our understanding of the 
“cultural” content of the model of technology transfer developed at Stanford 
University and the micro-level mechanisms that enabled its institutionalization. 
However, it seems that the economic aspects of the linkages between university and 
industry, and the commercialization of academic research, are completely dissolved 
in the analysis of the ‘social’.  
Colyvas (2007) extended the work on technology transfer at Stanford University, 
by analyzing the development of revenue disbursement models within the university, 
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the practices they entailed, the meanings attached to those practices and how in turn 
revenues and rewards practices were linked to distinctive ways of categorizing 
inventions, inventors and the relation between science and business. In this case 
economic practices such as revenue sharing agreements were investigated in relation 
to the sets of meanings attached to such practices. 
Overall, the section has looked at studies that analysed the origins and diffusion of 
cultural models (e.g. liberalism in economics, Stanford ‘model’ of technology 
transfer) and how these contributed to shaping organizations as rational actors. 
Economization was understood there as part of a broader process of rationalization at 
work at societal and organizational level. Organizational forms however are not 
limited to markets and hierarchies but also include, according to Powell (1990), 
networks. The next section will look at processes of economization in the context of 
networks, the latter understood as a form of organizing economic interactions 
alternative to market and hierarchies. It will explore studies that analyse (or set the 
agenda for the analysis of) the factors that generate, sustain, reproduce networks. The 
next section will also review those studies that regard on the one hand institutional 
infrastructures (e.g. accounting) as enabling condition for networks, and on the other 
hand historical political, and cultural context as influencing the capacity for 
collaboration. 
Organizing, economizing, and network forms of organizations 
Powell (1990) maintained that “relational or network forms of organization are 
clearly an identifiable and viable form of economic exchange under certain 
specifiable circumstances” (p. 296). If on the one hand Williamson’s work on 
markets and hierarchies (Williamson 1975) contributed to accounting for the 
centrality of organizational forms in economic transactions, on the other hand the 
market-hierarchy dichotomy it proposed to explain economic exchanges is 
questionable, Powell argued. More specifically, Powell advanced that “firms are 
blurring their established boundaries and engaging in forms of collaboration that 
resemble neither the familiar alternative of arms’ length market contracting nor the 
former ideal of vertical integration” (Powell, 1990, p. 297).  
Some scholars argued that economic exchanges can be represented as a 
continuum between markets and hierarchies, where the intermediate zone was 
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populated by hybrid organizational forms like quasi-firms, subcontracting 
arrangements, joint ventures, and matrix management (Powell 1987). However, a 
number of social scientists contended that there was not such a strong distinction 
between market and hierarchy. Particularly a group of critics stressed the 
embeddedness of economic action in social and cultural forces (Granovetter 1985).  
With regard to this thesis, Chapter 7 will discuss how the forms of economic 
exchange observed in the field of innovation, i.e. exchange of value for money, occur 
in a distributed fashion while mobilising a variety of entities that range from 
individuals and organizations to accounting devices and principles. 
Although sympathizing with the thesis whereby economic action is embedded in 
particular social structural context, Powell’s aim was one of identifying the factors 
that make it meaningful to talk about networks and that generate, sustain, and 
reproduce them. Powell claimed to align with the Simmelian idea whereby “similar 
patterns of exchange are likely to entail similar behavioral consequences, no matter 
what the substantive context” (Powell, 1990, p. 306). After providing a number of 
illustrative cases of network forms (e.g. networks, industrial districts, regional 
economies, strategic alliances, partnerships, and vertical disaggregation) spanning 
different industrial sectors, Powell concluded that “the absence of a clear 
developmental pattern and the recognition that network forms have multiple causes 
and varied historical trajectories suggest that no simple explanation ties all the cases 
together” (Ibid., p. 323).  
Powell’s findings are relevant to this thesis in that they recognize the importance 
of attending to the contingent aspects of networks. The governance of innovation –
whether through hierarchies, markets, or networks- is a highly contingent endeavor 
in that it depends, above all, on stakeholders’ configurations, their objectives and 
resources (e.g. models of technology transfer, valuation techniques, and performance 
measures). The thesis aims to show how such configurations can be highly transient 
and variable and how accounting has a role in shaping and stabilizing such 
configurations.   
Finally, Powell drafted a research agenda which revolved around two lines of 
enquiry. First, he suggested complementing a search for causation and factors that 
enable networks formation and durability with an investigation of the political and 
economic conditions supporting network forms. Secondly, Powell called for 
attending to the phenomenological dimension of network, i.e. how participants 
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experience issues like collaborative and competitive forces, and problems of control. 
Another avenue to be explored –according to Powell- was related to understanding 
how information is processed through networks and how learning is sustained.  
Overall, the accounting that inhabits networks and markets, as forms of 
organizing economic interaction, is conceptualized as an institutional infrastructure 
that contributes to either enabling or hindering the emergence and growth of 
networks and markets. In other words, the type of accounting in networks is the one 
that Miller and Power (2013) so conceptualized: 
“While accounting is profoundly technical, its role in patterns of 
economizing means that it is also and simultaneously profoundly 
institutional, in the sense of exhibiting styles and patterns of thinking 
about organizations and management that may be quite stable, and that 
are supported by habituated routines and work practices which realize 
and reinforce those styles” (Ibid., p. 7) 
However, in Powell’s analysis (1990) of the determinants of networks (i.e. know-
how, demand for speed, and trust), calculative attitudes emerge only in the absence 
of trust among network participants. According to Powell, when trust ceases, 
calculative attitudes and formal agreements replace cooperative behaviour and 
informal agreements.  
In the context of this thesis, the emergence of calculative attitudes within 
innovation networks has less to do with a lack of trust and more to do with 
differences in participants’ goals and interests. The entities participating in the action 
of controlling innovation translate their goals and interests in numbers by mobilising 
different calculative frames (or styles, as emphasised in the quote above). However, 
the interplay between participants and calculative frames is highly contingent and 
result in multiple calculative practices. In the context of this thesis, calculative 
attitudes do not emerge from a lack of trust or a lack of cooperation, but rather 
emerge from equipping economic agencies with calculative tools. Paradoxically, if 
we use Callon’s notion of calculative action (i.e. calculating understood as listing, 
prioritising possible states of the world, and deciding what action to undertake to 
make them happen) (Callon 1998c), also trust and cooperative behaviour could be 
regarded as the outcome of calculative action. 
Shifting the focus from the study of the “social”, where culture is deemed to be a 
constitutive element of societies, to the study of materialities (Law and Mol 1995; 
Callon and Muniesa 2005) and the interplay between humans and artifacts, we get a 
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quite different understanding of the role of accounting in processes of 
economization. The next section will discuss the performativity programme in social 
studies of science and its contribution to understanding how accounting is involved 
in economization processes. It is in fact by attending to the roles that accounting 
plays in economizing things that one can better understand the mutual shaping 
between accounting and innovation. 
2.1.2   The performativity program in social studies of 
science 
The study of accounting and economization within the performativity programme 
A group of scholars within social studies of science has long investigated 
economizing as a central process in shaping markets, the latter understood as 
multiple forms of economic organisation (Callon 1998c). The so called 
performativity programme, as formalized by Michel Callon (1998c), advanced the 
notion of performativity of economics to emphasize the idea of an interplay existing 
between the economy and the theories of economy. Callon’s position maintains that 
“economics, in the broad sense of the term, performs, shapes and formats the 
economy, rather than observing how it functions” (Ibid., p. 2). 
The object of Callon’s programme centred on how behaviours, organisations, 
institutions and more in general objects are constituted as ‘economic’. Core features 
of the research programme on economization were three key agents: the theories of 
the economy, the institutional and technical arrangements that extend human agents’ 
capacity for action and cognition, and the things –comprising both their modes of 
valuation, their outcome and their materialities (which in turn influence the possible 
modes of valuation). Such emphasis on materialities2 is central to the understanding 
of the role of accounting within the framework of analysis offered by the 
                                                          
2
 To clarify what is meant by materiality Callon and Muniesa’s illustration comes handy: 
“Materiality and physicality must not be confused. A fish sold on the Marseilles market or a 
week’s skiing holiday bought by an English person dreaming of snow and sun are both 
material, in the sense that they both are things that ‘hold together’ and that can be 
appropriated because they have objectified properties” (Callon & Muniesa, 2005, p. 1233). 
Yet, Law and Mol (1995) offer a conceptualisation of materialities and sociality as mutually 
co-produced. Following this view, materials can be considered as “relational effects”. 
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performativity research programme. Accounting understood in its both programmatic 
and technological dimensions (Rose and Miller 1992) is involved in the 
performativity/economizing programme at different levels. First, accounting –as a 
science- is involved in the formatting of calculative agencies. Second, accounting 
understood as accounting numbers (Robson 1992) is involved in the process of 
inscribing, that is the translation of one’s interest in a material form. 
The origins of the performativity programme 
While locating the roots of the performativity programme in the pragmatist tradition, 
Çalışkan and Callon (2009) distinguished between a structuralist and a pragmatic 
approach to the study of economic valuation. A structuralist approach pays attention 
to structures such as 'regimes of value', 'spheres of circulation', and 'systems of 
exchange' and keep them separated from individuals. A pragmatics of economic 
valuation instead considers the relations between things, people and their context. In 
this regard, economic anthropology that focuses on regimes of value, has been 
analysing the contradictions/tensions between capitalism and non-capitalism, and 
between commodity versus gift. This "analytic binarism" has the advantage of 
describing multiplicity in the systems and logics that underlie economization. 
However, a pragmatics of economic valuation goes beyond the mere description 
of such multiplicity and investigates the processes that originate such multiplicities 
and differences. This line of enquiry is the one also pursued across this thesis, which 
aims not only to account for the different practices of making scientific discovery 
visible in economic terms, but also to investigate the origins and effects of 
calculative practices. In Chapter 6, the origins of different ways of ‘calculating’ 
incubation are interpreted in the light of the calculative frames. As noted by Beunza 
and Garud (2007), the calculative frames mobilized by actors in the process of 
attributing value to incubation, are made of both material and cognitive 
infrastructure. According to the authors, calculative frames are made of “analogies, 
categorizations, and choices of metrics” (Ibid., p. 33). In this regard, Chapter 6 will 
show how the origin of calculative practices such as measuring incubation 
programmes by means of economic development indicators is to be found in the 
interaction between managerial principles (management by objectives), non-
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accounting devices (input-output analysis), and accounting devices (performance 
indicators). 
Consistent with the idea of calculative frames, Çalışkan and Callon (2009) 
advanced the idea of “modalities of valuation”. The later differ from 'regimes of 
value' because "that a modality of valuation is enacted over another, at a particular 
time and in a particular location, depends only on the immediate circumstances of 
exchange" (Ibid., p. 386). Referring to Guyer (2004), Çalışkan and Callon 
emphasised the multiple character of valuations and the fact that they are "locally 
shaped by creative, imaginative, and calculative people" (p. 387). In other words 
multiplicities, differences, asymmetries in valuations are empirically proved to exist, 
but the authors argue they are not embedded in pre-existing regimes or spheres. As a 
result valuation is not the result of structures which determine/influence value by 
means of passive intermediaries but "it is a consequence of how competent and 
active people engage with specific things" (Ibid., p. 388). It is –they argued- this 
hybrid configuration of competent agents and circulating material entities that are of 
interest in the pragmatics of valuation program. Not the demarcation and contrast of 
regimes such as reciprocity, redistribution or market transactions.  
According to Çalışkan and Callon (2009), it is by looking at formalist and 
substantivist influences in economics, economic sociology, and anthropology that a 
pragmatics of valuation can be positioned (and justified). Both intellectual positions 
have, according to Çalışkan and Callon, contributed to advance the 
definition/investigation of economization by shifting the focus of analysis from the 
economy (noun) to what is regarded as economic (adjective).  
In the context of this thesis, shifting the focus from the economy to what is 
regarded as economic means to look at how accounting practices contribute to 
transforming technologies/scientific ideas into goods/services that can circulate, be 
exchanged, and acted upon. This thesis aims to show how accounting economises 
innovation, that is how accounting renders innovation’s entities thinkable and 
actionable in economic terms. This begs the questions of what the entities of 
innovation are, what qualifies them as economic, and the consequences of such 
processes of economization. The thesis adopts a pragmatic approach to 
economization in a sense of identifying and characterising those entities of 
innovation that have been transformed into something economic. This is done by 
observing the interplays between the social and technical aspects of a phenomenon, 
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i.e. the interplays between people (e.g. managers, scientists, accountants) and things 
(e.g. accounting tools, scientific ideas). Analysing the interplays between people and 
things in the production of economic entities means that economization is situated 
neither at the level of society, nor at the level of individuals. Nor is economization 
observed as the effect of imposing structures or regimes of calculation over people 
and things. Conversely, in this thesis economization is analysed in the contingent 
interplays between accounting tools and people in organisations. The thesis shows 
how controlling innovation is a form of distributed action, in a sense that controlling 
innovation involves a variety of actions (e.g. monitoring, budgeting, assessing), 
which are performed by a vast array of people and things. 
On the one hand the formalist position in economics, which in turn drew on 
neoclassical economics, holds that individuals make decisions based on the 
maximization of their utility. This principle of instrumental rationality leads to 
'economic' behaviours and applies universally both to Western and non-Western. 
According to the proponents of the formalist school, there can be variation and 
diversity in the concrete actions observed and this can be accounted for by using the 
notion of culture. In other words, in the formalist view, economizing is synonymous 
with instrumental rationality (i.e. the maximization of an individual’s utility 
function) and its modalities depend on the cultural model in use within a certain 
society. 
On the other hand the substantivist school was rooted in another stream of 
economic thought, i.e. political economy, and regarded economizing as a sort of 
provisioning. To put it differently, according to the substantivist school the term 
'economic' refers to anything (e.g. behaviours, activities and forms of organisation) 
that can be linked to those processes through which a society meets its material 
needs. Such processes -typically of production, distribution and consumption- 
involve a variety of institutional configurations which revolve around three 
modalities of circulation: reciprocity, trading and redistribution. Given the variety of 
institutional arrangements and modalities of circulation, it follows that instrumental 
rationality is only but one of all the possible economic rationalities (i.e. the one 
underlying trading mode of circulation).  
How and to what extent have disciplines such economics, economic sociology and 
anthropology taken on board the debate between substantivism and formalism? The 
message that emerges from the debate is that to understand economization one has to 
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"identify and characterize entities that have been 'economized'" (Ibid., p. 391). In this 
respect the thesis aims to identify and characterize how the entities of innovation 
(e.g. scientific ideas, incubation programmes) have become economized. Economics, 
economic sociology and anthropology have, according to the authors, situated such 
economized entities between the individual and society. More specifically, 
economics has attributed to institutions the role of "socio-cognitive prostheses" 
designed -also by economists- to overcome agent's cognitive limits. From the 
perspective of economics, according to Çalışkan and Callon (2009), economic action 
and the construction of economic markets both require economics to design suitable 
institutions. The influences of formalist school are here most evident. 
Economic sociology instead, as also discussed earlier in the chapter when 
presenting new institutionalism, regards both Western and non-Western economies 
as the outcome of institutional arrangements, networks, power and fields at plays in 
different times and societies. On this basis economic sociology tends to deconstruct 
economy in order to show how contingent historical processes are at play within the 
economy. Through the concept of embeddedness -which determined the shift to the 
so called 'new economic sociology'- it is claimed that the study of economy cannot 
be kept separated from the study of society. The emphasis of new economic 
sociology is on the idea that the economy is embedded in society and economics is 
embedded in sociology. Finally, anthropology has taken on board the task of 
investigating the role of materialities (e.g. standard, techniques, calculating 
instruments, etc.) in the processes of economization and in the processes of economic 
valuation. It is in this context that a pragmatics of economization/economic valuation 
is advanced. 
However, the shift to a pragmatics of valuation implies not only distancing from 
structuralism, but also from the ontological asymmetry of humans and things. Such 
asymmetry is -according to Çalışkan and Callon- built into the infrastructure of 
economic thought, in "the taken-for-granted relationship of production and 
consumption which presume the ontological divide between animate and inanimate 
entities, even though this is simply one mechanism for organizing the transformation 
of beings and their mutual attachments" (Çalışkan and Callon 2009, p. 390). 
The economization/performativity programme poses a distinctive set of 
assumptions about agency, its sources and distribution. These assumptions will be 
discussed in the next section. 
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Agency and the sources of calculativeness 
Understood as a capacity to act and to give meaning to action, agency in Callon’s 
framework “can neither be contained in a human being nor localized in the 
institutions, norms, values, and discursive or symbolic systems assumed to produce 
effects on individuals” (Callon 1998b, p. 4). Action instead takes place in “hybrid 
collectives comprising human beings as well as material and technical devices, texts, 
etc.” (Ibid., p. 4). According to Callon, forms of agency are multiple and diverse, 
depending on how they are framed. Types of agencies can be pinned down to 
adaptive behaviours, reflexive agencies, calculative or non-calculative agencies, or 
disinterested or selfish ones, and they may be either collective or individual. I will 
focus here on one particular type of agency, that is the calculative agency. In fact, 
economization and market organisational forms are, according to Callon, 
accomplished through calculations and calculative agencies. 
Calculative agencies are investigated in Callon’s framework in relation to several 
dimensions. A first dimension has to do with the source of calculativeness, where by 
calculativeness Callon means the conditions under which economic action becomes 
calculable (Callon 1998a). A second dimension has to do with the modalities of 
calculating. Finally, a third dimension is related to how calculation and calculative 
agencies proliferate. 
In relation to the sources of calculative action, the performativity programme 
locates them neither in cognitive psychology where calculative mental capabilities 
are presumed, nor in cultural sociology where cultural frames are deemed central to 
agents’ calculative competences. Sources of calculativeness are instead to be found 
at the intersection between the materialities of things (e.g. accounting tools) and 
people’s skills and competencies, where people are regarded as active and competent 
individuals (Çalışkan and Callon 2009). As discussed earlier in relation to new 
institutionalism, modern agency tends to assume over-socialized actors, that is actors 
who act as cultural dupes and passively adhere to social norms and scripts. In that 
framework, agents who operate in market contexts are simply better equipped with 
socio-cultural frames, or their institutions, than others. While maintaining that actors 
need indeed to be equipped, Callon argued that the sources of actors’ calculative 
competencies are not to be found in institutions. 
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In responding to a critique of his work The Laws of the Markets (Miller 2002; 
1998c), Callon further elucidated what constitutes agency in the context of the 
performativity programme: 
 "The actors that he (Miller 2002) brings into play are those usually 
studied by the social sciences. We find individual actors and collective 
actors (e.g. social classes) framed by institutions, values, worldviews, 
interests, etc. Nothing is said or even suggested about the place of 
materiality, about socio-technical agencements and consequently about 
the possible shaping of agencies who must be seen as susceptible to be 
(re)configured and built up” (Callon, 2005, p. 13). 
According to Callon, an actor’s calculative competencies lie in her ability to enter 
relations with other actors. The source of calculativeness is therefore a relational one 
because, it is argued, action within a network of relations can only be calculative. In 
order to explain this passage Callon draws on the example of two market participants 
–A and B- who are involved in a transaction, and a third actor –C- who acts as an 
intermediary for that transaction. Each of these actors will define their position in the 
negotiation/transaction by drawing a list of the entities involved, of possible world 
states, of possible actions and expected outcomes. The actor –say A- will include in 
her list of entities also B and C and their respective possible decisions. One can 
therefore understand A’s identities and decisions only by taking into account B and 
C. Ultimately, according to Callon, this process of listing and ranking/prioritizing 
defines what constitutes calculation (Callon and Muniesa 2005).  
There are two implications here. First is that calculation/calculating does not 
necessarily involve numbers in that ranking/listing/prioritising constitutes already a 
form of calculating. Second each actor will be able to draw that list/ calculate only if 
she enters a relation with other actors. By drawing lists of entities and possible world 
states what the actor A does is to frame the interactions in a way that includes both B 
and C in the analysis. In this sense the purpose of framing is to detach/ 
disentangle/cleanse of ties the entities which are to be included in the frame. 
Although framing is supposed to disentangle the entities involved in the transaction 
from all the ties they have, what framing generates –according to Callon- is quite an 
opposite effect.  
In other words, framing is likely to generate new entanglements because by 
including B and C in the frame a new set of ties are also brought in. Framing entails 
establishing rules of inclusion and exclusion. However, according to Callon, the very 
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act of setting up frames is conducive to (and potentially generates) overflows. The 
notions of framing and overflowing are rooted in the idea of action as a collective 
property that inevitably overflows. In order to be attributed to a particular agency, 
action has to be framed (Callon 2005, p. 4). In the context of this thesis, if one 
considers a research contract agreed and signed by university and industry, the 
contract binds not only the two institutions but also the pool of resources they bear 
(e.g. academic and non-academic staff, library resources, etc.). The idea of 
overflowing is that those resources that are included and regulated in the contract are 
conducive to other sets of relations, events, actions that were not originally foreseen 
in the initial contract.  To illustrate the twin concepts of framing and overflowing, 
Callon brings the example of a transaction involving the purchase of a car. The two 
parts involved in the transaction, i.e. the buyer and the seller, would not be able to 
reach the end of the transaction if the car market –Callon argues- was not framed. 
For the transaction to take place one has to exclude from the frame a number of 
effects that the car transaction can potentially generate, such as effects on traffic 
jams, climate change, exploitation of workers in countries of the South working for 
car manufacturers, the victims of road accidents, etc. (Callon 2005).  
The process of framing enables the transaction to take place, but it does not mean 
that that particular frame has crystallised, since the parties affected by the overflows 
will try to negotiate a new frame which internalize the overflows. Once the 
transaction takes place the good, i.e. the car, which was previously 
objectified/framed hence disentangled from the buyer’s world, becomes attached to 
the buyer’s world and her network of relations.  
Formatting calculative agents 
A second dimension investigated in Callon’s analysis of markets and economization 
is related to how different styles of calculating/framing emerge and the extent to 
which they compete with each other. To put it differently, there are different sources 
of calculative action and these different sources depend, according to Callon, to 
different ways of formatting. In the context of this thesis, Chapter 7 will discuss how 
the sources of calculative action can be found in the interactions between accounting 
and managerial principles, and accounting and non-accounting devices. The 
interactions between these entities vary according to the arrangements under 
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observation. However, Chapter 7 will show that, other than differences, there can 
also be patterns of regularity in the sources of calculative action, that is different 
arrangements can feature similar sources of action (e.g. the management by 
objectives principle and the input-output framework constitute the source of action 
for several R&D funding programmes). 
Formatting calculative agencies means to provide agencies with different frames 
of reference that in turn inform and shape their calculations. Many can be the sources 
of formatting. Among these, social sciences and economics are, according to Callon, 
notable examples of such formatting work.  By creating frames of reference, i.e. 
economic models, economics provides different styles of formatting calculative 
agencies. The mutual relation between economy and economics is one where 
economy and economics perform each other. Performativity is the outcome of a 
process where the economy (as a thing) and economics (as the discipline which 
studies the thing) mutually influence –or better- perform each other. This mutual 
shaping, however, does not happen automatically. According to Callon, accounting 
(as much as law and marketing) tools are needed in order to mediate between the 
realm of economy and the realm of economics. In this respect, accounting acts as a 
mediator that links economics to the economy, while maintaining both as 
independent entities. Accounting provides the tools for framing interactions and 
enacting the calculative agencies and in so doing it mediates between theories of 
economy and economic practices. An illustrative example here is provided by the use 
of discounted cash flow formula for valuing new drugs across the stages of discovery 
and development (see Chapter 4 for more details). In this case accounting mediates 
between the estimates on R&D costs provided by health economics’ studies and 
valuation practices used by companies.  
To better understand the role of accounting in the mutual shaping between 
economics and the economy, scholars have investigated which qualities of 
accounting make such shaping possible. While referring to the Latourian notion of 
inscriptions (Latour 1987), Robson (1992) explored the qualities of accounting 
numbers that appeal to broader aspirations of control at a distance. Building on the 
notion of inscription as a material translation of any setting that is to be acted upon, 
Robson showed how qualities of inscriptions such as stability, mobility, and 
combinability resonate with those of accounting numbers.  
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First, the mobility of accounting numbers enables, alongside with their written 
quality, the visualization and movement of otherwise spatially and temporally 
dispersed corporate accounts (e.g. loans, cash flows, etc.).  
Second, for accounting numbers to be acted upon at a distance they need to show 
stability. In other words they should be recognized by their users as accepted 
conventions/rules. The tendency towards normalization, standardization, and 
homogenization of forms of accounting codification contributes to create stable 
inscriptions. Accounting numbers can also be combinable –in the sense of being 
prone to processes of aggregation and accumulation- and this quality might be 
strongly related, according to Robson, to their numerical and conceptual character. 
The combinability of things that are different is achieved through accounting 
numbers. Combinability makes comparisons possible and, through processes of 
quantification, allows to perform calculations upon different things (e.g. averages, 
ratios, valuations etc.). 
Callon’s notion of calculation entails listing entities, states of the worlds, possible 
actions and outcomes, and ranking/prioritising them. In Callon’s notion of 
calculation not all the framing efforts take the form of numerical representations. 
Framing efforts can also take the form of classification. As Espeland et al. (2008) 
noted in fact there are forms of quantification that name phenomena and forms of 
quantification that commensurate them.  In this respect, accounting not only provides 
a numerical metaphor that contributes to formatting calculative agencies, but also 
constitutes a technique of classification. 
However, economics alone cannot explain the changes in the styles of formatting 
calculative agencies. According to Callon, to understand such changes one has to 
look at the role of the State. By means of policies, rules, and legal frameworks the 
State plays a constitutive role in the economy. This thesis advances that changes in 
formatting of calculative agencies can be interpreted as the outcome of the interplay 
between economic theories and the rationales, programmes and technologies of 
government (Rose and Miller 1992). In this regard, Chapter 3 shows how changes in 
the discourses surrounding innovation can be traced historically in the economic and 
political conditions that led to the emergence of R&D productivity as a problematic 
of government. This thesis advances that changes in the formatting of innovation’s 
calculative agencies were co-produced by changes in economic paradigms and in 
programmes of government might be, in other words, co-produced by historical and 
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political conditions. In the context of this thesis, the shift from neo-classical to neo-
institutional/evolutionary approaches to innovation (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff 
1995; Nelson and Winter 1982), was  reflected in the aspirations of the British 
government toward increasing economic growth and national productivity through 
research commercialisation (see historical reflections in Chapter 3). In the 1980s, the 
regime of direct control on research commercialisation was displaced by forms of 
governing innovation at a distance through mandated calculations, which aimed at 
realising the value of governmental programmes for technology transfer and 
incubation. 
Mechanisms of proliferation: disentangling/entangling and circulation  
The third aspect in Callon’s theorization of markets centres on the mechanisms 
through which calculative agencies and calculations proliferate. Callon argues that 
framing –while temporarily disentangling objects from the network of relations in 
which they are embedded- also constitutes a source of new entanglements. This 
process of creating new attachments by cleansing previous/old ones, can be regarded 
as the mechanism through which calculative agencies proliferate.  
To illustrate the concept of entangling and disentangling one can draw on the case 
of the invention disclosure submitted by an academic to a university technology 
transfer office (see Chapter 5 for more details on invention disclosure). By signing 
and submitting an invention disclosure, the academic agrees on a number of issues. 
He agrees to disclose to the technology transfer office all the relevant technical 
elements of the invention, and the details of any past and future papers, disclosures, 
presentation at conferences that the academic inventor has done or plans to do. He 
also agrees –in some cases- to a defined revenue sharing agreement which 
determines how revenues from the invention are going to be distributed among the 
inventor, the department, and the university. In other words, the invention disclosure 
frames the interaction between the academic and the university. In the moment that 
the academic inventor signs the disclosure, he agrees, for example, not to pursue 
commercialization opportunities without involving the university. The disclosure has 
disentangled the academic from his own network of relations with industry, with 
external collaborators, with colleagues at the pub, but has also created new 
entanglements with the department, the technology transfer office and the university. 
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A new entanglement because once an academic has opted in and disclosed the 
technology to the technology transfer office, he is bound to a series of arrangements 
(if the technology is then actually commercialised). He is entangled, for example, in 
the web of calculations included in the revenue sharing agreement (see for example 
Table 5.1 in Chapter 5). Interactions, however, happen all the time and if the 
academic goes down to the pub and shares his scientific ideas with colleagues from 
other neighbouring universities or companies then, unless the reality of the overflow 
is proved (i.e. sharing scientific ideas outside normal work, in the pub, with friends), 
it is not possible to frame that sort of interaction. 
New entanglement means new associations and the latter, as Latour stressed, are a 
source of power. In this regard, Latour argued how the constant circulation of 
documents, stories, accounts, goods, and passions are those that construct a 
corporation as a ‘big’ and ‘powerful’ actor (Latour 2005, p. 179). It is through the 
constant circulation and aggregation of data from one centre of calculation (Latour 
1987, p. 232)  to the next that actors become powerful. When the UK government 
allocates innovation public funding on the basis of a formula-funding (see discussion 
in Chapter 5), the data that enters the formula is the result of sequences of 
aggregations which involved layers and layers of data to feed into Excel 
spreadsheets. Measures such as the number of spin-outs generated by a university in 
a year are devices that mobilize data that travel from the individual academic/start-up 
funder all the way through the technology transfer office, the finance department of 
the university until reaching the higher education statistics agency.  
The study of markets as a case of economization 
A place where to start the investigation of economization processes is –according to 
Çalışkan and Callon- the market and the processes that lead to establishing markets 
(i.e. marketization). The challenge in studying marketization is partly motivated by 
the fact that contemporary societies tend to conceive of market forms as all identical. 
Çalışkan and Callon advance that their approach attends to differences and diversity 
in market forms rather than taken market as a monolithic concept. Referring to 
markets and processes of marketization in the plural means to recognize and attend to 
the infinite ways of configuring calculating equipment and material devices. To put it 
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differently: "[T]he trajectories taken towards the achievement of markets are never 
of a singular course" (p. 4).  
Popular conceptualization of markets regards them as “institutions that favour the 
creation of values by organising competition between autonomous and independent 
agents” (p. 3). Çalışkan and Callon propose a definition of market that –while still 
compatible with the popular conceptualization- insist on the materialities and 
technicalities, as well as knowledge and skills developed by market agents 
themselves. In other words, first markets organize the conception, production and 
circulation of goods, and property rights attached to them. Second markets are 
arrangements (or better agencement, as Çalışkan and Callon would say) of 
heterogeneous constituents (i.e. rules, conventions, technical devices, metrological 
systems, technical and scientific knowledge, competences and skills. Third markets 
“delimit and construct a space of confrontation and power struggles” (p. 3) where 
multiple definitions and valuations of goods and agents oppose one another.  
Investigating the marketization processes means attending to the processes and the 
elements that determine the diversity of markets. Bearing this in mind, Çalışkan and 
Callon single out five types of framing markets:  
1. pacifying goods (i.e. determining the value of goods),  
2. marketizing agencies (i.e. calculative agencies),  
3. market encounters,  
4. price settings,  
5. and market design and maintenance. 
First, pacifying goods means to transform entities from entangled beings into 
passive things. This entails a process of reducing natural objects (from wild 
unknowns) to things with fixed qualities and incapable of expressing novelty or 
unexpected characteristics. In this respect, science and technology studies offer 
strategies for analysing the process through which entities are framed as passive and 
valuable. Such strategies include Callon’s twin notions of framing/overflowing 
(Callon 1998a). Framing entails, as discussed earlier, establishing rules of inclusion 
and exclusion. However, according to Callon, the very act of setting up frames is 
conducive of (and potentially generates) overflows. With regard to this thesis, in the 
context of the due diligences carried out by technology transfer offices within 
universities, new technologies are assessed in terms of their commercial potential. 
The value of a technology is estimated by listing competitors, the size of the existing 
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market, the number of people affected by a particular disease that the technology 
aims to cure, etc. All these represent attempts to qualify and pacify the technology. 
Second, marketization –compared to other forms of economization- is 
characterized by the multiplicity and diversity of actors competing to participate in 
defining goods and valuing them (p. 8). An inventory of such multiplicity of actors is 
an essential part of a study of marketization processes, Çalışkan and Callon argue. In 
this respect the notion of agencement is advanced by the authors as a methodological 
tool which is aimed at capturing multiplicity and diversity. Socio-technical 
agencements “are comprised of human beings (bodies) as well as material, technical 
and textual devices” (p. 9). And yet “agencements are arrangements endowed with 
the capacity to act in different ways, depending on their configuration” (p. 9). With 
regard to this thesis, considering arrangements from their capacity to act means, for 
example, to analyse a R&D funding programme in terms of the effects it generates 
on people (e.g. project managers) and things (e.g. the trajectory of a funded R&D 
project). In this respect, Chapter 7 will discuss what the effects of controlling 
innovation are and conceptualise these effects in terms of tensions between different 
versions of the value of innovation. 
There are according to Çalışkan and Callon, at least three advantages from using 
the notion of agencement. First, it does not impose any a priori distinction between 
different types of agency, in so allowing for the continuous proliferation of 
differences to be accounted for/analysed. Second, agencements enable to study any 
actors, regardless their size/strength. In fact as similarly argued in Callon and Latour 
(1981), macro-actors are not bigger than micro actors and any a priori assumption 
about their size cannot be made. Their size is the same and in this sense they are 
isomorphic. What makes them different lies instead in that –compared to micro 
actor- macro actor is a force capable of associating so many other forces that it acts 
like a ‘single man’. In this sense an organisation, such as a corporation, is not 
different, in terms of complexity, from a single human being.  Third, agencements do 
not distinguish between collective and individual action, but rather leaves the 
attribution of agency open. The reason for this, in Çalışkan and Callon words, is that: 
"All action is collective since it is distributed; what vary are the mechanisms for 
attributing the source of the action" (p. 10). The notion of socio-technical 
agencement helps address the issue of agency distribution. It casts the question of 
how differences in competencies, know-how, knowledge, material devices, and 
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forms of organization become distributed across actors and ultimately contribute to 
the constitution of markets. In this respect Çalışkan and Callon point at the role of 
disciplines such as accounting and management science in providing the know-how, 
methods, and tools for agents to calculate/construct tradable goods and values. This 
thesis contributes empirically to Çalışkan and Callon’s notion of distributed action, 
first by showing that controlling innovation is a distributed type of action and second 
by showing that, while accounting devices (e.g. performance indicators, R&D 
budgets) are deployed across different arrangements (e.g. university incubators, 
corporate R&D unit), their enactment occurs according to modalities that are specific 
to each arrangement.  
The asymmetrical distribution of competencies leads, according to Çalışkan and 
Callon, to inequalities and results into struggles for those who are under-equipped. 
For example, the liberal subject (both collective and individual) should be able to 
interact, define objectives, calculate interests and also enter complex negotiations 
(i.e. utility maximization). However, formatting this type of agency is particularly 
costly and might result in uneven distribution of competencies with the consequent 
inability to act and calculate. Asymmetrical distribution of agency results into 
relationship of domination where those under equipped are bound to succumb. In this 
respect, Chapter 6 will show how the emergence of quality and health- related frames 
for calculating the value of incubation programmes struggled to emerge. They both 
struggled compared to other calculative frames such as the commercial, economic 
development, and the finance frames. Struggles are partly due to the fact that the 
agents involved in incubation are not particularly equipped to calculate incubation in 
terms of quality and health outcomes, or when they are they still struggle in that their 
frames do not translate into economic terms. 
The constitution of agents as autonomous constitutes as a pre-condition to the 
‘legitimate’ distribution of asymmetries. Such ambivalent reality is highlighted by 
Çalışkan and Callon as follows: "it is by affirming the autonomy of calculating 
agencies that markets are able to conceal and to legitimately impose the asymmetries 
that develop out of the achievement of calculative capacities" (p. 13). 
Third, market encounters between calculative agencies and goods do not happen 
haphazardly, Çalışkan and Callon hold. They are also framed and formatted through 
calculative devices. In this respect the role of non-humans in mediating such 
encounters is central. This is particularly evident if one considers the rise of 
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computerization and automation and its consequences in the shaping of markets 
(especially financial markets, but also firms). An interesting aspect here involves 
mapping the attribution and apportionment of agency between humans and non-
humans established within encountering devices (p. 16). Such devices do not simply 
act as ‘intermediary’ but as ‘mediators’. Referring implicitly to a debate on the role 
of intermediaries versus mediators (Latour 2005), Çalışkan and Callon emphasizes 
how the concept of mediator is much more dynamic and hints to the fact that the 
mediator has an active role in producing a certain (desired) outcome. In this respect, 
Chapter 4 shows how a R&D budget does not merely express a future plan in 
quantitative terms, but it mediates between different positions within the 
organisation, and contributes to embedding the tensions between such positions (e.g. 
the tension between financial sustainability frame and innovation/quality frame). 
Fourth, when it comes to define price-setting Çalışkan and Callon draw on (and 
extend) Weber’s notion of price. The latter is based on the idea that prices are 
estimated quantification (hence entailing calculative tools) and involve agents’ 
struggles to impose their definition of value –hence generating asymmetries. For an 
actor to successfully impose her calculations/valuation on the others –i.e. the 
valuation that is closer to her interests/goals- it takes to transform her position into an 
obligatory passage point (Callon 1986). The striking fact here is twofold –according 
to Çalışkan and Callon. First there is a multiplicity of prices available at a given time, 
and second prices are always based on other prices. The second aspect particularly 
emphasizes how interdependency are created between different transactions taking 
place at different times and in different locales. Prices are not only based on other 
prices but also on more physical variables taken into account in calculating (new) 
prices.  
Finally, the issue of market design and maintenance is treated as central to the 
understanding of marketization processes. Here Çalışkan and Callon stress the 
linkages with what is called ‘performativity’ programme. The latter studies the role 
that economics has in making the diversity of forms of organization and modalities 
of functioning of markets possible/visible/debatable. The authors also extend the 
performative role of economics to other actors outside the academic field and such 
collaboration between the former and the latter (economists and other actors) become 
more frequent, systematic and reflexive. 
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However, marketization represents only one case of economization processes. 
Economic valuations and calculations can also take place in non-market type of 
settings. This seems to be the case for innovation, where not all the economizing 
processes result into the creation of a market as such. Innovation seems to be 
characterised more by attempts to embed market logics into existing or new 
arrangements.  These attempts are marked by a variety of “valuation modalities” 
aimed at capturing the economic value of a drug/technology, an incubation 
programme, or an academic invention. Yet, ‘realizing’ and ‘visualising’ the value of 
such programmes is often a pre-conditions to the mobilization of financial (both 
public and private) resources around a specific technology, but not always these 
resources are mobilized in exchange of equity or ownership position. 
The idea that economic valuations/calculations can also take place in non-market 
sort of settings is reinforced by some scholars in sociology. In an effort to trace and 
understand how we attribute economic value to intangible things, and therefore how 
we transform quality into quantity, Marion Fourcade  (2011) investigated three 
prominent non-market valuation episodes. The context is the valuation of “nature” by 
ordinary people and their expert voices in the case of the non-commercial losses 
associated with large-scale maritime oil spills in France and the United States. 
Fourcade looked at how people framed the need for monetary compensation for a 
polluted landscape. Drawing on the work of Bruno Latour (1987), she argued that for 
how flat money/measures seem, the processes of quantification that lead to them are 
not flat at all. Indeed the production, selection, and application of valuation 
techniques involves “trials of strength”, processes of “translation” and “allies and 
enrolment”. In other words processes of quantification are highly contingent and 
political. In Fourcade’s words: “Economic valuation […] does not stand outside of 
society: it incorporates in its very making evaluative frames and judgments that can 
all be traced back to specific politico-institutional configurations and conflicts”. 
(Fourcade 2011, p. 1769).  
2.1.3   Contribution to social studies of accounting: the 
study of differences and the study of isomorphism 
Part I of this chapter discussed economization as a process that lies at the interface 
between social studies of science and new institutionalism. The choice of discussing 
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economization processes across academic literatures was motivated by a number of 
reasons.  
First, the predominant theme emerging from the field is related to how economic 
market and economic theory have progressively configured the field of scientific 
discovery and innovation in economic terms. This has led to consider economization 
as the broader process to be considered in the analysis of the role of accounting in the 
field of innovation.  
Second, the emphasis on economization (and economizing) and accounting 
devices has long been suggested (Burchell et al. 1980) and recently repeated in 
Miller and Power’s paper (2013). Although reviewing different streams of 
sociological thought deployed in past and present accounting scholarship (e.g. 
governmentality and new institutionalism), Miller and Power do not explicitly 
include in their review the accounting scholarship that has drawn on social studies of 
science and more specifically on the performativity program advanced by Callon. 
Therefore, this section will seek to analyse economization and the role of accounting 
by means of a comparison between Callon’s performativity framework and the new 
institutional framework. As argued earlier, different ways of framing accounting 
illuminate the different roles that accounting plays in the context of a specific 
phenomenon, such as innovation. These aspects will be presented later, after 
summarizing the main points of divergence and possible linkages between the 
performativity program and the organizational research program in new 
institutionalism. 
Overall, there are differences between the two literatures and some of them cannot 
be easily reconciled at level of theory. As discussed below such differences can 
however be used to illuminate different pieces of evidence (Reed 2011).  
First, they hold different assumptions in terms of agency and its distribution. The 
symmetry granted to human and non-human actors and the role of materialities (e.g. 
accounting techniques, standards, etc.) under the performativity program seem to 
diverge from new institutional conceptualization. The latter do not grant to non-
humans the same type of agency as humans and it does give visibility to 
materialities. In the context of this thesis, the empirical evidence seems to benefit 
from an approach which attributes agency to ‘things’. Performance indicators such as 
‘invention disclosures count’ or ‘spin-outs count’ can have the effect of creating 
certain trajectories, certain courses of actions within a field. They have productive 
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effects. In this respect, Chapter 5 shows that research commercialization trajectories 
are shaped by accounting measures in a way that accounting measures create the 
reality they aim to represent. A university which aims to increase the number of 
invention disclosures can be constructed as an ‘inventive institutions’, hence 
increasing its standing and reputation. At the same time, across the innovation field, 
performance indicators have also become a standard way of evaluating 
organizational and individual performances. They have become a standard way of 
constructing/formatting universities as ‘rational’ economic actors. 
Second, the ‘mechanisms’ through which ideas and practices ‘travel’ differ 
between the two approaches. One approach is more oriented to study diffusion by 
looking at isomorphic mechanisms, decoupling mechanisms, etc. The other approach 
looks at forms of entanglement and disentanglement, translation, framing and 
overflowing. In the context of innovation, processes of displacements and 
transformation have helped to understand how an invention disclosure submitted by a 
scientist to a local technology transfer office becomes embedded in a broader web of 
relations involving government actors and funding devices (see Chapter 5 for more 
details). At the same time, an increasing isomorphic tendency seems to characterize 
the way in which, for example, technology transfer office structure their activities. 
Models for attributing property rights on academic inventions, for sharing revenues 
arising from inventions are appropriated and embedded by different academic 
institutions. 
Third, as Carruthers (1995) pointed out, new institutional tradition views 
accounting practices as a “set of features that can legitimize organizations through 
construction of an appearance of rationality and efficiency” (Ibid., p. 313). Not only 
has accounting a legitimizing role and not only does accounting contribute to the 
transformation of organizations into rational actors. It also has, according to Miller 
and Power (2013), an adjudicating role, which means that accounting practices exist 
“to pronounce on and to evaluate the performance of individual and organisations” 
(Ibid., p. 562). In the performativity program, accounting is instead viewed as central 
in forming/formatting the calculative abilities of agents, where agency has a 
distributed character. Accounting is not only an instrument used to achieve certain 
ends, but also contributes to shaping the realm where action takes place. With regard 
to this thesis, when consultants are called upon to set up performance audits for open 
innovation, the management and accounting expertise involved in such task does not 
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simply devise measures to ‘capture’ the reality of open innovation, rather it 
contributes through sets of measures to constructing what is meant by and done in 
the name of open innovation. By mobilizing these sets of measures accounting 
contributes to performing the economy through theories of economics of innovation. 
And also, by excluding or including certain possibilities in the setting up of 
measures, it contributes to framing economic action in certain ways rather than 
others. Therefore, the process of qualifying an object by setting its potential value or 
performance level is not trivial and should not be taken for granted. As Robson 
(1992) observed, the process of representation is linked to the problem of action at a 
distance. Thanks to their properties of mobility, stability, and combinability, 
accounting numbers make possible to influence contexts or situations remote from 
the actor. While inscribing (Latour 1987) distinctive sets of interests into numbers, 
accounting frames “the original substance” (Latour and Woolgar 1979) by listing a 
number of properties which qualify the substance.  
Fourth, by granting visibility (and agency) to materialities the performativity 
program attends to the diversity and specificity of arrangements that lead to the 
construction of markets. It traces and problematizes differences instead of flattening 
them (Latour 2005). More in general the theme of differences and how these arise 
within socio-technical agencement is central to the definition of economization 
within the performativity program. Different market (and also non-market) 
configurations are contingent to the multiple devices (e.g. laws, calculations, 
reporting tools, decision-making procedures, etc.) that are mobilized within a certain 
network. Different market configurations also depend on how such devices become 
distributed. On the one hand, the study of differences is central to the performativity 
program, on the other hand isomorphism and standardization as social processes gain 
centre stage in new institutional analysis. As discussed earlier, new institutionalism 
(in organizational analysis) takes as a starting point the increasing homogeneity of 
practices and arrangements found in the labour market, in schools, in states, and in 
corporations (DiMaggio and Powell 1991). 
Despite the differences between the two sociological approaches, there have been 
attempts to lay more explicit micro-foundations of institutional theory (Powell and 
Colyvas 2008). The building blocks of such micro-foundations could draw, 
according to Powell and Colyvas, on ethnomethodology and sense-making literature, 
but also on actor-network theory and the performativity program in social studies of 
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science. Miller and Power (2013) gather the variety of traditions in social studies of 
accounting (e.g. new institutionalism, governmentality) and show how they 
contributed to explain the different roles that accounting has in processes of 
economizing. From mediating, territorializing, adjudicating, to subjectivizing, 
accounting plays multiple roles in society. This multitude of roles in turn has to do 
with certain qualities of accounting, i.e. accounting as a fluid, historical contingent, 
and constantly shifting object. In order to address theoretically such multiplicity it 
might be useful to discuss two concepts advanced within social studies of science 
and social studies of accounting respectively, i.e. socio-technical agencement and 
accounting complex. 
On the one hand, Callon advances the concept of socio-technical agencement to 
denote “socio-technical arrangements when they are considered from the point of 
view of their capacity to act” (Çalışkan and Callon 2010, p. 9). Agency and 
arrangements are not kept separated. When it comes to analyse markets using the 
notion of agencements, the heterogeneous nature of markets is emphasized: 
 “A market is an arrangement of heterogeneous constituent that deploys 
the following: rules and conventions; technical devices; metrological 
systems; logistical infrastructures; texts, discourses and narratives (e.g. 
on the pros and cons of competition); technical and scientific knowledge 
(including social scientific methods), as well as the competencies and 
skills embodied in living beings”(Çalışkan and Callon 2010, p. 3). 
On the other hand, Miller and Power advance the notion of accounting complex to 
suggest that: 
“[a]ccounting practice is an assembly of very different elements: ideas, 
laws, bureaucratic instruments, spreadsheets, reports, standards, and 
registers, not to mention accountants and other human agents” (Miller 
and Power 2013, pp. 588-589) 
The notion, the authors argue, is similar to the one of network if not that the 
atomistic components are heterogeneous and are co-constructed rather than given. 
Both concepts clearly emphasize the role of materialities in the construction of 
‘networks’. The fundamental difference seems to lie in the agentic properties 
attributed to agencements, while accounting complex does not explicitly mention the 
distributed character of agency. However, one can speculate that if elements in the 
complex are co-constructed rather than given, then some sort of agency is attributed 
to material devices too.  
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Although both notions are relevant to this thesis in that they provide a tool for 
identifying and analyzing the multiple accounting and non-accounting entities 
involved in economizing innovation, the thesis mainly draws on the notion of 
agencement. For the notion of agencement makes it possible to place the analysis of 
how innovation is controlled through accounting within the larger issue of how 
economic agencies of innovation are configured, organised, and distributed, and the 
role of accounting in these processes.  
While applying the notion of agencement to the case of a hedge fund, Hardie and 
MacKenzie (2007) argues that it is important to single out the not too obvious 
features of the concept and focus “on ways in which  the composition and 
configuration of agencements affect economic action” (Ibid., p. 74). According to 
Hardie and MacKenzie the notion of agencements emphasises the conditions of 
possibility for economic actors, and the infrastructure that enable them to be the 
actors they are, and how the distribution of cognition and action may shape the 
properties of actors (Ibid., p. 74). In this regard, Chapter 7 will discuss how 
innovation is assembled by means of a variety of human and non-human entities that 
interact with each other in the production of the multiple values of innovation. The 
discussion will focus, particularly, on the effects of the interactions between such 
entities in the context of the exchange of value for money (e.g. public and private 
financial resources).   
In conclusion, although at theoretical level performativity programme and new 
institutional analysis bear different assumptions, at level of meanings the two 
literatures can be used to illuminate different aspects of the empirical material. As 
Part 2 will discuss, Reed (2011) advocates for a pluralistic use of theory where 
different theories can be used “to illuminate aspects of a meaningful social context 
[…] and the coherence of the maximal interpretation derives from the coherence of 
background meanings interpreted to be surrounding the social action under study” 
(p. 103). 
Miller and Power’s notion of accounting complex constitutes perhaps an attempt 
to bridge the two literatures at the level of theory. On the one hand, the emphasis of 
the performativity program on materialities is congenial to accounting. In fact, both 
the programmatic and technological dimensions (Rose and Miller 1992) of 
accounting are involved in the idea of mutual shaping of economics and the economy 
put forward by the proponents of the performativity programme. First, accounting as 
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a science is involved in the formatting of calculative agencies. Second, accounting 
understood as accounting numbers (Robson, 1992) is related to the production of 
inscriptions (Latour 1987), that is the translation of actor’s interests in a material 
form. On the other hand, how can we understand the homogenizing and normalising 
effects of accounting in the field of innovation, if not turning to new institutional 
theory? Different practices of valuing innovation and different meanings are attached 
to ‘standard’ accounting tools such as discounted cash flow and key performance 
indicators. Standard models of formatting universities, incubators, technology 
transfer offices as rational actors are also an important part of the innovation 
phenomenon. Overall, the pragmatic approach to valuation and the performativity 
programmes are those predominantly used throughout the thesis to make sense of 
innovation as a socio-technical phenomenon and the role of accounting in it. 
However, it seems helpful to combine the interest in materialities, offered by the 
pragmatic approach to valuation, to the analysis of the patterns of regularity in the 
processes of formatting of calculative agencies and of the homogenizing tendency 
within the field of innovation.  
Both approaches shed lights on different aspects of the research question, which 
explores the role of accounting in shaping innovation, where shaping includes all 
those processes of translating scientific ideas into goods and services that have an 
economic value and that can therefore circulate in the economy. In this respect, 
‘controlling innovation’ does not merely mean imposing calculative structures on the 
entities of innovation (e.g. new drugs, incubation programmes), but rather it means 
that calculative structures and the entities of innovation mutually shape each other. 
The empirical evidence presented in this thesis shows that in the process of 
discovering, developing, transferring, and incubating innovative scientific ideas, 
accounting contributes to realizing their economic value, in so translating them into 
economic entities. Once translated into economic entities (e.g. total project cost, 
value inflection point, etc.), innovative scientific ideas can be invested upon, and 
their value can be appropriated. Hence, they can circulate in the economy. 
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PART 2: METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND 
RESEARCH METHODS 
 
 
2.2    Researching innovation as a socio-technical 
phenomenon 
In order to investigate how accounting configures innovation, the thesis sets to 
trace the origins and distribution of the different forms of accounting involved in 
innovation (e.g. performance indicators, valuation techniques, etc.), the calculative 
frames they embed (e.g. public intervention, financial sustainability, etc.), and the 
intended and unintended effects that arise from the overlaps between different frames 
in the context of the exchange of value for money.  
Such research agenda is pursued while maintaining a non-essentialist view of 
what constitutes accounting and “a constructivist symmetry” (Power 1996, p. 3) in 
the treatment of innovation and accounting. This philosophical positioning is 
consonant with the central process of this thesis which is the process of 
economization. Thus, to understand how accounting transforms the entities of 
innovation (e.g. new drugs, incubation projects) into economic entities we need to 
bracket out both accounting and innovation and observe them in their contingent 
interplays. Furthermore, because of the central role attributed in this thesis to 
accounting technologies (understood as the product of the interactions between social 
and technical aspects), the type of interpretivism here deployed is one that stresses 
the role of technology, rather than culture3, in society.  
                                                          
3
 Broadly speaking, the interpretivist paradigm locates the foundation of knowledge in the 
experience of human beings and focuses on “cultural derived and historically situated 
interpretations of the social life-world” (Crotty 2003, p. 67). However, when it comes to 
culture, there are several interpretive nuances (e.g. symbolic interactionism and 
phenomenology) which are rooted in constructivism and social constructionism, each of 
which attributes different roles to culture in the social world (Mead and Morris 1934; 
Merleau-Ponty 1967). Beyond all the nuances, the interpretivist paradigm aims to 
“reconstruct the textures of human subjectivity” and “the meaningful worlds of social life in 
which subjects act in a certain place and a certain time” (Ibid., p. 91). 
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While attending to the role of technology in society, and yet remaining within a 
constructivist/interpretivist paradigm, actor network theory (Latour 1987, 2005) 
offers a poignant view of how reality is ‘assembled’. By granting ontological 
symmetry to things and humans, actor network theory argues that, far from being 
passive, technologies create spaces of possibilities and shape human beings as much 
as human beings shape them. However technology does so in a particular way. As 
Latour suggests, technologies (as much as actors) make us do things, but they do so 
“not by transporting a force that would remain the same throughout as some sort of 
faithful intermediary, but by generating transformations manifested in many 
unexpected events triggered in the other mediators that follow them along the line” 
(Latour 2005, p. 107). In the context of this thesis, accounting technologies such as 
key performance indicators (e.g. invention disclosures count, spin-outs count, etc.) 
do not have the same effects across all the organisations that adopt them. They 
trigger effects such as the increase in number of spin-outs only when actors (e.g. 
university managers) use them as tools for performance evaluation. Furthermore, 
Latour seems to distance his work from the interpretivist epistemic mode in that the 
latter renders the world all ‘too human’ in contrast to a world of “inflexible objects” 
and “pure causal relations” (Ibid., p.144).  
Although the origins of actor network theory are often rooted in constructivism 
(Brey 1997), the type of constructivism defended by Latour is not of the ‘social’ 
type. As Muniesa (2014, p. 11) clarified, in actor-network theory reality is 
constructed in an engineer’s sense, i.e. “the scientific facts stand objectively in the 
laboratory as the bridge stands firmly over the water”. Yet, reality does not simply 
‘stand there’ without taking the trouble to happen, but rather it needs to be 
continuously assembled. In this sense the fascination of interpretive accounting 
research for actor-network theory (Roslender 2015) is partly motivated by the fact 
that accounting, as a science but also as a technique, endlessly provides the material 
and the tools for the assembling and construction of reality. Using an 
interpretive/constructivist paradigm à la Latour in the context of this thesis means to 
attend to the contingent interactions between people and accounting tools, and the 
constitutive effects that such interactions have on innovation. Embracing this line of 
inquiry means to combine the attention for accounting as the object of human 
experience to accounting as a practice that is co-produced by contingent historical, 
political, and economic forces (Hopwood 1983).  
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Although the research process is often widely characterised by errors (Swedberg 
2012, p. 34), false leads and dead ends (Alasuutari 2000, p. 192) and therefore 
continuous changes, the process of gathering the traces of a phenomenon does 
require the prior design of methods and strategies. Both methods and strategies help 
govern all those practices which are carried out in order to conduct the observations. 
Methods and strategies provide “the rules by which these observations can be 
modified and interpreted in order to assess their meaning as clues” (Alasuutari 2000, 
p. 42). A method should therefore allow the production of data that surprise the 
researcher and should also provide a mechanism by which feedback on the 
hypothesis and the research design is ensured. The next section will introduce the 
research field by discussing the criteria for selecting the research sites and entering 
the field. Subsequently, the section will present the chosen methods of data 
collection, and the issues of access and familiarity with the subject of study. 
2.2.1   Criteria for selecting the research sites 
Innovation as a phenomenon makes countless appearances in many arenas from 
technology transfer offices in universities to R&D units within private companies. 
For this reason, some boundaries needed to be established at empirical level. As 
Denzin and Lincoln (1998) suggested, the choice of the sites where to investigate a 
given phenomenon is informed by the processes that one intends to study. The 
underlying process that this thesis aimed to investigate is the changing nature of 
accounting –i.e. the “progress” of accounting agenda toward the construction of the 
“knowledge society” and “innovation economy”. With this research agenda in mind, 
three main criteria for identifying the research sites have been selected. 
First, the research attended to those sites where claims “to produce innovation” or 
“to be innovative” were made, e.g. firms, research centres, public and private 
laboratories, etc. This criterion provided a starting point to unpack the ‘reality’ of 
innovation and investigate those materialities and human actors that populate it. 
Second, the research attended to those sites where traditional accounting 
tools/systems (e.g. performance measures) could be potentially challenged. Forms of 
problematization and scrutiny of traditional modalities of producing numbers seemed 
to occur in contexts where knowledge-based modes of production (Gibbons et al. 
1994) are fostered and implemented (e.g. R&D units of traditional manufacturing 
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companies, but also private research institutes, and yet university incubators). In 
these contexts the challenges posed to accounting were operating on two different 
grounds: a) the ground of quantification. Quantification processes were said to be 
problematic when resources and outcomes of “innovative projects” were not only 
intangible/immaterial but also of a long-term and risky nature; b) the ground of 
organisational forms. ‘New’ organisational forms, i.e. networks, were said to replace 
traditional ones, i.e. hierarchy and market (Powell 1990). Network forms of 
organisation were said to challenge accounting in the sense that they involve the 
simultaneous coordination of multiple objectives, goals, and interests which in turn 
emanate from multiple stakeholders.  
Third, cases where both public (e.g. UK government, the European Union) and 
private (e.g. industry) resources were involved has been sought. This choice was 
motivated by an intellectual curiosity for the interplay between multiple logics (e.g. 
public and private) within and across organisational sites. 
Overall, the empirical settings were based on sites where claims about innovation 
were associated with hybrids forms of organising (e.g. networks or collaborative 
arrangements) and knowledge-based mode of productions. In other words, the sought 
research sites were those where the world of research and that of business were 
brought together to collaborate on innovation/R&D projects. Those were also the 
sites where pre-competitive activities are in place (e.g. prototyping, testing, de-
risking etc.), and where private and public resources were mobilised. And finally, the 
selected research sites were those where programmes of competitiveness and 
productivity devised by the UK government and industry were enacted through 
accounting. In such contexts, accounting and related forms of calculation were 
envisioned, constructed and promoted as mechanisms of government over innovators 
and innovation. 
The criteria for selecting the research sites presented above were also exposed to 
two forms of contingency, which will be discussed in the next two sections. To 
anticipate, one contingency consisted in the opportunistic nature of access, i.e. the 
opportunities that emerged while the fieldwork was being conducted. The other type 
of contingency consisted in the influences exerted by the empirical and theoretical 
clues which were progressively emerging from the field. 
77 
 
2.2.2   Negotiating access 
Prior to entering the field approval was obtained from Cardiff University Research 
Ethics Committee to carry out the research. Respondents would normally be 
contacted via e-mail, followed up sometimes with a phone call. The first interaction 
would include a cover-letter which provided a summary of the research project, a 
confidentiality statement, and the researcher and her main supervisor’s contacts.  
Prior to each interview the respondent would be also provided with an Informant 
Consent Form (also approved by the Research Ethics Committee) in which, once 
again, confidentiality would be guaranteed and data treatment process would be 
clarified to the participant. 
All the interviews –except one- were recorded, and consent to record each 
interview was obtained before starting the interview. Specifically in relation to the 
second part of the fieldwork carried out at Incubator#1, the researcher was granted 
an in –depth access to the organisation. In this case a Confidentiality Agreement was 
also required by the organisation and signed by both parties. 
2.2.3   Entering the field 
This section will discuss how the researcher has had access to the organisations and 
research sites under study. Methodologically speaking, for the type of research 
approach adopted (Latour 2005), it is essential to follow the actors across the virtual 
and physical spaces where they regularly meet and talk about their concerns or where 
they act as spokesperson and representatives of somebody else’s concerns. 
Conferences, scientific and social events are examples of such spaces. Important also 
the question of what participants’ capacity and motivations to attend such events are 
because it provides an indication of their concerns and the strategies to address them. 
Attendance at two events provided the arena to start the investigation and gain 
access to potential interviewees. The first event was a Cardiff University Innovation 
Network Event. It was organized by Cardiff University Innovation Network and 
sponsored by Cardiff City Council and South Wales Chamber of Commerce. The 
event was aimed at creating a space where entrepreneurs, venture capitalists, 
business consultants, university research centres, and public funding agencies could 
meet and ‘network’. A one-day program involving workshops, one keynote speech, 
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pitching opportunities for start-up companies was set up in order to facilitate such 
“networking”. 
The second event was held at the Royal Society in London on the occasion of the 
first public debate on Wilson Review on Business-University Collaboration (Wilson 
2012). The Report was an independent review for the UK Department of Business, 
Innovation, and Skills, conducted by Dr Tim Wilson, and designed to give 
recommendation on how to form stronger links between universities and employers. 
The event was organized by the Research and Development Society and sponsored 
by the Institute of Physics and the University of Surrey jointly. Aim of the event was 
to gather people from industry and academia  to debate around the Wilson Review on 
Business-University Collaboration (Wilson 2012). A hybrid panel of academics and 
entrepreneurs –in their respective capacities- discussed the areas of further 
development to be addressed such as the improvements in the information exchange 
between university and business, and in the funding for higher education innovation 
activities. 
The Innovation Network event was more oriented toward networking purposes. In 
addition, workshops and seminars run by business consultants gave visibility to a 
range of models and tools for how best protecting ideas, for how being competitive, 
financially viable, socially networked, etc. The Wilson Review event was designed 
less for networking purposes and more for giving public visibility to possible 
solutions to the ‘problem’ of business-university collaboration. Such type of 
collaboration, as claimed in the review, has been an issue of central concern for 
British economy (Wilson 2012, p. 2), and the purpose of the event seemed to be 
discussing, negotiating, and framing the ways in which such issue could be 
substantiated in the future.  
2.2.4   The research methods  
Interview methods in context 
As Alvesson (2010) noted, methods provide ideas on how to produce and make sense 
of empirical material. Interviews particularly as a method of data collection, 
Alvesson argued, need to be coupled with theoretical understanding in order to 
support our critical judgement. Without such understanding the material risks 
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“naivety and leaves interpretations standing on a shaky ground” (Ibid., p. 5). As 
discussed earlier the approach adopted in this study is constructivist. In the context of 
the constructivist paradigm, (open end) interviews are regarded as “reality-
constructing and interactional events during which the interviewer and the 
interviewee construct knowledge together” and yet as a “site of, and occasion for, 
producing knowledge itself” (Holstein and Gubrium 2013, p. 430). While other 
authors in the interpretive tradition regarded interview as “an inscription of narrative 
production” (Barbara Czarniawska 1997; Czarniawska 2004). However, scholars 
also warned of the limited range of what can be captured through interviews, and 
argued that things also happen outside the frame of the interviews, i.e. outside of 
what is directly registered by individuals (Alvesson 2010). In the same vein Latour 
(2005) pointed out that when the researcher arrives to the interview site to conduct 
interviews, action is already taking place and: 
 “[E]ven when we are in the midst of things, with our eyes and ears on 
the lookout, we miss most of what has happened. We are told the day 
after the crucial events have taken place, just next door, just a minute 
before, just when we had left exhausted with our tape recorder mute 
because of some battery failure” (Ibid., p. 123) 
In the context of this study, interviews constituted a space for immersing in the 
social but also technical world of participants. As discussed later in the chapter, the 
aim was to elicit conversations about participants’ everyday practices, their 
encounters with numbers, spreadsheets, and reports and to account for their 
interactions with such materialities.  
Sampling strategy 
Interviews started with contacting people who attended the events discussed above. 
At the end of each interview, respondents were encouraged to suggest further 
contacts to the researcher. In most of the cases they would allow the researcher to 
mention their names to further contacts or they would themselves introduce the 
researcher via e-mail to other contacts. The various interviews were conducted over a 
period of two years. This gave time to the researcher to transcribe the interviews and 
reflect upon them as soon as the material was collected and before proceeding with 
other rounds of interviews. The sampling was partly ‘opportunistic’ and partly 
inspired by researcher’s exposure to theoretical material meaning that the sampling 
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was in part influenced by introductions and suggestions made by the respondents 
themselves, following what is called a snowball process. The first half approximately 
of the fieldwork was carried out across different research sites –involving a variety of 
organisations. During this period the researcher interviewed an Intellectual Property 
Director at a top tier university who keenly introduced her to an incubator manager 
who turned out to be a central figure for the second half of the field-work. The 
incubator manager was the one who granted the researcher an in-depth access to the 
incubator he was managing. Such access opportunity in turn influenced the design of 
the whole second part of the fieldwork. Had the incubator manager not given in-
depth access, the fieldwork would have probably had a different configuration.  
The choice over the type of respondents to be contacted has not been exclusively 
driven by opportunism. The choice has also been informed by the theoretical 
background of the researcher. In this sense the sampling pattern aimed at eliciting 
and addressing certain theoretical facets such as the dynamics between actors, 
resources, and interests within a given context (e.g. incubation). As Clarke (2003) 
illustrates: 
“sampling” is driven not necessarily (or not only) by attempts to be 
“representative” of some social body or population (or heterogeneities) 
but especially and explicitly by theoretical concerns that have emerged in 
the provisional analysis. Such “theoretical sampling” focuses on finding 
new data sources (persons or things) that can best explicitly address 
specific theoretically interesting facets of the emergent analysis (p. 557). 
In the context of this thesis, theoretical sampling means that pieces of theories have 
illuminated the research in the sense of identifying and mapping the entities in the 
field and have provided a preliminary interpretation of the relations among them. 
Callon’s concepts of translation and obligatory passages (Callon 1986) helped the 
researcher to map out the actors, interests, goals, and resources involved in 
incubation and technology transfer and their interrelations. However, this does not 
mean that theory has exclusively driven the process of data gathering.  
The process of data collection generated forty-two hours of interviews distributed 
across several institutions, as summarised in Table 2.1 below. Interviews’ length 
ranged from half an hour to more than two hours. With regard to participants’ 
background and institutional roles, in most cases participants often had quite diverse  
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Table 2.1: List of participants and interviews' length 
 
Organisation Interviewee's Job Title Interviewee's Background Length (hh:mm:ss)
Technology Transfer Office Business Development Manager
Degree in Economics, enterpreneur in marketing, 
SMEs-industry relations 01:16:52
Incubator Director of Innovation
PhD in Pharmacy, University Technology Transfer 
executive, Venture Capital industry 01:37
Company Head of Technology Strategy
Degree in Mechanical Engineering, Chief Design 
Engineer 01:45:36
Consultancy Programme Manager
PhD in Biochemistry, Marketing and Sales 
Manager 01:07:00
Incubator Commercial Director Dean of Business School, Innovation Manager 01:20:37
Company Chief of University Liaison Office Degree in Mechanical Engineering 02:10:00
Incubator Commercialization Manager
PhD in Molecular Biology and Biochemistry, 
Innovation Manager 01:00:16
Incubator CEO
Degree in Chemistry, Master in Business 
Administration, Business collaborations 00:45:10
Start up Chief Business Officer
Degree in Biochemistry, Master in Business 
Administration, Sales and Marketing Director 01:24:03
Venture Capital Company Director of Healthcare ventures
Degrees in Economics, Leadership and Strategy, 
Pharma Business Development Manager 01:20:42
Incubator Chief Executive Officer
PhD in Immunology, Chartered Accountant, Head 
of Business Development 00:56:15
Start up Founder - Managing director
PhD in Chemistry, Scientist at multinational 
Pharma company 00:36:38
Incubator Incubator manager Master in Business Administration 01:30:33
University Deputy President Deputy Vice Chancellor PhD in Economics 00:59:03
Technology Transfer Office (TTO)Director of Operations
PhD in Molecular Biology, Business Development 
manager 01:13:08
Incubator CFO
Accountancy qualification, Finance positions in 
retailing industry, Business Development 00:50:28
Contract Research OrganisationManaging director PhD in Chemistry 00:30
Incubator CEO
PhD in Biochemistry, Science director within 
pharmaceutical company 00:45:25
Incubator Marketing, Sales & Events Manager Commercial background in life sciences 00:59:54
Incubator CFO
Accountancy qualification, Finance positions in 
retailing industry, Business development 00:27:34
Technology Transfer Office (TTO)Spinout portfolio manager
PhD in Molecular Biology, Accountancy 
qualification, Co-founder enterpreneur 
(biochemistry imaging software) 01:05:20
Technology Transfer Office (TTO)Licensing executive
PhD in Molecular Biology, Post doctoral positions in 
Molecular Genetics, Technology transfer 01:27:30
Incubator CFO
Accountancy qualification, Finance positions in 
retailing industry, Business development 01:03:12
Innovation Consultancy Founder/Principal
PhD in Neuroscience, Clinical Scientist, MBA, 
University-Business Partnerships 01:04:11
Incubator Marketing, Sales & Events Manager Commercial background in life sciences 00:58:49
Incubator Accountant Accountancy qualification 00:44:30
Start up Chief Scientific Officer
PhD in Biochemistry, Academic scientist, scientist at 
Biotech company, science director at big pharma
01:33:16
Technology Transfer Office (TTO)TTO manager
PhD in Chemistry, Post doc position in Chemistry, 
Director biotechnology company 00:55:51
Technology Transfer Office (TTO)Industrial Partnerships Manager
PhD in Biophysics, Scientist at multinational 
technology company 00:51:01
Charity Head of Legal &Operations / SBC observer
PhD in Molecular Biology, Intellectual property 
lawyer 00:59:14
Start up Chief Operating Officer (co-founder)
PhD in Biochemical engineering, Master in Business 
Administration (MBA) 00:51:52
Incubator CEO
PhD in Biochemistry, Science director within 
pharmaceutical company 00:35:11
Start up Chief Operating Officer (and founder)
PhD in Biochemistry, Post doc positions, Scientist at 
multinational pharma company, MBA 00:54:03
Incubator CFO
Accountancy qualification, Finance positions in 
retailing industry, Business development 00:57:53
Incubator CEO
PhD in Biochemistry, Science director within 
pharmaceutical company 00:49:01
Big Pharma Company Finance Director
Researcher scientist in biochemistry, Accounting 
qualification 00:58:12
Big Pharma Company Academic Liaison Director
PhD in Biotechnology, post doc position in 
biotechnology, scientist in big pharma 00:54:01
Big Pharma Company Finance Director
Chartered accountant, commercial finance director, 
Business administration manager in big pharma 
00:52:19
Start up CEO
PhD in Organic Chemistry, Post doc position, MBA, 
Scientist and programme leader at big pharma 01:20:59
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background. It is very common to find in the sample former venture capitalists 
becoming incubator managers, or scientists with doctorates in molecular biology, 
rather than chemistry, obtaining Masters in Business Administration later on in their 
careers. Or yet, scientists becoming managers of their own start-up companies, and 
scientists becoming specialists in Intellectual Property protection. Interview materials 
most certainly benefited from such diversified career paths both in terms of the 
quality of insights and also in terms of the pool of contacts to whom to have access. 
Interview schedule: eliciting accounting materialities 
“In the relatively unstructured interviews typical in social 
studies of science, the investigator has in mind certain 
topics that seem to be important in the light of previous 
research, but which are too complex to be defined in 
advance”  
(Potter and Mulkay 1985, , p. 248) 
 
The interviews took the form of semi-structured interviews, which means that the 
questionnaire was treated flexibly and kept open to potentially interesting topics 
emerging from the conversation. The schedule used during the interviews took the 
form of maps rather than lists of topics. Only the researcher (and not the participants) 
would be able to consult the map. Mapping out the interview schedule had the 
advantage of keeping the focus on the main topics while connecting different parts of 
the interview more easily. Interview maps also facilitated time management. This 
was important considering that participants where often let talk freely and at length, 
in so making it possible for topics to occur as much naturally as possible. Sometimes 
topics in the map would not be casted either because of the time constraint, or 
because of other interesting topics emerging during the interview. 
As exemplified in Table A-1 (see Appendix 1), interview topics would range from 
general topics such as participants’ biographic information, background and role to 
more context-specific topics. Table A-1 provides the structure of an interview carried 
out with a technology transfer executive. In that case context-specific topics were 
related to university’s approach to research commercialisation and the relations with 
other actors such as government and industry. Or yet, context-specific topics would 
delve into participant’s experience of certain practices such as disclosing inventions, 
filing patents and other practices involved with the transfer of a technology. Talking 
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about participants’ everyday practices was central in eliciting information on the 
material and technical aspects of their work (e.g. measurement practices, 
spreadsheets, records, graphs, etc.). The idea was that it is in the material and 
technical aspects of daily practices that accounting is more likely to emerge. 
Since the researcher did not always have the opportunity to have access to internal 
documentation, talking about numbers, spreadsheets, measures etc. seemed the only 
way to access to accounting. In other words, the researcher constantly tried to make 
participants talk about their everyday practices, the meetings they had, their daily 
schedules, and how they experienced them. The idea, once again, was to elicit 
information on the calculative devices (e.g. financial models, budgets) existing 
within the organisation. Another topic addressed was related to participants’ 
background and expertise and how this would be brought into current work practices.  
Another objective was to explore the frames of reference used by participants in their 
every day practices. The excerpt below is illustrative of how frames of references 
would emerge while talking about practices (e.g. the financial plan). The following 
conversation took place between the researcher and the Chief Financial Officer of a 
biotechnology incubator: 
[Researcher] You were saying earlier that there are different versions of 
the financial plan and that you will commit to the one which has the most 
likely outcome… 
[Participant#23] [he interrupts] yeah and I want to be conservative.  
[Researcher] But what does that mean? 
[Participant#23]  if you take for instance funding and you have this [he 
reads out one of the key assumptions from the long term financial plan] 
“It is assumed that  [funder] agree an extension of the Grant Offer to 
April 2015 and that the grant allocation can facilitate the ground floor 
development of the Accelerator (tbc)” you read to be confirmed […] 
however I had already spoken with [funder] and they gave me a strong 
reassurance that this would be acceptable and then there is a [funder’s] 
representative in the Board and he was able to confirm that yes, we have 
to sign the formal agreement, but in principle [the grant is confirmed]. 
The excerpt shows how “being conservative” is a frame that the participants 
normally deploys when ‘practicing’ the financial plan. This is an example of how 
calculative devices (such as the financial plan) in practice can embed a variety of 
meanings and calculative frames which translates into distinctive ways of doing 
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things (e.g. not taking the grant for granted is a way of practicing conservativism in 
financial planning). 
Where documents such as internal strategy report, financial plan, and budgets 
were provided, the interview schedule would centre on them. The aim in that case 
was to elicit information on participants’ experience and interpretation of such 
documents. Here below an excerpt from an interview with a Chief Financial Officer, 
where the researcher was provided in advance with a report, namely an open 
innovation report. The document equipped the researcher with more background 
information on the organizational and accounting practices. This helped to start the 
interview with already a common pool of information (i.e. the documents): 
[Researcher] About the Open Innovation report and the proposed KPIs 
[key performance indicators]. Why do you need them? 
[Participant#34] Well, they are …I’m not convinced necessarily on 
KPIs. I think they were a term that consultants invented 20 years ago. But 
what is important is you need to measure the output of your effort. If you 
can’t do that then you can’t run anything. So you have to define what it is 
you should be delivering and producing and then you have to measure 
that, set the target each year and then you measure your performance 
against the target. That’s what really KPIs are. 
After discussing the qualitative methods and research strategies adopted to collect 
the empirical evidence, the chapter will discuss how the theory presented in Part 1 is 
used in the context of the empirical evidence. The next section will cast the questions 
of what role theory can have in the interpretation of data, what distinguishes a rough 
written account of data from a maximal or thick interpretation, and how this applies 
to the context of this research on innovation and accounting. 
2.3    Discussing the relation between theory and 
evidence: maximal and minimal interpretation  
By questioning in abstract terms the relation between theory and evidence, this 
section aims to illuminate how the theory developed in Part 1 has shaped the process 
of data analysis. Nevertheless, a deep (maximal) interpretation will only be provided 
in the discussion chapter (Chapter 7). This section will evaluate the proposition 
offered by Reed (2011, p.103), according to whom it is the coherence of the 
background meanings surrounding a social action that gives coherence to the 
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interpretation, and not the abstract coherence within the set of different theories 
deployed to interpret a certain phenomenon. 
The section is organised into two parts. The first –as just mentioned- discusses the 
role of theory and evidence particularly in the context of interpretive research. 
Against this background, the second part provides an outline/discussion of the main 
theoretical signifiers used to analyse and interpret the phenomenon under study, i.e. 
the interplays between innovation and accounting. 
2.3.1   Innovation and accounting: from minimal to 
maximal interpretation 
"[A]nthropological writings are themselves interpretations, 
and second and third order ones to boot. (By definition, 
only a "native" makes first order ones: it's his culture.) 
They are, thus, fictions; fictions, in the sense that they are 
"something made", "something fashioned" -the original 
meaning of fiction- not that they are false, unfactual, or 
merely "as if" thought experiments." 
–Clifford Geertz (1973, p. 15)  
 
Once gathered (or rather while gathering) the clues and traces of innovation as a 
socio-technical phenomenon, the interpretive researcher faces the uneasy task to 
provide interpretation(s). There can be several levels (or orders) of interpretation, as 
Geertz’s quote in the opening of the section reminds us. From a scientific point of 
view reporting on a phenomenon is not sufficient and social researchers are asked to 
go beyond or beneath the mere description of facts and provide a deeper 
explanation/evaluation of them. This inevitably leads to the question of when and to 
what extent theories and theoretical concepts should ideally be brought into the 
research process. The literature is prolific of works that engage in the discussion of 
the relation between evidence and theory. Within these studies there are several 
authors who –somewhat in line with Geertz- emphasize the idea that there are 
different levels/degrees/orders of interpretation. The mechanisms proposed in order 
to progress through different depths of interpretation vary across the literature. For 
example, Reed (2008; 2011) advances that interpretive researcher should embark on 
a reconstruction of what he calls landscapes of meaning through a pluralistic use of 
86 
 
theory. In Reed’s view (Reed 2011) establishing the phenomenon represents a first 
step toward explanation.  
With regards to this thesis, establishing the phenomenon means to identify the 
entities of innovation that have been economised. In this regard, Chapter 4 will 
establish that technology transfer mobilises chains of calculations, such as key 
performance indicators, business plans, and market valuations. The question is: how 
can we render the fact of measuring a meaningful event? In this sense Reed argues 
that the researcher should then move from a thin description of the phenomenon to a 
thick, deeper understanding and comprehension of it. Thick description rests on the 
idea of human behaviour as productive of symbolic actions, and on providing 
accounts of what the “import” of such action is, i.e. what it is said (and done) in 
relation to that specific action (Geertz 1973).  
The aim of interpretive research according to Reed is to reconstruct landscapes of 
meanings by bringing together theory and evidence according to a principle of 
localized verificationism – i.e. theory should “adequately and reasonably 
comprehend the surface meanings indicated by a subgroup of evidential signs” (ibid., 
p. 114). Localized verificationism represents a constraint which emanates “from 
below”, i.e. from evidence. At the same time though the reconstruction of landscapes 
of meaning is to be subjected also to a constraint “from above” –i.e. all the theories 
deployed should together make sense.  
Overall, Reed’s argument can be summarised in the idea that both the pluralistic 
use of theories and the unity in meanings should be satisfied all at the same time. 
And the way in which this is achieved is by means of a careful ‘matching’, at local 
level, of evidential and theoretical signifiers in order to build -what he calls- a good 
maximal interpretation. But what is a maximal interpretation? Reed (2011) speaks of 
a spectrum of interpretations that spans from minimal to maximal interpretation: 
“At the minimal end of the spectrum, the frequency of theoretical terms is 
slight (or … minimal), and the claims tend to be less controversial –
though they can, on rare occasions, be startlingly new. The maximal end 
of the spectrum involves statements that mix, in a consistent and deep 
way, theoretical and evidential signification, in an effort to produce a 
powerful comprehension of the matter at hand.” (ibid., p. 23) 
With regard to this thesis, Chapter 4 will present in minimal terms the use of 
discounted cash flow (DCF) technique in valuing a drug throughout the different 
stages of drug discovery and development. Moving closer to the maximum end of 
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Reed’s interpretation spectrum, discounted cash flow can be said to grant economic 
visibility to a certain developmental drug. By drawing on social studies of 
accounting, which regards accounting tools as actively implicated in the construction 
of the object of their measurement rather than simply mirror it (Miller and O’Leary 
1987; Hopwood 1987), one can interpret DCF as something more powerful than a 
mere neutral technique. The power of visualising the economic value of a drug lies in 
enabling certain notions of value rather than others. It also lies in mobilising certain 
financial resources rather than others. Therefore DCF creates possibilities of 
representation and possibilities of intervention. 
Figure 2.1 shows the elements which characterize a maximal interpretation, i.e. 
different pieces of theories are used “to illuminate aspects of a meaningful social 
context…and the coherence of the maximal interpretation derives from the coherence 
of background meanings interpreted to be surrounding the social action under study” 
(ibid., p. 103).  
 
Figure 2.1: Maximal interpretation in the interpretive epistemic mode 
Source: (Reed 2011, p. 102) 
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In the same vein, Gioia and Chittipeddi (1991) argue for different “orders” of 
analysis in ethnographic accounts. What they call the “first order” is similar to a 
narrative story which is often told using participants’ words and their themes. There 
is then a “second order” analysis, they hold, which adds a more theoretical 
perspective to the first order story. In this sense, one can say that in interpretive 
research the theoretical dimension “emerges” from the evidence –i.e. the first order 
account- rather than the opposite.  
The process through which descriptive accounts transforms into interpretation has 
been extensively discussed by Wolcott (1994). He conceives of the research process 
as made of three inherent categories –i.e. description, analysis, and interpretation. All 
of them are deemed to be central to the process of “transforming data”. However, 
each individual researcher, in organising and presenting her data, will attribute a 
different emphasis to each of these three categories. According to Wolcott the shift 
from descriptive accounts to analytical and interpretive ones is highly subjective, 
meaning that the interpretive framework can be introduced earlier or later in the 
process depending on individual researcher’s decision. In other words, data is already 
theory laden (Pitman and Maxwell 1992, p. 761), meaning that some sort of implicit 
interpretation is already in progress during the very process of generating and 
reporting data.  
Although Wolcott does not explicitly refers to “orders” or “levels” of 
interpretation, his idea of distinguishing between description, analysis, and 
interpretation in the process on transforming data can be useful. Finally, an 
interesting reflection that Wolcott offers is on the use of theory for both analytical 
and interpretive purposes. In the first guise, i.e. analytical, theory serves the purpose 
of providing structure; while in the second guise, i.e. interpretive, theory links the 
cases under study with larger issues. In the context of this thesis, theoretical tools 
from actor-network theory such as inscriptions have been used to provide a first level 
structure of the interview material (see section 2.3.2 below for a more detailed 
discussion). Subsequently, inscriptions have been used at level of interpretation to 
show how different modalities of framing incubation became translated into 
accounting numbers (see Chapter 6). 
Figure 2.1 wraps up the reflections presented so far in a way that is meaningful to 
the present thesis. It maps out Reed’s idea of maximal interpretation as a journey 
where evidential signifiers (surface meanings), and theoretical signifiers (theory) 
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undergo a process of re-signification in order to produce “deep meanings”. The ways 
in which this re-signification of the evidence (in the light of the theory) takes place 
responds –according to Reed- to criteria of “adequacy” from below and “coherence” 
from above. Other authors we came across in this section also stressed how there is 
indeed a continuum that goes from the raw evidence to the n-order interpretation.  
In conclusion, Reed’s (2011, p. 103) idea that the coherence of the maximal 
interpretation stands on a coherent re-construction of the case and not necessarily on 
the coherence of the social theories mobilised, is illuminating. It is insightful in that 
it shows that differences (and incoherence) at level of theory do not necessarily 
compromise the validity of the interpretation. In this respect Part 1 of this chapter 
discussed the theoretical tenets underlining this thesis, i.e. performativity programme 
in social studies of science and new institutional theory in organisational analysis. 
While there is a common thread cutting through Part 1, which is the study of 
processes of economization, the two theoretical programmes bear different 
ontological assumptions about agency and the mechanisms of circulation (e.g. 
translation versus diffusion, differences versus similarities/standards).  
However, since both differences and similarities are found at empirical level (e.g. 
different calculative practices, different funding arrangements, but still similar 
calculative tools, similar frames etc.), both performativity and new institutionalism 
can contribute to provide a coherent interpretation of innovation. Again, this trait 
d’union does not imply an ‘abstract’ coherence between the two sets of literature that 
we just mentioned. It rather stems from a “coherent re-construction of the case”, and 
is motivated by a “pluralistic use of theory [that] remain[s] empirically responsible 
to the case” (Ibid., p. 116). 
2.3.2   The process of data analysis 
The move form evidence to theory is by no means a linear trajectory. Rather it 
involves a sort of progressive enmeshment between evidence and theory. The 
process of data analysis has been informed to Reed’s (2011) idea that a pluralistic 
use of theory has to remain “empirically responsible to the case” and its coherence 
does not derive necessarily from the abstract coherence of the sets of theories. As 
discussed in the following, the analysis has been conducted in two stages, proceeding 
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from a first level broad thematization of the material to a second level theory-laden 
interpretation.   
The first stage unveiled the substratum of meanings elicited and gathered during 
the interviews. Themes were created by using at first a (light touch) narrative 
analysis approach (Czarniawska 2004; B. Czarniawska 1997). This approach enabled 
the researcher to look at interviews’ text as “inscriptions of social interactions” 
(Czarniawska 2004, p. 55) and helped to account for participants’ narratives. This 
approach was combined with an intellectual interest for the material and social 
aspects of accounting and innovation. This means that the analysis of the interview 
material focused on those processes of listing, enumerating, prioritising that in turn 
lead to the creation of “things that hold together and that […] have objectified 
properties” (i.e. materialities) (Callon & Muniesa, 2005, p. 1233).  
With regard to this thesis, when a finance director talks about the “financial 
model” that he has contributed to create, he is talking of something that is ‘material’. 
To clarify, financial models do not necessarily possess physicality (although strictly 
speaking they do inhabit some kind of physical space such as software, papers, etc.), 
but they are rendered ‘material’ when the financial director and the accountant define 
and list the properties of the models. They do so while discussing about the model in 
board meetings, and yet while compiling spreadsheets that show occupancy rates, 
income from rental, etc. In other words spreadsheets, graphs, numbers contribute to 
inscribing (Latour 1987) specific frames (e.g. conservativism) into the model and in 
so doing they create a “thing that holds together” and that can be transported across 
board meetings, used, drawn upon. Financial models are therefore an example of 
how devices can be both material and social, without necessarily having physicality. 
During the process of analysis the effort was to trace numbers and graphs not only 
directly in documents, but also indirectly in participants’ oral accounts of 
materialities (e.g. numbers, practices, etc.), i.e. materialities as described and 
interpreted by them.  
Practically, this process involved creating for each interview a document 
containing four columns like the excerpt provided in Figure 2.2 below. The first 
column presented the transcript from the interview. In this column, those parts with 
an interesting content were highlighted. As showed in Figure 2.2, expressions such as 
“targets”, “75%”, “right environment” were highlighted to draw the attention on 
possible sources of materiality and frames. The second column was devoted to 
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describe/follow the narrative moments of the interview such as: “listing”, 
“evaluating”, “classifying”, “creating solutions”, “introducing characters”, 
“referencing” to mention a few. The third column encapsulated/condensed (Rossman 
and Rallis 2003)  in concise wording those interesting parts. The fourth column was 
devoted to coding, and this will be discussed below in explaining the second stage of 
my process of data analysis. 
 
Figure 2.2: Excerpt from analysis spreadsheet (#20) 
 
The second stage linked each theme to broader theoretical concerns/concepts, 
which in turn were reflected in the theoretical framework that presented in part 1 of 
this chapter. At least three broad themes emerged from the second order analysis.  
The first theme aimed to capture the ontological dimension of accounting. In other 
words the theme accounted for the multiple nature of the forms of quantification 
found in the field and for the variety of meanings that actors attached to them. For 
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example, in the context of a technology incubator, indicators such as the number of 
tenants/companies that have the potential to generate intellectual properties acts in 
some cases as a measure of quality and in other cases as a measure of innovation. 
The theme was meant to capture this sort of multiplicities.  
The second theme aimed to go beyond the nature of quantifications themselves, 
and looked at the mechanisms by which they ‘travel’ across different organizational 
and institutional domains and organise financial (and non-financial) resources around 
them. For example, as also discussed in Chapter 5, by aggregating data about 
research commercialization (e.g. number of spinouts, number of invention 
disclosures, etc.) universities and the Higher Education Statistics Agency (HESA) in 
the UK are able to make decisions about the allocation of innovation public funding. 
The third theme was related to the discursive and recurrent elements 
characterising the multiple forms of accounting found in the field. The theme, 
dubbed as ‘calculative frames’, aims to capture all those “analogies, categorizations, 
and choices of metrics” (Beunza and Garud 2007, p. 33) mobilised by actors in the 
act of calculating. As discussed in Chapter 6, incubators ontology seems to be shaped 
by multiple (and sometimes conflicting) programmes (e.g. public intervention frame, 
investment frame, quality frame, etc.) that are linked to distinctive ways of 
measuring performances within incubators.  
Analytical memos were prepared for each interview to discuss the main narratives 
emerging from the analysis. Linking to the themes discussed above, each interview 
was supposed to contribute to our understanding of multiple forms of accounting 
(e.g. performance measures, valuations), of what they express about their ontologies 
(e.g. what frames they inscribe, what effects they have), of what 
programmes/discourses lay hidden behind them (e.g. marketization, economization, 
etc.). 
Conclusion 
This thesis investigates the entanglements between innovation, as a phenomenon, 
and the economy by attending to the role that accounting plays in economizing 
innovation.  In the context of this thesis, economizing means to translate the entities 
of innovation (e.g. new technologies, incubation projects, new scientific ideas, new 
drugs) into economic entities that possess economic value(s), that is into entities that 
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can circulate and be exchanged within the economy precisely because of that 
economic value(s).   
Given the relevance of economizing processes in the context of this thesis, 
Chapter 2 discussed the theoretical and methodological issues, and research methods, 
involved in studying such processes. Building on Reed’s idea (Reed 2011, p. 103) of 
a pluralistic use of theory where different pieces of theories can be used to illuminate 
different aspects of a phenomenon, the chapter discussed the relevance of two 
sociological framework to the study of economization, namely  new institutional 
theory and the performativity programme in social studies of science and technology. 
Part 1 analysed the two literatures on issues such as agency, mechanisms of 
circulation, and conceptualization of accounting. 
The chapter concluded that although the performativity programme constitutes the 
main approach adopted in the thesis, also new institutional theory can shed light on 
specific aspects of economizing innovation. In this regard, it was argued that while 
the process of configuring the economic entities of innovation gives rise to 
multiplicity and differences in practices of valuing and assessing innovation; at the 
same time patterns and similarities can arise too, such as the regularities in the 
mechanisms for attributing and organising economic action within the field of 
innovation.  
Chapter 3 will discuss the historical and political context and the conditions of 
possibilities that gave rise to innovation as a problematic of government. The chapter 
will show how the space of interrelation between university and industry became a 
“laboratory” where the government has experimented with programmes for 
promoting and decentralising innovation, while maintaining at a distance control 
through mandated calculations and accounting devices.  
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CHAPTER  3  LINKING SCIENCE, 
ECONOMY, AND THE STATE: THE 
EMERGENCE OF UNIVERSITY-INDUSTRY 
INTERRELATIONS 
 
 
 
Introduction 
The programmes for transferring innovation from university to industry and for 
incubating innovation that will be analysed in the empirical chapters (i.e. Chapters 4, 
5, and 6) and the forms of accounting mobilised to control innovation in those 
settings are not merely organisational phenomena. On the contrary, they are co-
produced by a series of historical, economic, and political conditions that transcend 
the domain of the organisation. This chapter aims to show that the sources of changes 
in the instruments for controlling innovation can be better understood only by linking 
organisational practices to broader changes in governmental rationalities. Changes in 
the accounting tools are often influenced, as Callon (1998b) noted, by the role of the 
State in the economy. Legal frameworks, innovation policies, intellectual property 
regimes are examples of how the State can intervene in the space of innovation and 
shape how calculative agency is equipped and formatted.  
 The historical conditions for the emergence of discourses on the 
commercialisation of academic research and the rise of university-industry 
interrelations as a domain of governmental intervention are traced across the 
interconnected arenas of economic theory and innovation policy making in the UK. 
The chapter aims to contextualize the escalating political emphasis on innovation and 
R&D that has characterised the political discourses in the UK from the 1970s 
onwards. 
95 
 
First, the chapter will attend to different academic traditions within the arena of 
economics, and their influence on policy-making. The British economy of the past 
decades has been portrayed in economic analyses as only slowly closing the gap in 
productivity with North America and much of Western Europe (Broadberry and 
O'Mahony 2007). Besides cross-countries productivity and economic growth 
differences have been the object of extensive empirical and theoretical work within 
macro-economics for decades. Different schools of thought in economics have 
conceptualized the relation between technological progress and economic growth of 
nations in different ways. Where neoclassical model of economic growth (Solow 
1956) treats technological progress as an exogenous variable, endogenous growth 
models (Romer 1994; Grossman and Helpman 1994) conceive of technological 
progress as endogenous variable. In simpler terms, in the neoclassical theory of 
growth technology is deemed to improve for reasons outside the economic system 
and it is independent from economic forces. Technology progress is considered –as 
vividly noted by Baruch Lev- like “manna from heaven” (Lev 2001). In endogenous 
growth models instead technology progress is generated through forces which are 
internal to the economic system (e.g. learning by doing, spill-overs, etc.).  
The chapter will attend to such different conceptualisations not so much because 
they lead to different explanations of temporal and cross-countries differences in the 
rates of economic growth, but because they entail different ideas of State intervention 
on matters of innovation, technological progress, and economic growth. In fact, 
although both schools –neoclassical and endogenous growth- take into account R&D 
and innovation in their models of growth, only post-neoclassical endogenous growth 
theory stresses the role that State policies have in increasing economic growth rates, 
particularly through the creation of opportunities and incentives for innovation 
(Crafts 1996). This fundamental difference between the two models has had a strong 
impact on the ways in which science policies have been conceived from the 1950s 
until the first decade of 2000s. However, the design of innovation policies was not 
only influenced by highly formalized neoclassical and endogenous growth 
economics. Other traditions in economics, such as evolutionary and institutional 
economics (Fagerberg 1994; Nelson and Winter 2009; Lundvall 1992), which are 
classified as heterodox also for their use of historical and narrative accounts as 
opposed to highly formal/mathematical approaches (Nelson 1994), contributed to 
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influencing policy making toward the end of 1990s and throughout the first decade of 
2000s. 
Second, the chapter will look at the emergence of university and industry 
interrelations as a significant area where the set of concerns about productivity and 
economic growth has been addressed, and where programmatic solutions have 
continuously been created and tested. While holding that the emergence of 
discourses on the commercialisation of public-funded science entered the political 
agenda predominantly from the 1980s onward, the chapter will identify a number of 
conditions and events that facilitated this emergence. First, against a background of 
privatization and public sector reforms, the 1980s witnessed a progressive shift from 
a centralised model of governing technology transfer to a more competitive-oriented 
and decentralised style. This shift was evidenced by the end, in 1985, of the State’s 
monopoly of intellectual property (IP) arising from universities and public research 
establishments. From a domain of direct intervention technology transfer 
progressively became a domain to be regulated ‘at a distance’. At a distance control 
meant that British Governments from the 1980s onward attributed the ownership of 
IP, arising from public-funded research, to universities while letting industry free to 
negotiate licence terms to exploit IP and, where it was the case, to let industry free to 
negotiate ownership over IP (Lambert 2003). Second, a progressive shift in the 
principles for governing the allocation of public funding to science (e.g. the 1971 
Rothschild contractor-customer principle) together with regimes of increased 
accountability created the conditions for linking via formulae the allocation of 
funding to science performances. Through mandated calculations, such as those 
implemented within the context of research assessment exercises, technology transfer 
became progressively visible and amenable to government control. Third, the late 
1990s witnessed the establishment of the so-called “third mission” of universities to 
the aim of embedding “wealth creation” in universities’ objectives, alongside the 
long-established missions of research and teaching. By linking the third mission to a 
“third leg” of funding, which was allocated on the basis of university innovation 
performances, the Government created intendedly (House of Commons Trade and 
Industry Committee 2003) the basis for increased competition “between people, 
academics and technology transfer offices.”  
The fact that innovation and public science commercialization have become the 
subject of political and economic concern was not something necessary or self-
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evident. An extensive work of problematization –to which (macro) economics have 
actively contributed- has taken place by linking technological progress and 
innovation to economic growth. At the same time problematizing innovation in terms 
of productivity and economic growth meant also a shift in the role played by the 
State in the arena of research commercialization from 1950s onward. This chapter 
shows that a major shift was from direct intervention and control over scientific ideas 
–through the British Technology Group- toward exerting control at a distance. The 
latter role saw the State as an actor that contributed to the shaping of networks of 
people, ideas, and things (e.g. economists, accountants, scientists, research funding 
mechanisms, research assessment criteria, formula-based funding, patent law, etc.). 
Furthermore economics was also involved in designing the role of the State in the 
space of innovation. It did so by promoting models (e.g. “endogenous growth 
theory”, “triple helix”, “national systems of innovation”) in which the State, together 
with other institutions such as University and Industry, actively contributed toward 
the construction of the so called “knowledge economy”(Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff 
1995; Lundvall 1992).  
The next section will set science and innovation policies from 1950s onward in 
the context of the academic and political debate that has surrounded economic 
growth and productivity. The next section will also make the case that the emergence 
of science commercialization in political discourses is to be rooted into different –
formal versus appreciative and orthodox versus heterodox- interpretations of the 
causes of economic growth and the role of technological progress. Subsequently, the 
chapter will show how different ways of framing science, technology and innovation 
in economic theory have been providing the rationales behind the programmes for 
governing innovation. From 1950s until 2000s the UK witnessed a shift from 
programmes labelled as “short-termist” and “ring-fenced” toward programmes aimed 
at incentivising innovation and technology transfer through regimes of increased 
competition and accountability. Finally, the chapter will show how this shift implied 
new forms of governance and new forms of State control over economic agencies 
and innovation. 
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3.1    The role of economic theory in the linking of 
technology progress, economic growth, and 
governmental concerns 
“How the knowledge behaves as an economic resource we 
do not yet fully understand. […] We need an economic 
theory that puts knowledge into the centre of the wealth-
producing process. Such a theory alone can explain the 
present economy. It alone can explain economic growth. It 
alone can explain innovation.” 
–Peter Drucker (1993, p. 67) 
Neoclassical versus endogenous theories of growth 
Differences in the explanation of countries’ rates of growth depend on the economic 
theory under consideration. In neoclassical settings the rate of technological progress 
is treated exogenously, which means that technology –or knowledge- is assumed to 
proceed independently of forces within the economy (e.g. learning by doing, spill-
overs, etc.). The underlying assumption is that technology is driven by scientific 
processes whose direction and pace are largely independent of economic incentives 
(e.g. subsidies to R&D investments). Moreover, in neoclassical settings, technology 
is conceptualized as a public good accessible by all countries (Fagerberg 1994, p. 
1149). On the basis of such assumptions neoclassical theory of growth explains the 
growth in output by attending to the growth in the state of technology. Nevertheless 
criticism was raised as to the rates of technology growth, which cannot alone explain 
the full contribution of technological change to the expansion of the output of a 
country (Grossman and Helpman 1994, p. 31). As the economist Christopher 
Freeman (1982) observed, in a typical pre-war (and many post-war) economics 
textbook the effects of innovation and R&D on the growth of national economies 
was a neglected area, while technological change was treated as a black box that 
“needed not to be opened” (Ibid., p. 195). 
From the 1950s neoclassical theory of growth together with its set of assumptions 
about technology and innovation (i.e. technology as exogenous and as a ‘free’ good) 
translated into a style of policy making which scarcely considered technology 
transfer as a problem. According to Freeman (1982), science and innovation policy 
in the 1950s was characterized by an over-emphasis on ‘big science and technology’ 
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(e.g. defence, space, and nuclear sectors). In this respect, Crafts (1996) noted that 
technology policy in the 1950s concentrated unduly on promoting radical 
innovations and too little on facilitating the diffusion of improvements and enhancing 
technology transfer.  
In the decades from 1950s to 1970s, research commercialization, through 
technology transfer and incubation, was not part of the policy machinery mobilized 
by the UK government, yet. According to Crafts (Ibid.) two were the main features 
of British supply-side policy characterising the years of rapid relative economic 
decline between the 1950s and the 1970s: 
“First, the poor targeting of subsidies to investment and, second, the 
failure effectively to tackle questions of institutional reform. These 
weaknesses did not go completely unrecognized but governments were 
generally too weak or too short-termist to address them” (Crafts 1996, p. 
42) 
Neoclassical theory of growth, as formulated by Solow, had according to some 
scholars (Grossman and Helpman 1994) dominated economists' thinking about long 
term economic growth rates for more than three decades from 1950s until 1980s.  
It was in the early 1990s with the work of a number of economists (Romer 1994; 
Aghion and Howitt 1992; Grossman and Helpman 1994) on endogenous growth 
models that neoclassical growth theory started to be challenged. The endogenous 
growth models started to lay down the macroeconomic foundations of the so-called 
knowledge economy (Floud and Johnson 2004). In the summer of 1998, in Pebble 
Beach California, during a roundtable organised by Bank of America (“The soft 
revolution: achieving growth by managing intangibles”) the economist Paul Romer 
exemplified to an audience of practitioners/entrepreneurs the rationale behind 
endogenous growth theory: 
“How can it be that we are wealthier today than people were 100 years 
ago? […] There’s only one explanation for this increase in wealth. We 
took this raw material that was available to us and rearranged it in ways 
that made it more valuable. […] What lies underneath this process of 
rearrangement are instructions, formulas, recipes, methods of doing 
things – the things accountants classify as intangible assets if they 
recognize them at all. They tell us how to take something that is not very 
valuable and rearrange it into a new configuration that is more valuable.” 
(Romer 1998, p. 9, emphasis added) 
The idea emerging from Romer’s words is that increases in growth (and wealth) can 
only be explained by the value produced through the processes of rearranging things 
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into new configurations. Based on this idea, endogenous growth models challenged 
the neoclassical assumptions where technology is independent of economic forces 
and technological opportunities are the same across countries. While arguing that 
technological progress can take the form of new products, processes, and markets –
many of which result from economic activities- endogenous growth proponents set to 
investigate the channels through which the rate of technological progress, can be 
influenced by economic factors (Howitt 2002). For example, technological progress, 
it was argued, can be influenced by economic policies (e.g. competition, trade, 
education, taxes, and intellectual properties) which in turn affect the private costs and 
benefits of doing and investing in R&D (Howitt 2002).  
Given the recognition attributed by endogenous growth theory to State economic 
policies as a lever for influencing both country’s technological progress and rate of 
economic growth, the step toward linking governmental programmes to endogenous 
growth theory was closing. This link became visible in the autumn of 1994 when the 
then Shadow Chancellor Gordon Brown referred in his speech to “post-neoclassical 
endogenous growth theory” (Coyle 1999). Brown’s call for a new wave of thinking 
in Labour’s growth policy pointed to endogenous growth theory as the possible 
solution to the “relative” slowdown in UK macroeconomic trend (Snowdon 2002).  
The point was also reinforced by the then Prime Minister Tony Blair when in his 
speech in 1997 set out “Education, education, education” as one of the core priorities 
of the ‘New’ Labour’s education manifesto (Floud and Johnson 2004).  
By mid-2000s the idea of a knowledge economy in which growth is generated and 
sustained through investments not just in physical assets, but in ‘intangible’ assets 
such as education, R&D, and knowledge, seemed to pervade national science 
policies. It was during a debate on innovation policy, held in winter 2007 at the 
House of Commons, that the linkage with endogenous growth theory was renewed: 
“The [post-neoclassical endogenous growth] theory […] saw subsidies 
for research and development and for education increasing the growth 
rate in an endogenous way by—this is the main point for our debate—
increasing the incentive to innovate. That amazing idea, which linked 
those areas with the economy, is now pervasive in the Treasury” 
(House of Commons 24 January 2007, Col. 489WH, emphasis added) 
The influence of endogenous growth theory on policy making has been evidenced 
by some scholars  (Kitson and Wilkinson 2007) within economics. In their study 
Kitson and Wilkinson analyse how endogenous growth theory has informed the 
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economic policies of Labour Governments in late 1990s/early 2000s (HM Treasury 
2000). According to the authors, endogenous growth models passed the idea that “if 
you identify and target key areas of an economy then long-term growth can be 
improved – and the key areas are usually linked to knowledge, including educations, 
skills and research and development (R&D)” (Ibid.,  p. 808). As it will be discussed 
later in the chapter, Labour’s 1998 White Paper (Department of Trade and Industry 
1998) identified the key ‘drivers’/areas to economic growth to be skills and human 
capital, enterprise, innovation, competition, and investment. The choice of the skills 
and human capital driver was justified in a paper published by HM Treasury in 2000 
as follows: 
 “[i]mproving skills and human capital is important in promoting growth, 
both as an input to production and by aiding technological progress. This 
has been recognised both in endogenous theory of growth and also in 
empirical studies comparing growth in different countries” (HM Treasury 
2000, p. 32) 
However, endogenous growth models were subjected to criticism for “retaining 
many of the restrictive assumptions associated with neoclassical economics” such as 
the assumptions of market efficiency and of rational utility maximization. More 
recently some economists wondered what happened to endogenous growth models 
after their surge in the 1990s and came to the conclusion that such models were only 
an “intellectual bubble” (Krugman 2013). 
An assessment of whether endogenous growth theory survived in the political 
discourses and whether the “soft revolution” (Romer 1998) long argued by the 
economist Peter Romer effectively took place goes beyond the scope of the present 
chapter. Nevertheless, the history of accounting for intangible assets (Lev 2001) and 
the history of endogenous growth theory crossed their paths in the context of the 
1994 Bank of America Roundtable. Since then, endogenous growth theory seemed to 
rely on developments in accounting for intellectual capital, given that intellectual 
capital is a key factor in endogenous growth theories. The success (or lack of 
success) of endogenous growth theory might have been therefore related to the 
ability of accounting to capture the value of intangibles. Moreover, the narrative turn 
in accounting for the intellectual resources of the firm, i.e. intellectual capital 
statements, is also paralleled by the narrative turn in economics and the rise of the 
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evolutionary and institutional approaches to growth theory, which will be discussed 
in the next section. 
The emergence of the evolutionary and institutional approach 
in the study of economic growth 
In the 1980s, parallel to the development of formal approaches to economic growth 
such as neoclassical growth theory, other forms of theorizing the relation between 
innovation/technological progress and economic growth were put forward. 
Evolutionary theory of economic growth first emerged in the early 1980s (Nelson 
and Winter 1982) as part of the so-called “heterodox” economics, as opposed to 
neoclassical “orthodox” economics (Lawson 2006). In the evolutionary approach 
technical advance was treated as an evolutionary process in which ex-post selection, 
provided by market environments, determines winners and losers (Nelson 1994). 
They held that technology and know-how is embedded in organizational structures 
(e.g. firms, networks, institutions, etc.) and it is often difficult to transform from one 
setting to another (Fagerberg 1994).  
Evolutionary and institutional approaches in economics started to appear within 
the British political arena in the second half of 2000s, and challenged the influence 
that neoclassical and endogenous growth theories had on policy-making (PACEC 
2009). If on the one hand the ideas furthered with endogenous growth theory entailed 
an active role of the State in modifying, through policies, private costs/benefits of 
R&D and incentivizing innovation; on the other hand national systems of innovation 
adopted an eco-system approach which included in the analysis of growth not only 
the State, but also Universities and other institutions. According to a study 
commissioned by the Higher Education Funding Council for England (PACEC 
2009), evolutionary theory and national systems of innovation approaches have been 
informing UK innovation policy making in 2000s: 
“Evolutionary and systems approaches to innovation policy have been 
increasingly emphasised in UK government thinking. This is most 
apparent in the Innovation Nation White Paper (DIUS 2008) and in the 
Sainsbury Report The Race to the Top (Sainsbury 2007). The Sainsbury 
Report explicitly adopted a systems approach and identified a national 
innovation eco-system as central to the elements determining the 
country’s innovation rate.” (Ibid., p. 24)  
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Overall, the emergence of institutional and evolutionary economics’ approaches to 
innovation policies in the late 1980s (Godin 2007) was at the heart of innovation 
policy-making across the 2000’s (DIUS and BERR 2008; Lord Sainsbury 2007). The 
relevance of this passage, in the context of this thesis, lies in the fact that adopting an 
eco-system approach meant a re-thinking of the role of universities. Universities 
started to be conceptualised as part of a system together with the government and the 
industry. As shown in Figure 3.1 below, the eco-system was defined to include:  
“industrial research, publicly funded basic research, user-driven research, 
knowledge transfer, institutions governing intellectual property (IP) and 
standards, supply of venture capital, education and training of scientists 
and engineers, innovation policies of government departments, science 
and innovation policies of RDAs [Research Development Agencies], and 
international scientific and technological collaboration.”  (PACEC 2009, 
p. 24) 
Figure 3.1 highlights how knowledge and intellectual property emanating from 
universities, public sector research establishments, and private sector research 
organisations are treated as input resources to large, medium, and small size firms. 
Thus, following this representation, only firms can produce innovations. 
 
Figure 3.1: The innovation eco-system 
Source: (House of Commons Science and Technology Committee 2013, p.11) 
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Institutional and evolutionary economics informed the innovation policies of the 
last two decades, particularly those policies that led to the emergence of the 
university third mission and university third stream funding (PACEC 2009). Third 
mission was concerned with wealth creation (alongside with the traditional missions 
of research and teaching), while third stream funding was aimed at supporting 
initiatives which would lead to wealth creation (e.g. knowledge and technology 
transfer activities). Institutional and evolutionary economics approaches to 
innovation also challenged the view of neoclassical economics on the ground of State 
intervention. They argued that the motivation that was usually drawn upon by 
neoclassical scholars to justify State intervention on matters of innovation was the 
one of market failure. The standard neoclassical view is explained by the Deputy 
Vice-chancellor of a top-ranked British university as follows: 
"It is pretty clear from an analysis of the technological change that there 
are lot of circumstances where pieces of useful technology get partially 
created in universities, but there is a serious market failure between that 
point and the opportunity for existing incumbent companies to 
commercialize that technology probably either because there is 
asymmetric information and they do not know that the technology 
exists or because the technology is immature so they might not be able to 
assess the commercial value properly or both." (#14 – emphases added) 
Market failure, information asymmetry, and the difficulty to assess the value of a 
technology provide the frames for actors to make sense of the reason why a 
university should commercialise research. Besides, the University has a “moral” 
justification to intervene where the market fails, as the Deputy Vice-chancellor 
explains: 
"If you take the view that one of the things that university can do is 
contribute to society [...] And what the university can do is to take some 
modest measures to move the technology forward a little further to the 
point where its commercial value becomes evident to somebody out there 
and then the market will operate and someone will pick up that piece of 
technology and do something with it. So it is about bridging that gap" 
(#14 -emphasis added) 
From the words of the Deputy Vice-chancellor it is noticeable that moving from the 
policy arenas to the arena of universities the frame used to justify technology transfer 
and incubation activities conceptualizes markets as the main institutional set-up and 
universities as intervening only when the market ‘fails’. While criticising this view, 
institutional economic scholars argue that: 
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"Standard [neoclassical] economics will tend to see the market as the 
'natural', if not optimal, framework of human interactions and economic 
transactions. This leads to biased conclusions when considering how to 
organize the economy (Nelson, 2006). The concept of 'market failure' 
reflects this bias since it indicates that the other institutional set-ups 
should be considered only when it is obvious that the market cannot do 
the job." (Lundvall 2010, p. 333) 
Overall, the quotes above signal that institutional and evolutionary economics 
encountered obstacles in translating into the everyday practices of universities. The 
neoclassical ideas of market failures and State intervention as a last resort seem to be 
still embedded in the culture of universities. At the same time the ‘battle of ideas’ 
between neoclassical and innovation system approaches has recently come to the fore 
in the course of a public inquiry on “bridging the valley of death” in the 
commercialisation of public science (House of Commons Science and Technology 
Committee 2013). In that context, Research Councils UK (and others) stressed the 
idea of innovation as a system, while rejecting the idea of a single point of failure 
where State intervention is required: 
“Research Councils UK consider that there is no single point of 
failure—or “Valley of Death”—that affects the whole innovation 
system, but sector by sector there are a number of different aspects where 
there can be insufficient progress towards impact. […] In order to ensure 
that the innovation ecosystem is highly effective it is important to address 
the full range of factors including funding, regulation and cohesion of 
different sectors working across actual or perceived boundaries.” (Ibid., 
ev. 174, emphasis added). 
In conclusion, this section proposes that it was on the grounds of economic 
growth and productivity that political discourses and the commercialisation of public 
science became linked. Different ways of conceptualising the relation between 
economic growth and technological progress in macroeconomic theory have 
contributed to constructing the different roles that the State has come to play within 
the space of innovation. The dominance of neoclassical theory of growth in the past 
decades has somewhat been challenged since the early 1990s by the rise of 
endogenous theories of growth. While providing the macroeconomic foundations of 
the so-called knowledge economy, endogenous growth theories stressed the impact of 
knowledge and intellectual capital on economic growth and the role of the State in 
incentivizing innovation.  In 2000s, the emergence of narrative approaches to 
innovation and economic growth have informed governmental programmes and 
contributed to re-define the role that institutions (e.g. the State and University) play 
106 
 
within the economy. Furthermore, the last decades developments in economics were 
also paralleled by new developments in accounting. An illustrative example here is 
the rise in the 1990s of accounting for intangible assets and the attempt to link the 
latter to endogenous growth theory (Lev 2001; Romer 1998). Yet, the emergence of 
appreciative or narrative approaches in economic theories of growth (e.g. national 
system of innovation, evolutionary theory, etc.) developed concomitantly with the 
emergence of narrative approaches in accounting for intellectual capital (e.g. 
intellectual capital statement).  
The next section will discuss how the interplays between economics, science and 
governmental actors translated into policies and programmes for incentivizing the 
commercialisation of public science. The next section will also identify a set of 
economic and political conditions that facilitated the emergence of technology 
transfer and technology incubation programmes and practices in the UK. 
3.2    Science policy and the emergence of 
technology transfer and incubation programmes 
in the UK 
Technology transfer and technology incubation – and more generally civil R&D- 
were not on the political agenda in the two decades spanning the 1950s to the 1970s 
(Crafts 1996). British science policies in the 1960s and the 1970s was mainly 
concerned with subsidizing physical investments while building the infrastructure for 
big science and technology projects (e.g. defence, nuclear etc.) in order to compete 
internationally (Ergas 1987). Conversely, the diffusion and transfer of technology to 
domestic companies within existing patterns of specialization was not pursued by 
British Governments at that time (Hall and Rosenberg 2010). The transfer of 
technology outside of defence-related projects together with investments –not only in 
physical capital- but also in human capital and education started to appear in the 
political agenda of 1980s and 1990s (Crafts 1996). This section will analyse how 
technology transfer and incubation activities progressively emerged as a result of the 
changing role of the State within the arena of science and technology. As it will be 
shown, such changes implied reconstructing universities as active actors in the 
economy, capable to contribute to economic growth by controlling at a distance the 
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commercial exploitation of public-funded science. Decentralising the 
commercialisation of research from the State to universities on the one hand meant a 
series of policies of intervention (Department of Trade and Industry 1998; 
Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster 1993; DIUS and BERR 2008; House of 
Commons Science and Technology Committee 2013; Lambert 2003) aimed at 
incentivizing universities and industry to collaborate (e.g. Teaching Company 
Scheme, LINK, Foresight, Higher Education Innovation Fund, etc.); on the other 
hand it meant exerting control at distance through devices such as Research 
Selectivity Exercise (1989, 1992), Research Assessment Exercise (1996, 2001, 2008) 
with the purpose of linking public funding to science performances.  
From the 1980s until the 2000s the role of the State shifted from one of directly 
intervening in the commercialisation of academic research by means of agencies 
such as the British Technology Group, to a more ‘distant’ role with universities in 
charge of intellectual property (IP) management. This meant that the government, 
while still regulating the space of innovation through national policies, began to exert 
control over research commercialisation ‘at a distance’. This form of control was 
made possible also through practices such as the formula-based funding device 
which links financial resources, such as innovation, and business interactions funds, 
to mechanisms of accountability such as research assessment exercises and surveys 
(a more detailed account is provided in Chapter 5). Furthermore, the transition from a 
centralised to a more decentralised system for managing/commercialising IP rights 
(arising from academic research) was also paralleled by a shift in the underlying 
economic models of innovation and economic growth (e.g. neoclassical, endogenous, 
and evolutionary models). The rhetoric of knowledge economy which pervaded the 
1990s was substantiated by macro-economic models that emphasized the role of 
State policies in incentivizing innovation and technological progress (Romer 1994; 
Crafts 1996). The same rhetoric continued to spread during the 2000s backed this 
time by more ‘appreciative’ (or narrative/historical) approaches, which regarded 
technology and know-how as embedded in organisational structures such as 
networks, firms and institutions (Lundvall 1992; Freeman 1991; Etzkowitz and 
Leydesdorff 1995; Nelson 1993). Within this group of studies not only was the dyad 
industry-government involved in commercialising public science, but also 
universities were conceptualised as central actors. All these events, i.e. the changes 
in intellectual property management and in macro-economic models, can be better 
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understood if set against an economic context –the one of the 1980s and 1990s- 
characterised by fluctuating economic growth, regimes of competition and increased 
accountability toward the use of public resources. 
The key events, policies and programmes timelined in Figure 3.2 created the 
conditions for the emergence of technology transfer and incubation in the UK. The 
section will be organised as follows. First, the implications of the end of State 
monopoly on intellectual properties arising from universities and public sector 
research establishments will be discussed. Second, a discussion of the changes in the 
principles governing the funding of public science in the UK will be provided. Third, 
the rationales and programmes underlying two influential White Papers produced by 
the Conservative Government in 1993 and Labour Government in 1998 will be 
presented. Finally, the section will discuss the rise of the third mission of 
universities. The rise of technology transfer and incubation in the UK was therefore 
facilitated by a series of changes rooted in 1980s’ transition to neo-liberal rationales 
of government (e.g. end of monopoly, privatizations), and in late 1990s’ turn to post-
neoclassical economic rationales. The latter contributed to re-configuring the role of 
the State as one of providing economic incentives through policies.  
 
Figure 3.2: A timeline of key events, science policies and programmes 
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From centralisation to competition in research 
commercialisation programmes 
Programmes for transferring technologies arising from publicly funded research were 
first initiated in Britain after WWII –in 1949- with the establishment of the National 
Research Development Corporation (NRDC), whose aim was to protect with patents 
and then transfer the technology arising from British defence R&D to civil 
applications (Addison and Jones 2008). At that time, central planning, monopoly and 
direct State intervention were the rationales informing technology transfer in the UK. 
However, as Ergas (1987) pointed out, British style of technology policy was mainly 
“mission-oriented” and aimed at identifying and solving ‘big problems’ of defence, 
health and education to strive for international leadership. While technology policy 
was less oriented toward assisting domestic firms in competing internationally 
through the diffusion and transfer of technology, as it was instead the case in 
Germany. 
In 1981 NRDC merged with the National Enterprise Board (established in 1975 as 
part of British industrial reconstruction programmes) to form the British Technology 
Group (BTG).  BTG was a non-statutory body whose objectives consisted in 
obtaining ideas and inventions from universities, Government research 
establishments, private companies and individuals, in funding their development up 
to the stage where they become globally patented, and in licensing the resulting 
intellectual property to industry worldwide while gaining an income from such 
activity. In order to pursue these objectives BTG was given right of first refusal on 
intellectual property rights arising from publicly funded research. Such arrangement 
dates back to the 1940s –before BTG was established, when the National Research 
and Development Corporation was given the right of first refusal on the intellectual 
property arising from publicly funded research (Connor 1984).   
In 1985 the monopoly of the commercialisation of publicly funded research held 
by BTG came to an end. This event constituted a first step toward decentralising the 
commercialisation of technology from the State to British universities. This passage 
–as it is often the case- did not happen automatically and if on the one hand a part of 
universities and other public sector organisations begun to exploit their own 
scientific ideas through industrial companies, on the other hand the flow of 
inventions from universities to BTG increased (HC Deb 12 February 1991). In 1991, 
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amidst the wave of privatizations and public sector reforms put forward by the 
Conservative Governments, BTG became privatised. The decision was made –not 
without criticism (HC Deb 12 February 1991)- on the ground that, according to then 
Minister of Corporate Affairs, the transfer to the private sector: 
“would rid [BGT] of restrictions on borrowing powers, obligations to 
submit investments for approval by the Department of Trade and Industry 
and remove the requirement that the salaries of its chairman and chief 
executive should be agreed with my Department and the Treasury” (HC 
Deb 12 February 1991, , col. 735) 
In the late 1990s and early 2000s the Labour Governments’ policies on 
technology transfer progressively moved away from the centralised model of 
managing intellectual properties arising from public-funded research toward a model 
based on competition where university and industry could negotiate the terms of 
collaboration –and technology transfer- agreements. In 2003 the Lambert Review on 
Business-University collaboration was commissioned by the government in order to 
review existing practices in university-industry collaboration and make suggestions 
for future developments. The review paved the way toward a decentralised model of 
managing intellectual property (IP) generated during collaborations: 
“The Review […] suggests that where public funding is involved, this 
starting point should be for universities to own any resulting IP, subject 
to certain conditions. For its part, industry should be free to negotiate 
licence terms to exploit it. When industry has made a significant 
contribution to the research, then business should be able to negotiate 
ownership of the resulting IP itself. The Review does not believe that the 
UK should introduce legislation giving ownership of IP to universities 
along the lines of the Bayh-Dole Act in the US” (Lambert 2003, p. 5) 
The new rationale underlying technology transfer was inspired to a principle of 
competition. The point was so illustrated in 2003 by the then Undersecretary of State 
at Department of Trade and Industry (i.e. Minister of Science): 
“I think that past experience says that centralisation is absolutely not the 
way to go. The one disastrous bit of history here was the NRDC 
[National Research and Development Corporation] where it was all 
centralised and there was a monopoly. NRDC had all the rights to 
exploitation and that was a complete disaster. I am actually more for 
competition on this and that is why I would always support technology 
transfer offices in universities not having a monopoly over things even 
within a university. I think there should be clear policies about how the 
benefits are shared across the university, but I think the more 
competition between people, between the academics and the technology 
111 
 
transfer offices is a good thing probably.” (House of Commons Trade and 
Industry Committee 2003, , par. 632, emphasis added) 
Organising technology transfer on the base of competition meant in the years ahead, 
–as the Minister of Science Lord Sainsbury of Turville himself explained (House of 
Commons Trade and Industry Committee 2003, par. 632), a shift in the allocation 
principles of public funding for technology transfer initiatives and the creation of a 
third leg of funding (besides funding for teaching and research) dedicated to 
innovation and technology transfer activities. The next section will discuss how the 
principles for allocating public funding to science have changed through time. 
Shifting rationales in public funding allocation to research 
The end of monopoly of BTG in 1985 occurred in the context of the neo-liberal 
reforms which took place under the Conservative Governments in the 1980s. In a 
political and economic landscape characterised by the privatization of public 
research establishments and following a “ministerial demand for more 
accountability” (Jump 2013), the UK University Grants Committee (i.e. a 
predecessor of the Higher Education Funding Council of England) made the decision 
in 1985 to establish a national system for the evaluation of research in universities. 
Where teaching funding was allocated on the basis of the number of students taught, 
prior to 1983, the criteria to allocate public funding for research, according to some, 
was not “clearly defined” (Jump 2013). Prior to 1983 in fact the criteria for allocating 
public funding for research were informed to the so called Haldane Principle. The 
principle was first suggested in Lord Haldane’s 1918 report (Ministry of 
Reconstruction 1918) and introduced the notion that “decisions about what to spend 
research funds on should be made by researchers rather than politicians” (House of 
Commons 2009, par. 138). In 1971 Rothschild report (1971) questioned the 
relevance of Haldane Report and put forward the so-called customer-contractor 
principle.  
The customer-contractor principle made the Government Department or 
Government Chief Scientist the ‘customer’ who commissioned ‘contractors’, the 
Research Councils and Universities, to do research (House of Commons 2009). It 
was based on the assumption that scientists “cannot decide what the needs of the 
nation are, and their priorities, as those responsible for ensuring those needs are 
112 
 
met” (Lord Rothschield 1971, par. 8). The principle did not go unnoticed and was 
subjected to criticism such as that voiced by the Agricultural Research Council: 
“The Council also noted that according to the Rothschild Report the 
major part of the ‘Research and Development’ work, i.e. ‘applied’ 
research should be done on a customer-contractor principle, as R & D is 
in the manufacturing industries. Unlike industrial research where one can 
set out a definite objective and time-limit, do a cost-feasibility study, 
assess customer demand and profit, and then continue research to the 
pilot plant stage, little if any research in the biomedical field can be done 
in this way” (Council of the Nutrition Society, 1971, p. 73) 
Despite the criticism, the customer-contractor principle informed Governments’ 
approach to the funding of public science from the 1970s onwards. The principle in 
fact guided Governments’ decision to establish clear objectives for expenditure,  to 
develop criteria for assessing and managing research, and to ask “research bodies to 
consider the  national benefits of their work in terms of commercial exploitation and 
economic impact” (House of Commons 2009, , par. 144).   
Against a backdrop of increased accountability toward public science, the then 
newly appointed chair of University Grants Committee –mathematician Peter 
Swinnerton Dyer- put in place in 1985 the first of a series of systems of evaluation, 
i.e. the Research Selectivity Assessment (1986, 1989, and 1992). In the mid-1990s the 
system would be replaced by the Research Assessment Framework (in 1996, 2001, 
and 2008) first and then by the Research Excellence Framework (2014). Although 
the processes and criteria behind such exercises/assessment will be analysed in 
Chapter 5, some illustrative example of how assessment worked is provided here.  
The Research Excellence Framework (REF) was carried out in 2014 to assess the 
research carried out in Higher Education Institutions between 2009 and 2013. REF 
was aimed at providing a quality judgment for each Higher Education Institution (i.e. 
university institution) and was eventually linked to the funding allocation process via 
formula-based funding.  
The overall quality judgment for each institution revolved around three main 
elements, namely outputs, impact, and environment. The system of weights assigned 
to outputs under REF defines research output in terms of “originality, significance 
and rigour” with reference to international research quality standards (HEFCE 2012, 
p. 6). This element carried a weighting of 65% in the overall outcome awarded to the 
institution. Yet, impact was assessed in terms of the “reach and significance” of 
impacts on economy, society and culture. Impact was assigned a weight of 20%. A 
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third element, environment, was defined in terms of “vitality and sustainability” of 
the research base, and was given a 15% weight. Overall research output was the one 
carrying the highest weight, i.e. 65%. This means that the quality expressed and 
measured in terms of research output (i.e. publications) carried the highest weight. 
Different assessment exercises carried different systems of weight. Chapter 5 will 
discuss how weights have been changing throughout the years, but overall the staple 
of these systems of evaluation introduced in the 1980s, is the underlying logic of 
competition that they deliberately aim to instil. A logic that is particularly evident in 
the formula-based funding which will be also discussed thoroughly in Chapter 5. 
Restructuring the public institutions of science 
In 1993 the “Realising our potential” White Paper (Chancellor of the Duchy of 
Lancaster 1993) was published under John Major’s Conservative government. The 
paper recognised the importance of the UK science base and its central role in 
fostering the innovative and economic performances of the country. In terms of 
science institutional infrastructure, the paper reversed how science policies and 
science budget responsibilities were organised within the government. Until 1992 in 
fact the responsibility for science budget fell within the remit of the Department of 
Education and Science. Besides there was not a dedicated science minister, with the 
consequence that science matters fell under the Prime Minister’s general 
responsibility for trans-departmental issues. The 1993 White Paper introduced 
changes to this arrangements, by setting up the Office of Science and Technology 
(OST) and appointing the first Cabinet level Minister for Science (Georghiou 2001).  
However, in 1995 OST was moved to the Department of Trade and Industry 
(DTI) (see Figure 3.3) with Science being part of the portfolio of the Cabinet 
Minister for DTI and the Minister of Science being a junior minister within DTI. As 
reported by Georghiou (Ibid., p. 259) the new set of institutional arrangements was 
then motivated by the aim of bringing science closer to industry, although such 
motivation was perceived at that time as “an ex-post rationalisation”. 
In terms of programmes for science, the 1993 White Paper introduced the 
Foresight Technology Forecasting Panels whose aim was to advise on which fields 
the new and existing technology and knowledge transfer programmes (e.g. LINK and 
Teaching Company Schemes) should focus. Foresight programme was modelled 
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around the experiences of other countries, namely Japan, and was designed to bring 
together science and industry in networks, and inform priorities for public spending 
on science and technology. Implicit in the Foresight programme was the recognition 
by the government that science base in the UK could no longer support the full range 
of scientific opportunities but had to focus only on selected fields (Georghiou 2001). 
 
Figure 3.3: The relationships between the DTI and its Research Establishments 
Source: (National Audit Office 2002, p. 1) 
Another programme in the 1993 White Paper introduced the Faraday Partnership 
programme. Together with the existing Teaching Company Scheme (introduced in 
1975), Faraday Partnerships were aimed to develop linkages between universities 
and industry. With Faraday Partnerships essentially the Government explored and 
tried to import the German Fraunhofer model
4
. However, concerns for the nature of 
the funding in support of such initiative emerged. In this respect, the President of the 
Association of Independent Research and Technology (AIRTO), Richard Brook, 
                                                          
4
 The Fraunhofer Gesellschaft is Europe's largest application oriented research organisation 
located in 59 specialist institutes around Germany. Its budget is €1.6B, of which €1.3B is for 
contract research where two-thirds of the revenue comes from industry and publically funded 
research projects and only one third from German Federal sources (House of Commons, 
2011a). 
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argued that Faraday Partnerships “started up in a very uneven way” (House of 
Commons Science and Technology Committee 2011, Ev. 13) in a sense that they 
initially benefited from some ring-fenced funds provided by Engineering and 
Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC), but then in the following years, when 
the EPSRC funding was used up, the Department of Trade and Industry “did not find 
the budget to provide what would be the core funding” (Ibid.). Faraday Partnerships 
eventually shifted towards carrying out research that industry was more interested in 
paying for (House of Commons Science and Technology Committee 2011). 
Following a major inquiry in 1996-1997 into the future of higher education, the 
Dearing Committee, and the Comprehensive Spending Review in 1998, the 
incumbent new Labour Government in 1997 identified science as a major priority 
(Georghiou 2001, p. 261). Based on this prioritisation, the Government increased the 
spending in science of £0.7 billion, to which Wellcome Trust (i.e. one of the major 
biomedical research charities in the UK) added further £400 million (Ibid.). 
According to Georghiou (Ibid.), “an economic philosophy which distinguished 
between investment and consumption in public expenditure provided a suitable 
backdrop for a campaign which stressed the rewards available, and more pertinently 
the penalties of missing out on the wave of discoveries in genomics.” 
The rise of universities’ third mission and third stream funding 
The transition in late 1990s to the (New) Labour’s government was also marked by a 
series of reports and policies aimed at boosting economic growth by encouraging the 
links between universities and industry. An influential White Paper was released in 
1998, devised by Peter Mandelson: “Our competitive future: building the knowledge-
driven economy” (Department of Trade and Industry 1998). This second 
Competitiveness White Paper, which was realised five years after the first 
(Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster 1993), put at the centre of science and 
technology policy the investments on human capital and education. Influenced by 
economic theories of growth, such as the endogenous growth theory, the White Paper 
identified skills, innovation, investment, and competition as the key drivers to 
economic growth. Furthermore, the White Paper established what is today known as 
university’s “third mission” of wealth creation, alongside the other two well-
established and longstanding missions of research and teaching. The White Paper 
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also set up the first stable stream of funding specifically dedicated to university’s 
third mission by launching in 1999 the Higher Education Reach Out to Business and 
the Community (HEROBC) funding initiative. HEROBC was devised to encourage 
universities to develop better internal capacity for knowledge and technology 
transfer, to promote collaboration with industry and to develop effective technology 
transfer. According to Hatakenaka (2004) establishing third stream funding 
initiatives such as HEROBC (which would then become Higher Education 
Innovation Fund): 
"was a decisive move from the perspective of universities, as it was the 
first time the mainstream funding body (HEFCE) had acknowledged the 
need for funding administrative infrastructure for university-industry 
relationships" (Ibid, p. 30) 
Dedicated funds for setting up the administrative infrastructures to sustain research 
commercialisation had a central role in creating the conditions for the emergence of 
technology transfer offices and incubators. Moreover, as declared by the then 
Minister of Science Lord Sainsbury of Turville, the creation of the third stream 
funding in the late 1990s was aimed at instilling the logic of competition between 
“people, academics, and technology transfer offices” (House of Commons Trade and 
Industry Committee 2003, par. 632). 
After the late 1990s, public funding for research and innovation in the UK 
continued to work under a dual system (House of Commons Science and Technology 
Committee 2002). On the one hand the Higher Education Funding Councils –under 
the aegis of the Department of Education and Skills- have been administering and 
allocating funding to Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) in the form of blocks 
grant distributed on the basis of research assessments. On the other hand the Office 
for Science and Technology (OST) –under the aegis of the Department for Trade and 
Industry (see Figure 3.3)– has been providing funding to the UK Research Councils, 
which would then allocate research grants on competitive basis. 
Nevertheless –as discussed in the next section- the rise of universities’ third 
mission also posed problems of potential conflicts between the charity status of 
universities and their trading activities. The charity status of public universities was 
seen by some as incompatible with the idea of profit-making activities arising from 
licensing intellectual properties. These activities were said to transcend the charity 
primary mission of university, i.e. research and teaching. To overcome this obstacle 
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universities’ structures started to include commercial subsidiaries in charge of 
managing profit-making activities on behalf of universities. 
Universities’ charity status and the emergence of universities’ 
commercial subsidiaries 
In the late 1990s wealth creation became crystallised in the so-called “third mission” 
of universities alongside teaching and research. Concerns emerged however as to 
whether universities – as charitable organisations- were allowed to make profits from 
activities which transcended their primary mission of research and teaching. 
Hatakenaka (2004) observed that in the 1990s  taxation law in the UK was not very 
much clear about the fiscal treatment of profits arising from such activities; whereas 
in the US the Bayh-Dole Act was specifically regulating this aspect. The lack of 
regulation created the conditions for the diffusion of university commercial 
subsidiaries –or commercial arms- specifically devoted to the commercialisation of 
academic research. The same sort of concerns for the potential conflicts between 
charity primary purpose and commercial activities interested not only public 
universities but also research-based charity foundations. As illustrated by the Head of 
Legal and Operations of a biomedical charity foundation: 
“In charity commission mind- the fact that we were dealing with 
intellectual property they considered that an asset, a trade and therefore 
that should be done through a subsidiary. I spent a number of years then 
to persuade the charity commission that what we were actually doing was 
consistent with what the charity mission was and because of the trading 
part was not primary purpose and trading was actually accelerating what 
we were trying to do, we could do it without being a separate subsidiary” 
[#30] 
There was in fact a number of implications involved in setting up a separate trading 
subsidiary to carry out technology transfer activities and these were related to the fact 
that a trading subsidiary had to be self-sustainable: 
“[W]e had a business plan and a structure that allowed us to succeed, but 
it meant we were doing only things that we thought that would give us 
enough return so that we could be self-sustainable. […] we didn’t fund 
early stage projects that had too much risk, because they had a low 
chance of success, […] or there were no markets or the market 
commercial return was very thin and that sort of things” [#30] 
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The risk was one of selecting only projects that would increase the chances of 
success and therefore the profitability of trading subsidiaries.  
Since the rise of the third mission in the 1990s, an increasing number of 
universities in the UK have begun to incorporate a commercial vehicle to carry out 
technology transfer activities. According to HEFCE (House of Commons: Science 
and Technology Committee 2013) the vast majority have staff employed in 
technology transfer offices not only for intellectual property exploitation, but also for 
a range of “knowledge exchange” activities. This trend is relevant in order to 
understand how commercial considerations have progressively entered the arena of 
universities in the UK. Commercial frames have been shaping the way in which 
science is regarded, that is science as instrumental to the achievement of broader 
societal goals such as economic progress. This in turn helps to contextualise the 
relevance of this thesis, which aims to investigate the processes of making scientific 
discovery visible in economic terms through accounting. 
Conclusion 
Accounting, economics, and the shifting role of the State in the emergence of research 
commercialisation programmes 
This chapter argued that a number of events and conditions have enabled the 
emergence of technology transfer and incubation in political discourses. First, 
macroeconomic theories contributed to the problematization of economic growth in 
terms of technological progress. Neoclassical, endogenous, and evolutionary growth 
theories have informed science policies in the last six decades and contributed to 
constructing the role of the State in the arena of innovation. Second, from 1985 the 
end of British Technology Group’s rights of first refusal on intellectual properties 
arising from publicly funded research led to a decentralisation of the responsibilities 
to commercialise research from the State to universities. Third, the late 1990s 
witnessed the institutionalisation of wealth creation (and research commercialisation 
objectives) as part of universities’ mission and the creation of the so called “third 
mission” alongside the long-established missions of teaching and research. The third 
mission was then linked to the so called “third stream” of funding through which the 
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Government, still today, allocates financial resources for innovation and research 
commercialisation on competitive basis (i.e. on the base of performances).  
Overall, the decades from the 1950s to the 2000s have been characterised by two 
stages of State intervention in innovation. The first stage, which characterised the 
post WWII period (i.e. the years of the industrial reconstruction), saw the 
establishment of the National Research and Development Corporation. At this stage 
the governance of innovation was characterised by a centralised regime in which the 
State intervened less with policies and incentives, and more with direct initiatives 
(e.g. monopoly of intellectual property). The second stage, initiated with the 
liberalisations and the public sector reforms of the 1980s, was characterised by a 
regime of increased accountability toward public spending, by more decentralisation 
in the management of the IP generated through public resources, and by increased 
competition. In this second stage State control was (and still is) exerted at a distance 
through devices such as research assessment exercises and surveys, whose 
functioning and effects will be discussed in Chapter 5 and 6. To anticipate the 
discussion, it was also by devising and implementing the concept of formula-based 
funding that Governments have been able to control research, and its 
commercialisation, at a distance. At a distance control was made possible by making 
research commercialisation visible through assessment exercises and surveys, and by 
linking the outcome of such surveys/assessments to funding allocation via specific 
formulae.  
In conclusion, the chapter expands past scholarship in accounting (Robson 1993b) 
that has shown how in the 1980s,when the neoliberal logic of privatization started to 
permeate the UK economy, the linkages between science, technology and the 
industry gained prominence within the arena of economic and industrial policy-
making. It was in the 1980s that R&D discourses became intertwined with ideals of a 
managerial society. According to Robson (1993b), it was in the 1980s that the issue 
of how to make R&D activities manageable without government agencies 
intervening directly in the realm of private enterprises became a government priority. 
R&D was constructed as a space where the ‘problem’ of UK productivity could be 
tackled by leveraging private investments through mandated calculations and R&D 
disclosures. In line with this past scholarship, the chapter has shown how 
macroeconomic theories have contributed to shaping the role of the State within the 
space of innovation. The chapter has also suggested that the success/failure of certain 
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economic theories of growth (e.g. endogenous growth theories) might be somewhat 
linked to the ability of accounting to capture the value produced, at firm level, by the 
‘drivers’ of the knowledge-economy (e.g. intellectual capital). Accounting for 
intangibles is an area that has progressively emerged from the late 1990s in both the 
accounting and economics arena (Lev 2001; Romer 1998). In other words the 
problem of “realising the value” of firms (Edvinsson and Malone 1997) and entire 
economies seemed to be a problem co-fabricated by both accounting and economics. 
While setting the agenda for the creation of the so called knowledge economy, 
endogenous growth theorists whether intendedly or not, opened up a controversy on 
how best “capturing the value” produced through knowledge/technology at both 
country and firm level. Moreover, there seems to be a parallel which runs between 
the emergence of more “appreciative” and narrative approaches in economics (e.g. 
national systems of innovation, evolutionary and institutional theory) (Nelson 1993; 
Lundvall 1992), and the shift to more narrative approaches in accounting for the 
immaterial resources of the firm (e.g. intellectual capital statements). 
This chapter was motivated by the knowledge that attending to the historical and 
political conditions for the emergence of research commercialisation discourses can 
help to interpret certain accounting and organisational practices within universities, 
incubators, and corporate R&D units. The chapter discussed the historical and 
political conditions that facilitated the transition from State direct intervention on 
research commercialization toward forms of intervention at a distance. The following 
chapters (i.e. 4, 5, and 6) will move to the realm of organisational practices and 
explore how control at a distance has been performed while discovering, developing, 
transferring, and incubating innovation. Particularly, the next chapter (i.e. Chapter 4) 
will focus on the problem of productivity in discovering and developing innovative 
drugs (i.e. pharmaceutical R&D) at BigPharma1, a big pharmaceutical company 
headquartered in the UK. The chapter will show how accounting practices, such as 
valuation and budgeting practices, did not only translate neo-liberal ideas of 
flexibility, autonomy, and freedom across the organisation, but also translated 
innovative scientific ideas into economic entities. By establishing the multiple values 
and costs of scientific discoveries, accounting has translated the latter into economic 
entities (such as total R&D project costs or economic value of a drug) that can 
circulate within and beyond the corporation. 
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CHAPTER  4  THE MULTIPLE ROLES OF 
ACCOUNTING IN THE RE-
ORGANISATION OF DRUG DISCOVERY 
AND DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES AT 
BIGPHARMA1 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
Amidst contested scenarios of declining R&D productivity and rising R&D costs, the 
space of pharmaceutical R&D has witnessed in the past two decades endless 
processes of organisational reforms. While discovering and developing innovative 
drugs remains central to the advancement of human health, relatively little is known 
in terms of how the economic relevance of scientific ideas is constructed through 
accounting and how the translation of scientific ideas into categories of value and 
cost influence their circulation. To better understand such processes, this chapter will 
examine the interplay between accounting and innovation as enacted in corporate 
R&D practices, and more specifically in corporate drug discovery and development 
practices.  
The empirical focus of this chapter is on the role of accounting in the context of 
the re-organisation of drug discovery, i.e. R&D activities, at BigPharma1, a globally 
renowned pharmaceutical company headquartered in the UK operating in the 
consumer healthcare, vaccines, and pharmaceutical markets across Europe, USA, and 
Asia Pacific. Since early 2000s the economic imperatives of productivity and 
competiveness have provided the ground for a series of organisational reforms within 
BigPharma1. The reforms were conceived and implemented in order to provide a 
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solution to the ‘exacerbating’ problem of drug discovery pipeline productivity. Over 
a span of nearly two decades BigPharma1 has designed and implemented at least two 
rounds of organisational reforms which in turn have involved the mobilisation of a 
variety of resources and models such as “incubation” models, “biotechnology 
company” model, and “open innovation” models.  
The chapter will show that a central role in the translation of these models and the 
underlying neo-liberal ideals of “flexibility”, “freedom”, and “autonomy” across the 
organisation was played by accounting. In this respect accounting devices have not 
only provided the calculative infrastructure for such translation to take place, but also 
shaped those ideas they were meant to operationalize, contributing to economizing 
scientific discovery, i.e. innovation. How this happened is investigated by paying 
close attention to the socio-material content of accounting practices, their origins, the 
inscriptions they produced, and ultimately the effects that they have generated in the 
context of Drug Discovery Centres, Therapeutic Areas, and Incubator#1. More 
specifically, Drug Discovery Centres and Therapeutic Areas were conceived as units 
within the R&D organisation, while Incubator#1 was conceived as a partnership 
between BigPharma1 and other public and private stakeholders. 
The remainder is organised as follows. First, while introducing the context of 
organisational reforms at BigPharma1, the chapter will show that a fundamental 
condition for reforming the organisation was the construction of the productivity of 
the drug discovery pipeline as a problem. Subsequently, the chapter will discuss what 
and how accounting devices have been mobilised in the re-organisation of 
BigPharma1’s R&D efforts into Drug Discovery Centres and Performance Units. 
While remaining within BigPharma1’s R&D space, the chapter will then shift from 
the domain of corporate R&D to a domain, i.e. Incubator#1, where BigPharma1 is 
one among a mix of private and public sector actors. The chapter will discuss the 
mediating role played by the financial model, the innovation budget, and the open 
innovation report within Incubator#1, i.e. a partnership between BigPharma1, the UK 
government, and a UK biomedical research charity. Finally, the chapter will present 
the findings and argue that the fluid and combinable characters of accounting devices 
have ultimately contributed to making drug discovery visible in economic terms and 
amenable to economic intervention. By mobilising accounting tools such as 
discounted cash flow, financial model, and innovation budget accounting has not 
only contributed to translating innovative scientific ideas into categories of costs and 
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value, but also enabled managers to shape the trajectories of such ideas on the basis 
of economic rationales (e.g. financial attrition, financial sustainability, etc.). 
4.1    Re-configuring the problem of drug 
discovery pipeline productivity into an 
organisational problem 
In the last two decades the decline in R&D productivity has become the object of 
growing concern within big pharmaceutical industry (Paul et al. 2010; Scannell et al. 
2012). As discussed by Pammolli et al. (2011), the decline in productivity has been 
attributed by some (Evenson 1993; Segerstrom 1998) to a saturation of easy targets. 
While others (Helpman 1998) have pointed out that the decline might be only a 
temporary phenomenon to be attributed to the time lag between investments and the 
outcomes that usually follow the introduction of radical technological changes (e.g. 
the genomic revolution). Distinctive discovery paradigms have developed through 
time (Drews 2000) and contributed to shaping the drug discovery process (see 
Figures 4.1 and 4.2). It was in the 1970s –with the human genome sequencing- that 
we started to witness the rise of biotechnology and more targeted approaches to drug 
discovery. Yet, the rise of synthetic organic chemistry and the shift to non-natural 
drugs, the rise and fall in the 1980s of computer-aided design for drugs, a return in 
the 1990s to empirical methods such as small molecule library synthesis and high-
throughput screening are all paradigms that have had an impact on how drug 
discovery is represented and practiced today (Pisano 2006; Pritchard et al. 2003). 
In late 1990s and early 2000s, the problem of the productivity of the drug 
discovery pipeline started to emerge as a result of several works at the boundaries of 
health economics, biotechnology, and business. Analysts, scientists, and the like 
contributed in their analyses to making the problem visible and tangible by observing 
the trends for a number of healthcare/medical R&D indicators such as: the increased 
cost of developing a new drug, the increase in total R&D expenditures, the almost 
constant rate of introduction of new molecular entities (NMEs), the rise of the 
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attrition rate5 (Pammolli, Magazzini, and Riccaboni 2011; DiMasi, Hansen, and 
Grabowski 2003; Kola and Landis 2004), the decline in the number of new drugs 
launched in the market per million of dollars spent by biotechnology and 
pharmaceutical companies (Scannell et al. 2012).  
The decline was said to be of such a magnitude that some authors (Scannell et al. 
2012) have been advancing the hypothesis of an “Eroom’s law”, that is the backwards 
spelling of Moore’s Law (i.e. a law formulated in the 1970s that stated that the 
processing power for computers will double every two years): 
“Eroom’s Law indicates that powerful forces have outweighed scientific, 
technical and managerial improvements over the past 60 years, and/or 
that some of the improvements have been less ‘improving’ than 
commonly thought” (Ibid., p. 191) 
Against this backdrop a more flexible, “entrepreneurial” approach to drug 
discovery was advocated (Douglas et al. 2010) to address what was constructed as 
the drug discovery pipeline productivity problem. This was the context to a series of 
reforms aimed at the re-organisation of R&D and innovation activities which took 
place at BigPharma1 from early 2000s onward. The problem of productivity of the 
drug discovery pipeline as constructed through R&D indicators translated –in the 
case of BigPharma1- into an organizational problem, i.e. the problem of how to re-
organise BigPharma1’s R&D activities. The model of Drug Discovery Centres was 
first developed by BigPharma1 in early 2000s and it was aimed at re-organising the  
                                                          
5
 Drug discovery attrition rate is usually defined as the rate of failures in developing new 
drugs, i.e. the failure of New Molecular Entities (NMEs) to reach the “first time in humans” 
stage. According to a number of authors (Herter-Sprie, Kung, and Wong 2013), several are 
the factors that can lead to drugs failure, and these include usually a mix of technological and 
technical obstacles across the development stages.  
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Figure 4.1: A visual representation of the stages of drug discovery and development 
Source: adapted from Huckman & Strick (2005) 
 
Figure 4.2: A visual representation of the drug discovery process 
Source: (Lombardino and Lowe 2004) 
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drug discovery pipeline from early stage Research and Development (R&D) up to 
clinical trial. The model consisted in breaking down part of the R&D unit into the so 
called Drug Discovery Centres, which would carry out drug discovery and development 
activities until the proof of concept stage (see Figure 4.3) 
However, almost a decade later such centres would be merged and re-organised into 
Therapeutic Areas, which would carry out all drug discovery and development activities 
including also the late stage development activities. Contextually, each Therapeutic 
Area would be broken down into small Performance Units (see Figure 4.3). The 
rationale for this organisational reconfiguring was to replicate the perceived advantages 
of the biotechnology company model (e.g. “flexibility” and “freedom”) within the 
context of BigPharma1. The latter had already adopted in the past the strategy of 
acquiring biotech companies and integrating them into BigPharma1’s existing 
organisational structure. Beyond the biotech companies acquisition strategy, the re-
organisation first into Centres and then into Performance Units meant translating the 
entire model of biotech companies into the R&D organisation of BigPharma1, with the 
ultimate aim of creating an internal competition between performance units for 
innovation. 
Parallel to such organisational restructuring, in 2012 BigPharma1, in partnership 
with CharityFoundation1, the UK government, a former regional development agency, 
and the UK’s innovation agency, opened Incubator#1 at BigPharma1’s R&D campus. 
The bio-incubator is a jointly-owned not-for-profit organisation which provides office-
space, facilities and services to start-up companies and to various academic projects in 
the area of life sciences and biotechnology. Whereas the transition to Drug Discovery 
Centres and Therapeutic Areas/Performance Units meant embedding the biotech model 
within BigPharma1, the Incubator#1 initiative was imbued with the rhetoric of “open 
innovation” and “collaboration”. Incubation and open innovation were conceived as part 
of the solution to the problem of drug discovery pipeline productivity. Compared to 
Centres and Therapeutic Areas, one of the peculiarities of Incubator#1 initiative lies in 
the fact that it constituted a solution that brought the State and other private actors both 
into the R&D space of BigPharma1 and into the campus of BigPharma1.  
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Figure 4.3: A timeline of the re-organisation of drug discovery at BigPharma1 
 
All in all, the reforms that took place in the last fifteen years at BigPharma1 can be 
seen as the continuous and restless attempt to construct solutions to address the 
problems of the productivity in the drug discovery pipeline. Central to such solutions 
was the so called biotech model. The main features of such model were usually 
summarised as follows: 
“[The biotech] model is based on external investment – typically, venture 
capital – in an innovative idea arising from an entrepreneurial source, often a 
group of academics […] It assumes that investors can realise value through 
one of two routes: flotation on the public markets or, more frequently, a 
trade sale to an established pharma company” (PricewaterhouseCoopers 
2010, p. 6)  
The next section will investigate what made possible to translate the ideals behind 
innovation biotech model into organisational practices at BigPharma1. The section will 
argue that accounting instruments such as discounted cash flow had a role in translating 
the ideas of flexibility, freedom and responsibility embedded in the biotech model into 
BigPharma1’s practices. By inscribing innovation and economic value into value 
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inflection points, accounting made the drug discovery process visible in economic terms 
and amenable to economic intervention.  
4.2    Accounting devices in the transition to Drug 
Discovery Centres and Therapeutic Areas 
As part of an interview to a scientific journal back to 2012, the former head of R&D at 
BigPharma1 explained the rationale for conceiving and implementing Drug Discovery 
Centres. The motivation for dividing up the big R&D operation into smaller units was to 
remove “bureaucracy”, while giving more “authority” and “accountability” to the 
smaller units. Based on these ideas, Drug discovery Centres were created and 
implemented in the early 2000s in order to re-organise BigPharma1’s approach to drug 
discovery. There were about six Centres located within and beyond the UK and each of 
them employed between 200 and 300 people. Each Centre would focus on one or more 
therapeutic areas (e.g. respiratory, immuno-inflammation, etc.) and would cover all the 
discovery and development stages from target identification until the proof of concept 
(see Fig. 4.3). According to the former finance director of one of these Centres, what 
characterised them was the fact that they were run as many biotech businesses. This 
entailed according to the finance director a number of features. First, each Centre had a 
certain freedom and autonomy over the budget. Second, they had a commercial focus, 
which often meant that a clinician was appointed to the head of research in each Centre. 
Third, the performances of each Centre were assessed against a set of simple targets, 
such as the number of proof of concepts6 produced by each Centre in a year. 
The next section will explore the interplays between accounting, understood here as 
valuation practices, and drug discovery in the process of translating the model of 
innovative and flexible biotech business into Centres. Valuation tools such as 
discounted cash flow and inscriptions such as value inflection points contributed to 
linking science, time, and economic value throughout the drug discovery process. While 
                                                          
6 In drug discovery Proof of Concept usually refers to clinical phases I and IIa. In Phase I 
clinical studies, the safety and dosage of the drug is tested on a group of 20 to 100 healthy 
volunteers or people with the disease/condition.  
In Phase II the drug is tested for efficacy and side effects on up to several hundred people with 
the disease/condition (“The Drug Development Process”. FDA. Accessed 16 November 2015 
http://www.fda.gov/ForPatients/Approvals/Drugs/ucm405622.htm#Clinical_Research_Phase_St
udies). At the end of Phase IIa a decision is made as to whether progress to the later stages of 
drug development. 
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linking drug discovery to economic value, accounting translated the drug discovery 
chain into a ‘value chain’. By transforming the drug discovery process into a value 
chain, accounting made it possible to mobilise and switch financial and non-financial 
resources across different areas and stages of drug discovery. 
Linking science, time, and value: discounted cash flow and the drug discovery process 
When it comes to innovation in the context of drug discovery and development, there 
are a number of accounting practices that contribute to shaping the drug discovery 
process (see Figure 4.1). Drugs portfolio valuation was a practice in place at 
BigPharma1, as the former head of finance of one of the Drug Discovery Centres stated: 
“One of the things that we used to look at in drug discovery was the value of 
the portfolio” (#16) 
Drugs valuation within BigPharma1 consisted in linking the scientific and technical 
stages of the drug discovery process to the economic value of drugs. The changes in the 
economic value of a drug throughout its development stages were inscribed in the so 
called “value inflection point”7, as a former BigPharma1 scientist pointed out: 
“[T]here is a good reason why this [drug discovery process] is segmented 
into sections; it is because each one of these points [corresponding to the end 
of each stage] represents a value inflection point” (#39) 
What values inflection point did was to both inscribe and combine time –expressed in 
stages of drug discovery- and value. The implication of this linkage can be explained as 
follows: 
“[M]oney goes up, the closer you get to the market … you launch here and 
you count to be making 10 hundreds of million or billion and this point the 
risk has gone down to 90% and you probably get approval and you probably 
going to get billions and billions” (#39) 
The probability of success was, therefore, one of the elements that determine the rise 
and fall in the economic value of the drug according to the different stages of the drug 
                                                          
7In differential calculus, an inflection point is a point on a curve at which the curve changes 
from being concave to convex, or vice versa. In drug discovery financing it refers to “the 
attainment of a goal or completion of body of work, for example the completion of a toxicology 
study, which if completed successfully serves to reduce some of the inherent risk in the project” 
and makes the project “relatively more attractive investment proposition than previously and 
should facilitate an increase in interest from potential investors” (O'Neill and Hopkins 2012) 
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discovery process. While looking at Figure 4.1 we can follow the description provided 
by the former BigPharma1 scientist:  
“Here [end of phase 2] the risk is probably 50 and 50, you prove it is safe 
and efficacious and the risk is 50% and the risk is discharged at the end of 
phase 2 is proof of concept is where you show safety and efficacious 
application in man population. [While] preclinical you are down to 5%-25% 
so you are still in a super risky area” (#39) 
The origins of the risk estimates the scientist refers to can be traced in a number of 
studies:  
“They are having a couple of reports on this, a couple of publications around 
the risk. It is all based on the risk adjusted Net Present Value, so you can do 
the net present value discounted cash flows to get to the value” (#39) 
 
The literature on biotechnology and pharma valuation widely refers to discounted cash 
flow techniques (e.g. risk-adjusted Net Present Value) for valuing biotechnologies and 
drugs (Keegan 2009; Svennebring and Wikberg 2013; Stewart, Allison, and Johnson 
2001). These studies refer to the work of DiMasi et al. (1991, 2003) as industry 
standards which provide the estimates for pharmaceutical R&D costs. According to the 
head of finance of BigPharma1: 
“You are going to take industry standards…so typically in the industry how 
much does it cost to take this type of asset to this type of development 
activity, how long and what the chances of being successful” (#36) 
Prompted by the researcher to provide an example of source of industry standards, the 
head of finance cites DiMasi’s data. 
In 1991, DiMasi et al. (1991) published a work that aimed to provide a project-level 
estimation of R&D costs in pharmaceutical industry. The study was based on data 
collected through surveys across a sample of 93 New Chemical Entities (NCEs) 
discovered and developed by 12 U.S. pharmaceutical firms that first tested in humans 
between 1970 and 1982. The authors reported that preclinical expenses averaged 66 
percent of total self-originated NCE research, which spread over 42.6 months prior to 
the initiation of the clinical period. The estimated cash outflows were converted to their 
present value in the year of market approval using a real (inflation-adjusted) cost of 
capital of 9 percent. The authors estimated the total cash outlays per successful new 
NCE to be US$127.2 million. In 2003, DiMasi et al. (2003) updated their 1991 study 
and analysed a sample of 68 NCEs, which were discovered and developed by 10 
pharmaceutical companies and had been first tested in humans between 1983 and 1994. 
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The new estimated R&D costs per new drug amounted to US$ 403 million, amount 
which was then capitalized to the point of marketing approval at a real discount rate of 
11 percent, obtaining a total pre-approval cost estimate of US$ 802 million. The studies 
hence demonstrated how total capitalized R&D costs have increased at an annual rate of 
7.4% above general price inflation. In so providing evidence and support to industry-
wide claims about the rising costs of pharmaceutical R&D (clinical trial costs 
particularly) (Collier 2009). 
Since their release, DiMasi et al.’s studies (1991, 2003) on R&D cost estimates have 
gained wide currency. As the authors themselves stated, the proposed estimates "have 
been used by the [U.S.] Office of Technology assessment (OTA), the Congressional 
Budget Office (CBO), and various researchers to analyze policy questions such as the 
effects on R&D activities of health care financing reform or changes in intellectual 
property legislation related to the pharmaceutical industry." (DiMasi, Hansen, and 
Grabowski 2003, p. 152). Furthermore, the estimates have been often referred to by 
industry associations in their reports on the state of pharmaceutical R&D (EFPIA 2015; 
PhRMA 2008).  
Perhaps a contributing factor to the diffusion of the estimates provided in DiMasi et 
al. (1991) was the endorsement they received by the U.S. Congress Office of 
Technology Assessment (OTA) (Office of Technology Assessment 1993). In 1993, the 
OTA reviewed DiMasi et al. (1991) study and highlighted sources of weakness. 
However, gaining access to proprietary company management cost accounts, the OTA 
noted, can be a very costly, lengthy and difficult process, mostly given pharmaceutical 
companies’ resistance to provide access to proprietary data (Ibid., p. 66). Nevertheless, 
OTA concluded that the DiMasi et al. (1991) produced reasonably accurate estimates. 
While becoming progressively institutionalised within pharmaceutical industry and 
policy making, the estimates of R&D costs provided in the study of DiMasi et al. (1991, 
2003) have attracted strong criticism from a number of scholars. Light and Warburton 
(2005a, 2005b; 2011) advanced a critique of the $802 million R&D cost estimate 
proposed in the study of DiMasi et al. (2003) and observed that:  
“The estimate of R&D cost in this article [DiMasi et al 2003] is widely cited 
and accepted as an authoritative “fact” in the press and in the highest 
national and global policy circles. Given the prominent use of these cost 
estimates by the pharmaceutical industry and its advocates to influence 
national and international policies, it is critical that they be scientifically 
valid and relevant to the policy uses made of them.” (Light &Warburton, 
2005a, p. 1032)  
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While warning on the “constructed nature of R&D cost estimates”, Light and 
Warburton (2011, p. 14) deconstruct the methodology and assumptions that have led to 
the $802 million figure: 
“Shortly after [DiMasi et al 2003] appeared, the Tufts Center for the Study 
of Drug Development announced that the average cost of developing a self-
originated new chemical entity, including post-approval studies, was $897 
million (TCSDD, 2003; Kaitin, 2003). This figure, like the ones that 
preceded it, is based on confidential, unsystematic data, and has dubious 
scientific validity. In addition, adding post-approval studies to the costs of 
R&D is inherently questionable, because these “seeding trials” are designed 
primarily to familiarize physicians with the new drug and encourage its use; 
they are rarely randomized or blinded, but instead feature open-label case 
series, and are often sponsored by company marketing departments (Kessler 
et al., 2004)” (Light and Warburton 2005a, p. 1032) 
Furthermore, Light and Warburton argued how the high R&D costs in 
pharmaceutical industry, the latter supported by the estimates of DiMasi et al. (2003), 
are a “myth” which is merely constructed and overlooks at best a number of facts. In 
this respect, Light and Warburton claimed for example that half of the costs are profits 
foregone, that trials costs are inflated, and that the time for R&D (i.e. 52 months for 
preclinical research, 72 months for trials, 18 months for regulatory review, a total of 142 
months or 11.8 years) is inflated, and that corporate R&D risk is much lower (Light and 
Warburton 2011). 
The controversy over the high estimates of R&D costs built up with a reply and a 
rejoinder of DiMasi et al. (2005a, 2005b), where the authors substantially rejected Light 
and Warburton’s critique. Beyond the technicalities of the arguments  (see Collier 
(2009) for a summary), the controversy shows how the risk and R&D costs estimates 
provided by a number of academics within  the arena of health economics gained the 
status of ‘established facts’. That is, facts which are hardly contested and widely 
recognized within the industry and policy making arena, but still hotly debated within 
the arena of health economics.  
Once extrapolated from studies conducted within health economics, the probability 
of success and R&D costs estimates are usually incorporated in what is known as the 
discounted cash flow formula. A former BigPharma1’s scientist explained this passage 
as follows: 
“The discount rate would be a relatively standard 10 or 14%. And then 
depending on what phase in the discovery process you are adding an 
additional discount factor which is then taking into account that if you are in 
the preclinical it is much more risky, and if you are here therefore you have 
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to multiply for another 10% which takes the value down. So each stage in 
this chain, the risk gets less as you move up here” (#39) 
According to one of BigPharma1’s heads of finance, discounted cash flow formula is: 
“[A] pretty boxed standard way of valuing in the industry for research 
pipeline assets because you don’t really have anything else as reliable” (#36) 
Drug valuation at BigPharma1 implied linking time, expressed in terms of stages of 
drug discovery, to monetary value in order to produce what were called “value 
inflection points”. The latter correspond to the drop and rise in the value of a drug/asset 
at each stage of the drug discovery process. Inscribing economic value and drugs 
development phases into “value inflection points” has generated two effects. The first 
effect consisted in transforming the drugs R&D pipeline into a “drug value chain”. The 
second effect consisted in creating the conditions for acting upon the pipeline. In fact 
once the value was calculated then financial resources/investments –internal as much 
external venture capital funds- could be mobilised more easily, or current investment 
could be switched more “flexibly” between therapeutic areas.  
As shown in Figure 4.4 below, linking drug development stages to economic value 
was made possible through a specific accounting device, which is the discounted cash 
flow formula. In this case, accounting has made itself relevant to the realm of 
pharmaceutical R&D activities/drug discovery by providing a “boxed standard” (#36) 
technique for quantifying/estimating the value of assets/drugs in each stage of drug 
development.  
Without the discounted cash flow formula such quantification would be problematic 
for the actors in the field. In fact, the drugs/assets in the pipeline usually are not 
commercialised in the market yet, and in this sense one can say that both their market 
and their commercial value are only potential ones. To be sure, the value of a drug from 
preclinical stages all the way down to the launch in the market is only projected and its 
value cannot be determined by means of market prices mechanism. The power of 
discounted cash flow, in this case, consisted in making the drug discovery process 
commensurable by assigning economic value to the assets in the pipeline at each stage 
of their development. Discounted cash flow contributed to translating innovative 
scientific ideas into economic entities amenable to be acted upon by switching 
investments and resources across therapeutic areas/projects. 
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Figure 4.4: Transforming the drug pipeline into a “value chain” 
 
Overall, discounted cash flow became a standard technique of valuation in drug 
discovery and development ultimately because of its fluid character. Discounted cash 
flow was fluid in that its components, i.e. cash flows, risk, and discount rate adapted to 
the environment of drug discovery and transformed into drugs’ success rates and drugs’ 
R&D costs. While the estimates of such components were debated across the arenas of 
health economics and pharma industry, the formula itself never became contested. 
Embedding the uncertainties of drug discovery through financial attrition, wish lists, 
and R&D budget 
This section will continue the analysis of the role of accounting in translating the ideas 
behind innovation biotech model (e.g. flexibility, freedom, autonomy) into 
organisational practices at BigPharma1. The interplays between innovation and 
accounting are investigated in the context of the budgeting practices in place within 
Drug Discovery Centres. The section will show how accounting instruments such as 
wish lists and financial attrition, contributed not only to visualizing and prioritizing 
drug discovery activities, but also to embedding and normalising the ‘unknowns’ of the 
drug discovery process, i.e. the sources of project failure and delay. By inscribing the 
uncertainties of drug discovery into a number, i.e. the financial attrition rate, accounting 
attempted to control innovation not by acting on the sources of delays and failures, but 
by creating a ‘fictional’ form of control. 
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As highlighted earlier, running Drug Discovery Centres as a biotech business meant 
also that each Centre had a budget and could exert a certain degree of autonomy over it. 
According to a former BigPharma1 finance director, having autonomy over the budget 
meant creating the budget, understanding it, having it approved, managing it, and 
readjusting it according to the changed circumstances. First of all, “creating a budget” in 
the Centres entailed looking at costs. According to the former finance director of one of 
the Centres, the budgeting and forecasting process was made of a “spectrum” ranging 
from “predictable and controllable costs” to “difficult costs”. The predictable costs were 
exemplified as follows: 
“You can predict the number of people you have, you can calculate how 
much they are going to cost and you can build a fairly accurate estimate for 
that and then there are costs that people incur such as travelling, training etc. 
the costs they incur in the lab in the day to day….so those costs are 
reasonable to forecast and control” (#16) 
The “difficult costs” instead were related to the temporal dimension of projects: 
“The difficult costs in drug discovery are obviously the project costs, 
because you don’t know how quickly the project will progress and indeed 
most projects will be slower than you forecast” (#16) 
Not knowing when the costs were going to happen –which is to say not knowing how 
fast/slow the projects would go- constituted a problem and was making the budget 
“interesting” and “unusual” to the eyes of the former finance director. In order to solve 
the obstacle posed by “difficult” costs and manage the “unusual” budget, at the 
beginning of the year all the teams were meeting together with the aim of determining 
the total projects budget figure: 
“To manage that we would get all the project teams together, we would 
agree all their project plans, let’s say 25 projects, each one had a plan for the 
next one-two years of activity, we would have a pretty good idea of how 
much each activity would cost. So a particular type of animal study for 7 
days for 14 days we have relatively standard costs for those. A clinical study 
15 people 3 months you can estimate for that. So you can build up a picture 
of all the activities that people plan and then add all of those together and 
that’s your total projects budget” (#16) 
The total project budget, however, was a figure that apparently was not going to 
happen and this was mainly because of “unexpected problems” –according to the former 
finance director. This was something that has been learnt and internalised by the 
management team throughout the years: 
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“[Y]ou know you are not going to spend all of that because projects fail they 
hit unexpected problems. So what we discovered over several years was that 
let’s say you [say you’ll] spend fifty million, you add up all of the plans you 
interrogated…in reality you only spend twenty/twenty-five because you 
didn’t know why but you would get what we call the financial attrition”(#16) 
In other words, all the uncertain and unknown aspects involved in the running of 
drug discovery activities in the Centres was embedded by the finance team in the 
concept of “financial attrition”. The latter was exemplified by the former finance 
director as follow: 
“Through the year if you have the project plan from January to December 
and you plan to spend this amount -say 50- and then you track the actual 
spend and then the attrition is the difference. Percentage of attrition. So what 
I would do and let’s say that is 25. (#16) 
“So the difference between the planned spend and the actual spend. We 
called it [financial] attrition. It is due to various factors, mainly delays but 
also some failures or cancellation. So it’s only in financial terms, in terms of 
budgeting that’s all we have to do is to say the plan is up to that, how much 
do we think we are actually going to spend” (#16) 
To be sure, financial attrition constitutes an underspend on a budget in a period that is 
attributable to delays in projects or to project failures. Financial attrition aims to 
encapsulate a certain type of underspend into a category, without actually acting on the 
causes that led to underspending. In this sense financial attrition creates a fictional 
control of the unknowns characterising innovation, i.e. drug discovery. 
In terms of managing the budget, there was a practice in the Centres such that the 
budget was managed as a total set where each individual project would carry on with 
the activities and the finance director would review the pool of activities and track the 
spending three-four times throughout the year. This practice was aimed at revealing 
both overspends and underspends, and making a decision accordingly: 
“[W]e would decide if the level of attrition was what we thought it was 
going to be. If it’s likely we are going to overspend we have to agree 
changes to plan to reduce the plan spend and equally if we were going to 
underspend we were saying to people “you can accelerate what you are 
doing” (#16) 
Here a new device, i.e. the level of financial attrition, is brought into the scene in order 
to address the issue of control over the unpredictable aspects of the drug discovery 
process. As the former finance director put it: 
“It was a quite interesting area because you couldn’t tell where the 
underspends would be, where the attrition would be, but it almost always 
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happened. It just took experience to manage. We learnt, when I started we 
didn’t quite know, we learnt” (#16) 
However, the difficult part was for people –particularly new members of the team- to 
accept the level of attrition, i.e. to accept the fact that the approved budget would be 
lower than the total cost of the activities necessary for a specific project: 
“Initially it was a bit scary because it looked like you are going to spend all 
this money and you only have budget for this month and eventually after two 
or three years we realised …and for people new they always have difficulties 
in accepting this but I say “don’t worry I think we are going to spend this”. 
So that was an interesting aspect of running the Drug Discovery Centres’ 
budget” (#16) 
The origins of financial attrition as a practice were not easy to trace. Although the 
concept might resemble the one of variance, they are not the same. On this point the 
finance director clarified as follows: 
“Variance is the total difference between the budget and the actuals; in drug 
development, a major contributor to the variance is “attrition” – the 
combination of time slippage and other changes to project plans that will 
delay spend. Other elements of variance are – costs e.g. clinical studies, 
toxicological studies etc.” (#40) 
At first glance, it seemed that financial attrition was a category that originated from 
within the organisation. On the contrary, the finance director explained: 
“[Financial attrition] is a peculiarity of drug development – particularly early 
stage development. However, the same also happens often with capital 
projects which tend to suffer delays rather than being ahead of time. I have 
used [in the past] a general allowance for slippage of capital projects when 
planning” (#40) 
The origins of financial attrition seem to be tracked down to the practices related to 
capital projects planning and a parallel can be drawn with the notion of allowance for 
slippage.  
Financial attrition was linked with another budgeting practice, i.e. wish list or 
activities lists. This practice was such that every year each Drug Discovery Centres’ 
Finance Director had to submit a list of activities for the projects which were planned to 
be carried out throughout the year. Let us assume that the total of that list was £300m. 
However, the “approved budget” for that year was given only for a lesser amount –say 
£200m. The difference between the two numbers was due to the rate of financial 
attrition. As a finance director at BigPharma1 observed: 
“[Wish list] mostly comes from the fact that what you think is going to 
happen isn’t what happens. So you might want to recruit 50 patients in 2015 
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and that is going to cost you 10 million pounds to run that study, you are 
going to recruit 10 and you are going to spend 2 million pounds. So say you 
haven’t spent 8 of the wish list. So we have a wish list versus an actual 
[approved] budget” (#36) 
Yet, making sense of the gap between approved budget -£200m- and the total of the 
wish list -£300m- the finance director stated: 
“I was counting on that [activity] not working because it helps to bridge that 
100 [£300m less £200m] million pounds gap that I have” (#36) 
In order to understand why the finance director was counting on the activity not 
working one has to look at the role and the effects of budgeting practices in the context 
of drug discovery at BigPharma1. Budgeting practices such as “financial attrition” and 
“wish lists versus approved budget” represent an attempt to make the uncertainty and 
the unknown visible through accounting. Accounting, through the financial attrition 
rate, enabled top management to grant autonomy/freedom to Drug Discovery Centres, 
while exerting control at a distance over the R&D activities in the pipeline.  
Overall, the problematic of measurement and control faced by BigPharma1 (and 
Drug Discovery Centres) lies in the difficulty to trace the origin of underspends within 
the organisation. BigPharma1 learnt through experience that underspends were often 
related to “a combination of time slippage and other changes to project plans” (#16). 
What was unknown was where in the organisation such changes were going to happen, 
or in other words in which projects they were going to happen. Through processes of 
accumulation of information about actual and planned spends, the organisation 
developed a practice of monitoring the systematic underspends and inscribed them in 
what was called the historical rate of attrition. As shown in Fig. 4.5, the attrition rate 
acted as an inscription, travelling from the periphery, where science was mundanely 
carried out, to the core of the R&D organisation, where funding decisions were made. 
Every time an activity was cancelled or delayed in the periphery, at the decisional core 
where wish lists and budgets were drawn, a new activity would be prioritised and the 
gap between the total of the wish list and the approved budget would become closer. 
Being able to bridge the gap between the total of the activities and the approved budget 
meant to ensure the stability of the inscription. This helps to explain why the head of 
finance would “count on that activity [in the list] not working” (#36), for activities that 
do not work, act as allies toward bridging the gap and ensuring the stability of the 
attrition rate. 
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Figure 4.5: Constructing the “autonomy” of Drug Discovery Centres as biotech 
businesses 
 
The rate of financial attrition was combinable in a sense that it was often attached to 
other devices such as wish/activities lists. Because of this property not only has 
financial attrition made uncertainties visible within the organisation, but also it has 
created a form of control at a distance that was essentially fictional. It was fictional 
because it did not act directly on the causes of uncertainties (e.g. delays, slippages, 
failures), but rather it tried to make those uncertainties accepted and normalised. In this 
sense financial attrition was more the product of uncertainty, rather than controlling it. 
By granting “autonomy over the budget” and “sufficient resources” (#20) to Drug 
Discovery Centres and by setting up financial attrition as a device, the top management 
of the R&D unit at BigPharma1 was able to control at a distance the R&D activities 
while granting the freedom and autonomy typical of biotech businesses.  
The chapter so far showed how accounting, understood as budgeting and valuation 
practices, contributed to shaping innovation in drug discovery. In the case of Drug 
Discovery Centres and Therapeutic Areas, accounting as discounted cash flow tool 
shaped innovation by translating the drug discovery process into a value chain where 
each development stage corresponds to a change in the economic value of the drug. By 
making drug discovery visible in economic terms, accounting made it possible to switch 
investments across therapeutic areas and to mobilise resources around the drug 
discovery process. Furthermore, accounting understood as budgeting practices, shaped 
innovation in a sense of making it possible to visualise and prioritise, hence to calculate, 
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the costs of R&D activities. While inventing the financial attrition category, accounting 
not only contributed to embedding and normalising the unknowns (e.g. failures and 
delays) of drug discovery within the R&D organisation, but also created a fictional form 
of control over them, that is a form of control that did not involve acting directly on the 
causes of uncertainty. 
The analysis has so far centred on the interplays between accounting and innovation 
in a context where discovering innovation is managed by a private corporation. How 
does accounting configure innovation when discovering innovation takes place in a 
context characterised by a mix of corporate (i.e. BigPharma1), charity, and public sector 
actors? To address this question, the next section will analyse the interplays between 
accounting and innovation in the context of BigPharma1’s incubation programme, 
which is a programme for nurturing early stage drug discovery projects arising from 
both BigPharma1 and other organisations (e.g. universities). While remaining within the 
space of BigPharma1 R&D activities, the analysis will shift to a context where 
BigPharma1 is one among a variety of public and private stakeholders. This begs the 
question of whether and how the calculative frames and devices deployed within the 
corporation are translated into incubation, and whether such frames come into conflict 
with those of other stakeholders. The next section will address such question by 
examining the role of accounting practices, such as budgeting and financial planning, in 
translating different visions of incubation into numbers that can prove the value (and the 
cost) of incubating innovation. 
4.3    From discovering to incubating innovation: 
accounting devices within Incubator#1 
In 2012 BigPharma1, in partnership with CharityFoundation1, the UK government, a 
former regional development agency, and the UK’s innovation agency opened 
Incubator#1 within BigPharma1’s research and development campus. The bio-incubator 
was a not-for-profit organisation which provided office-space, facilities and services to 
start-ups and various academic projects in the area of life sciences and biotechnology.  
Whereas the transition to Drug Discovery Centres and Performance Units meant 
embedding the small biotech cultural model within BigPharma1, the Incubator#1 
initiative was imbued with the rhetoric of open and disruptive innovation. The narrative 
surrounding Incubator#1 in the press releases, in the institutional website, in the reports, 
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and in the banners and posters displayed inside the incubator building made three 
evident and interconnected claims. The first claim was the one of being an incubator 
which was “different” from anything else already existing, in the sense of offering an 
innovative approach to incubation. The second claim stressed the idea of being the first 
and only incubator in the UK to deliver “open innovation” programmes. The third claim 
revolved around the commitment to creating an “ecosystem” that connects “academia, 
big pharma, and biotech”. 
In the attempt to show how controlling innovation has been performed in the context 
of Incubator#1, the remainder of the section will analyse how the above claims came to 
be linked to accounting practices, such as financial modelling, budgeting, and internal 
reporting. Attention will be given to the interplay between the social and technical 
aspects of accounting practices, that is the cognitive models, categorizations, and 
metrics mobilised by actors in the enactment of innovation within the incubator. 
Ultimately, accounting devices such as the incubator’s financial model, the innovation 
budget, and the open innovation report constitute spaces where stakeholders experiment 
with accounting tools (e.g. budget categories, ratios) in order to translate their objectives 
and interests into numbers. Only by translating innovation objectives and financial 
objectives into numbers, the tension between the two sets of objectives become visible, 
hence actionable. 
The financial model as a socio-technical device 
The practices of both incubation and open innovation within the incubator were shaped 
by what was called the “financial model”, hence the importance of understanding its key 
characteristics. The actors involved in the process of producing (and updating) the 
model were the chief financial officer, the chief executive officer, the chairman, the 
accountant, and three other top managers. The model was shown to the board of 
directors in the form of power point slides, which contained graphs and excerpts 
extrapolated from the spreadsheets of the model. Descriptively, the constitutive 
elements of the model consisted of a set of key assumptions about occupancy and rental 
levels, funding requirements, business development and innovation objectives, and a 
number of financial projections (e.g. Profit and Loss, cash position, etc.).  
The process, culminating with the final version of the model, started with a first draft 
of the key assumptions. The CFO would produce the first draft based on past board 
meetings and his own experience. The key assumptions covered areas such as rental (i.e. 
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rent and service charge per square foot) and occupancy levels (i.e. percentage of space 
occupied by tenants/companies), and funding requirements (i.e. funding agencies, 
duration and amount of funding programmes). The assumptions were then run by the 
CEO and the chairman, to whom only the excerpts from the model were shown. The 
key assumptions were then discussed with each individual manager (i.e. marketing and 
event manager, and operations manager) according to the specific areas that they were 
responsible for. Once they were “comfortable” with such assumptions then the 
following stage consisted in updating and running the model on the basis of those 
assumptions. This last step was carried out by the CFO in conjunction with the 
accountant and it was aimed at creating what was called a “base-case”. To create a 
base-case meant to run the model starting from the key assumptions. Once drafted the 
base-case the CFO and the accountant run at least six versions of the model by 
modifying the assumptions, with the aim of providing different projections. The chosen 
version was the one that “fairly reflected” (#23) the most likely outcome and that 
everybody “felt highly confident in achieving” (#23). 
The financial model embedded the frames of simplicity, financial conservativism, 
and quality/innovation.  
First, the frame of simplicity implied that too many details portrayed and 
communicated at board level can only generate complications and further questioning 
coming from the board of directors since “they start to become suspicious” (#23). All 
these complications needed to be avoided, in the CFO’s view and replaced with simple 
and clear information about the running of the business. As a result of employing this 
‘simplicity’ frame, graphs and tables were constantly drawn upon by the CFO in his 
communication with the chairman, the CEO, and the Board. This choice was motivated 
by the fact that “this board likes graphs, they are scientists, they find it quite helpful” 
(#23) and also “if they [top people] just see a big table of figures then it’s hard for them 
to really understand” (#23). So, the CFO –and the accountant, who “is really good at 
Excel” (#23) -were the only ones who had access to the details of the model contained 
in the Excel spreadsheets. 
Second, financial conservativism and financial sustainability frames were also 
embedded in the financial model. In many instances the CFO seemed to act as the spoke 
person for financial conservativism. He had been applying it since he was working at 
BigPharma1 as finance director of one of the Drug Discovery Centres. Financial 
conservativism meant, for example, to be highly confident that certain funding 
opportunities would actually take place by the time specified in the model, or that a 
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certain tenant would come to occupy the space by a certain date. Financial sustainability 
meant to be a self-sustaining incubator, that is to breakeven without drawing on loans 
and grants made available from the stakeholders. 
Third, another frame embedded in the financial model revolved around quality and 
innovation. According to the CEO, quality and innovation consisted in promoting 
activities that showed how “different” and “unique” the incubator was and in 
“evangelizing around innovation and open innovation” (#32) by means of such 
activities (e.g. business development support, access to drug discovery expertise, etc.). 
However, financial conservativism, financial sustainability and quality were often in 
tension and such tension was noticeable in many instances. During the conversations 
with the CFO he was often drawing a parallel between sales/marketing people that he 
met in the past, and the figure of the CEO at Incubator#1. In his view finance people 
tended to be conservative while sales or marketing people: 
“would try to over inflate their sales because that means they can have a big 
cost budget or a big advertisement budget or a bigger promotion budget, 
because they are marketing people and they want as big advertisement 
budget as possible” 
This tension between financial sustainability and the quality frame was traceable also in 
two documents. One was a strategy report, and the other one was the 2014/2015 budget. 
Back to spring 2013, all Incubator#1’s stakeholders convened in a one-day meeting with 
the aim of discussing Incubator#1’s vision, mission, and strategy. As a result of the 
workshop, an internal report was compiled containing the strategic priorities, objectives 
and the actions to be taken in the years to come. Under the objective “Success and key 
metrics” there was an item which crystallized what was described as a tension, i.e. 
“innovation vs [financial] sustainability”. The item was then explained in the same 
document as follows: “financial success can be achieved more quickly without focusing 
on [Incubator#1’s] other goals of driving innovation”. The point scrutinised and 
contested the centrality of innovation objectives as opposed to those related to the 
financial sustainability of the incubator. It reinforced and visualised that tension 
between financial conservativism and innovation that we encountered earlier on. 
According to the strategy report an agreement needed to be reached between these two 
ways of framing Incubator#1’s strategy. The next section will argue that the ways in 
which the tension between innovation and sustainability have been inscribed into 
accounting numbers were two, i.e. the IP/CRO ratio and the innovation budget figure. 
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Producing inscriptions: the IP/CRO ratio and the innovation budget figure 
In line with the assumptions included in the financial model, the budget 2014/2015 
presented the projections related to Profit and Loss, funding requirements, capital 
spend, operational spend, cash flow, building running costs, management overhead, and 
finally the projection for business innovation and development projects. The projection 
of business innovation and development objectives for the year 2014/2015 appeared as 
a list of prioritised “strategic” items (e.g. new business creation projects, Phase 2 
Accelerator project). For each item two numbers were projected: one was the 
“potential” amount for 2014/2015 and the other was the “approved budgeted” amount. 
Below the line featuring the total approved budget figure (e.g. £200k), a list of 
additional strategic projects was also provided. Such “additional” items were not 
included in the approved budgeted amount. The CFO explained the reason for having 
the “additional” funding/projects below the budget line as follows: 
“I introduced this concept of “additional funding” to enable us- during the 
growth phase- to carry out these brand-building type of activities […] He 
[the CEO] is always pushing here [business innovation activities], he likes 
these things and I was pushing back […] We came to an agreement […] we 
could re-prioritize to get the total back down to 200” (#34) 
The quote highlights how business development and innovation activities are 
considered as “brand-building” type of activities, that is activities which are associated 
to the frame of ‘marketing’. Put it differently, innovation activities are seen by the CFO 
as activities that contribute to constructing the image and reputation of the incubator as 
innovative, rather than developing the internal innovation capabilities of the incubator. 
The CEO made sense of the distinction between approved versus additional items as 
follows: 
“Anything below the line you must not do. That means you cannot budget 
for it, you cannot put resources into it until you deliver one of the top five 
and then the next priority moves up. So that’s portfolio management for me. 
The budget line sets where you have to draw the line and you have to 
be…it’s very very difficult. Because that project is one that you need to do, 
you want to do but you have to show discipline of not to do it until you 
deliver” (#35) 
The effect of having an approved budget as opposed to the potential budget for business 
innovation objectives, consisted in exerting “discipline” over innovation and over the 
innovation spokesman, i.e. the CEO. The rationale behind the approved versus potential 
budget seemed to be very similar to the one characterising wish lists versus approved 
budget in place in the Drug Discovery Centres. Perhaps this similarity has to do with the 
145 
 
fact that the incubator CFO was a former finance director of one of the Drug Discovery 
Centres. This suggests that a translation of accounting devices from the Centres to the 
Incubator#1 took place thanks to the CFO, who effectively acted as a spokesman for 
both financial sustainability and financial conservativism. 
Whereas the budget for business innovation objectives constituted one way to 
inscribe the tension between financial sustainability and quality/innovation, another way 
of inscribing such tension was by means of the Intellectual Property/Contract Research 
Organisations ratio (hereafter “IP/CROs” ratio). The ratio was presented by the 
incubator managers as the key performance indicator of Incubator#1. Descriptively, the 
ratio represents the percentage of tenants that could potentially develop intellectual 
properties (IPs), as opposed to the percentage of tenants that provide research services 
on a contract base to pharmaceutical and biotechnological companies (so-called 
Contract Research Organisations, CROs). On the one hand, by IPs related companies it 
is meant those companies that carry out intellectual activities in a scientific (or 
industrial) field that can give rise to protection rights such as patents or copyrights 
(WIPO 2014). Often operating at very early stages of drug discovery, IP-related 
companies are said to contribute to constructing the incubator as an innovative 
environment. Given the early stage of drug discovery at which they operate, such 
companies often do not produce revenue streams and have to rely on external 
investments in order to pay the rent to the incubator. For this reason they are said to 
pose a risk to the financial sustainability of the incubator. On the other hand, CROs are 
regarded as a more stable source of income for the incubator in that their main activity 
consists in providing services on a contract base (i.e. fee-for-services). However, since 
service providers tend not to generate IPs, they are not counted as high 
quality/innovative tenants.  
Overall, the IP/CROs ratio inscribed the tension between financial sustainability (i.e. 
making profits) and quality and innovation objectives, by creating a space where the 
objectives of the incubator could be discussed and negotiated through numbers. In 
agreement with the board of the incubator, the management team has set the ratio at the 
level of 75%/25% - 80%/20%. This means that the targeted percentage of tenants that 
have already developed or will potentially develop intellectual property is set at 75-
80%. While the targeted percentage of tenants that provide services is set to be at 25-
20%.  
Compared to the budget for business innovation objectives, the IP/CROs ratio seems 
to align the members of the management team and the board of directors, such that 
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IP/CRO is regarded as the key performance target for the incubator. Consistent with his 
frame of simplicity, the CFO regarded the ratio as a simple and clear target which could 
prove the progress toward the construction of the “high quality scientific environment” 
at Incubator#1: 
“My view is that you must have clear targets about what you are going to 
deliver, and how you are going to measure against that. If the target is going 
to help you to achieve those objectives then it’s worthwhile, but you 
shouldn’t be distracted by having too many things, because that will reduce 
the focus that you have. I mean, our KPIs to be quite honest, at the beginning 
was quite simple: attract high quality tenants –something like Proof of 
Concept in [Drug Discovery Centres]. High quality tenants defined as 80/20 
percent –IP versus the rest- that’s our KPI” (#34) 
The IP/CRO ratio also embedded both the quality/innovation objectives and the 
financial sustainability objectives of the incubator. As a consequence, the ratio shaped 
incubation in a sense of putting less emphasis on filling the building with income 
generating/fee for service sort of businesses. Talking from his office in the Incubator#1 
building –located within BigPharma1 campus- the CEO observed: 
“If you build one of these [Incubator#1 building] next to one of those 
[BigPharma1 buildings] then people will come and the quality will be good 
and you wouldn’t have to fill [the incubator] like other incubators in the UK 
and other incubators in the world with CROs and service providers. CROs 
are contract research organisations – fee for service” (#35) 
The IP/CROs ratio provided a space where the financial sustainability and quality 
frames could be experimented, calculated, discussed, and negotiated by actors. The 
(intended) effect of the ratio was to perform the incubator’s environment according to 
the frames embedded in the ratio itself. Hence, innovative environment is an 
environment where 80% of the companies are IPs generating companies. However, this 
might exclude from the picture those CROs that are still regarded innovative, although 
not producing intellectual properties. In this sense the ratio contributed to enact a vision 
of innovation which clashes with intellectual property.  
The open innovation audit report 
In 2013, the management team of the incubator commissioned an innovation consultant 
to write up an open innovation audit report. The reason for this decision was explained 
by the CEO as follows: 
“I need to show that in addition to the incubator success, there is a 
measurable success caused through open innovation” (#35) 
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The first part of the report was based on a series of interviews conducted by the 
consultant with the incubator’s tenants and other stakeholders, to the aim of building a 
picture of the open innovation activities in place within the incubator. In other words it 
was intended to show to stakeholders in general the progress toward the achievement of 
the open innovation objectives, by means of case studies and narrative type of accounts.  
The second part of the report focused instead on the design of a set of key performance 
indicators for open innovation and collaboration, with a view to develop in the future a 
more systematic approach to the assessment/audit of open innovation. 
One can look at the open innovation audit report from different perspectives. First, 
the open innovation report acted as an ally for the innovation programme in that it 
translated the innovation objectives of the incubator into numbers and performance 
measures. In this way, measures of innovation could compete with those of financial 
sustainability (e.g. profitability measures). Its role was to show the board of the 
incubator that the activities funded under the innovation budget produced quantifiable 
successful results, potentially aligning the quality frame to the financial sustainability 
frame. Second, the report embedded a distinctive set of metrics, categorization, and 
models of innovation.  
With regards to the models embedded in the report, the latter explicitly drew on work 
such as: “The innovator’s DNA: mastering the five skills of disruptive innovators” 
(Dyer, Gregersen, and Christensen 2013) and “Open Innovation: The New Imperative 
for Creating and Profiting from Technology” (Chesbrough 2003). The following will 
briefly summarise the main message advanced in these works and the main points of 
criticism. The concept of disruptive innovation is based on the idea that a lower margin 
product, which is positioned at the bottom of the market and which initially reaches less 
profitable customers, can take over the entire industry. An illustrative example here is 
the mainframe computing industry, which was “disrupted” and taken over by the 
incumbent production of more affordable personal computers.  
However, critics held (Lepore 2014) that the theory of disruptive innovation has 
failed as a tool for predicting disruptive innovation, while being evangelised as a 
“gospel”, in Jill Lepore’s words, within and beyond corporate arenas. Open innovation 
is defined as “the use of purposive inflows and outflows of knowledge to accelerate 
internal innovation, and expand the markets for external use of innovation, 
respectively” (Chesbrough, Vanhaverbeke, and West 2006). Often presented as a shift 
away from the closed system innovation paradigm, the concept of open innovation 
attracted criticism from various scholars. Some authors stressed the lack of precision in 
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Chesbrough’s definition (Trott and Hartmann 2009; Dahlander and Gann 2010), while 
others (Trott and Hartmann 2009) criticised the fact of presenting open innovation as a 
new paradigm, and argued that it rather constitutes a re-packaging of existing concepts 
and models in innovation and R&D management literature.  
With regards to the metrics included in the open innovation report, a number of 
performance measures of open innovation were created such as the number of new 
collaborations, and the number of conversations started with new co-tenants. In this 
case, not only has accounting adapted traditional tools, i.e. performance indicators, to 
new environments, i.e. open innovation; but also it has contributed to realising the value 
of open innovation.  
In conclusion, the accounts from Incubator#1 reveal the emergence of a tension 
between different ways of framing the incubation programme, i.e. incubation as a 
financially sustainable business and incubation as an innovation and quality driven 
environment. Such frames were mobilised by different actors within the organisation, 
and both were embedded into a number of accounting devices such as the financial 
model, the budget, and the open innovation audit report. Figure 4.6 shows how each of 
these devices contributed to creating spaces of experimentation, tension, and 
negotiation. The budget for business innovation and development translated the 
innovation and quality objectives into a list of all the innovation activities that the 
management team wished to carry out and the related costs. However, the total budget 
figure for innovation was approved to cover only a part of such activities. The approved 
budget figure contributed to inscribing the tension between financial sustainability and 
innovation objectives. Furthermore, the financial model addressed the same tension by 
constructing a ‘balanced’ proportion between service providers and IP-generating 
tenants, i.e. the IP/CROs ratio. The proportion seemed to constrain the number of 
tenants which provide services and generate income, in favour of “high quality 
innovative” companies, which generate IPs but not income. Finally, by providing 
narrative accounts of “open innovation” activities, the open innovation audit report has 
contributed to enacting open innovation and how this should be audited and acted upon. 
Overall, different forms of accounting contributed to negotiate the tension between 
different calculative frames. In this respect, the approved versus potential budget for 
business innovation will still be negotiated in the future. The tension will be solved 
perhaps only when the outcomes of open innovation projects will be made fully 
‘auditable’ and ‘transparent’, or perhaps this will but exacerbate the tension. Conversely 
the IP/CROs ratio seemed to be a much more stable inscription, i.e. an inscription that 
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all the parties agreed on, such that it was transformed in the main performance target of 
the incubator. 
 
Figure 4.6: Inscribing the tension between the financial sustainability frame and the 
innovation/quality frame 
Conclusion  
Economizing science through multiple accounting devices  
The chapter began with a problematic of productivity in the drug discovery and 
development pipeline. It developed further by narrating situations which showed how 
the problem of productivity was reconstructed as a problem of the corporation, which in 
turn became a problem of how to re-organise R&D activities in such a way that 
productivity could rise again. It presented several accounts from finance directors, 
scientists, incubator managers, and consultants and suggested a number of things, which 
are summarised in Table 4.1.  
First, the material showed how accounting as discounted cash flow formula, was 
linked to innovation in the drug discovery process. Linking accounting and innovation 
through discounted cash flow formula had the effect of transforming the drug discovery 
process into a ‘value chain’ characterised by value inflection points. Furthermore, 
attributing value to the assets/drugs across the different discovery and development 
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stages has enabled managers and investors to act upon the pipeline and to mobilise 
financial and non-financial resources across the different stages of drug discovery.  
Second, the empirical material showed how accounting, in the form of a ‘new’ 
category, i.e. financial attrition, made it possible for the organisation to visualize the 
uncertainties inherent to innovation, i.e. to the drug discovery processes. By translating 
the financial attrition category into a percentage (i.e. 50%), which represented the 
slippages and failures occurring during the R&D process, and combining it with other 
accounting tools, such as “wish lists”, accounting made it possible to shape innovation. 
In this case, shaping innovation meant not only that financial attrition and wish lists 
made it possible to prioritise, rank, and select which R&D activities to include in the 
approved budget and which activities to exclude or defer. But also that activities were 
‘expected’ to fail or to get delayed in order to avoid underspends and carry out all the 
wished activities. By normalising failures, delays, and slippages, accounting created a 
sense of discipline and control in the management of R&D activities without having to 
intervene on the causes of such failures, delays, and slippages. 
Third, in the case of Incubator#1, the empirical material showed how accounting 
simultaneously inscribed multiple and sometimes conflicting calculative frames (e.g. 
innovation versus financial sustainability) by means of the IP/CRO ratio, the incubator 
financial model, and the business innovation and development budget. In this case, 
accounting shaped the innovation activities of the incubation programme by providing 
certain actors (e.g. managers, board members) with the tools for translating their goals, 
objectives, and interests into different versions of value, i.e. value as ability to make 
profits, or value as ability to produce intellectual property. Accounting also provided the 
space where these different versions of value could be experimented and negotiated.  
Overall, what the chapter suggested is that it was not only a problem of productivity 
the one that actors in the field were concerned about and busy to fix. There was a wider 
discursive element coming to the fore, which is related to science, and how it is possible 
to govern science in a way that it can ally with the market, the State, and the 
corporations toward the objective of fostering innovation and hence economic growth. 
The pipeline productivity was a part of a wider discourse on how science can be linked 
to the economy in such a way that science becomes “economized”. How accounting is 
implicated in making such connection possible was the focus of the chapter. The 
questions that seemed to cut through all the accounts presented were: how do actors 
frame science in such a way that it can be brought from remote places in academic 
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departments, private and public research laboratories to the market place? How can 
science be enrolled to take part to the so called “race to the top” (Lord Sainsbury 2007)? 
All the indicators, formulas, and budgets presented in the chapter were mobilised by 
actors in order to frame science and try to control such an unpredictable and unreliable 
ally. Financial attrition, wish lists, performance indicators are mobilised to control 
innovation, that is to control for the fact that technical tests do not work out as planned, 
for the fact that activities take longer than expected, for the fact that scientists from 
private corporations are not always interested in collaborating with their colleagues in 
universities and incubators, and when they want to they have to confront with all the red 
tapes of the big organisations. Without the different forms of accounting discussed 
throughout the chapter, Drug Discovery Centres, Therapeutic Areas, and Incubator#1 
would probably become a dis-organised, value-less, un-prioritised, flat ensemble of 
drug discovery and development activities. After costing, framing, prioritising, valuing 
innovation– the decision making process becomes instead hard to contest precisely 
because of the ‘objectivity’ granted to the accounting devices that are mobilised 
throughout. So, to answer the initial questions, accounting has done and performed a lot, 
in all those different ways that have been discussed earlier on. And importantly all of 
them count as accounting for innovation. 
Accounting devices made it possible to translate innovative scientific discovery into 
economic entities such as project R&D costs, drugs’ value, etc. As a result of such 
translation, scientific ideas can be acted upon, financial resources can be mobilised, and 
investments can be switched in so shaping the trajectory of scientific ideas. We have 
seen throughout the chapter that the ways in which each accounting device has 
contributed to such translation are multiple, and the effects each device has generated 
are multiple too. And it is such ability of accounting to adapt to contexts and enrol into 
programmes that makes it powerful. Probably the power of accounting for innovation 
does not lie in creating “new” tools, but in adapting to new problematics of control by 
mobilising and combining (Latour 1987, p. 227) traditional, yet fluid, devices and new 
rationales. 
This chapter showed how discovering and incubating innovation involve translating 
scientific ideas into economic entities and how accounting made such translation 
possible in the context of the private corporation. The next chapter will investigate the 
practices of transferring of innovation in the context of universities and technology 
transfer offices within universities. In shifting the perspective from private to public 
contexts, one would expect to find different sets of concerns, calculative frames, 
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tensions, and accounting devices. The chapter will show how university’s concerns for 
commercialising research have been translated into performance indicators. The chapter 
will also discuss the effects of such translation and the tensions that have emerged, such 
as the one between publishing and commercialising research. 
  
1
5
3 
Table 4.1: A characterisation of accounting devices in Drug Discovery Centres, Therapeutic Areas, and Incubator#1 
 
Accounting device / 
Characterisation
Financial attrition Wish/activities list
(Risk adjusted) 
Discounted cash 
flows
Financial model Innovation budget
Open innovation 
audit report
Descriptive elements
Underspends, 
attrition rate
List of R&D projects 
and activities' costs
Drug development 
cost estimates, 
probability of 
success, sales 
potential
Key assumptions 
about: rental level, 
occupancy level, 
funding 
requirements, 
innovation objectives
Business innovation 
and development 
objectives, list of 
activities' costs 
(prioritised)
Open innovation KPIs 
framework; review of 
open innovation 
initiatives already in 
place
Embedded frames
Being "realistic", 
"objective", and 
"clear"
Being "realistic"
Science-time-value 
relation
Financial 
conservativism and 
sustainability, 
simplicity, quality of 
incubation
Innovation, quality,   
and financial 
sustainability
Auditability, open 
innovation model 
Calculative action
Estimating and 
reviewing attrition 
rate
Costing, creating and 
prioritising list of 
activities
Valuing the market, 
using industry 
standards
Assessing 
prospective tenants, 
creating a base-case, 
assessing IP potential
Prioritisating activities
Measuring/narrating 
open 
innovation/collaborat
ions
Origins of practices
Capital projects 
planning
Portfolio 
management
Health economics, 
investment appraisal
Financial analysis   Portfolio management Auditing, KPIs
Inscriptions
Historical attrition 
rate
Projects/activities 
total, approved 
budget
Value inflection 
points
IP/CROs ratio (%)
Business innovation 
and development 
projects total (£) 
(potential and 
approved)
(future) Open 
innovation KPIs, 
(current) IP/CROs 
ratio
Drug Discovery Centres and Therapeutic Areas Incubator#1
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CHAPTER  5  EMBODYING TENSIONS 
THROUGH ACCOUNTING: THE CASE OF 
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER IN THE UK 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
“Many young scientists are now spending 50% of their time 
writing research proposals where they are expected to 
hypothesize about ‘impact’. They can have no real idea of 
impact at this point, so if they are honest on this issue they 
will be denied funding because it’s perceived that they’re 
doing research that is not particularly useful. Thus an 
intrinsically corrupt approach is being fostered which slowly 
but surely is destroying our discipline which is based on 
doubt, questioning and more importantly a deep respect for 
evidence-based truth” (emphasis added) 
–Sir Harold Kroto, 1996 Nobel Prize in Chemistry 
 
The quote above is taken from a public interview to Sir Harold Kroto -1996 Nobel Prize 
in Chemistry and effectively exemplifies the core theme of the thesis, which is the role 
of accounting in realising the economic value of science, where science is increasingly 
regarded as instrumental to the achievement of economic progress. More specifically 
the quote points to the underlying theme of this chapter, which is the paradoxical 
character and the unintended effects of measuring and valuing academic science on the 
basis of criteria such as usefulness and commercial relevance. 
The chapter will explore how accounting is implicated in transferring innovative 
scientific ideas from university to industry, in the context of university technology 
transfer offices. Attention will be given to the accounting and law devices that have 
been mobilised to align academic researchers with research commercialisation 
programmes within universities. Instances of such devices include invention 
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disclosures, key performance indicators, performance targets, and the so called formula-
based funding. In the process of making research amenable to commercial exploitation, 
different sets of aspirations (e.g. the “inventive” university, the growth of regional 
economies) are translated into accounting numbers and result (either intendedly or 
unintendedly) into tensions and contradictions. At least two types of tension emerge 
from the analysis. One is the tension between publishing and commercialising academic 
research and the other is the tension between licensing and spinning-out research ideas. 
The section will show how accounting not only was deployed to inscribe different 
aspirations, but also has contributed to either creating or mediating tensions within the 
field. The Research Excellence Framework (REF) and the Higher Education Innovation 
Fund (HEIF) will be drawn upon to show how the formula-based funding device has 
produced inscriptions (e.g. the weights) which have both generated and dissolved a 
number of tensions (e.g. publishing versus commercialising). 
5.1    Framing science through technology transfer 
“Anything is a disclosure. Also a conference, because 
anybody can take a picture of your slides or poster or talk. 
Technically even talk to your friends down the pub is a 
disclosure […] So we need to know if they [academics] are 
going to publish, because that helps to know whether we’ve 
got to rush to file the patent or whether we’ve got time”.  
–Licensing executive (#22) 
 
The opening quote is suggestive of the role that technology transfer plays within 
universities: ‘capturing’ (#22) ideas developed by academics before they reach the 
public domain. As Michel Callon (1998c, p. 253) suggested, academic research ideas 
can be conceived as overflows that take place everywhere (e.g. in the laboratory, at the 
university cafeteria etc.) and all the time, whether this is during the conduct of ‘normal 
work’ or not.  
The section examines how technology transfer is itself an assemblage of costly law 
and accounting devices established to ‘capture’ scientific ideas. Such devices are 
deployed to the ultimate aim of making scientific ideas visible in economic terms, and 
in so contributing to the construction of markets of scientific ideas. This section will 
consider the construction of two spaces within universities where framing efforts occur: 
one is the space of research commercialisation and the other one is the space of research 
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publication. The section will show what framing devices are mobilised within these two 
spaces and the effects they produce. Particular attention will be given to research 
commercialisation since this is where attempts to economize science is most 
concentrated. Research commercialisation is enacted across different centres of 
calculations within and beyond university institutions involving university’s finance 
offices, technology transfer offices, the Higher Education Statistics Agency (HESA), 
and offices within city councils and (former) regional development agencies. 
The remainder of the section will first provide an overview of what is meant by 
technology transfer practices. Then the discussion will turn to the law and accounting 
devices that are deployed by technology transfer offices in order to capture scientific 
ideas and their value. In this respect, the role of the invention disclosure form in framing 
scientific ideas will be analysed. The section will then follow the sequence of 
displacements and transformations of invention disclosures and patents into 
performance indicators, their aggregation at level of HESA and the linking between 
performances and innovation funding via formula-based funding. Finally the 
consequences and effects of linking performances to funding will be discussed. 
5.1.1   An overview of technology transfer practices 
Technology transfer offices represent a central part of the commercialisation activities 
carried out by British universities in the pursuit of the so-called universities’ third 
mission of wealth creation. As discussed in Chapter 3, Technology Transfer activities 
have gained prominence since the late 1990s in the UK. Their emergence was also 
enabled by changes in the regulation of intellectual property rights arising from 
academic and publicly-funded research.  
The organisational arrangements for technology transfer can take different forms. In 
some cases technology transfer activities are carried out by commercial vehicles which 
are wholly owned by the university, in other cases they are partly or fully outsourced to 
public listed companies specialised in technology transfer, and in which the university 
holds a minority stake.  
These arrangements are motivated also by the fact that public universities in the UK 
are registered as charities whose primary purposes are teaching and research. The fact of 
carrying out commercialisation activities such as intellectual property licensing and 
trading as part of universities’ third mission hence generating profits have raised in the 
past several concerns. This is due to the potential conflict between the charitable status 
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and the commercial activities, together with the fiscal treatment of the profits arising 
from such activities. Due to a lack of clarity characterising the fiscal and charity 
regulation of such aspects (Hatakenaka 2004, p. 30), universities opted either for the 
creation of wholly owned subsidiaries in order to undertake the commercial activities, 
or for outsourcing the management of their intellectual properties portfolio to third 
companies operating in the technology transfer sector. The first option –i.e. a wholly 
owned subsidiary- is the case for Top University 1,2,4,5, while the second option –i.e. 
outsourcing to a public listed company- is the case for Top University 3. The empirical 
part of the section on technology transfer will draw on the accounts from these 
universities.  
Broadly speaking, the range of activities that falls under the remit of technology 
transfer offices involves the identification, evaluation and protection of intellectual 
property (IP) and its commercialisation through licensing and the formation of spin-out 
companies. There is usually a division of labour within technology transfer offices such 
that different teams are assigned to different tasks. The licensing executive of a top 
ranked British university illustrates the point as follows: 
“There are two types of team. There is the me type who goes out and talks 
about technology transfer and how we can help academics to develop the 
technology and file patents on that, find the licensee and then license the 
technology. And then there are other colleagues that go out to the schools 
and explain them about the process of making a disclosure to the centre and 
how we would assess if we file a patent on that" (#22 – Licensing executive) 
As suggested in the quotes, a central part of technology transfer offices’ activities has 
to do with engaging/communicating with academics on a regular basis, either in the 
form of one-to-one meetings or in the form of networking events and workshops. The 
issues involved in interacting with academics are related to the difficulties of engaging 
them in the activities of technology transfer, partly because of academics’ focus on 
research and teaching and partly because of the reputation attached to technology 
transfer offices sometimes. As a technology transfer manager of a top British university 
put it: 
“The university tech transfer offices don’t have the best reputation […] I 
think historically there has been a perception that they have been quite 
unrealistic about what they can achieve […] But that does not mean that 
there has not been a reputation of tech transfer offices to be difficult or slow 
or heavy […]And when this kind of offices at universities are slow it is 
either because they have been asked a question they don’t know the answer, 
or we are permanently always snowed under and it is difficult. And so if 
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[academics] want to opt out that’s fine” (#28 – Technology Transfer 
Manager) 
Another important task of technology transfer offices involves ‘capturing’ 
inventions/technologies generated by the academics, which means amongst the other 
things assessing the commercial potential of an invention/technology and protecting the 
invention by means of intellectual property rights. The Director of IP of a top ranked 
British university stresses how a piece of research is not necessarily considered to be an 
invention and how not all the inventions have necessarily a commercial potential: 
“[Our] role is to identify intellectual property from academic research, so we 
have a team of people whose job is to talk with academic researchers to 
understand when their research might lead to an invention and when it does 
lead to an invention to make sure we determine whether that invention has 
commercial potential or not, so just because you made an invention does not 
mean that there is a potential of generating income and when we think there 
is good potential we will consider to protecting that IP, it might be by 
patenting, copyright, trade secret, design right” (#15 – Director of IP) 
The characteristic of having a good commercial potential is a necessary pre-requisite to 
patent filing, i.e. the beginning of the whole patenting process.  
“So we see about 300 inventions a year here at the university and then we 
focus down on those which we think have greater commercial potential and 
we work closely with those” (#15 – Director of IP) 
Another issue related to capturing inventions/technologies has to do with deciding the 
pathway that an invention/technology can take once the patent has been filed. This type 
of decisions characterises the space of technology transfer too. The options, which will 
be discussed later, consist in either licensing the technology to an existing company or 
creating a spin-out company. 
This chapter will consider the practices of transferring ‘innovative’ academic science 
to industry from the perspective of accounting. The chapter will show how accounting 
contributes to the circulation (i.e. transferring) of innovation by providing the tools to 
assess the economic value of transferring technology. In so doing, accounting translates 
the vision of universities as inventive and creative institutions into numbers that can be 
negotiated and acted upon. Technology transfer offices represent costly structures put in 
place by universities in order to capture scientific ideas generated by academics and 
frame such ideas in economic terms. As a result of such framing, scientific ideas are 
translated into economic entities (e.g. spinouts, income from licensing), thus becoming 
economised in a way that they can speak the language of economic actors such as 
investors, public agencies, and the industry. 
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To identify the economic entities fabricated while transferring technology, the 
chapter will explore how technology transfer offices act as centres of calculations 
providing data that is aggregated and passed on to other centres of calculation within 
and beyond the university (e.g. the Higher Education Statistics Agency (HESA) and the 
Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE)). Once reached these centres, 
indicators are aggregated and form figures (e.g. Income from research councils 
involving business collaboration) on the base of which financial resources are allocated. 
The next section will discuss technology transfer as a space characterised by tensions 
rationalised into calculations of performance, that is the tension between publishing and 
commercialising research on the one hand, and the tension between licensing and 
spinning-out technologies on the other hand. First, the section will discuss invention 
disclosure and patenting as devices aimed at framing scientific ideas and enrolling 
academics into commercialisation programmes, the latter finalised at either licensing or 
spinning-out technologies. Second, the section will trace the transformation of invention 
disclosures, patents, and spin-outs into performance indicators (e.g. invention 
disclosures count, patents count, and spin-outs count). Third, the section will account 
for the collection and aggregation of data about universities’ innovation performances at 
HESA level. The section will argue that it is by linking performances to funding via 
formula-based funding and by assigning weights to research and innovation 
performances that local tensions can either arise or dissolve.  
5.1.2   Characterising technology transfer as a place of 
tensions 
“From [industry] standpoint [technology transfer] is a good 
thing. Whether UK ltd reputation will continue to be excellent 
is an interesting question. I am worried slightly there is a 
paradox here: we [industry] go to universities [to collaborate], 
why do we go to universities? Because they are brilliant. Let’s 
take [TopUniversity#1], in the moment we fund a contract, 
we don’t want them to publish papers –you see what I mean? 
And if they don’t produce any papers their standing goes 
down. It’s a paradox”  
– Head of Technology Strategy (#3) 
 
The opening quote is indicative of a contradiction that characterises the space of 
interrelations between university and industry. It offers an intellectual puzzle where 
technology transfer and more in general university collaborations with industry, while 
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being encouraged by the government, can affect research and academic publishing in 
paradoxical ways. This section analyses the emergence of a tension experienced by 
academics between publishing their research and commercialising it. This tension is 
often coupled with a pressure posed on technology transfer office executives to enrol 
academics into research commercialisation programmes. 
How are paradoxes, tensions, and contradictions created in the space of technology 
transfer? And has accounting a role in producing rather than mediating such tensions? 
To answer these questions the remainder of the section will look first at the devices 
which are used to frame academic ideas, that is devices which are deployed to make 
ideas visible in such a way that they can be commercialised. Second, the section will 
look at how such devices are displaced/transformed into performance indicators and 
how this implies them travelling across different centres of calculations, such as 
universities’ finance offices and HESA, i.e. the Higher Education Statistics Agency. 
Framing innovation through the invention disclosure form and 
patent application 
 “The frame establishes a boundary within which interactions 
–the significance and content of which are self-evident to the 
protagonists –take place more or less independently of their 
surrounding context”  
–Michel Callon (1998c, p. 249)  
 
Research contracts, invention disclosure forms and patent applications represent 
attempts to capture scientific ideas and inventions put forward by academics in the 
course of their normal job. As suggested by the opening quote, contracts bring resources 
(e.g. ideas, researchers, technologies, equipment, etc.) into a demarcated stage within 
which said resources come to play a specified role, which is self-evident to participants. 
This means, for example, that after an invention disclosure is signed, the scientist is 
aware of the fact he will not be able to disclose his idea at conferences without letting 
the technology transfer office know about it. In this sense one can say that resources and 
the interactions between them are framed by disclosure forms and contracts.  
The next section will show the role that accounting plays in framing scientific ideas. 
Revenue-sharing agreements, cost-sharing agreements, and economic valuations are few 
instances of how accounting has contributed to shape the space of technology transfer. 
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Patents Act 1977 
The first device designed to control the flow of scientific ideas generated by 
universities’ employees is a law device. The licensing executive at Top University 4 
illustrates the latter as follows: 
"I think it’s in 1983 [sic 1977] with the copyright act which stated the 
employer owns the intellectual property. So for instance if you are an 
academic at the university, you are employed to do research and in a sense 
through your research you are expected to invent new things and anything 
you invent belongs to your employer. However, if you were administrator, or 
cleaner, or secretary and you invented something that didn’t relate to your 
normal work then you would own it because it’s not been invented through 
the course of your normal duty" (#22 –emphasis added) 
It was under the Patents Act 1977 
8
 that academic and publicly-funded academic 
research started to be assigned to universities as direct consequence of the employment 
contract. However, not all the universities in the UK assume almost automatically that 
the IPs are owned by the Universities. There are a few exceptions in the landscape of 
higher education institutions, as explained by a technology transfer manager at Top 
University 1: 
"[T]he other thing which is quite different to others is that we don’t assume 
that the university owns the IP, but we don’t assume that scientists own 
the IP either. Some people think that [name of university] owns the IP, 
that’s not true. We don’t try and decide who owns the IP, we simply put in 
place a piece of paper which says “any rights at the university that all the 
scientists have are all assigned to [tech transfer office]” so all the rights are 
in one place and that means that we can either go further and commercialize 
on behalf of the university and the inventors or we can assign it back to the 
scientists that want to opt out, but it means that is all gathered in one place. 
Where there is a lot of other universities that assume they own the IPs 
and then once something is commercialized they have to go back and just 
check, which is not necessarily ideal" (#28 –emphasis added) 
The other device in place to capture the flow of academic ideas is the invention 
disclosure to which the chapter will now turn. 
 
 
                                                          
8
 Section 39(1) of the Patents Act states that an invention made by an employee shall be taken to 
belong to the employer if: (a) it was made in the course of the normal duties of the employee, or 
specifically assigned duties, from which an invention might be reasonably expected to result; or 
(b) it was made in the course of the employee’s duties and because of the nature of the duties, a 
special obligation to further the employer’s interests. 
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Capturing ideas through the Invention Disclosure Form 
A practice in place in most of the British universities is the one of asking 
academics/inventors to fill in a form through which they disclose their invention to the 
university’s technology transfer office. There is some variation across universities in the 
content of the form. However, the purpose remains the same: 
"It’s really to capture as much relevant information as we can about an 
invention" (#22 - licensing executive) 
As shown in the sample provided in Appendix 2, the form is made of several boxes 
which are to be filled in by the academic/inventor. Commercial, technical, and legal 
elements characterise this piece of documentation. Appendix 2 provides a general 
template of what is usually to be found in a disclosure form. The form usually contains 
a box where inventors provide a summary of the technology, avoiding "too many 
graphs, details, and equations" (#22 -licensing executive) because technology transfer 
managers would not necessarily be of the same specialist area as the inventor and too 
many details would be therefore difficult to grasp. Another box asks the inventor to 
disclose whether the technology has already been presented at conferences etc. If a 
decision is made to apply for a patent, i.e. the technology has a commercial potential,  
then other extra boxes need to be filled about the commercialisation strategy to be 
pursue (e.g. licensing, spin-out formation, etc.), the competitors, any existing company 
to approach for licensing, and any existing sponsor (in case they might have first right 
on the invention). In some cases the disclosure contains an agreement to revenue 
sharing of the kind shown in Table 5.1 below. 
Table 5.1: Example of revenue sharing agreement 
 
Yet, in some cases (e.g. Top University 4) a box containing the clause “School/Faculty 
agrees to cover 1/3 of the costs of patent filing and maintenance” is inserted in the 
invention disclosure form. The reason for including this box is explained by a licensing 
executive as follows: 
"We ask the schools to provide some funding to cover the cost of the patent 
–filing and maintenance- and the reason for that is to match funding. So the 
NET REVENUE INVENTOR(S) DEPARTMENT UNIVERSITY
£1 - £2,000 100% 0% 0%
£2,001 - £42,000 60% 20% 20%
£42,001 - £200,000 50% 25% 25%
>£200,000 30% 35% 35%
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centre [University] pays two third of the cost [of patent filing and 
maintenance] and we ask the school to pay a third and if the school says no 
we are not paying the third, we have to ask the question why. It is because 
the academic got a reputation for saying he’s got this fantastic invention but 
he hasn’t, so we are looking for the school to make sure that the technology 
is as good as it can be" (#22 - licensing executive) 
What the 1/3-2/3 ratio does in this context is to inscribe different views of what the 
inventive reputation of an academic is and of what constitutes a good technology. 
Not all the academic ideas are ‘eligible’ to be disclosed and to be entered in the 
universities’ databases. As seen before, academics can decide not to disclose an 
invention either because they are not interested in the commercialisation path or because 
they prefer/opt for liaising directly with a company bypassing the technology transfer 
office.  
However, also technology transfer managers operate some sort of skimming strategy 
and as a consequence of that not all the ‘informal’ disclosures result into a formal 
invention disclosure to be entered in the university’s database. On this point a 
technology transfer manager at TopUniversity#1 argues: 
"Even in University1 Enterprise [technology transfer office] we all view all 
these things slightly differently, so if an academic talks to you, you could log 
it into the system as an invention disclosure" (#28 ) 
There seems to be ‘tacit’ selection criteria which managers apply when an academic 
talks to them in order to disclose his invention or simply to ask for advice: 
"But I don’t tend to log that unless I think that there might be a patent. So, I 
was talking to this guy about how his project needs to develop and funding 
that he needs to apply for and whether or not he should have a 
confidentiality [agreement] and whether there would be an opportunity to 
patent. I didn’t log that. The disclosure is a little bit artificial because it is 
very person to person dependent on what you consider as a disclosure" (#28 
–emphasis added) 
As noticeable in the technology transfer manager’s words, it is “artificial” and “very 
person to person dependent” to establish what count as an invention disclosure. 
Patenting application process 
Once an invention is disclosed to the technology transfer office then a decision needs to 
be made as to whether filing a patent, i.e. applying for the patent. As seen earlier, a 
practice within technology transfer offices consists in formalising the disclosure only 
for those inventions that are potentially patentable. However, the final decision as to 
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whether filing a patent in some cases is not made neither by the manager nor by the 
academic individually, but by a panel like the one at Top University#4. This is to avoid 
the risk that too many patents with “no real commercial value” (#22) are filed. A risk 
ranking is usually performed by the commercialisation panel on the basis of factors such 
as the level of maturity of a technology, how far the markets are, how big they are, how 
easy is to penetrate into the market, how many competitors, what the perceived demand 
from people is. 
However, the overall ranking is only part of a “narrative”, as the licensing executive 
explains:  
“I don’t think that you can say that anything that scores less than three 
doesn’t get funding. It’s more complicated than that. And part of this has 
also to do with academics whether they are keen on commercializing or they 
have a track record of commercializing or whether they are difficult to work 
with. It becomes a multi-faceted [decision] and although this ranking I think 
it is much more like a narrative than as being a number. So I don’t think I 
can give you an answer on what the cut-off is. So many factors it’s almost 
the decision of my committee - if you like- is influenced by the ranking” 
(#22 –emphasis added) 
Timing also constrains the decision making process and if an academic goes to the 
technology transfer office close to a publication or conference deadline, then technology 
transfer managers find themselves rushing into patent application decisions. This point 
is illustrated by a technology transfer manager at Top University 1 as follows: 
“[A]part from invention disclosure which is a very personal thing, filing a 
patent again you are pushed into it because you don’t have enough time to 
really consider the invention disclosure” (#28) 
Once the decision to file a patent is made, the process, as regulated by the Patent Office, 
is described in Figure 5.1 below.  
Normally, the routine for a technology transfer office would consist in filing a patent 
and a year later the application enter the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) which 
establishes a filing date in all contracting states. Six months later it becomes published 
on the internet. Twelve months after that it enters the national phase and will 
automatically go on the public records. At this point it is not possible to withdraw the 
application (#22) and decision will then be made by Patent Office (or any other 
regional/national office) as to whether granting or rejecting the patent application. 
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Figure 5.1: The patenting process flow 
Source: adapted from https://www.gov.uk/patent-your-invention/overview (accessed 
25/04/2015) 
 
In terms of costs, the more expensive part of the process is –according to some 
respondents- the PCT application and not the initial filing. As shown in the invention 
disclosure form (see Table A-1, Appendix 1) some universities require the 
department/school to contribute (e.g. one third) to the cost of patent filing and 
maintenance. However, the PCT application involves an amount between 5-6 thousand 
pounds (Intellectual Property Office 2015) and this represents the make or break point 
for the patent application, i.e. the point at which the technology transfer office together 
with the academic has to decide whether to carry on with the PCT filing or not. 
Licensing and ‘spinning out’ pathways 
Once the academic/inventor together with the technology transfer office decide to take 
the commercialisation path, another important decision has to be made as to whether 
licensing or spinning out the technology. Commercialising academic research can take 
either the form of licensing a technology to an existing company or the form of 
licensing the technology to a newly formed company, i.e. start-up, in which both 
university and the academic/inventor (and further investors if it is the case) have an 
equity position. When undertaking the licensing path, the academics usually provide the 
link with potential companies: 
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“There is an old rule of thumbs that 80% of contacts for licensing 
technologies come from the academics, because they work in the field 
already and 20% comes from the technology transfer office” (#22) 
However, licensing a technology also depends on the priorities of the company to 
which the technology is licensed: 
“[The] question is then do we go to any of the big pharma and say we have 
this lead compound, we have done some work on it, looks very exciting do 
you want to license it? And they say ‘yeah maybe’ and they give you a little 
bit of money for it and maybe they don’t have that in their priorities and 
forget about it” (#22) 
The spin-out route instead takes more ‘commitment’ on the side of academics both in 
terms of developing the technology and also in terms of attracting rounds of 
investments/funding: 
“Or you go down the spin-out route and form a spin-out company, you are 
driven….you want this route to be developed so all your attention is focused 
on it, you find research development funding for it and investment funding 
for it and you’ll be on board in the management team and you develop until 
you’ve got evidence that it works, that has grown its value and then you 
license it” (#22)  
Spin-out formation requires developing a business plan which sort of ‘crystallises’ and 
puts numbers on the “commitment” to develop the technology (e.g. a drug): 
“With a business plan you say this is our spin-out company and then if there 
is a commitment to develop the drug in the next five years, you have to work 
out what your costs are gonna be, almost working out month by month what 
the cash flow is, where the money is going to come from, and month by 
month how much you are gonna spend” (#22) 
Moving from each individual licence story or spin-out story to universities’ top 
levels, each commercialisation story becomes disentangled from local relations and 
contingencies (e.g. the technology, the academic career of the start-up founder, etc.) 
quantified and inscribed into a set of performance indicators (e.g. number of spinouts, 
total income from licensing) which are used within universities for different purposes. 
The latter range from constructing narratives about the standing of the university as 
inventive and impactful institution, to accounting for internal resources and acting upon 
them. The next section will show how spin-outs stories are made visible at an aggregate 
level within universities and how this process is not free from tensions. 
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Transforming disclosures and patents into performance indicators  
“My boss would say the management doesn’t really care 
about what we do on a daily basis, what they want to see are 
metrics because they have the numbers so they can see –
you know- if there is a trend from 5 years ago, going up or 
going down” 
–Licensing executive (#22, emphasis added) 
 
This section will show how individual disclosure forms and patent applications are 
transformed and displaced into performance indicators. The passage implies moving 
numbers from technology transfer offices to the actors at the top of the organisation (i.e. 
university’s top managers). This is done by accumulating information about inventions 
and patents in order to make them visible and manageable to the eyes of those placed at 
the top of the organisation (i.e. the university management). The section will look at 
how and where invention disclosures count, filed patents count, licenses count, and 
spin-outs count are created. 
Key performance indicator: the ‘invention disclosures count’  
‘Invention disclosures count’ is a performance indicator which is often used by 
universities both for internal reporting and also in order to comply with the HESA 
(Higher Education Statistics Agency) data requests. However, disclosure counts as a 
performance indicator means different things to different people. As the Director of IP 
at Top University 5 illustrates: 
"So, some stats: I said that there are 370 inventions a year and there are 3300 
researchers here. This tells us about one in ten researchers has an invention 
that we capture here. So 370 for me is a good number and is certainly above 
university norms. But that’s really saying that one in ten academics have 
an invention or that they get engaged with the tech transfer office 
someway. We could also say that 9 in 10 are completely disconnected with 
the tech transfer office, don’t have ideas –not to be a bit harsh- it is fair to 
say that amongst the priorities that academics have –researching, teaching, 
ensuring that their knowledge is used in useful way- research and teaching 
for many academics are primary objectives that’s what they want to do" (#15 
-emphasis added) 
As the quote above suggests, invention disclosures count can mean different things to 
different people. A technology transfer executive might take it as an indication of the 
“level of engagement with technology transfer offices” (#15). While a university’s top 
executive might interpret invention disclosures count as a measure of the “level of 
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inventiveness” (#14) of the university. In these different guises the same performance 
indicator can contribute to building different stories, like the following one: 
"The more inventions the university gets the greater standing it feels it has as 
an inventive institution" (#15) 
A licensing executive from Top University 4 instead emphasises how the number 
itself is not a measure of the quality of the portfolio of technologies. However, he 
stressed the importance of keeping the number high: 
“If you have 10 disclosures per year and they are all absolutely excellent and 
you are able to file a patent on four tenth of them, and license four tenth of 
technologies out to companies, then disclosure number wouldn’t really 
matter too much because you get that flow of ten good ones every year. But 
you don’t get ten good ones, you get in our case about 100 and some are 
poor, some are OK, some are really good. So you need to keep that flow 
coming through. So you need that number [invention disclosures] to be 
relatively high” (#22 –emphasis added) 
To sum up, the decision as to whether formalising an invention disclosure can be 
“very personal” (#28) in that it depends on what the executive considers to be a 
disclosure (e.g. a serious and analytical conversation about the project, or else) and 
whether the executive thinks there might be a future patent. The fact that the count of 
the disclosures produced in one year is used as a performance indicator can perhaps 
influence that personal judgment. In other words, the number of invention disclosures as 
a performance indicator can generate the effect of pushing both academics to engage 
with technology transfer offices and managers to formalise that engagement/interaction 
under the form of an invention disclosure. However, the meanings attached to the final 
figure (e.g. 370 disclosures in a year) can range from indicating the level of 
inventiveness of a university to indicating the level of engagement between academics 
and technology transfer offices.  
Key performance indicator: the ‘filed patents count’ 
Each university keeps record of the number of patents that have been filed in a year. 
Such performance indicator is often reported in universities’ annual and strategic 
reports. Similarly to what happens with the number of invention disclosures, also the 
number of filed patents tends to be contested on the ground that is not indicative of the 
level of innovation. Criticism about this performance indicator is usually based on the 
fact that filing a patent does not necessarily mean that the patent will be granted. As a 
Head of Legal and Operations at a charitable sponsoring agency points out: 
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"The metrics that I have are a bit clumsy because they are counting patents, 
it needs to be more subtle" (#30) 
At Charity Foundation 1 the percentage of grants (awarded by the charity to 
academics for translational research) which result in patent application is used as 
performance indicator, which nevertheless is subjected to contestation within the charity 
itself: 
"I worry some time that the figures that I see –we ask whether they have 
filed any patents- and something like 15% of grant holders said that they 
filed patents. I find it very difficult to believe, it might be actually true, but 
they might have just abandoned it straight away cause –you know- in any 
university scientists have great ideas, they go to the tech transfer offices and 
say “I want to publish, I want to present at the next conference” and the tech 
transfer officers say “oh we need to file a patent! We need to file a patent!” 
It costs thousands of pounds and then nothing happens for another year and 
then they’ve got to spend extra ten or fifteen thousand and so they will 
abandon it. So, you know 15% is great but I don’t think it is reflective of 
whether that actually turned into something. And we haven’t worked out 
how to fine tune that, follow that up as the patent really turns into anything" 
(#30, Head of Legal and Operations –emphasis added) 
What Charity Foundation 1 is struggling to measure is whether the awarded grants have 
turned into any commercial output. In this respect filed patents is not reflective of the 
amount of awarded grants that turned into commercial outputs. Nevertheless, other 
institutions such as Top University 1 regard filed patents, if anything, to be reflective of 
the work that has been done to file the patent. The number of PCT application is instead 
regarded as a better indicator when it comes to measure the outcomes of 
commercialisation efforts: 
“[I]f you put in a patent application is kind of performance indicator… you 
know you put a lot of work into it, cause these things don’t just happen but 
actually when it comes to assessing whether or not you identified the 
technology that you are really going to pursue, I think the PCT application is 
better” (#28) 
This section has discussed the case of filed patent count as performance indicator. It 
has shown how they can mean different things to different actors and how they 
contribute to build different type of narratives. From the point of view of the individual 
manager, the number of patent applications in fact can be used to monitor the 
performance of managers because they are supposedly “reflective” of the work that has 
been carried out to file a patent, but they are not “reflective” of the success of a 
technology. However, in the university’s annual report, the number of patent application 
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constitutes a key performance indicator which helps to build the story of economic and 
social ‘impact’. 
Key performance indicators: ‘spin-out companies count’ and ‘licenses count’ 
Within Top University 4, the spinning-out route is made visible at the level of 
Innovation Board, at the level of the university council, and at the level of the university 
executive board by means of a number of indicators. The Innovation Board is 
essentially an investment committee, while the council of the university is a body 
composed by external people who “have an interest in the running of the university and 
advise the executive board on the running of the university” (#21 –Spinout Portfolio 
Manager). As explained by the Spin-out Portfolio Manager at the Top University 4 the 
different bodies within the university want to see “any events that you can put numbers 
on”. The numbers which are usually produces are: 
"How many grants they received, how much income, what the sales effort, 
what  turnover. All those kinds of information. Depending on the company, 
how many employees, whether they have expanded or reduced [...] Every 
single one, what is their cash position, how stable is the cash position. If they 
get no more sales or no more incomes how long are they going to survive. 
That is something we would always report. The asset value of the company, 
are they in positive or negative asset position? Should we be concerned? [...] 
We develop our own indicators every time" [#21] 
Performance indicators can serve different purposes, depending on the narrative in 
which they become embedded. As to case of “cumulative investment over time” (i.e. 
investments into spin out companies) the Spinout portfolio manager at Top University 4 
explains: 
“One of the indicators that we use is the cumulative investment over time. 
To me, I am not convinced by this indicator. I don’t think it is particularly 
useful [...] For example if you had a lot of money, lots of investments going 
into a company that has died, that’s not mentioned [...] It doesn’t indicate, it 
is pointless about how the investment was…because the investment is 
wasted” (#21).  
On the one hand, the performance indicator is used to construct a narrative about “This 
is us. This is what we achieved” (see quote below) as university. On the other hand, 
from the perspective of the individual manager, the performance indicator does not 
support a narrative made of “true business indicators”. The Spinout Portfolio Manager 
illustrates the point as follows: 
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“It is just a cumulative figure that gets bigger every year. And to be honest 
that’s the point of it: it gets bigger every year and so it looks interesting. I 
would not say that this is a true business indicator. It’s “this is us. This is 
what we achieved” and to be honest I think this is unnecessary. But how 
much investments have been secured in this time frame, that’s a useful 
indicator. But not a cumulative, year after year, getting bigger and bigger" 
(#21) 
The illustrations so far have showed how individual licence stories or spin-out stories 
become disentangled from local relations and contingencies (e.g. the technology, the 
academic career of the start-up founder, etc.) and are transformed into sets of 
performance indicators (e.g. number of spinouts, total income from licensing).  
The next section will account for the collection and aggregation of data about 
universities’ innovation performances at HESA (Higher Education Statistics Agency) 
level. 
From “individual indicators” to “portfolios of KPIs” 
Looking through the pages of the “ten-year university strategic vision” of Top 
University 5, there is a detailed breakdown of each strategic area into sets of key 
performance indicators (KPIs) and targets. Intellectual Property commercialization is 
one of the key performance indicators oriented toward the goal of carrying out “world-
class research”. The correspondent target is a “weighted portfolio of measures”, ranging 
from number of invention disclosures to number of licences and spin-outs. Talking 
about the exchange of accounting information between the technology transfer office 
and the university, the Director of Intellectual Property at Top University 5 explains: 
 
"We [Technology Transfer Office] have agreed certain performance metrics 
with respect to the university, so the university wishes to see so many 
inventions per year, to file so many patents, to do so many license deals, to 
form so many companies. Those are the kind of metrics they are looking for. 
Or to secure so many million pounds of income, these are all the kind of 
metrics that university is keen to see” (#15) 
 
These measures are then used to construct narratives about the university. The 
Director of IP provides some examples of such narratives: 
“They [performance metrics] are all surrogates for evidencing that the 
university is on the one hand an inventive institution, but on the other hand 
an institution that is connected with industry and transfers his knowledge 
and research to industry for the benefit of society, to achieve impact from 
research…that’s very important things for the university, that’s what funders 
require to the university" (#15) 
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However, when asked to interpret what a “weighted portfolio of measures” means the 
participant seems not to be aware of such weighted portfolio: 
"I am not quite sure how we do that honestly. I am provided with row 
information about these things here and what we do we look at those in a 
number of ways. What they are very keen to do is to compare our 
performance with the performance of other universities and a peer group 
both in the UK and internationally [...] I’m challenging the use of word 
“weight” in there, there is a portfolio of measures…I don’t know whether 
that is just loose language or whether the university is doing something. We 
need to have a good level of performance across a broad number of 
indicators" (#15) 
In other words, the Director of IP had a problem in making sense of what the weights of 
the portfolio of measures are. When the recorder is off, the director argues that if 
TopUniversity#5 (i.e. his employer) tells him to produce a certain performance indicator 
he would produce it and give it to them because that is what they want and not because 
it actually ‘makes sense’ to him. He also warns that one must be very careful to enforce 
certain measuring exercises because they can trigger a risky and distorted behavior. 
Similar sets of performance indicators are also in place at Top University 4. According 
to one of the licensing executives: 
“We [IP commercialization office] are measured on a number of metrics 
including number of patents filed, number of disclosures, how much license 
income reporting per year, how many spinouts have been formed, how much 
the portfolio of spinouts is worth, how many patents have been filed…" 
(#21) 
The licencing executive who works within the IP commercialisation office at Top 
University 4 makes sense of the numbers that they are asked to provide to University 
top managers as follows: 
“My boss would say the management doesn’t really care about what we do 
on a daily basis, what they want to see are metrics because they have the 
numbers so they can see –you know- if there is a trend from 5 years ago 
going up or going down” (#22) 
The idea of applying weights to the portfolio of performance indicators is a practice 
that can be found in at least other two different, yet interconnected, devices which will 
be discussed in the next section. The first device is the Research Excellence Framework 
(REF) and similar exercises which have been performed by the government since the 
mid-eighties. Systems of weights are the central part of such devices and provide the 
mechanism (i.e. the formula-based funding) through which research commercialisation 
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performances are linked to resources allocation. The second device, which will be 
discussed in the next section, is the Higher Education Innovation Fund (HEIF). Also 
HEIF device employs a system of weights in order to allocate funding to support the 
third stream mission of universities (i.e. wealth creation).  
The next section will discuss how REF and HEIF have not only provided the tools 
for assessing the economic value of transferring innovative science to industry, but also 
have generated a number of tensions.  
Linking KPIs to funding: the formula-based funding device 
Device: the Research Excellence Framework (REF) and formula-based funding 
Public funding for research in the UK works under a dual system (House of Commons 
Science and Technology Committee 2002). On the one hand the Higher Education 
Funding Councils –under the aegis of the Department of Education and Skills- 
administer and allocate funding to Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) in the form of 
blocks grant distributed on the basis of research assessment. On the other hand the 
Office for Science and Technology (OST) –under the aegis of the Department for Trade 
and Industry- provides funding to the UK Research Councils which would then allocate 
research grants on competitive basis. 
The 65%-20% weights as inscriptions: embedding governmental tension and creating 
local tensions 
This section will argue that the system of weights used in the assessment exercises 
inscribes the political will to economize academic research. The system of weights 
however not only inscribes certain modalities of conceiving research (e.g. research as 
marketable), but also has the effect of generating the tension experienced by academics 
between publishing and commercialising. 
In order to understand the effects of REF 2014, it seems useful to explain the overall 
mechanism for attributing weights under REF2014. The overall quality judgments 
revolve around three main elements, namely outputs, impact, and environment. Of 
interest here is the weights assigned to outputs and impact and the effects that they can 
generate. According to REF guidance, the research output is defined as follows: 
“The sub-panels will assess the quality of submitted research outputs in 
terms of their ‘originality, significance and rigour’, with reference to 
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international research quality standards. This element will carry a weighting 
of 65 per cent in the overall outcome awarded to each submission” (HEFCE 
2012, p. 6, emphasis added) 
While impact is characterised as follows: 
“The sub-panels will assess the ‘reach and significance’ of impacts on the 
economy, society and/or culture that were underpinned by excellent research 
conducted in the submitted unit, as well as the submitted unit’s approach to 
enabling impact from its research. This element will carry a weighting of 20 
per cent” (HEFCE 2012, , p. 6 -emphasis added) 
Finally environment is defined in REF guidance as follows: 
“The sub-panels will assess the research environment in terms of its ‘vitality 
and sustainability’, including its contribution to the vitality and sustainability 
of the wider discipline or research base. This element will carry a weighting 
of 15 per cent” (HEFCE 2012, p. 6, emphasis added) 
Research output is the one carrying the highest weight, i.e. 65%. This means that the 
quality expressed and measured in terms of research output (i.e. publications) carries the 
highest weight. The emphasis on commercialising academic research through licensing, 
spinning out, consultancy, and so on is most evident under the “impact” element. 
Examples of suggested measures for sub-panels considerations –in relation to economic 
impact- are presented in Table 5.2 below.  
What do these measures represent? First, the indicators in Table 5.2 make 
knowledge/science visible by linking it to economic concerns for business and market 
performances (e.g. “a new business sector has been created”, “the performance of an 
existing business has been improved”, “and licences brought to the market”). Second, 
the overall score of economic impact is assigned a weight of 20%. However, 20%, far 
from being an objective number, mediates/inscribes different sets of governmental 
concerns which relate to the progress of the economy and society.  
In particular, the 65%-20% weights together seem to embed a tension which is 
present at governmental level and which is clearly summarised in the following quote:  
"From a business perspective, there are some principles that the Government 
should take into account [...] World-class excellence across all types of 
research should be recognised and rewarded by the RAE and Research 
Council peer review process. Excellent research undertaken with industry or 
other users should be recognised as being of equal value to excellent 
academic research"  (Lambert 2003, p.86, emphasis added) 
RAE 2008 weighted the overall quality (see Figure 5.2 below) in terms of research 
output (70%), research environment (20%) and esteem indicators (10%). 
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Table 5.2: Excerpt of measures of economic impact under REF 2014 
 
Source: (HEFCE 2012, p. 49-52) 
 
The criticism to RAE 2008 in terms of ‘equalling’ excellent research with industry 
and excellent academic research was based on the fact that: 
"[T]he guidance for panels and sub-panels of RAE2008 did not however, 
indicate to assessors with any great weight that collaborative applied 
research with industry should carry similar weighting to applied research 
carried out by a purely academic researcher" (House of Commons Trade and 
Industry Committee 2005, , p. 22 emphasis added) 
It was, therefore, recommended that: 
"[A]ny future guidance provided to the panels should carry a section on the 
treatment of applied research with business or other outside institutions. This 
should provide that, given the work is of a sufficient quality, it should be 
considered in the same way as if it had been carried out in a purely 
academic environment" (House of Commons Trade and Industry Committee 
2005, p. 22, emphasis added) 
REF 2014 - IMPACT EXAMPLES OF MEASURES
Licences awarded and brought to market
Jobs created or protected
Investment funding raised from UK and/or non-UK agencies
A business or sector has adopted a new or significantly 
changed technology or process, including through acquisition 
and/or joint venture
The performance of an existing business has been improved
A spin-out or new business has been created, established its 
viability, or generated revenue or profits
A new business sector or activity has been created.
Performance has been improved, or new or changed 
technologies or processes adopted, in companies or other 
organisations through highly skilled people having taken 
upspecialist roles that draw on their research, or through the 
provision of consultancy or training that draws on their 
research.
Potential future losses have been mitigated by improved 
methods of risk assessment and management in safety or 
security critical situations
Economic Impact
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Figure 5.2: “Quality profile” under RAE 2008 
Source: (HEFCE 2005a, p. 32) 
 
An opposite concern was also expressed at governmental level in relation to a “too 
aggressive” commercialisation/innovation agenda: 
“We are concerned that driving an innovation agenda too aggressively 
through universities may have diminishing returns with regard to 
commercialisation and risk damaging the academic research that is 
working well. We recommend that the Government’s objective should be to 
create a commercial demand for university engagement to which they are 
already primed to respond” (House of Commons: Science and Technology 
Committee 2013, p. 40) 
If on the one hand REF 2014 did provide more indications of measures of “impact” of 
the kind presented in Table 5.2 above, on the other hand the 65%-20% inscribes the 
political tension toward the commercialisation/exploitation of academic research 
without solving that tension. REF 2014 did not seem to solve the tension framed as 
“applied research carried out by a purely academic researcher” versus “applied research 
carried out with industry”. Therefore, in this respect one can say that the controversy 
seems to remain open. 
However, the 65%-20% proportion not only inscribes more governmental sort of 
discourses but, as analysed in the next section, it also creates (unintended) effects at a 
more local level. 
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Tension between publishing and commercialising academic research 
Earlier in the chapter it was mentioned how technology transfer offices were struggling 
to enrol academics into commercialisation programmes. The adopted strategies involve 
usually “educating” or “persuading” academics on the importance and the “utility” of 
commercialising their technologies/inventions. The difficulty of doing this lies in the 
tension that academics constantly face between publishing and commercialising their 
research. Academics have been historically –at least since 1986 with the first Research 
Selectivity Exercise- assessed on the basis of the publications they produce. Yet 
research commercialisation has become since the 1990s an extra source of pressure for 
academics. As seen in the previous section, the 65%-20% weights used in REF 2014 
embed the political tension to equate purely academic research with applied research 
carried out with industry, without solving it.  
To what extent are those weights productive of more local tensions between 
publishing and commercialising? According to a relatively recent study (PACEC-CBR 
2010), there has been a significant change between 2001 and 2008 in the perception that 
academics have of the importance of publications for their career, paralleled by a starker 
change in their perception of the importance of commercialisation activities for their 
career (see Table A-3, Appendix 3). There are a number of elements to consider in order 
to investigate whether the weights imposed by the REF 2014 perform local tensions 
between publishing and commercialising. 
First, the major problem is that disclosing an invention and the related process of 
filing a patent etc. can delay publications. Conversely, publishing prevents any 
opportunity to commercialise the research because “nobody can take preparatory 
positions on something that has been published, because it has been published” (#30). 
This means that if a research idea has been already disclosed through publications or 
through presentations at conferences, there would not be any company or any other 
investors willing to invest into something that has been publicly disclosed before getting 
protected with IP rights. According to the Head of Technology Strategy of a 
multinational corporation, technology transfer from academia to industry carries 
positive/beneficial effects to the industry. However, there seems to be an intrinsic 
paradox caused by the contractual arrangements in place between the university and the 
corporation whereby the latter can ask academics/scientists involved in the projects to 
withhold publications. The paradox is effectively illustrated in the opening quote of 
section 5.1.2 and comes from the fact that the pressure on academics toward both 
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commercialising their research and collaborating with industry run parallel with the 
pressure to publish. Nevertheless companies collaborating with academics usually ask 
them to delay publications because they “want to keep stuff secrets” (#3) 
Second, to add more complexity, even for those academics who would like to 
collaborate with industry and commercialise their technology there can be obstacles. As 
an Industrial Partnership Manager at Top University 2 observed: 
“The question is: is [commercialization] an extra burden for [academics]? 
Because for getting the impact the process hasn’t changed, you still have 
to get the high impact publications and that actually makes it more 
difficult to work with the industry because first the industry they don’t come 
with big funding, they have a lot of processes, a lot of demands [and then 
academics]  suddenly start to get stressed out because [the 
commercialization process] doesn’t go that fast and they are not publishing 
such good papers, so they fall off the academic path which is extremely strict 
and very competitive. So if you are running into that process and you get 
distracted by something else and you fall off and then it is very difficult to 
come back” (#29 –emphasis added)  
Third, according to the manager part of the problem in “persuading” academics to 
commercialise is that: 
“[T]he non-academic path is not defined. So [tech transfer offices] are 
encouraging academics to work with the industry but [they] do not tell them 
what they can expect for their future, for their development, for their job 
security” (#29) 
The tension is experienced on the side of sponsoring organization sometimes as an 
excessive emphasis put on publishing, which in turn undermines any attempt to engage 
academics into commercialization activities. As the Head of Legal and Operation at a 
charity foundation explains: 
"[It]is really frustrating for me. I mean [publications] are really important. 
You know, when I was an academic it was critical, and one of our concerns 
in [CharityFoundation1] is that [academics] are encouraged so much to have 
publications that it restricts the ability to do something different –
commercializing the research, because they are worried where the next grant 
is coming from and need publications cause they need to have a continuing 
track record. (#30)  
As pointed out by a licensing executive at Top University 4 the drive to publish is 
important for academics, but the extent to which this is critical depends on REF:   
"I think there is a first point to make and it depends on timing. You’ll be 
aware of REF exercise which is coming to a close. So there is a rush to get 
paper submitted and accepted before the deadline. And so patents become 
rushed, there is more pressure to file them now. Once REF is out of the way, 
clearly academics still need to publish because that’s what makes their 
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careers and need to publish paper in order to get good chance to get the next 
grant funded. So there is always a drive to publish but -how critically- it 
depends on REF" (#22, licensing executive –emphasis added) 
The rush of getting papers published can also lead to rushing the patent application. 
Conversely, in order not to rush a patent application, technology transfer office tries to 
“persuade” academics to delay publications: 
"There are pressures. So you need balancing almost on a case by case basis. 
Identifying if the academic is held on publishing now, then we have to work 
with them to get the patent filed now; or if they can be persuaded to leave 
[publishing] for a little while" (#22) 
There are other effects generated by REF, as the Head of Legal and Operations at 
Charity Foundation 1 explains: 
"[Research Excellence Framework] remains a difficult exercise because you 
cannot have all the information that you need in a timely manner. You 
actually had to get at some point where you have to threaten the grant 
holders that we hold back 10% of their award unless they provide us with 
information that they will only get at the end of their award. They are under 
persuasion to provide us with the information and the difficulty with all this 
sort of information is that it is difficult to be objective with research that 
you have done" (#30 –emphasis added)  
One the one hand, sponsoring agencies and technology transfer offices see academics 
as being put under too much pressure to publish such that they do not have any 
incentive to commercialise. On the other hand according to some, REF puts too much 
pressure on academics toward commercialisation objectives such that the quality of 
their research can be affected. This point is well illustrated by the former Head of 
Technology Strategy of a multinational company in the advanced manufacturing sector:  
[Participant#3] Because we [industry] can kill the thing, the reason why we 
have gone to them in the first place. It could be a downward spiral. And the 
REF, Research Excellence Framework, arguably could drive the wrong 
behaviour or less good behaviour such that our standing in the world as a 
country [decreases]. [Publications] is the way the academic world judges its 
karat, is the number of papers you produce, the number of citations you get, 
OK? That’s the way they judge it. And we are trying to add stuff 
[like]"have stuff gone out to the market? 
[Researcher] So the two things may be conflicting?  
[Participant#3] [nodding] because we [industry] want to keep our stuff 
secrets” 
(#3, Head of Technology Strategy –emphasis added) 
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The formula-based funding device and the system of weight is also to be found in 
other devices used by the government in order to control research commercialisation at 
a distance and act upon it. The next section will look at the Higher Education 
Innovation Fund, which constitutes a stable source of funding for the universities’ third 
mission of wealth creation. 
Device: the Higher Education Innovation Fund (HEIF) and the Higher Education 
Business Community Interaction Survey (HE-BCI)  
The third mission of universities was designed and encouraged throughout the 1990s to 
cover all those activities related to “knowledge exchange”. Third stream policies were 
designed “to develop linkages and promote networking and other activities to allow the 
co-evolution of activities and processes in HEIs and external organisations in the 
public, private and voluntary sectors, and in wider society” (PACEC 2009, p. 1). Beside 
the dual funding system to allocate public funding for research, since the late 1990s, a 
third leg of funding has been devised to support universities’ third mission.  
The HEROBC (Higher Education Reach-Out to Business and the Community) fund 
was created by HEFCE in 1999 as part of the Our competitive future (Department of 
Trade and Industry 1998) white paper. Since 2000 HEROBC has been incorporated into 
the Higher Education Innovation Fund (HEIF) (HEFCE 2011), which is provided by the 
Office for Science and Technology and HEFCE (House of Commons Science and 
Technology Committee 2002). Since then HEIF has become a permanent third stream 
of funding for Higher Education Institutions. 
Since 1999, the subject of the third mission, i.e. the inter-actions between universities 
and business, public services and the wider community have been described and 
measured in the HE Business and Community Interaction (HE-BCI) survey (House of 
Commons Science and Technology Committee 2012; HEFCE 2013).The linkage 
between HE-BCI survey and HEIF via formula-based funding started to be drawn in 
2006: 
"Initially HEIF was awarded to projects, to support innovation and improve 
understanding of good practice. However from the outset our intention was 
to move towards formula-based funding so that knowledge exchange was 
driven forward by institutional mission and strategy, leadership, priorities 
and partnerships. This would enable a diversity of knowledge exchange 
activities to be delivered, reflecting the diverse economic and social needs of 
the country. In 1999 we began to measure knowledge exchange activity 
through the Higher Education-Business and Community Interaction 
(HE-BCI) Survey, to inform policy and eventually funding allocations. 
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The first formula-based HEIF allocations were made in HEIF 3 in 2006, 
together with a selective project element. From HEIF 4 in 2008, all HEIF has 
been allocated by formula" (HEFCE 2011, p. 5) 
The components of the formula funding in the 2008-2011 round of funding were 
three: potential and capacity building (measured by the number of full-time equivalent 
staff members), external income, and activities not best measured by income. The 
“capacity building” component recognizes staff members as an ‘asset’ in developing 
knowledge and technology exchange and innovation activities. Capacity building is 
measured by the number of full-time equivalent academic staff members of universities. 
The component “external income” aims to recognize –by means of a proxy such as 
external income- the overall performance in third streams activities (e.g. collaboration 
with industry). The third component includes all the activities that cannot be ‘captured’ 
by income indicators and in HEIF 3 they are measured, for example, by the level of 
engagement with non-commercial organisations and small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs), and by students placement (HEFCE and OST 2005). 
 As shown in Table 5.3 below, the progressive shift to performance/external income 
have characterised the three round of funding (HEIF 3, 4, 5). The shift toward 
performance/external income was particularly evident in the changes to the weights 
attributed to the component in the formula-funding. The weights attributed to 
performance/external income increased throughout the years from 45%, to 100%, where 
100% means that all the funding is allocated on the basis of external 
income/performance. According to HEFCE report (HEFCE 2011) the way in which 
external income and performance are calculated remains unaltered.  
Table 5.3: Components and weights in HEIF 3, 4, 5 
Source: (HEFCE 2011; HEFCE and OST 2005; HEFCE and DIUS 2008) 
 
Centres of calculations: from Universities to HESA 
As discussed earlier in the chapter, universities collect every year a variety of data 
which feed into internal database. Data include indicators such as the number of filed 
patents, the number of granted patents, the number of invention disclosures, the income 
HEIF3 (2006-2008) HEIF4 (2008-2014) HEIF5 (2011-2015)
Capacity Building 45% 40% -
Performance (income) 45% 60% 100%
Activities not best 
measured by income 10% - -
Components
Weights
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from licensing, etc. However, these measuring exercises are not performed only for 
internal purposes. The same data reach other centres of calculations such as the Higher 
Education Statistics Agency (HESA) which collects a variety of data including those to 
be entered in the Higher Education Business Community Interaction Survey (HE-BCI). 
As shown in Table 5.4 below, the Higher Education Innovation Fund has been basing 
its measurements of the external income/performance component on HE-BCI data.  
Table 5.4: Higher Education Statistics Agency measures of external 
income/performance under HEIF 3, 4, 5 
 
Source: adapted from (HEFCE 2011) 
 
As a Spin-out Portfolio Manager at Top University 4 describes: 
"There are figures that I need to report not just within the university but also 
outside the university to HEFCE. They also have the higher education 
business community interaction survey HE-BIC. That’s how they monitor 
how many employees all the companies have, what turnover the companies 
have, how many companies have survived for more than three years, how 
many have been formed, and all this sort of data need to be monitored and 
collected for this survey" (#21- emphasis added) 
Licensing and spinning out are often seen in local technology transfer offices as two 
alternative pathways, each of which bears different sets of meanings. The question here 
is: what becomes of the local tension between commercialising and spinning out once 
spinouts and licenses data reach HESA/HEFCE centres of calculations to then be 
entered in HEIF’s formula?  
 
MEASURES OF EXTERNAL INCOME/PERFORMANCE 
IN HEIF 3, 4, 5
HE-BCI data for income from contract research, consultancy 
and equipment services (where the residual ambiguity in the 
three definitions is mitigated by aggregation)
HE-BCI data for regeneration and development income
HESA data for income from non-credit bearing courses
HE-BCI data for income from intellectual property
Data for income from Knowledge Transfer Partnerships
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Making the tension between licensing and spinning-out invisible 
What the external income/performance weights (45% in HEIF3, 60% in HEIF4, 100% 
in HEIF5) do is to include the income both from licensing to existing companies, and 
from licensing to new spin-outs under the same category “Intellectual Property Income” 
which together with other forms of income are assigned the same weight. At that point 
both streams of income are made to weight the same. 
However, licenses and spin outs do not have the same ‘weight’ at a more local level, 
where the commercialisation pathways can mean different things to different 
organisations. For Top University 4 licensing to external companies is important not 
only because of the income, but also in terms of “going out to the wide world”. The 
point is made by a licensing executive at Top University 4: 
“I think that from the University point of view [spinning out] is not the same 
as a company licensing technology out there. Okay we get some royalty 
income if we license technology out, but also this is the kudo of having 
developed the technology here and going out to the wide world and doing 
some good…you wouldn’t have [name of technology] in hospitals. […] So 
the fact that the technology has gone out and it is pretty much in every 
hospital around the world, it has a fantastic impact for [Location 4]. So for 
all those things licensing is important for the university” (#22 –emphasis 
added) 
Conversely, at the level of Location 4’s city council and at regional level, spin-outs 
generation seems to play a much more important role compared to licensing: 
"From the City Council’s point of view I imagine spin-outs would be more 
important for them for two reasons: a license can go anywhere in the world 
–we had a license in America another one in Brazil. It could be anywhere 
and that brings benefit to the UK because it comes to the University. But if 
you form spin-outs, the chances are they will be around [Location 4]. So the 
more spin-outs you form –say in medtech sector- the more you create a 
critical mass in the region for medtech, the more likely is that investors 
outside the region will come in, see the value of what’s going on and want to 
invest, and it becomes a virtuous spiral really. So, by starting up new 
companies from the university you’ve got employment, you pretend you get 
investment into the region, so the whole thing will build a positive story" 
(#22 –emphasis added) 
In summary, the section showed how innovative scientific ideas are overflows that 
happen all the time. In order to regulate their circulation, scientific ideas need to be 
framed by means of devices such as publications, invention disclosures, and patents. 
Framing allows both their value (whether scientific or economic or other) to be 
appropriated by actors and financial resources to be mobilised precisely because of that 
value. However, the difference between publications and other framing devices such as 
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invention disclosures is that publishing promote a version of value of scientific ideas 
that is not qualified as economic, but based on criteria such as academic rigour. While 
disclosing an invention constitutes an early stage attempt to identify the market 
potential of scientific ideas. To be sure, invention disclosures (but also business plans) 
are mobilized to prove the economic reality of such ideas by assessing their commercial 
potential.  
However, evidencing the reality of scientific ideas is a costly activity, which requires 
putting in place a complex apparatus of which technology transfer offices are part. The 
chapter showed how through a chain of displacements from individual 
commercialisation stories to performance indicators and formulas, innovation data is 
shaped and made to travel across centres of calculations (e.g. technology transfer 
offices, finance offices, HESA). The effect of linking innovation performances to 
funding allocation mechanisms consists in producing (and sometimes dissolving) local 
tensions between publishing and commercialising research, and between alternative 
commercialisation strategies (e.g. licensing and spinning-out). 
Conclusion 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the intersection between problematics of economic growth 
and increased demand for accountability in public spending characterising the 1980s, 
created the conditions for the emergence of academic research commercialisation as a 
space. This is the context against which technology transfer programmes (analysed in 
this chapter) and incubation programmes (analysed in the next chapter) are to be 
understood.  
This chapter explored technology transfer practices within universities and how, in 
this context, accounting has contributed to the framing of science in economic terms. As 
illustrated in Table 5.5, accounting has contributed to making inventions/technologies 
within universities visible and quantifiable by means of different devices. Such devices 
included invention disclosure form, performance indicators, and weighted average 
formula funding. 
First, the invention disclosure form is a device which combines accounting and legal 
components. Within such device accounting contributes to frame inventions in terms of 
costs and revenues. It makes possible to make agreements around technologies and 
therefore to act upon them. In fact, once identified, costs and revenues are shared 
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between university departments, university as a whole, and the academic/inventor by 
means of legal agreements.  
Second, accounting contributes to making spinout companies and licences visible at 
the level of central university. Performance indicators like patents count and invention 
disclosures count re-construct the reality of research commercialisation so that it can be 
‘seen’ by the executive board of universities. Accounting is also mobilised by the 
university management in order to build narratives of the university as “inventive 
institution”. 
Third, accounting makes possible the allocation of funding by means of the formula-
based funding device. Performance indicators travel from universities, understood as 
centre of calculations, to other centres of calculations such as the Higher Education 
Statistics Agency (HESA). Here performance indicators are framed in terms of 
Research Excellence Framework components, that is research outcome, impact, and 
environment. To each component, a weight is assigned. By assigning a 65% weight to 
research outcome (which is measured in terms of publications) and a 20% weight to 
impact (which is measured –amongst the other things- in terms of number of patents, 
licenses, spinouts, invention disclosures etc.) the formula-funding device ends up 
creating a tension at local/organisational level. The latter consists in the ‘dilemma’ that 
academics face between commercialising and publishing their research. The REF –via 
component weights- also inscribes the governmental tension between the position that 
wants to equal the weight for academic research conducted purely by academics and the 
weight for academic research conducted in collaboration with industry, and the position 
which is instead worried about the “too aggressive” commercialisation agenda posed on 
academics/universities. 
A similar formula-funding mechanism links the results of the Higher Education 
Business and Community Interaction survey (HE-BCI) to the allocation of the Higher 
Education Innovation Fund. The HE-BCI survey collects through HESA centre of 
calculation data from universities related to the commercialisation of academic 
research. Performance indicators such as those discussed earlier (e.g. patents count, 
invention disclosures count, spinouts count, licenses count) not only are used for 
internal purposes at the level of universities but they also reach HESA where they 
become linked to HEIF funding via a system of weights.  
The effect of such system of weights however is one of making local tensions 
‘invisible’. In other words, there seems to be a tension at level of universities between 
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spinning out and licensing as two possible commercialisation strategies. On the one 
hand these strategies are treated ‘equally’ in terms of components’ weight. In fact both 
spinouts and licenses contribute to form the overall external income score to which a 
100% weight (under HEIF 5) is attributed. On the other hand at local level – spinouts 
and licenses ‘weight’ differently depending on the type of actors. Universities in fact 
seem to put more emphasis on licensing as commercialisation strategy, while city 
councils and other regional institutions put the emphasis on spin-outs in that they 
contribute to the regional economy through improving job creation. 
Table 5.5: Characterising Technology Transfer through accounting devices 
 
The next chapter (Chapter 6) will move from universities’ technology transfer sites, 
to universities’ technology incubation sites. Both transferring and incubating technology 
are central to the innovation activities carried out by universities (in collaboration with 
industry and government). The next chapter will explore programmes for incubating 
innovation within university technology incubators in the UK. The chapter will analyse 
the different types of funding arrangements, governance mechanisms, and performance 
measurement practices in place within a number of university incubators. Different 
ways of calculating incubation can result into tensions and the role of accounting in 
creating, mediating or dissolving tensions will be analysed. Examples of calculative 
Accounting device/ 
Characterisation
REF HEIF
Universities' KPIs 
portfolios
Invention 
Disclosure Form
Descriptive elements
Components of 
formula-funding: 
research outcomes, 
impact, environment
Components  of 
formula-funding: 
external 
income/performances
Patents count, 
invention disclosures 
count, spinouts count, 
income from license, 
cumulative spinouts 
investments, etc.
Legal and 
commercial 
components
Embedded frames
Objectives, input, 
output, outcomes 
framework
Objectives, input, 
output, outcomes 
framework
Objectives, input, 
output, outcomes 
framework
University 
ownership model, 
linear model of 
innovation
Underlying practices
Formula funding, 
KPIs
Formula-funding, KPIs Weighing KPIs
Revenue sharing, 
market potential
Inscriptions
65% -20% outcome-
impact weights
60%, 45%, 100% 
external income 
weights
Weights (% not 
disclosed)
1/3-2/3 patent filing 
and maintenance 
costs, % of revenue 
sharing
Effects
Inscribing 
governmental 
tension, performing 
local tension, 
controlling at a 
distance
Making local tensions 
invisible, controlling 
at a distance
Making research 
commercialisation 
visible, controlling at 
a distance
Making 
technologies visible, 
acting upon them
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frames are the public intervention/economic development frame and the 
commercial/free market frame. The interplays between accounting and innovation are 
discussed in the context of the calculative infrastructure (or metrological framework) 
put in place to realise the multiple values of incubation, the underlying calculative 
frames, and their effects. 
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CHAPTER  6  CALCULATIVE FRAMES: 
THE ROLE OF ACCOUNTING IN FRAMING 
UNIVERSITY INCUBATION PRACTICES IN 
THE UK 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
“The challenge for incubators and their funding bodies is to 
capture some of the value created for incubatees. 
Generating revenue from services when clients are resource 
constrained is often not possible without subsidies from 
public bodies. […]. Incubators with mixed funding may 
encounter principle-agent problems as they attempt to meet 
multiple objectives”. 
(Dee et al. 2011, p. 7) 
 
Descriptively, incubation undergoes a variety of business models that can be 
represented in a continuum of activities from renting laboratories and office space to 
tenants (e.g. start-up/spin-out companies), to providing technical and specialist services 
such as those offered by contract research organisations, accounting firms, and strategy, 
innovation and marketing consultancy and providing access to university expertise and 
venture capital funds (Dee et al. 2011; Hackett and Dilts 2004).  
As argued in the opening quote and in the academic literature on incubation (Hackett 
and Dilts 2004), incubating innovation poses challenges in terms of how to capture the 
value produced for (and by) incubatees. This chapter will suggest that accounting 
shapes innovation within incubators by providing the metrological framework to realize, 
not just a single, but the multiple values of incubating innovation. In this respect, the 
notion of value is better understood and investigated as the outcome of processes of co-
production between contingent social and technical elements. This means that the value 
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of incubating innovation depends on the configuration of the network of incubator’s 
stakeholders, their goals, the financial and non-financial resources they mobilise, and 
the calculative frames they use. Given such premises, the chapter will trace the nature 
and origins of differences in measurement practices and the underlying calculative 
frames. The study identifies at least three emergent calculative frames, i.e. commercial 
frame, public intervention/economic development frame, and finance/investment frame, 
which contribute to the construction of the incubator as a “business”, a “capital efficient 
environment”, and the “biggest employer in the region”. Each calculative frame is 
constituted by different models, analogies, choice of metrics, and categorization which 
are mobilised and inscribed into key performance indicators and targets, and also into 
non-accounting devices such as incubator’s entry mechanisms. 
The value(s) of incubating innovation emerges in the process of translating such 
frames into numbers. Numbers can compete or coexist in the production of value, and 
the dominant versions of value are often linked to the ability of actors to mobilize 
financial resources within the incubator. The chapter will show how accounting, as 
performance indicators and targets, has a role in translating calculative frames into 
numbers. Accounting contributes to creating and mediating the tensions between 
different versions of the value that is generated through programmes for incubating 
innovation.  
Other than locally situated socio-material practices, the chapter will also show how 
different calculative frames arise from the co-production of historical and political 
contingent forces, which will be examined in the next section. 
6.1    Exploring the origin and nature of differences 
in incubation practices 
“This incubator [Incubator#7] has a different model from a 
lot of other incubators for sure” (#13 -Chief Executive 
Officer) 
“We [Bioincubator#1] need to show that we are different, 
we need to show that we are unique” (#32 -Chief Executive 
Officer) 
 
As suggested in the opening quotes, creating an incubation programme that is 
“different” and “unique” from all the other existing programmes is predicated like a 
mantra in most of the incubators analysed throughout this chapter. However, 
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incubation’s variable and multiple characters are not the direct consequence of the 
claims to be “different” and “unique”. The section advances that the differences in 
incubation practices are more the outcome of processes of co-production of historical 
and locally contingent forces, than the result of implementing unique business models. 
The rise and fall of regional development agencies across the UK and the creation of 
university commercial subsidiaries are two amongst the factors that have influenced 
how incubation programmes have been configured through time. Since these factors are 
highly contextual, they can vary across sites and result into ‘different’ arrangements.  
This section will show that the conditions for the emergence of multiple and variable 
practices of incubating innovation are also historical, political, and institutional. Such 
conditions include the set of policy and legal arrangements which designed university 
incubators as commercial and trading subsidiaries of universities; the rise and fall of a 
network of governmental agencies (i.e. the Regional Development Agencies) across the 
UK responsible for implementing national and European regional development 
programmes; the establishment of funding devices such as the European Regional 
Development Fund (ERDF), and underlying principles (e.g. the so called “logical 
framework”). Such conditions have influenced the emergence of certain ways of 
framing incubation, i.e. different ways of identifying and measuring the value of 
programmes for incubating innovation. For example, establishing programmes for 
incubating innovation as part of universities’ commercial subsidiaries contributed to the 
emergence of a commercial way of doing incubation. Furthermore, the Regional 
Development Agencies (RDAs), the local government, the Research Councils, and the 
European funding bodies had a pivotal role in funding programmes aimed at incubating 
innovation, while contributing to the emergence of a public intervention frame. 
The legal form of Universities’ subsidiaries 
As shown in Chapter 3, the rise of universities’ third mission and the increasing role of 
universities in the commercialisation of research have created the problem of how to 
reconcile universities’ charitable status with the potentially profit-making character of 
their trading/commercial activities. Most of the university incubators analysed in the 
chapter are constituted as commercial vehicles or commercial arms of universities and 
charitable research institutes. Public universities in the UK have charity status, however 
the activities that they carry out can be both charitable and non-charitable. Depending 
on this divide, activities are classified either as primary purpose or non-primary purpose 
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activities. Usually, charities’ primary purpose activities are exempt from tax. 
Universities often set up wholly owned subsidiary companies in order to carry out 
trading activities that fall out of the charitable status hence out of the tax exemption 
regime (BUFDG 2014). Historically, commercial subsidiaries (also known as “related 
companies”) had been established for many reasons as highlighted in the below 
passage: 
“The activities of related companies can vary considerably. Some take 
advantage of specialist skills by selling training and consultancy expertise; 
others exploit the commercial potential of research and intellectual 
property. Some retain ownership of activity and intellectual property, whilst 
others attract private funders to share in the risks and rewards of ventures 
which institutions may not otherwise be able to fund. Some institutions are 
now experienced in generating commercial income from spin-out companies 
or the licensing of intellectual property, whilst many others are actively 
developing mechanisms for this purpose” (HEFCE 2005b, , p. 6) 
It is against this context that one can better understand the reason why universities set 
up their own commercial vehicles.  
One of the legal forms that usually these vehicles take is the company limited by 
guarantees form (HEFCE 2005b). This is the case in Incubator#5 and Incubator#2, 
which will be analysed later on in the chapter. Broadly speaking the implication of 
setting up a company limited by guarantees is related to the treatment of the surpluses 
(i.e. profits) generated by the incubator through rents and other services such as 
laboratory services, conferencing space, networking event etc. Any surplus in fact 
should be put towards the company’s social purpose at the aim of furthering it. 
Surpluses cannot therefore be distributed among the members.  
Another legal form that subsidiaries companies –constituted as universities 
subsidiaries- can also take is that of companies limited by shares. In this case the profits 
(i.e. surpluses) arising from incubation activities can be distributed among shareholders. 
This is the case in Incubator#6, which will be analysed later on in the chapter. 
Incubator#6 is owned and managed by TopUniversity#5 wholly owned subsidiary. The 
incubator’s main mission is claimed to be the creation of value for the 
university/shareholder. Its profits are in fact distributed to the shareholder –i.e. the 
university.  
Either way –whether it is a company limited by guarantee or by shares- a university 
subsidiary is run as a self-sustaining business. This implies that, as one participant once 
put it, being a commercial subsidiary “you have to be self-sustainable, [which means 
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that] a charity [or university] can’t constantly top up a trading subsidiary, it has to 
stand on its own” (#30 – Head of Legal and Operations). 
Being a self-sustainable business can have implications for the choice of the 
activities carried out by the subsidiary/incubator. In this respect, I will talk later about 
how incubators activities/practices seem to be shaped by a commercial frame which 
translates into distinctive calculative styles (e.g. key performance indicators such as 
breakeven, occupancy level, etc.) and how these can compete with alternative frames 
such as “quality” and “public intervention”. For the time being what is helpful to bear in 
mind is that the legal arrangements behind commercial/trading subsidiaries of university 
constitutes a condition of possibility for the emergence and diffusion of certain styles of 
calculating incubation. 
The rise and fall of Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) 
The rise of RDAs is relevant to the discussion of incubation practices in the UK in that 
it provides insights on the historical and political conditions which led to the emergence 
of a public intervention/economic development frame within incubators across the UK. 
Incubators were often the target of RDAs investments as part of regional strategies for 
economic development. As this section will discussed, the accountability regime to 
which RDAs were subjected has created the conditions for framing incubation 
programmes in a distinctive way. 
Toward the end of 1990s under the newly-formed Labour government and with the 
aim of promoting economic development across UK regions within an accountable and 
strategic regional framework (House of Commons 2002), eight Regional Development 
Agencies (RDAs) were established (House of Commons 1998) covering eight England 
regions (East Midlands, West Midlands, Eastern, London, North East, North West, 
South East, South West, Yorkshire and the Humber). Modelled on the existing 
bodies/RDAs for Wales and Scotland that have been set up by the Labour government 
of the 1970s (Bache 2008, p. 99), the network of RDAs was designed in a way that 
would make them responsible to the regional chambers, but operationally separate, 
acting as their executive arm in the area of economic development (House of Commons 
2002, p. 9). RDAs also had a board appointed by the regional chambers and was 
conceived “to represent wide regional economic interests, including local authorities 
and business, co-operatives, banking and trade unions” (House of Commons 2002, p. 9; 
Regional Policy Commission 1996).  
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RDAs were in charge of designing, implementing and keeping under review a five-to-
ten year Regional Economic Strategy. Their budget would be based on a “Single Pot” of 
resources to which several departments contributed (e.g. Department for Communities 
and Local Government, Department of Innovation, Universities, and Skills, etc). In 
addition to this, RDAs would also manage the European Regional Development Fund 
(ERDF) and the Rural Development Programme. 
The accountability regime within which RDAs were to operate was based on 
standard models of monitoring already in use within the European Commission and the 
National Audit Office (see Figure 6.1) (Department of Trade and Industry 2006).  
 
Figure 6.1: Relationship between inputs, outputs and outcomes 
Source: (National Audit Office 2001, p. 2) 
 
In 2002 a new guidance on the performance evaluation framework for RDAs was 
released by the Department of Trade and Industry (House of Commons 2002). It set out 
the targets “to be delivered by [RDAs] in exchange for greater flexibility under the 
Single Pot”. Under this framework performances would be assessed based on a set of 
“key regional indicators” (see Table 6.1) and a three-tier target framework. The latter to 
be broken down in tier 1 regional objectives, tier 2 regional targets (outcomes) and tier 3 
milestones (outputs).  
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Table 6.1: RDA activity indicators 
Source: (House of Commons 2002, p. 28) 
 
Amidst a controversy surrounding the issue of sub-national governance in economic 
development policy, the performances of RDAs and of the so called “quangos” (quasi-
autonomous non-governmental organisations) a number of reports and enquiries (House 
of Commons Business and Enterprise Committee 2009; PricewaterhouseCoopers 2008) 
were commissioned by the UK government. In 2012 the government took the decision 
of dismantling the network of RDAs (Sandford 2013). 
For more than a decade, before dismantling RDAs and the related idea of a 
decentralised system of regional development, the complex accountability regime based 
on the input/output/outcome framework have shaped incubation local practices. This 
shaping was made possible through the funding devices mobilised under the Single Pot 
budget in order to support university incubation programmes. The Single Pot budget 
provided the motivation for implementing assessment exercises aimed at “capturing” 
the “value” of incubation programmes. The input/output framework was translated into 
the space of incubation not only through the Single Pot budget, but also through the 
European Regional Development Fund, which will be discussed in the next section. 
European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) 
The European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) was first implemented in 1975 as 
one of the main pillars of EU’s Structural Funds. Funding under ERDF is managed 
through three main strands: convergence, regional competitiveness and employment, 
and European territorial co-operation. ERDF allocated overall €201 billion between 
2007 and 2013, of which €3.3 billion (approximately £2.8 billion) were allocated to 
England through the RDAs. Since 2011 responsibility for managing the ERDF in 
England has passed from RDAs to the Department for Communities and Local 
Government (DCLG) (House of Commons 2012). Five are the priority areas of 
Indicator RDA purpose
Number of jobs created and safeguarded
Economic development and employment 
promotion
Net hectares of derelict land brought into use Physical regeneration
Number of business start-ups and survival rates Business support
% of medium/large organisations recognised as 
Investors in People
Competitiveness & skills
Value of private finance attracted Private sector involvement
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ERDF: stimulating enterprise and supporting growth in target sectors and markets, 
exploiting innovation and knowledge, creating the conditions for sustainable growth, 
growing and accessing employment, and technical assistance.  
The linkages between ERDF and the activities of RDAs are twofold. First, one of the 
eligibility criteria for ERDF is that applicants must provide match funding which can 
originate both from national public funders and private funders. Match funding cannot 
originate from other European funds (Department for Communities and Local 
Government 2012). RDAs would traditionally play an important role in this respect by 
providing the match funding through the Single Pot (House of Commons 2012). 
Second, the alignment between ERDF and RDAs activities is noticeable in the 
similarity of the frameworks governing the allocation, monitoring, and assessment 
mechanisms of resources under ERDF and under RDA’s Single Pot. There is a striking 
similarity between the criteria for monitoring and evaluating RDAs represented in 
Figure 6.1 and the principle that guides ERDF monitoring and evaluation infrastructure 
is the so called “Logical Framework” (see Figure 6.2). Initially adopted by the United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID) in 1971, it has subsequently 
been used by many other aid agencies (including the European Commission DG VIII) to 
assist with project and programme planning (Wiggins and Shields 1995). According to 
some authors (Wiggins and Shields 1995, p. 2) its origins can be traced back to the 
“management by objectives” approach popularized by Peter Drucker in the 1950s.  
The logical framework was conceived originally as an aid to thinking which allowed 
project planners to identify the logical linkages between a set of means and a set of ends 
for describing a given project (Coleman 1987). In the context of the ERDF the logical 
framework serves to structure an intervention programme in terms of inputs, outputs, 
results, and impact. The framework is essentially organised around two main activities, 
i.e. monitoring and evaluating, which are aimed to support management in the effective 
running of the programme and to capture the effects of the intervention programme 
(European Commission 2015).  
Given the similarity between the logical framework used for ERDF assessment and 
the evaluation model used for RDAs assessment (see Figure 6.1), combined technical 
notes have been produced in order to regulate the production of output/outcome/impact 
indicators (Department for Communities and Local Government 2008). 
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Figure 6.2: The logical framework 
Source: (Office of Project Appraisal Training 2011, p.5) 
 
Beside the logical framework there are other principles governing the ERDF 
application, monitoring and evaluation process, such as the principles of additionality, 
market failure, and value for money, which in turn are rooted in economic theory.  
Nevertheless, the calculative efforts mobilised to “capture” the value of programmes 
funded through ERDF are challenged by the continuous overflows, as the quote below 
suggests: 
"Assessing the value for money of ERDF is inherently problematic, partly 
because it is so difficult to separate out the impact of ERDF funding from all 
the other factors affecting regional economies" (House of Commons 2012, p. 
14) 
Most of the incubators analysed in this chapter have been funded both through ERDF 
and RDAs funding. These funding devices acted as a condition of possibility for the 
translation of the “public intervention” frame into incubation local calculative practices.  
The next section will analyse incubation as a space characterised by multiple 
participants, each carrying distinctive sets of goals, objectives, and aspirations which 
translate into distinctive calculative frames. Calculative frames, as Beunza and Garud 
(2007) advanced, are mobilized by actors in the process of attributing economic values, 
and are made of “analogies, categorizations, and choices of metrics” (Ibid., p. 33) 
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6.2    Accounting, framing, and the multiple values 
of incubating innovation 
The multiple values of incubating innovation emerge from framing practices that are 
contingent to incubators’ ownership, legal, and managerial configurations. This section 
will show how these configurations translate into different sets of objectives, 
aspirations, categorizations, and choices of metrics, i.e. into different calculative frames 
(Beunza and Garud 2007). In this regard, incubation can be simultaneously framed as a 
“capital efficient environment”, as a “timely, efficient, and cost effective business”, as a 
“commercial entity”, as a “quality-based incubator”, as the “biggest employer in the 
region”, and also as a way to address economic development objectives in 
“convergence areas”.  
Furthermore, these different visions of incubation embed different versions of what 
the value of incubating innovation is. These different versions of value tend to clash 
within the same space and/or time, hence creating tensions and instability. Incubating 
innovation come to being as a place of tension where different calculative frames 
compete and become the object of negotiation among actors. As Chapter 7 will also 
discuss, powerful actors are those who are able to shape incubation not only by bringing 
financial resources, i.e. funding, but also by inscribing their goals and objectives into 
accounting numbers that can speak for them. Incubating innovation is a process 
characterised by ongoing negotiations about what innovation is and how it should be 
measured.  
The remainder of the section will focus on these different ways of constructing and 
calculating incubation, and how accounting devices made it possible for certain frames, 
hence certain forms of value, to become more powerful than others. The section will 
present five emergent frames which have translated into accounting practices, ultimately 
shaping incubation. The first frame constructs incubation as a space for public 
intervention, where objectives such as economic development and jobs creation can be 
addressed. The second frame constructs incubation as a commercial and free-market 
space. The third frame conceives of incubation as a space where finance and 
investments construct a capital efficient environment. Finally, the quality and health-
outcome frames are confined to the margins of incubation, where they struggle to 
produce accounting numbers that can represent them. 
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6.2.1   Tensions between the public intervention frame 
and the commercial frame 
This section will investigate the emergence of two distinctive calculative frames within 
Incubator#2 and Incubator#4, i.e. the public intervention frame and commercial (or 
financial sustainability) frames. Each frame embeds distinctive forms of accounting, 
distinctive notions of what incubating innovation means and how its value should be 
calculated. When multiple frames are mobilized within the same incubator, this can lead 
to tensions. By inscribing frames into performance indicators, accounting provides tools 
for negotiation and mediation. Within Incubator#2, for example, the breakeven target 
plays the role of mediating between the “free-market” approach adopted by the 
incubator manager and the economic development remit of the incubator’s funders. 
While within Incubator#3, the tension between the public intervention frame, 
encapsulated in the number of jobs created, and the commercial frame, measured in 
terms of profit and occupancy levels, remains unsolved. 
Mediating the commercial and public intervention frames through the breakeven target 
Incubator#2 is a joint venture between the government, the local health board, the local 
council, and TopUniversity#6. The joint venture was founded in 1994 and had received 
initial support also through the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) through 
a match-funding mechanism. Since all the stakeholders sitting on the board are public 
bodies, the remit of the incubator is predominantly oriented to create:  
“incubation facilities that support start-up companies that are located in 
[location#6] and hopefully will stay in [location#6] and will potentially 
generate a reasonable amount of jobs, and high quality jobs” (#2 –Director 
of Innovation) 
TopUniversity#6 and the local Health board carry a further set of concerns: 
“University have an interest because they want to generate spin out 
companies and for those to be successful this is obviously a good home for 
early start up that come up from the university departments. Similarly with 
the local [Health Board], the law changed recently to allow NHS [National 
Health Service] Trust to commercialize technologies so they are quite 
interested in that aspect as well” (#2 –Director of Innovation) 
The incubator is a not-for-profit entity. As such the surpluses generated from the 
incubation activities (e.g. from rent and services) cannot be distributed among the 
members, while they can be re-invested in the incubator itself (e.g. infrastructures, etc.).  
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The performance indicator that most inscribes such arrangements is the breakeven, 
which is also a target against which the performance of the Director of Innovation is 
judged. The decision to set the breakeven as a target comes from the Director himself 
and not from the Board: 
“When I arrived the organization was in significant deficit, so what I 
achieved in the two years since I’ve been here was to turn that around so we 
are breakeven […] The reason why we are breakeven is because we have 
more tenants, a great diversity of tenants, but if I’m honest this isn’t 
something that was really being pushed on me by the Board, but it’s 
something that I pushed on the Board” (Ibid.) 
To describe his vision of how the incubator should be managed, the Director often 
refers to the “commercial” and the “free market” frame. This is clear, for example, in 
the decision of “educating” the “20 year old” Board to move from having fixed rental 
rates to rental rates based on ratchets. The aim is to encourage tenants (i.e. start-ups) to 
‘graduate’ from the incubator as soon as they can. As the Director put it: 
“I’m taking a free market approach to that. Basically if you introduce 
incentives that are commercially orientated then people will react to those 
because it is coming directly out of their pocket” (#2, Director of Innovation 
–emphasis added) 
Rental rates act here as a device which inscribes the commercial frame adopted by 
the director. Nevertheless, applying a commercial frame entails a lot of work in terms of 
“pushing” the Board to increase rent and to have an independent audit of the level of 
service charges. Only the independent audit could prove the reality of missed revenues: 
“I wanted to have a concrete report from an independent auditor that said 
this is what the service charge is. We did that exercise and now we are 
charging probably two pounds less than we ought to be charging per square 
foot. So clearly we’re missing out on legitimate revenues we could 
genuinely have been generating […] we are very transparent about it, the 
report is published” (#2, Director of Innovation –emphasis added). 
Running the incubator in a “commercial” way is also inscribed in a set of 
performance measures such as the amount of square feet assigned to each tenants (i.e. 
not more than 10 sq. ft.), and the maximum number of employees (i.e. 10) as a measure 
of companies’ growth. Other non-accounting devices developed by the Director of 
Innovation include the “queue” mechanism designed to create competitiveness at the 
entry level of the incubator. According to the Director by creating a queue, existing 
tenant companies are pressured to graduate as soon as possible. At the same time the 
queue acts as a “quality” control device for those in the queue in that it takes the 
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willingness to stay in the queue for long periods as a ‘negative’ sign. The process is 
described by the Director as aiming “to generate a pipeline of active enquires for people 
wanting to come in” (#2). 
Board meetings are depicted by the Director as “one-man shows”. The performances 
which are usually presented at the Board are: 
“Every time we have a board meeting what I try to do is to demonstrate 
some kind of progress from one quarter to another, so it might be in terms of 
employees or new contracts, patents that have been filed or new products 
that have been launched, so it is quite a comprehensive assessment of how 
companies are doing.” (#2 –Director of Innovation) 
“One of the things I saw in previous board papers and I was very unsettled 
because they weren’t very…they didn’t give the board full information. Not 
deliberately, I’m saying they weren’t particularly comprehensive” (Ibid.) 
To sum up, incubation management practices at Incubator#2 seem to be shaped by 
the tension between the ‘public intervention’ remit of the incubator (rooted in the not-
for-profit set up), and the struggle of incubator managers (i.e. Director of innovation) to 
run the incubator like a “commercial” business. The Director’s commercial background 
from venture capital industry and technology transfer highly influence his way of 
framing how innovation should be incubated. In this case accounting, in the form of 
breakeven target, inscribes both the commercial and the public intervention frame, in so 
contributing to mediating the tension between the two frames. 
Inscribing frames into indicators: profitability versus number of jobs created 
Incubator#3 operates as the wholly-owned trading subsidiary of a public funded 
research institute. Registered as a charity, the research institute decentralises all the 
commercial activity to Incubator#3, which is instead a limited company. The 
commercial subsidiary is described in the institute’s website in terms of number of 
spinouts, number of active commercialisation projects, number of commercialisation 
projects that have been licensed to companies for further development and marketing, 
and amount of income coming from licensing. 
The research council plays a central role in funding the incubator and this is clearly 
reflected in the ways in which the performances of the incubator are defined. As it is 
often the case in incubators where the government has a stake, the emphasis is 
predominantly on jobs creation. There is a tension here between how the CEO would 
measure the performances of the incubator and how the research council measures 
performances. On the side of the research council, what matters is the impact of public 
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funded research. Impact is to be understood, according to the incubator’s Chief 
Executive Officer both as social and financial impact. However financial impact is 
ultimately what seems to matter. This is most evident when the benefits for the society 
and community are proved in financial terms.  
On the side of the incubator manager, the incubator should be run as a commercial 
entity. This means that what matters is not how many jobs have been created, but rather 
how much profit has been generated through rents and how much space have been 
occupied (or how much space is void). 
Here the tension seems to be between measures of impact, exemplified by indicators 
such as number of jobs, number of spinouts, number of patent filed on the on hand, and 
profitability measures together with occupancy levels (e.g. percentage of void space, 
number of people on the campus) on the other hand. Profits are not a concern for 
government, but they are for the CEO of the incubator who regards the incubator as a 
commercial venture: 
“Because of my commercial background- I aim to make a profit, but the 
government might not be interested in me making the profits, all they ask is 
creating the maximum number of jobs and growth” (#8 –Chief Executive 
Officer) 
What is the origin of the concern for capturing the return of government funding and 
government funded research? According to the CEO: 
“[The government] worries that suddenly a company will take up something 
funded by the government and make a huge amount of money out of it and 
there is no return to the organization who invented it” (#8 – incubator CEO) 
In conclusion, Incubator#3 is constructed as a space for public intervention, where 
the commercial style of framing the “value” produced through incubation struggles to 
emerge. Whereas the public intervention frame, embedded in the number of jobs created 
and the number of spin-outs created through public funding, is more powerful. 
6.2.2   Tensions between the public intervention frame 
and the health-related outcome frame 
This section will show that the incubation of innovation at Incubator#4 can be 
interpreted as a space where different sets of aspirations, concerns, and objectives are 
translated into performance indicators and targets. However, not all the aspirations and 
objectives become translated into accounting numbers. The section will show how a 
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lack of equipment in terms of accounting tools, makes certain actors and their 
aspirations more powerful than others in realising the value of programmes for 
incubating innovation. In practical terms, in the case of Incubator#4, a version of value 
based on economic indicators prevailed on a version of value based on the effects of 
innovation on human health. 
Inscribing the public intervention frame into output, outcome and impact indicators 
Incubator#4 is formally owned by the local university (University#4) college of 
medicine. It receives funding from the local health board, the local government, and the 
ERDF (European regional development fund). The ERDF resources are allocated 
through the Local European Funding Office (LEFO). The same organisation also carries 
out the monitoring and assessment activities for the ERDF funded projects in the 
country. The reason for collecting and reporting the data required by the European 
Commission is to facilitate the assessment of the progress of the programmes and make 
comparison between Structural Fund interventions and other type of assistance provided 
by the local government. 
The aspiration to boost regional economies is at the core of EU and local 
government’s funding initiatives. The commercial manager of Incubator#4 explained 
the remit of the local government and the European Union, which are Incubator#4 main 
stakeholders:  
“You have to go back to be able to see the whole objective behind the 
European funding that has to do the narrowing of the gap in the GDP per 
head, so the reason why we are getting European funding in [region] is 
because of the fact that our GDP per head is only about 85% of the average 
for Europe which is not good. So how can we narrow that gap, how can we 
move from 85% say to 95% and there has been a lot of criticism earlier on 
in the year about the fact that despite all the European money coming into 
[region], we have not been able to narrow the gap. So how does the [local] 
government through the European funding try to narrow the gap? It is trying 
to encourage the development in growth and jobs which are high level, 
better earning jobs, so you are creating more wealth and how you actually 
create more jobs is through the development and growth of businesses” (#5 –
Commercial Manager, emphasis added) 
Narrowing the gap in the Gross Domestic Product per head in the local region 
represents one of the concerns of the government. The effect of regional development 
policies –implemented through funding initiatives such as ERDF- are identified, 
measured and monitored by means of a detailed framework which revolves around three 
types of indicators: output, outcome/result, and impact indicators:  
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“The monitoring indicators are the outputs and results; outputs are the 
activities undertaken by the project and results are the direct consequence of 
the activity. The results follow from the activities, and reflect the key aims 
of your project. The evaluation indicators are the impacts; the impacts are 
the longer term consequence of the activity and follow on from the results. 
The result and impact indicators, therefore, are the most important types of 
indicator” (Local Government, 2013, p. 2) 
At application stage, the applicant is asked to fill in a spreadsheet, which includes 
accounting information about the project such as deliverable outputs, expenditures and 
sources of fund (both in the form of revenues and capital). The information included in 
the spreadsheet aims to:  
“capture essential information about the project which, once agreed, will 
form part of the terms and conditions of any offer of funding and therefore 
the basis on which the project's progress and performance are measured. 
Failure to spend in accordance with the agreed plans may result in grant 
being withdrawn. It is therefore essential that they are both realistic and 
accurate” (Department for Communities and Local Government and 
European Union 2012, , worksheet 3, emphasis added) 
Following these procedure, back to 2007 at the stage of bidding for European funding, 
the parties (i.e. the LEFO and Incubator#4 project applicants) agreed on the indicators 
presented in Table 6.2. It was also agreed that the results would be delivered in two 
phases. The choice of deliverable outputs and results was consonant with the indicators 
outlined in the ERDF programme guidance (Welsh Government 2013; Department for 
Communities and Local Government 2008). 
The indicators in Table 6.2 below represent the attempt to identify and measure the 
overflows generated while incubating innovation by means of EU funding. In the 
context of monitoring and evaluation exercises, Incubator#4 was asked to provide 
“evidence” that “650 new jobs are created” (#5 –Commercial Manager). 650 new jobs 
created acts as an inscription in that it translates into numbers what the local 
government, the European Union, and Incubator#4 agreed to achieve as part of projects 
aimed at incubating innovation. Only by providing such “evidence” the incubator would 
be able to unlock further funding: 
“We were able to evidence that over the course of the project we were able 
to help companies to create 209 jobs, we helped 206 companies, we were 
able to get an increase in turnover of £14,7 million” (#5 –Commercial 
Manager) 
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Evidence is provided by means of detailed spreadsheets, which include data on jobs 
created broken down into number of jobs created in each enterprise
9
. The effects of 
incubating innovation through EU funding are therefore captured predominantly by 
economic indicators. However, the next section will discuss the emergence of another 
type of frame mobilised within the incubator to capture the value produced through 
innovation, that is the health-outcomes frame. 
Table 6.2: Indicators reported by Incubator#4 to the Local European Funding Office 
 
Struggles in translating the health-outcomes frame into numbers  
Economic development indicators represent only one way to identify and measure (i.e. 
frame) the value produced through programmes for incubating innovation. Economic 
development indicators aim to capture the effect of ERDF and government funding 
using the categories and vocabulary of economics. New products, enterprises, jobs, and 
                                                          
9
 A new job is defined by the EU/government as “A new post which is expected will exist for at 
least 12 months and did not exist prior to the Structural Fund activity. This does not include 
jobs which have been relocated” (Welsh Government 2013, p.58) 
New jobs created
Companies advised in R&D/Innovation
New companies created
Increase in turnover
Collaborative research projects
New patents/trademarks
Enterprises assisted
Individuals assisted
Collaborative R&D
Innovation centres
Open access points
Gross jobs created
Enterprises created
Profit benefit
Product, processes, services registered
Product, processes, services launched
Product, processes, services launched
Equality strategies
Environmental manufacturing systems
Investment induced
Enterprises accommodated
Jobs accommodated
Phase 1
Phase 2
Phase of 
development
Indicator
% of target 
achieved
 Target  Actual
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investments are deemed to be the effects, i.e. overflows, of investing public funding in 
incubation and innovation. Putting the emphasis on economic indicators, such as the 
number of enterprises or jobs created, implies that the economy is the target of such 
overflows, and public funded incubation is the source. As one respondent put it: 
“If you look at how the relation with stakeholders is functioning, because of 
the European Union funding we have certain outputs to achieve. So part of 
those outputs –well, the majority of those outputs- are related to economic 
growth rather than the development of new treatments in human and 
health science” (#5 –Commercial Manager, emphasis added) 
Therefore, accounting shapes the value of programmes for incubating innovation by 
translating the aspirations and objectives of local government and the European Union 
into economic targets: 
“For me, because we are European funded then we have to meet those 
particular [economic] targets. In terms of [Incubator#4], you noticed none of 
those [pointing to the computer screen which shows the indicators 
represented in Table 6.2] really relate to improvements in health, they all are 
economic development objectives” (#5 –Commercial Manager) 
Other possible ways of framing incubation practices and the effects they generate 
could have focused –according to the Commercial Manager- on health-related 
objectives and outcomes.  
All in all, the case of Incubator#4 shows that the ability of the public 
intervention/economic development frame to impose itself as the dominant calculative 
frame lies in the power of its calculative equipment (e.g. economic performance 
indicators). The prevailing version of value, i.e. value expressed in terms of economic 
development, is one where the economy is the target of the overflows generated through 
innovation. Differently, the version of value where human health is the target of the 
overflows struggles to emerge. The causes of such struggle might lie either in the lack 
of ‘measurement tools’ available to the proponents of the health-related outcome frame, 
or in the absence of a calculative space where both frames (health-related and 
economic) can be represented and mediated by measurement tools. Overall, the version 
of value produced by those providing the financial resources, i.e. the EU and the local 
government, prevails on the version of value that could be produced by scientists, i.e. 
those generating the ideas/innovation. 
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6.2.3   Public intervention, commercial and quality frames  
This section will analyse how accounting is involved in incubating innovation at 
Incubator#6. Accounting, in the form of performance indicators, contributes to realising 
the multiple values of incubation while translating public intervention, commercial, and 
quality frames into accounting numbers. As a consequence of such translation, not only 
do different forms of value arise, but also different realities are constructed (e.g. 
economic reality). Incubator#6 is TopUniversity#5 wholly-owned incubator and is 
managed through a university subsidiary, which is a limited company. The subsidiary 
was funded in 2004/5 at the time of the merger between two universities to form 
TopUniversity#5. The incubator spreads across five sites, each of which is dedicated to 
a specific field (e.g. biotechnology, life sciences, IT, etc.).  
Inscribing the commercial frame into profitability indicators 
In TopUniversity#6’s financial report the incubator is accounted for as an investment in 
subsidiary undertaking. The fact that the incubator is owned and managed through a 
commercial vehicle –a limited company- not only has consequence in terms of fiscal 
treatments (i.e. the vehicle is subjected to Value Added Tax and Corporation Tax), but 
also has consequences in terms of the calculative frames mobilised within the incubator. 
A former managing director of the incubator explains the way in which the incubator 
was run as follows: 
“We were a for-profit company and essentially our model revolved around 
two sources of revenues. One was the occupancy – the rental, and the other 
one was through conferencing and events. Later I did some consultancy for 
the World Bank and stuff like that and the money went to the company as 
well” (#18 –former Managing Director) 
Occupancy level was an important target in that the higher the occupancy the higher 
the income from rents. Being a for-profit company implied that the central target was 
“at least” to breakeven:  
“We basically set up for profit to have a business plan that we would at least 
breakeven on the basis of occupancy” (Ibid.)  
The governance of the incubator was said to be separate from the university. In this 
regard, the incubator has a board composed by “university people” and two non-
executive directors, described as “independent non-university people”. The former 
managing director described the relation with TopUniversity#5 as follows: 
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“So [we had] separate governance but still under the framework of…you 
know we had only one stakeholder –the university […]. So everything we 
did was to provide stakeholder value for the university. So if we got any 
profit the money would go to the university, and the university would decide 
whether to give it back to us, to reinvest it or to spend it in research and 
development somewhere else” (Ibid.) 
The objective for the incubator management was to make profits –i.e. to create value 
for the university. The surpluses would therefore be distributed to the University. 
However, there was a practice in place where:  
“Usually [TopUniversity#6] would leave it, to be fair. So the money would 
get reinvested and you still have to cover your operating costs and operating 
costs are going up all the time” (Ibid.) 
The commercial/business approach to incubation consisted also in having in place a 
bonus scheme: 
“So you were running like a proper business. And you need to incentivize 
to motivate your team. I remember every year we had bonus every year, so 
we hit the target every year […] I think we were incentivised, we had a 
bonus scheme. So personally I was incentivised to make that profit and then 
I did not care if they took the profit or not” (Ibid., emphasis added) 
The bonus was to be distributed upon the achievement of certain targets, such as 
occupancy level, breakeven, and number of companies spun out from the university.  
To sum up, the commercial frame gives visibility to a certain notion of value 
produced through incubation, which is value understood as profits. Putting the emphasis 
on profits means that incubating innovation is regarded as an activity whose effects are 
projected into the realm of the economy. By providing profitability measures, 
accounting contributes to framing the incubation of innovation as an activity whose 
value is mainly economic. 
Other than the university, Incubator#6 had also other stakeholders such as the 
Regional Development Agency (RDA) and the European Regional Development Fund, 
who both provided funding for constructing the Incubator#6 buildings. The next section 
will explore what notions of value are embedded in the set of aspirations and objectives 
mobilised by actors such as the RDA and the EU and what forms of accounting are 
involved in realising the value of incubation. The next section will also explore whether 
the version of value produced within the commercial frame, i.e. value as profitability, 
comes into conflict with the value realised in the context of the public intervention 
frame. 
  
208 
 
Inscribing the public intervention frame into number of jobs created 
In virtue of their investments in incubation buildings, the Regional Development 
Agency (RDA) and the European Union (through the European Regional Development 
Fund) constituted, alongside the university, the relevant stakeholders for Incubator#6. 
As the former Managing Director of the incubator explains, the incubator did not need 
to pay the ERDF and RDA’s capital investment back and how this was central to the 
incubator’s business model: 
“The model was around revenues. So we had the capital money, so we didn’t 
have to pay any of the capital money back. So the 15 millions pounds for the 
original incubator came from the ERDF,[Charity Foundation#1], and the 
university.  
The 15 millions for building one and the 25 millions for [building two] we 
didn’t need to pay them back. That’s really important when you think of the 
business model. Cause if we had to pay 40 millions pound back over 10-20 
years that would have meant a different model” (#18 –former Managing 
Director) 
A contributing factor to the emergence of the public intervention frame within 
Incubator#6 was constituted by the 15 million and 25 million funding injected into the 
incubator by various stakeholders. Without such funding devices none of the 
stakeholders –university, RDA, and EU- would be able to mobilise their metrological 
tools (e.g. sets of performance indicators) and contribute to realising the value(s) of 
incubation.  
The rise of the public intervention frame within the incubation space was paralleled 
by a programmatic shift in the role that universities came to play within the regional 
economy in late 1990s and early 2000s. In this regard the former Managing Director of 
the incubator stated:  
“Suddenly there was a realisation that universities play a very important role 
in job creation for the local community, hospitals. Universities sometimes 
are one of the biggest employers so they have a huge impact on the region” 
(#18 –former Managing Director, emphasis added) 
Not only had the RDA and the ERDF contributed to incubation with a £40 million 
investment, but also they set up a calculative framework aimed at capturing the value 
produced while incubating innovation. As seen previously in the case of Incubator#4, at 
the stage of applying for European funding, a set of economic indicators (which aims to 
“capture” and visualise the activities carried out through incubation projects) has to be 
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chosen within the range of indicators
10
 suggested in the ERDF application guidelines 
(Department for Communities and Local Government 2011). For each of the selected 
deliverable indicators, a target figure is then proposed by the applicant (i.e. 
Incubator#6). Contextually, the management team also commits to achieve certain 
target indicators such as number of jobs created: 
“So you know how European money works or regional development 
agency…we had 11 millions from the regional development agency and 7 
millions from the ERDF…you have to commit creating 1000 jobs. So we 
created in 10 years over 1600 jobs, so we hit the target” (#18 –former 
Managing Director, emphasis added)  
Another indicator was the level of sales produced by the companies that the 
incubator was assisting. However, when it comes to companies operating in the 
biotechnology sector, such indicator is not applicable. It is a widely accepted fact in the 
field that biotechnology start-ups “do not make any sales”. As a consequence, a 
negotiation was needed in order to substitute the sales indicator with an equivalent one: 
“[Biotech companies] They get investments and we were allowed to use the 
investments that these companies got as a sales target. So we had a sales 
target of 60 millions. [Spinout#4] alone had 60 million investments from 
venture capital and created 250 jobs” (Ibid., emphasis added) 
Additional indicators that the incubator’s management team proposed and agreed to 
be monitored against were: 
“There were also more soft things like do they fund PhD students at the 
university, how many collaborations do they have with the university, are 
they engaging with the region?” (Ibid.) 
Overall, the effect of the public intervention frame in the case of Incubator#6 is to 
construct the incubator as “one of the biggest employer in the region”. Such aspiration 
was inscribed into the 1,000 jobs created indicator. This means that the effects of 
incubating innovation have, as a target, the economy of the region. By expressing the 
value of innovation in terms of jobs created, a piece of economic reality is constructed. 
                                                          
10
 Applicants can also provide supplementary indicators which are not included in the ERDF 
technical guidance, however they should still follow the output-outcome/results-impacts 
framework. This point is made clear in one of the notes in the guidance: “The Technical Note 
takes account of practitioners' practical experience of data collection and builds on existing 
information systems in a proportionate manner so that the indicators are consolidated and 
linked to make them manageable and useable and to rationalise the data collection 
requirements. It does not cover any supplementary outputs, outcomes/results or ERDF impacts 
that the Regions may choose to use in their programmes” (Department for Communities and 
Local Government 2011, p. 5) 
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An economic reality where incubation (and innovation) is valued for the number of jobs 
it creates. 
Whereas the commercial frame envisioned the incubator as a commercial entity (as a 
“proper for-profit business”), the public intervention frame envisioned the incubator as 
an employer. The process of constructing the incubator according to these frames was 
crystallised into different sets of targets, as the Managing Director effectively stated:  
“So you have a number of red amber green level targets. There were 
different targets for different stakeholders. The university wanted us to 
breakeven, to make profit, the academic-industry engagement. The ERDF 
and regional development agency they wanted jobs and academic impact” 
(Ibid.) 
Both the commercial frame and the public intervention frame project their aspiration 
onto the realm of the economy. Accounting provides categories and indicators such as 
profits and jobs created, in so contributing to realise the economic values of incubation.  
The next section will discuss another way of identifying and measuring the 
overflows produced through incubation. While the commercial and public intervention 
frames identify the economy as the target of innovation’s overflows, the quality frame 
encounters difficulties in being translated into economic terms. 
Struggles in translating the quality frame into numbers 
The value of incubating innovation, according to the commercial frame, is captured by 
key performance indicators such as profits from rent and occupancy levels. The latter is 
defined as the percentage of incubation space which is rented out to start-up and spin-
out companies. As mentioned before, the higher the occupancy level is, the higher the 
income from rent payments is likely to be. Higher income means that the incubator will 
be able to cover the operating costs (e.g. bills).  
However, according to Incubation#6 Managing Director an excessive emphasis on 
occupancy level and rents risks to undermine what he calls the level of “quality” of the 
incubator. In this respect, he argues the following: 
“In [Incubator#6] I had to breakeven and cover all my operating costs 
otherwise I had to fire staff. If you look around the UK, most of the 
incubators in the UK go down the model of having to fill the building and so 
quality is not the most important criteria or KPI [key performance 
indicator]. The most important KPI is occupancy level and ‘can you pay 
your bills?’. That’s fundamental and that’s one of the issues around 
incubation globally” (#18 –former Managing Director, emphasis added) 
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The concern of the incubator manager is that framing incubation in a commercial way, 
hence focusing on profits/breakeven and occupancy, not only undermines quality but 
also risks being the standard model for incubation: 
“And it’s really important to understand that the [Incubator#6] business 
model was “[name of managing director] fill the building, pay the bills, give 
us some profit!”[…]. And my worry is that most of the incubators in the 
world are driven by this business model and they forget about the quality 
very quickly because they are driven to just pay their bills. So the model is 
wrong, is flawed” (Ibid., emphasis added) 
To make his point stronger, the incubator manager draws on the story of Incubator#4’s 
flagship company, i.e. Spinout#4, and its trajectory from success to failure. Success was 
narrated by the manager in terms of number of people employed and market 
capitalisation: 
“[Spinout#4] went from 2 to 200 people, when it went to the stock market it 
was listed £300 millions, it was the biggest biotech in Europe, in our 
incubator, still” (Ibid.) 
Failure, instead, was narrated in terms of technical milestones and number of 
employees: 
“And then [Spinout#4] went to phase III clinical trial and failed and lots of 
trials failed, and the company went from 200 people to death” (Ibid.) 
This story of success and failure is drawn upon by the Managing Director in order to 
show how the focus on quantitative targets such as number of jobs and market 
capitalisation/amount of investments etc., can drive the attention away from what, to 
him, really matters which is quality. The proposed solution lies in challenging the 
commercial and public intervention concerns for profits, breakeven, jobs creation, 
enterprises creation by redefining how the potential value of an incubated company (i.e. 
a start-up) should be identified: 
“What we are trying to do now is to say “well maybe we need to create a 
different kind of biotech”. It has to be stronger, it has to be more viable, the 
process has to be a bit more diligent on the filtering so that companies that 
are gonna fail shouldn’t get £60 millions of VC [venture capital] funds” 
(Ibid.) 
Framing incubation in terms of quality, however, is difficult partly because quality 
cannot be easily translated into key performance indicators and targets and partly 
because it is not clear how quality should be identified and measured. The quality frame 
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struggles to emerge because neither the University nor the European Union have been 
successfully enrolled in such programme  
To draw a parallel with the account from Incubator#1 (analysed in Chapter 4), the 
quality frame was indeed mobilised by participants and translated into a KPI which was 
the number of Intellectual Property related tenants. In that context, the ability to 
mobilise the quality frame can be attributed to a specific funding device, i.e. a 
government loan, which was specifically set up to cover Incubator#1’s operating costs 
for the first three-four years of activity. In that case the commercial concern for profits 
and breakeven is less emphasised if compared to the centrality of the quality frame. As 
Bioincubator#1 Chief Executive Officer points out: 
“Because we have government money here [in Bioincubator#1] the objective 
is to be different, not to fill the building up with CROs [contract research 
organisations], but really focus on the problem that is the lack of IP-based 
research on life science, biotech, med-tech companies” (#25 –Chief 
Executive Officer) 
Since the quality frame struggles to emerge, public intervention and commercial 
frames dominate in realising the value(s) of incubating innovation within Incubator#6. 
The latter is hence expressed in economic terms, i.e. in terms of profitability and job 
creation. The public intervention and commercial frames create versions of value which 
apparently do not conflict with each other, while dominating over alternative versions of 
value such as quality. In the case of Incubator#6, by providing tools such as 
performance indicators, accounting contributes to shaping innovation by realising 
multiple versions of its value (e.g. jobs created, profits generated). 
6.2.4   Tensions between the investment frame and the 
commercial frame 
This section will explore how accounting contributes to framing the innovation 
incubated within Incubator#7 and Incubator#5. By translating frames into numbers 
accounting makes it possible to realize the multiple values of incubation, which in turn 
correspond to different ‘visions’ of incubation. Envisioning incubation as a commercial 
space implies that the value of incubating innovation is captured by performance 
indicators such as profits from rent and occupancy level. Whereas envisioning 
incubation as a “capital-efficient” environment entails investing in the equity of tenants 
by means of investment funds. The latter can have the form of either incubator’s 
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wholly-owned fund or incubator’s minority shareholding in investment funds. The value 
of innovation in an incubation environment that is “capital-efficient” is captured by 
short term performances, such as the ability to raise funding. 
In more detail, the section will map out the actors who mobilize the commercial and 
finance frames, what goals they aim to achieve, what accounting devices are used in 
order to realize the value of incubation under different calculative frames. Since finance 
and commercial frames are simultaneously mobilized within the same incubation space, 
this clash can result into tensions and conflicts. The section will also investigate 
whether accounting, in the form of performance indicators, contributes to creating, 
mediating, or solving such tensions. 
Linking the commercial frame to the percentage of shareholding 
Incubator#7 is 100 percent owned by TopUniversity#3 by means of a commercial 
vehicle which has the legal form of a limited company. The board of the limited 
company is composed mainly by people from the university, i.e. academics. The 
managerial aspects of the incubation are outsourced by the university to TechTransfer 
Plc. The latter was used to be, from 1986 to 1997, the university’s technology transfer 
office. In 1997 it became a wholly-owned subsidiary of TopUniversity#3 and 
subsequently became registered in the Stock Exchange. The university still retains the 
30,4 percent shareholding in TechTransfer Plc (as per the university annual report 2011-
2012). 
In outsourcing the managerial aspects of the incubator to TechTransfer Plc, the 
university pays a service fee to the public company for managing the incubator. As part 
of these arrangements, the CEO of the incubator is employed by the technology public 
company. The reason for running the incubator separately from the university is 
motivated by the incubator manager as follows: 
“The system of big colleges does not suit an incubator, because incubators 
we are doing businesses so this means that we have to act like a business. 
Time, efficiency, cost effectively…we have director of the company, we 
have board of directors and my job is to report quarterly to the board of 
directors on all of these companies here and how they are getting on, 
prospects of the company etc., and show that we are doing something good” 
(#13 –Incubator manager, emphasis added) 
What the incubator manager reports to the incubator Board and what the Board wants 
to know revolves around three main aspects: the percentage of occupancy (i.e. the 
percentage of incubator space which is occupied by start-ups and contract research 
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organisations, etc.), “whether the company is able to pay rents and how long it will take 
to them to successfully graduate” (#13 –Incubator Manager). The incubator Board has 
set the target at “more than 90% occupancy”, which is also the target that the incubator 
manager is made responsible for. 
The commercial performances of the incubator (e.g. occupancy, rental income) are 
also dependent on tenants’ commercial performances. For this reason, the board of 
Incubator#7 exerts direct and indirect controls on tenants. One form of control is exerted 
directly through the incubator manager. As the incubator manager put it: 
“In terms of [tenant companies’] performances you know, I’ve been talking 
with the companies so I have to report [to the incubator’s board] how they 
are doing.” (Ibid.) 
However, the attempt to frame tenants’ performances relies on what the tenants’ 
CEOs decide to disclose to the incubator manager: 
“What I see might not be the full picture [...] And I can only report what that 
[company] CEO tells me –to the board.” 
“I don’t have any idea of what’s going on in the [tenants’] board meetings, 
and when I meet them I’ll ask them how they are doing and they will tell 
me” (#13) 
Despite the efforts to “encourage” tenants to disclose information, the CEO doesn’t 
have any power to mandate tenants to provide full disclosure. Such privilege is for the 
board of the company/tenant and for Tech Transfer Plc. The latter has in fact a stake and 
a board position in most (i.e. 90 percent) of the incubated companies. In virtue of this 
investor/investee relation TechTransfer Plc can have a direct control over the 
performances of the company. As the incubator manager put it, the privilege of direct 
control over companies, which implies also setting and monitoring milestones, does not 
characterise the relation incubator manager-incubatees. 
However, in the case of Incubator#7 the incubator’s board can exercise a more 
indirect control (or control at a distance) over the performances of the tenants. This is in 
virtue of the shareholding position (i.e. 30,4 percent) that the incubator has in 
TechTransfer Plc. This shareholding position acts as a form of indirect control over the 
ability of tenants to pay the rent: 
“[I]n my old incubator people [tenants] would give you a business plan, they 
would give you their financials and everything is rosy and then if they are in 
trouble the first person they don’t pay is the landlord [incubator] and they 
would do anything not to pay. While here [Incubator#7] we don’t have that 
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problem because we know when the company is going to have any 
problem because we often are on the board” (Ibid., emphasis added) 
When the incubator manager say “we are on the board”, what he means is not that the 
incubator holds directly a board position in start-ups/tenants’ boards. What he means 
instead is that TechTransfer Plc can have a board position in invested companies, and 
the university is a shareholder of TechTransfer Plc, holding a 30,4% stake. Such 
percentage inscribes the right of the incubator to know the performances of tenants, 
hence their ability to pay the rent to the incubator. The ability to pay the rent is 
important for the financial sustainability (and profitability) of the incubator. The 
commercial frame is inscribed in indicators such as the level of occupancy and the 
ability of tenants to pay rent. Through the shareholding percentage, the incubator is 
therefore acting upon the uncertainty of rental income. 
Translating the investment frame into start-ups’ value 
These shareholding arrangements have an influence on the way in which the incubator 
is constructed. In Tech Transfer Plc annual report (2013), while illustrating the 
strategies for coping with risks, it is stated: 
“Technology companies may take longer to raise money and may find it 
more difficult to sell products. Mitigation: ensuring that companies are not 
formed until funding can be raised to take them to a clear value inflection 
point and only moving companies from the capital efficient environment of 
the incubator when co-investors and sufficient funding are in place” (doc#6, 
p. 19, emphasis added) 
From the point of view of the technology transfer company the incubator acts as a 
‘mitigation’ device, that is to say a device that contributes to mitigate the “potential 
negative impacts of the economic environment” (doc#6, p. 19) on technology 
investments.  
The idea of incubation as a capital efficient environment is embedded in one 
indicator, which is the percentage of tenants in which TechTransfer Plc has an equity 
position. In fact the 90 percent of tenants receives (equity) investments from the 
technology transfer company. 90 percent is also the number of companies that spun out 
from TopUniversity#3 and are now tenants at Incubator#7. Although it is not 
necessarily the case that all the spin-outs are backed by TechTransfer Plc, still the 
percentage of Tech Transfer Plc backed spin-outs tends to be high. As the incubator 
manager pointed out: 
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“[A] lot of businesses we have here are funded by VC [venture capital], 
which means that before they move in here they’ve got enough funding to 
keep them here for one or two years before the next funding round. So it 
means that we have a little bit less risk than we had an incubator open to just 
outside companies”  
The investment funds mobilised by TechTransfer Plc is based on funds raised in the 
financial market. 
However, there are also cases where the investment funds are raised through the 
incubator. In this respect, Incubator#5, which is a university owned incubator, re-invests 
the surpluses from the incubation activity (e.g. income from rent) in an on-purpose 
vehicle that acts as the incubator’s investment fund. Alongside the commercial activities 
such as space rental and services, the incubator invests on selected tenant companies 
which correspond approximately to the 10% of the tenants. The Chief Executive Officer 
of Incubator#5 explains the model as follows: 
“So if we are busy making all these companies successful then it is great that 
we can share in the rewards because they take more space and more 
revenues and more services, but actually we decided that we could share a 
reward in the capital appreciation of the companies so we have equity in the 
companies as well. So we get two benefits: the revenue benefit [i.e. rent] 
and the capital appreciation benefit (#11 –CEO, emphasis added) 
While investing in early stage and helping create future tenants, Incubator#5 captures 
part of the value created by tenants both in the form of equity and in the form of rent: 
“[O]ur investment helped [Startup#3] be created, other people put 80 
thousand pounds on top of us, so that was good because it helped create 
[Startup#3] but also it created a tenant for [Incubator#5], which gives us 
the money back” (Ibid., emphasis added) 
“For us it is important to have a separate vehicle to hold the investments, to 
hold the shares. And I mean our goal now is to having sort of proven that 
principle and it’s now to go out and raise a lot of more money so we can 
have a fund of 30-40 million pounds to invest in the companies alongside 
providing the facility” (Ibid.) 
Whether the investment funds raise money through rents or in the financial market, 
the frame used to identify and measure the value of the innovation developed within the 
incubator is based on financial tools. In more detail, under the investment frame the 
value produced by tenants is usually identified and measured by milestones. Milestones 
can be both technical/scientific milestones and also financial milestones. An example of 
technical milestone is provided by the director of Incubator#5’s investment fund: 
“Spinout#9 here [in Incubator#5] is developing a drug delivery technology 
and so one of its key milestones was in the proof of efficacy in its 
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technology and so they had to show they can get a certain amount of drug 
into the blood stream with a certain volume of delivery metrics and they did 
that and that was an absolutely crucial milestone if they hadn’t done that the 
company would have probably folded because everything was centered on 
that. So that’s important milestone” (#11 –Director, emphasis added) 
Technical milestones such as the proof of efficacy capture the effects of a technology 
on human body (i.e. blood stream). While financial milestones focus on the ability of 
tenants to raise money: 
“[R]aising money is always a key milestone because companies, 
particularly those developing new products, are always trying to raise more 
money because they usually don’t have a revenue stream, very little income 
and so they have to depend on raising the next tranche of cash in order to 
keep going.”(#11 –Director, emphasis added) 
How does the ability to raise money and technical milestones translate into financial 
value? To determine the value of start-ups (i.e. tenants), investors (e.g. venture 
capitalists) usually deploy the so-called capitalisation table (see Table A-4, Appendix 
4), which consists in analysing the founders' and investors' percentage of ownership, 
equity dilution, and value of equity in each round of investment. As the Director of a 
venture capital (VC) firm explains: 
“[T]he capitalization table [shows] who are the shareholders and what’s the 
pricing of an investment round, so what’s the pre-money valuation, 
imputing the value to each of the shares, and how much money we’re putting 
in. So pre-money plus the funding makes the post-money valuation and 
then what value you add to that to get an exit before you do another funding 
round. That is actually a cool part of the investment paper because we want 
to see value and we want to make sure that we get good value from the 
investment (#10, Director, emphasis added) 
Pre- and post-money valuation are, therefore, essential in order to “see value”. Pre- and 
post- money valuation are a central part of the so-called venture capital method, which 
is often used, alternatively or in conjunction to the discounted cash flow method, to 
determine the “value” of start-ups (i.e. tenants). Pre money valuation consists in 
discounting the terminal value of a start-up (i.e. the value at the time of VC’s exit, 
which is usually in the short term) at a discount rate which is not the traditional cost of 
capital used in discounted cash flow formula but a target rate of return
11
. The target rate 
of return is the yield that the VC “feels is required to justify the risk and effort of the 
particular investment” (Keegan 2008, p. 171). Other factors that contribute to the pre 
                                                          
11
 According to Keegan (2008), the formula for discounting the terminal value is: Discounted 
terminal value = terminal value/ (1 + target)
years 
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money valuation are the strength and completeness of the management team and the 
potential competitive advantage of the technology/drug (Keegan, 2008). Post money 
valuation, instead, simply adds the VC investment to the pre money valuation and is 
used as a base for further rounds of funding. 
Tensions between the investment and the commercial frames 
The fact that an incubator provides both facility and equity type of funding all at the 
same time can potentially generate a conflict between the commercial and investment 
frames. The Managing Director of Incubator#6 explains the point as follows: 
“We kept the fund and the landlord/tenancy separate. We still did business 
mentoring, coaching and support but in terms of …sometimes it is more 
important to keep the two roles separate because there might be 
conflicts of interests. If you have investments and equity positions in a 
company that cannot pay the rent, how do you deal with that? It’s difficult, 
there can be conflict” (#18) 
“[I]t might be that we have a stake in this company [start-up/tenant] but it 
doesn’t mean that I’ll always put them above other companies because my 
job is to work with all the companies here” (#13) 
Across the accounts of incubation presented so far a number of calculative frames, 
i.e. commercial, public intervention, finance, and quality, emerge. Each of them entails 
different visions of what an incubator should do and how it should be represented and 
calculated. The concluding section below will discuss in detail how these different ways 
of framing incubation creates a metrological framework and what consequences derive 
from such framework. 
Conclusion 
Translating calculative frames into value: the construction of a metrological framework 
“Overflows are devoid of economic significance unless they 
give rise to evaluations and measurements. The theory of 
externalities requires a metrological framework –i.e., 
measuring instruments- that allows the different agents to 
negotiate an agreement by calculating their respective 
interests” (Callon 1998a, p. 259) 
 
The question of how to best capture the value produced from incubating innovation 
often appears in academic and practitioner oriented debates (Dee et al. 2011). However, 
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this chapter showed that there is no single and absolute version of value, while there are 
multiple versions, which are mostly dependent on how different agents frame, calculate, 
and negotiate their interests and aspirations by means of accounting. The chapter 
demonstrated how accounting shapes innovation by providing the metrological 
framework that produces the multiple values of incubating innovation. Ultimately, what 
constitutes the multiple values arising from incubating innovation is shaped by the same 
indicators that are deployed to identify and measure those values. Where the choice of 
metrics and indicators depends on models and categories that are historically 
contingent, and situated in local practices. 
This section will discuss the constitutive elements and effects of the metrological 
framework that emerges from the analysis of the role of accounting within the space of 
incubation. As summarized in Table 6.3, this chapter contributed to mapping out and 
characterizing the calculative frames that were mobilized in order to capture the 
multiple values of incubating innovation.  
The table accounts not only for differences in the practices of valuing incubation, but 
also for those conditions that trigger such differences. To this aim, calculative frames 
have been traced in terms of the conditions that enabled their emergence, and the 
accounting devices and inscriptions deployed by incubator managers, funding bodies, 
and scientists in order to translate their objectives and aspirations into numbers.  
Table 6.3: Mapping out incubation metrological framework 
 
The conditions that enabled the emergence of a public intervention/economic 
development frame trace back to the setting up of Regional Development Agencies in 
late 1990s. Accounting was drawn upon in order to translate regional development 
Technology milestones (e.g. proof of efficacy),
financial milestones (e.g. n. of licenses, money 
raised) Venture capital industry
ERDF, N. of spin-outs created
Government grants N. of new jobs created
N. of enterprises assisted
Quality KPIs Percentage of IP-related companies Struggle to emerge
Health KPIs Health-related outcomes Struggle to emerge
Conditions of 
emergence
Universities' third 
mission, universities' 
commercial vehicles
ERDF logical 
framework, regional 
development policies
KPIs, rental mechanism 
(fixed/ratcheted, 
market/subsidized)
Inscriptions
Percentage of occupancy, breakeven, revenues, 
profits, tenants' graduation time
Commercial/financial 
sustainability 
(incubator as a 
business)
Investment (incubator 
as a capital efficient 
environment)
Public intervention 
(incubator as the engine 
of regional economies)
Calculative frames Accounting devices
Investment Fund, KPIs, 
capitalisation table
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objectives and aspirations into key performance indicators and targets such as the 
number of spin-outs, turnover, number of new jobs created etc. It is through these 
numbers that the overflows arising from the innovation produced through regional 
development programmes, or better the value created through incubation programmes, 
is identified and measured.  
The rise of universities’ third mission, universities’ increasing role in research 
commercialization programmes, and the creation of universities’ commercial 
subsidiaries as surpluses/profits generating businesses constituted the conditions for the 
emergence of the commercial frame. Within such frames accounting is mobilized to 
provide the tools for managing incubators as “businesses” through performance 
indicators such as breakeven, profits, revenues and percentage of occupancy.  
Traditionally, venture capital firms have represented a relevant source of financing 
for start-ups/tenants. However, a more recent trend (Ernst & Young 2014) sees 
incubators taking equity positions in clients/tenants through on-purpose investment 
funds, at the aim of capturing part of the value produced by incubated companies (Dee 
et al. 2011, p. 7). These phenomena have led to the emergence of a way of framing 
incubation that is typical of investment funds. As Dee et al. (2011, p. 7) noted, behaving 
like an equity investors means prioritizing short term returns rather than long term 
performances. As illustrated in the chapter, short term performances are usually 
measured in terms of technical and financial milestones to be achieved by the 
investee/incubatee before proceeding to other rounds of investments. The vision of 
incubation as a “capital-efficient environment” is embedded in the investment frame 
and is inscribed in a short term version of financial value, i.e. value estimated only at 
the time of investment’s exit by means of the so-called venture capital method. 
Overall, the stories of incubation presented throughout the chapter showed how 
multiple frames operate simultaneously within the same space. For this reason each 
frame summarized in Table 6.3 should not be considered separately. Rather, at level of 
practices, frames can enter into conflict with each other, or simply coexist. In this 
respect, incubation can be theorized as a space characterised by multiple forms of value 
which might sometimes conflict with each other. Ultimately, the stability of the space 
depends on the ability of accounting to inscribe frames into numbers and mediate the 
tensions between different calculative frames, hence between different versions of 
value.  
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The chapter showed how the commercial, economic development, and finance 
frames identify the economy as the target of innovation’s overflows. So to speak, the 
economic development/public intervention frame measures the effects of incubating 
innovation in economic terms, i.e. in terms of number of enterprises and jobs created. 
So does the commercial frame, where the effects of incubating innovation are measured 
in terms of profits. Differently, those frames that struggle to emerge, i.e. health and 
quality frames, do not target the economy, but other domains such as health. In the latter 
case, accounting does not provide tools for inscribing quality and health into indicators. 
The consequence is that the dominant frames are those where the economic effects of 
incubating innovation are translated into economic values. Therefore, mapping out 
incubation’s metrological framework contributes to identifying those objectives, 
aspirations and actors that struggle to represent their version of value. 
The effects of incubation’s metrological framework 
This section will discuss the effects of the metrological framework that emerges from 
translating the different goals and aspirations of public and private stakeholders into 
numbers. Performance indicators and targets such those discussed hitherto, have the 
power to shape reality by inscribing certain calculative frames and translating their 
referents (i.e. innovation) into economic entities. To prove the point, when regional 
development agencies and other public funding bodies establish and agree the indicators 
for monitoring and assessing incubation projects, not only do they aim to capture the 
overflows generated through public funded innovation. But also they choose to give 
visibility to a type of overflows over others, that is overflows that have the economy as 
a target. By choosing “economic development indicators”, funding bodies project the 
effects of incubation and innovation onto a purely economic plane, and frame the value 
of them in economic terms. This means that by setting economic targets such as 1000 
jobs created, the intended effect is to create 1000 jobs, which is also used to prove the 
economic value deriving from incubating innovation. In this sense, the economic targets 
set by funding bodies, in agreement with project applicants, are intendedly performative.  
However, measures (for which a target is not set) can also become unintendedly 
performative. In this respect, Incubator#3’s Chief Executive Officer argued that number 
of filed patents and the number of jobs created (per company as opposed to the totality 
of jobs created) can lead to a situation where “you get what you measure”: 
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“We don't create jobs here [Incubator#3], we create the environment for 
other organisations to create jobs. So if I go back to the government or the 
local authority and say there has been twelve jobs created here, we had a 
discussion that the measure is not the number of jobs but is the number of 
company creating those jobs. So they are much more interested in 4 
companies producing three jobs each than one company producing twelve. 
So is it better one company producing 12 jobs or four companies producing 
three jobs each? […] And so you get the situation where you get what you 
measure” (#8 – incubator CEO) 
Measuring the number of spin-outs created in a given incubator generates the effect 
of increasing the number spin-outs. However, counting the newly created companies is, 
to the CEO, a meaningless indicator: 
“With most government things there is always some metric that they want 
and for a long time it was used to be “spin-out companies” as a metric of 
university innovation which I always thought is a meaningless measure. 
[…]Because there is a big difference between having something of 
innovative value and having enough to create a company. They are 
different” (#8 – incubator CEO) 
Measuring spinouts do not simply ‘capture’ a form of economic value, rather it 
contributes to performing the economic reality, i.e. more spinouts are created as a 
consequence of the measure. 
Furthermore, certain choices of indicators such as those related to commercial, 
economic development, and finance frames were interpreted by participants as a 
“numbers game”, that is a game characterized by a strong appetite for the production of 
numbers. In this “game” participants agree to produce certain type of numbers (e.g. 
number of jobs, number of enterprises created), but they do not necessarily agree on the 
meaning attributed to such numbers by their superiors. The former Managing Director 
of Incubator#6 explained “the numbers game” as follows: 
“Number of IPs, number of spinouts…it became a number, number, number 
game! That’s not quality, that’s just quantity. If you look back at that 
period [early 2000s], yes there were a lot more spinouts, but those who 
survived …[were just a few] it’s crazy!” (#18, former Managing Director, 
emphasis added) 
“and I think we went too far down the road of creating a numbers game 
where we have to have more patents, more spinouts. And then someone 
will look back ten years later and say: well, how much of that led to real 
commercialisation and economic impact?” (Ibid.) 
The so called “numbers game” can be interpreted as the consequence of the dominance 
of certain calculative frames, such as commercial, economic development, and finance, 
which all realize the value of incubating innovation by means of quantitative measures 
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(e.g. number of spinouts, number of patents). The growing appetite/anxiety for 
producing numbers that capture the economic value of incubation, has contributed to 
performing the economic reality in such a way that conform to the measures, i.e. “a lot 
more spinouts…more patents”. This holds particularly true where the measures also 
becomes a performance target and it is used as a device for evaluating individuals and 
organisations.  
In conclusion, similarly to the case of technology transfer analysed in Chapter 5, 
incubators can be interpreted as costly initiatives aimed at capturing the economic 
value(s) of innovation. While adopting a pragmatic approach to valuation, the chapter 
aimed to trace the different ways of realising the multiple values of innovation within 
incubators, and the economic entities created thereby. Following such approach, 
incubation is conceptualized as the outcome of the continual re-configurations of 
networks of stakeholders (e.g. investors, managers, etc.) and the resources they mobilise 
(e.g. performance indicators, financial resources).  
Such networks are highly contingent and co-produced by historical and political 
conditions. In this respect, the chapter has shown that commercial, public intervention, 
finance frames emerged first of all as a result of historical and political contingent 
conditions such as the creation of universities’ third mission, the rise of universities’ 
commercial subsidiaries, and the establishment of a network of regional development 
agencies (RDAs) responsible for conceiving and implementing regional development 
strategies.  
Funding devices such as the ERDF, but also funds coming from the RDAs’ Single 
Pot budget and venture capital firms brought different visions of the roles of incubation 
in the economy. Accounting devices such as key performance indicators and key 
regional indicators contributed to translating these different visions of incubation into 
numbers. As a result of such translation, incubators were constructed as the biggest 
employers in the regional economies, as capital efficient environments, and as “proper” 
businesses. The chapter has discussed how these different ways of framing incubation 
never operated in isolation, but often coexisted within the same space resulting in some 
cases in tensions and struggles.  
The chapter has also shown how the metrological framework that was constructed in 
the translation of frames had different qualities and produced different effects. One 
effect was crystallised in the powerful expression “you get what you measure”, which 
means that what ultimately constitutes value is shaped by those same indicators that 
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were initially deployed to identify and measure that value. Therefore, the value of 
incubating innovation is multiple and the choice of metrics and indicators ultimately 
depends on calculative frames that are situated and historically/politically contingent. 
Chapters 4, 5, and 6 investigated the circulation of innovation through processes of 
discovering, transferring, and incubating scientific ideas. The chapters showed that an 
essential part in these processes was played by accounting. Accounting devices such as 
performance indicators contributed to realizing and capturing the multiple values of 
innovation. Building on the empirical evidence presented in Chapters 4, 5, and 6, the 
next chapter will discuss the paradox “controlling innovation, innovating control” by 
analysing the sources, origins, and effects of controlling innovation. 
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CHAPTER  7  CONTROLLING 
INNOVATION, INNOVATING CONTROL: 
SOME REFLECTIONS 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
Considering how hotly debated is still today the issue of whether the technological 
inventions developed across the 18
th 
and 19
th 
centuries had the effect of bringing about 
an “industrial revolution” (Hartwell 1990), it is perhaps less than surprising to observe 
21
st
 century economists, managers, and policymakers still struggling with identifying 
and capturing the effects of innovation. Innovation is often pictured in economic 
theories and policies as a society-wide powerhouse that can foster entire economies and 
close technological and economic gaps between national and regional economies.  
Parallel to such claims comes, however, the realization that in today’s society, 
perhaps, even the existence of a powerhouse is proved only when we are able to see its 
effects, whether these come in the form of electric lighting or in the form of electricity 
bills. However, proving the effects of innovation, hence controlling innovation, entails 
multiple efforts which have been restlessly put forward in the past three decades by 
different agencies of governance across the economy and society. This collective 
concern for capturing innovation, which is evidenced by the rapid spread of innovation 
measures, indexes, surveys, and assessment exercises, is also paralleled by the diffusion 
of government and corporate policies and programmes aimed at fostering innovation 
across regional and national economies. Seemingly, controlling innovation while 
promoting innovation has become the mantra of a society that is constantly reminded 
not only to invest on innovation (and knowledge) in order to progress, but also to realize 
innovation’s multiple effects. 
The progressive agenda dictated by the innovation-driven economy has posed, 
however, a significant challenge to accounting, which is called upon in order to aid 
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government, corporations, and non-for-profit organisations to realize the multiple values 
of innovation. For it is only by capturing innovation’s multiple values that innovation 
can be proved. The hypothetical paradox addressed in this thesis, i.e. controlling 
innovation, innovating control, aimed to address such collective concern for controlling 
innovation in terms of the roles and forms of accounting mobilized.   
While investigating the role of accounting in controlling innovation, this study 
contributed to tracing and characterizing economic action in the field of innovation by 
shifting the attention away from the effects of innovation on the economy, to the 
question of what entities and actions are regarded as economic in the realm of 
innovation. Where economists have been studying for a relatively long time the impact 
of innovation on the economy through their models of economic growth, this study has 
adopted a different approach. This study aimed to analyse innovation not from the point 
of view of its effects on the economy, but from the point of view of the economic 
agencies that both constitute and control innovation. To investigate what configures 
economic agencies of innovation and the role of planning, budgeting, and valuation 
devices in such process of configuring, the thesis sought to identify the entities of 
innovation that have been rendered economic.  
Nevertheless, to say that accounting is implicated in formatting the capacity to act of 
individual and collective entities implies that some form of interaction between 
accounting and such entities takes place. The questions of how accounting interacts with 
other entities, and what the effects of such interactions are, imply that accounting 
entities can have some form of agency too. Not all the conceptualizations of agency in 
social sciences allow this passage and this is why Michel Callon’s concept of agency 
(2008) proved particularly useful in this thesis. Following Callon’s formulation of 
agency, an economic agent is constituted by drawing together both human and non-
human entities and observing the arrangements between them from the point of view of 
their capacity to act and give meaning to action.  
One of the advantages of Callon’s conceptualization of agency is that it leaves the 
characterization of agency open. In this regard, this study contributed to characterizing 
the economic agencies of innovation by categorizing them in terms of the modalities of 
attributing action (i.e. what or who organizes action?), the content of action (i.e. to what 
extent is action calculative?) and the effects it produces. Such categorization is 
consonant with the role that the French pragmatist tradition attributes to the interactions 
between human and non-human entities in the enactment of subjectivity. In simpler 
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terms, humans do not act in isolation, but rather perform various types of action (e.g. 
piloting an airplane, monitoring an innovation project) aided by a network of other 
humans (e.g. the pilot and the cabin crew, the innovation project’s assessor and 
applicant) and devices (e.g. the radar, SMART objectives). Agency is therefore 
performed collectively through the interactions between the various entities 
participating in a network. 
The reminder of the chapter will discuss the findings related to the question of 
whether accounting has changed its concepts and instruments in order to account for 
innovation, i.e. “controlling innovation, innovating control”.  
First, the chapter will analyse the action of controlling innovation in terms of the 
source, content, and effects of action. In this respect, the findings suggest that the 
governance of innovation as a social and technical phenomenon is enacted in the form 
of distributed efforts/action oriented toward realising the multiple values of innovation 
and constructing economic markets for innovation. The findings related to the forms of 
controlling innovation are summarised in table 7.1 and 7.2. Table 7.1 identifies what the 
sources of action are in the realm of innovation (e.g. individuals or collectives) and what 
types of entity perform such action (e.g. humans or non-humans). Table 7.2 categorizes 
the consequences (or effects) of controlling innovation according to the type of 
economic exchange from which they arise. Such consequences are conceptualized as 
tensions occurring between different modalities of framing the interactions among the 
human and non-human entities participating in innovation.  
Second, the chapter will discuss whether the progressive agenda of accounting has 
brought about innovations in the forms of accounting that are used to control innovation 
as a phenomenon. In this respect, the findings suggest that rather than innovating its 
instruments and tools, accounting has adapted to the innovation rationale in virtue of 
accounting properties of combinability and fluidity. Furthermore, the evidence show 
how the interactions between human entities and non-human entities (e.g. accounting 
tools) do not merely rely on competent and creative and skilled actors (Çalışkan and 
Callon 2009) in order to take place, but also on a number of properties that the 
accounting tools possess, namely fluidity and combinability.  
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7.1    Controlling innovation 
The findings discussed in the following sections contribute to understanding the types 
of economic agency that underlie the multiple efforts of controlling innovation. The 
term ‘controlling’ is used here to indicate a range of calculative actions whose content 
and source cannot be determined a priori, but rather observed in the specific 
circumstances of action. The findings suggest that the forms of economic agency that 
constitute innovation are mainly collective and action is distributed across a multitude 
of non-human entities (e.g. performance indicators, budgets) and human entities (e.g. 
finance directors, incubator managers). The forms of collective agency observed in the 
field range from R&D funding programmes (e.g. European Regional Development 
Fund) to financial models and valuation tools. The architecture of these collective 
agencies will be discussed in the next section by looking at the mechanisms for 
organising action within agencements (e.g. economic principles, accounting tools) and 
the content of calculative action performed within agencements (e.g. budgeting and 
monitoring) 
7.1.1   Characterising the economic agencies of innovation 
as socio-technical agencements 
As discussed in Chapter 2, Michel Callon advanced the notion of socio-technical 
agencement to denote heterogeneous arrangements, comprising both human and non-
human entities, considered from the point of view of their capacity to act (Çalışkan and 
Callon 2010, p. 9). The central questions in tracing an agencement are: who participates 
to action? And with what effects? While addressing these questions Table 7.1 and 7.2 
contribute to identifying the entities participating in the action of controlling innovation 
and to understanding of how agencies’ capacity to act is configured and the role of 
accounting in this process of configuring. By identifying the content, distribution, and 
effects of economic action in the field of innovation, one can better understand the 
contribution of performance measurement, budgeting, and valuation devices to the 
emergence and development of the economic agencies of innovation. 
In addressing the questions of what entities participate to innovation, what type of 
calculative action they perform, and with what effects, there lie both challenges and 
opportunities. The challenge consists in the fact that origins, content, and effects of 
action can only be observed in the particular circumstances of action, with the 
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consequence that the configuration of agency is contingent to the specific settings under 
observation. This also implies that it is not possible to determine a priori how and by 
whom/what agency is enacted, for this depends on the particular arrangements under 
study. Therefore, how innovation is monitored and evaluated and who/what perform 
these actions can be traced only by observing the enactment of specific funding 
programmes, technology incubation programmes, etc.   
Nevertheless, addressing these questions provides the opportunity to include in the 
configuration of economic agency any attempt to calculate/control innovation, with no a 
priori categorization of what should constitute economic action and what should not. 
Furthermore, leaving the characterization of agency open has the advantage, in the cases 
analysed here, of considering accounting tools as central to the processes of configuring 
economic agency. As noted before, including non-humans entities in the analysis of 
economic action, such as accounting principles and instruments (e.g. management by 
objectives principle, time value of money, discounted cash flow formulas, key 
performance indicators) allows us to observe how they interact with other entities such 
as incubator managers, scientists, technology transfer executives, and policy makers. In 
so contributing to unveiling the content, properties, and effects of accounting tools 
themselves.  
Table 7.1 presents the findings related to the content and sources of economic action 
in the field of innovation. Since the contribution of this study lies also in the choice of 
categories to characterize agency, it is useful to elucidate the rationale for the analytical 
categories proposed in the table. Subsequently, the section will proceed with discussing 
the findings of the empirical analysis.  
First, the table lists the heterogeneous entities, i.e. human and non-human entities, 
participating in the action of controlling innovation. Tracing non-human entities that 
participate to controlling innovation is as much relevant as tracing human entities, for 
they all together constitute the arrangements through which calculative action is 
performed. Moreover, including non-human entities such as managerial and accounting 
tools in the analysis of action allows us to understand what effects the latter have on 
configuring economic agency.  
Second, the table characterizes the agencies of innovation by evidencing the content 
of the calculative action performed by human and non-human entities. The table sheds 
light on how budgeting instruments, managerial principles, and valuation tools on the 
one hand and humans on the other hand together participate in the actions of controlling 
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innovation. The interactions between humans and devices are a central feature of the 
type of economic agency conceptualised by Callon such that he conceives of the agency 
as an interactive one (Callon, 2008, p. 39). By interactive agency Callon means that 
individuals constantly engage with other entities such as procedures, rules, regulations, 
accounting and non-accounting devices. 
Third, table 7.1 addresses the question of what the mechanisms for attributing action 
are. In so it contributes to identifying what entities/mechanisms attribute and organize 
action in the realm of innovation. Identifying mechanisms for organizing action within 
agencement is important because: "all action is collective since it is distributed; what 
vary are the mechanisms for attributing the source of the action. The shape, content, 
and architecture of the agencement, with the equipment that facilitates the action to a 
lesser or greater degree, from a distance decisively influence the modalities of 
attributing action. So does the inclusion of specific legal or regulatory texts which 
distribute responsibility or property" (Ibid., p. 10).   
Finally, table 7.1 contributes to characterizing the economic agencies of innovation 
by identifying specific modalities of framing the interactions between entities, namely 
calculative frames. The concept of calculative frames here deployed aims to capture any 
patterns of regularity in the mechanisms for organising action within the agencement. 
The concept of calculative frame has been recently advanced by Beunza and Garud 
(2007) in order to show how the different versions of Amazon.com’s financial prospects 
provided by financial analysts were a consequence of the different sets of analogies, 
categories, and key metrics deployed by said analysts. The authors identified analogies, 
categories, and key metrics as the central components of what they call calculative 
frames.  According to the authors, the internal consistence of the calculative frames that 
they observed was provided by the interaction between a stable set of elements, i.e. key 
metrics, analogies, and categories.  
Compared to Beunza and Garud's conceptualisation, the calculative frames that 
emerge from this study (i.e. financial sustainability, public intervention, and investment 
valuation frames) identify patterns in the modalities of attributing action within the 
socio-technical agencements of innovation. In this regard, the findings suggest that a 
stable set of entities, i.e. economic, managerial and finance principles (e.g. management 
by objectives, input-output framework, time value of money) and managerial and 
accounting devices (e.g. logical framework, discounted cash flow technique) jointly 
organise and distribute action within agencements.  
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The remainder of the section will discuss the findings (see Table 7.1) related to how 
the action of controlling innovation is performed.  
Table 7.1: Socio-technical agencements of innovation 
 
Controlling innovation and the public intervention frame 
Controlling innovation is discussed in this section by looking at the monitoring and 
assessment practices performed in the context of R&D programmes such as the 
European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), Higher Education Innovation Fund 
(HEIF), and Research Excellence Framework (REF) (see Chapters 5 and 6). ERDF, 
REF, and HEIF are conceptualised here as involving forms of collective agency, for 
their capacity to allocate funding, to monitor and assess performances is embodied in a 
variety of entities such as application guidelines, managerial and economic principles, 
accounting devices, and human entities.  
The findings indicate there is a pattern in the mechanisms for organising, assessing 
and monitoring actions, which is called here public intervention frame. Action within 
CALCUALTIVE 
FRAMES
MODALITIES OF 
ATTRIBUTING 
ACTION
CALCULATIVE 
ACTION
KEY 
PERFORMANCE 
METRICS
QUALITY
Principles of 
budgeting
Listing, 
prioritising, and 
costing innovation 
activities
 N. of IP-related 
companies, N. of 
proof of concepts
INVESTMENT 
VALUATION
Time value of 
money, drug 
discovery and 
development 
stages
Assessing the 
commercial value 
of early stage 
drugs
Value inflection 
points
MANAGERIAL 
AND 
ACCOUNTING 
DEVICES
HUMAN ENTITIES
PUBLIC 
INTERVENTION
Management by 
objectives, logical 
framework, ERDF, 
REF, and HEIF 
guidelines 
(regulatory text)
SMART 
objectives, 
Options analysis, 
GANTTchart, 
Input/Output/Imp
act categories, 
formula funding, 
weights
Incubator 
managers, ERDF 
assessors (RDAs), 
technology 
transfer 
executives, REF 
assessors, 
scientists
N. of jobs created, 
N. of enterprises 
assisted, N. of 
start-ups created, 
N. of  patents
FINANCIAL 
SUSTAINABILITY
Accounting 
principles of 
financial 
sustainability, 
financial model
Budget, financial 
plan
Incubator 
managers, 
incubator board 
members, 
incubator chief 
financial officer, 
finance directors
Setting key 
assumptions, 
creating financial 
sustainability 
scenarios
N. of contract 
research 
organisations 
(CROs), 
breakeven, rental 
income, 
occupancy rate, 
profits
Budget, wish list, 
financial attrition, 
strategic report, 
innovation 
objectives
Finance directors, 
scientists, 
incubator 
managers
Discounted cash 
flow, R&D costs 
estimates, 
estimates on drug  
rate of success
Finance directors, 
scientists, venture 
capitalists
Setting 
deliverables, 
monitoring and 
assessing 
performances
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the ERDF, REF, and HEIF agencies is attributed and organised through the following 
entities: the management by objective (MBO) principle, the logical framework, and the 
market failure principle. MBO was initially introduced by Peter Drucker in the 1950s 
and subsequently has come to inform the practices of project appraisal and monitoring 
in the context of public sector programmes. The principle, which consists in setting 
objectives and monitoring the progress toward them, emphasizes the attribution of 
responsibilities to managers on the basis of goals and objectives that managers 
themselves set up. As highlighted in Chapter 6, the management by objectives principle 
informs the logical framework (see Fig. 6.2), which is an instrument often used in the 
monitoring and evaluation of public funded projects. As discussed in Chapter 6, the 
framework aids actors in framing projects’ objectives in terms of the inputs, outputs, 
outcomes, and impact. MBO and logical framework interact with a third entity, i.e. the 
principle of market failure. Broadly speaking, market failure concept originates from 
economic theory and usually refers to situations in which markets fail to deliver and 
there is a need for the public sector to intervene (Department for Communities and 
Local Government 2012).  
In the context of ERDF, the interactions between MBO, logical framework, and 
market failure principle are encapsulated in the ERDF application and monitoring 
guidelines. The latter constitute a form of regulatory text that establishes the content of 
action and the mechanisms for attributing responsibilities for action. Guidelines require 
funds applicants to set up objectives, performance indicators and for monitoring the 
performances during the course of the project. In line with the MBO principle, the 
actions of setting up project objectives, measuring and monitoring project performances 
are distributed across individuals and organisations, which are held responsible for the 
ERDF application process (e.g. incubator managers) and for delivering the objectives 
during the monitoring stage of ERDF funded projects. MBO constitutes a source of 
calculative action also for those public bodies that are held responsible for allocating 
ERDF and for monitoring ERDF funded projects (e.g. Welsh European Funding Office, 
Regional Development Agencies). In setting up objectives and indicators, individuals 
and organisations interact with accounting and managerial tools provided by ERDF 
guidelines. Such toolkits or, as Callon (2008) would call them, prostheses comprise 
managerial tools for the identification of project objectives, such as the SMART 
technique. The latter is a managerial technique that aids manager in setting objectives 
that are “Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Realistic and Time bound”. Where SMART 
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objectives technique is aimed to evaluate the “strategic fit” of a project’s objectives, the 
“options analysis” allows project managers and applicants to rank alternative project 
options on the basis of categories such as risks, advantages, disadvantages, impacts on 
costs and deliverables. Furthermore, in setting the objectives of a project, applicants 
also need to provide evidence that the project addresses a market failure, hence requires 
public funding. 
The findings show that the non-human entities such as ERDF managerial devices and 
principles modify courses of managerial action in that project managers (e.g. incubator 
managers) would normally favour sets of metrics that are different from those based on 
public intervention objectives (e.g. economic development indicator such as number of 
jobs created, number of companies created and assisted). If it were not for ERDF 
procedures, the interviewed incubator managers (i.e. ERDF project applicants) would 
put more emphasis on metrics different from economic development, such as 
profitability (e.g. rate of occupancy, rental income generated) and health-related 
outcomes.  
In the context of REF and HEIF, the interactions between the MBO principle and the 
logical framework are embedded in regulatory text, i.e. programmes guidelines. As 
discussed in Chapter 5, the calculative action undertaken in the context of REF and 
HEIF consists in measuring research and innovation performances, attributing weights 
to performances, and ranking higher education institutions.  Similarly to ERDF, action 
is framed in accordance to the logical framework, which is embedded in both REF and 
HEIF guidelines. The logical framework influences measurement practices within 
universities by conceiving of research and innovation as linear processes. Calculative 
action is directed toward evidencing how the financial resources (e.g. public funding) 
that are injected in the process produce measurable outputs and impacts on the economy 
and society. Compared to ERDF where MBO and logical framework are coupled with 
devices such as SMART method and option analysis, in the context of REF and HEIF, 
the MBO principle and logical framework interact with the formula-funding device.  
The mechanisms of attribution (and distribution) of responsibilities for action is 
central to our understanding of relations between the entities participating in innovation.  
These include entities such as pieces of regulatory text (e.g. guidelines), application and 
monitoring procedures, but also entities such as funded and applicant organisations, 
which are held responsible for interpreting guidelines, setting up projects objectives, 
choosing and measuring projects outputs, outcomes and impacts, monitoring them 
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against targets, compiling spreadsheets and tables for reporting periodically the progress 
toward the objectives. The ‘collaboration’ (in a sense of interacting) between the 
managerial tools provided in the ERDF, REF, and HEIF guidelines on the one hand and 
human entities such as incubator managers, assessors on the other hand, contributes to 
assembling agency as a distributed one. Although regulatory text included in ERDF, 
REF, and HEIF guidelines might lead to imputing responsibility for monitoring and 
assessing projects to specific individuals or organisations, calculative action is 
distributed across the collective entities listed above.  
Furthermore, interactions between entities within the public intervention frame result 
into a distinctive set of metrics. As showed in table 7.1, metrics such as the number of 
jobs created, number of enterprises assisted, and number of start-up companies created 
inscribe in a simple set of measures the complex arrangements occurring between the 
entities participating in the enactment of ERDF, REF, and HEIF.  
Overall, the section discussed how controlling innovation is performed by collective 
agencies that participate in the distributed and calculative action of monitoring and 
assessing public-funded innovative scientific projects. The section discussed how 
humans, accounting devices, managerial and economic principles interact in configuring 
ERDF, REF and HEIF as collective agencies. The findings showed how the interactions 
between the management by objective principle, the logical framework, and the market 
failure principle are central to framing interactions in terms of public intervention 
objectives. A distinctive choice of metrics, such as number of jobs created and number 
of companies assisted and created, emerged out of such interactions and inscribed the 
complex interactions underlying the public intervention frame. The role of accounting 
within the public intervention frame consists in translating managerial and economic 
principles such as management by objectives and market failure into a distinctive set of 
metrics that inscribe the complex arrangements between entities. 
Controlling innovation and the financial sustainability frame 
Controlling innovation is discussed in this section by looking at the planning and 
budgeting actions performed in the context of programmes for incubating technologies 
arising from university and industry, and funded by both industry and government (see 
Chapters 4 and 6). The section discusses the arrangements related to financial plans and 
budgets by analysing them from their capacity to act and influence courses of action. To 
this aim financial models are conceptualised here as involving forms of collective 
  
235 
 
agency, for their capacity to act (e.g. to list, cost, and prioritise activities) is embodied in 
a variety of forms and entities (e.g. accounting categories such as profit, revenues, costs, 
funding requirements etc.). The findings suggest the existence of a pattern in the 
modalities of attributing action, which is called here financial sustainability frame. The 
section will present the findings related to the financial sustainability frame by 
discussing the mechanisms for attributing action within such frame and the content of 
action, i.e. the extent to which action is calculative, distributed and collective. 
Compared to the public intervention frame where the source of action is distributed 
across managerial principles (e.g. management by objectives) and devices (e.g. logical 
framework) that are embedded in regulatory text (e.g. programme guidelines), within 
the financial sustainability frame the source of action is provided by accounting 
principles of financial sustainability and the financial model device. In the context of 
technology incubation programmes, financial sustainability is mostly defined in 
accounting terms, that is the “capacity to obtain revenues in response to a demand, in 
order to sustain productive processes at a steady or growing rate to produce results and 
to obtain a surplus” (León 2001, p. 11). The principle of financial sustainability 
influences decision making, hence courses of action, only when embodied into the 
financial model device because it is only in the context of the financial model that key 
assumptions about rental and services charges, occupancy rates, operational costs, and 
funding requirements are set out. Once the key assumptions are made, the time when 
financial sustainability will be achieved and extent to which it will be achieved are both 
influenced by those assumptions. Since different assumptions lead to different scenarios 
of financial sustainability, different versions of the model are usually produced. 
Creating different scenarios, ranking their likelihood, and choosing which one to 
perform and by what means constitute forms of calculative action.  
Although one might be prone to think of chief financial officer as the sole actor 
responsible for creating, running, and implementing an incubator’s financial model, the 
evidence suggests that creating and implementing a financial model is a type of 
distributed action. It is distributed because it involves not only the CFO, but also other 
individual entities such as incubator managers, who are held responsible for meeting the 
targets set out in the model. Creating a financial model also involves the interaction of 
the CFO with collective entities such as institutional investors who commit to secure 
funds for the incubator.  
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The findings show that revenues and profits are the key metrics used within the 
financial sustainability frame. Not only do these metrics inscribe the financial 
sustainability principle, but also they inscribe the whole set of arrangements that enact 
financial sustainability, i.e. rental and service charges, funding requirements, 
operational costs, investors’ commitment to provide funds, managers’ commitment to 
meet targets. 
Overall, the role of accounting within the financial sustainability frame is to provide 
the principles for organizing (calculative) action, i.e. incubation businesses make key 
assumptions about pricing and costing based on the financial sustainability principle. 
Accounting also provides the devices for performing calculative action, such as 
operational budget, profit and loss accounts. Finally, accounting also provides metrics 
that inscribe the financial sustainability arrangements. The most relevant here is the 
number of Contract Research Organisations (CROs) that rent space within the 
incubator. As highlighted in Chapter 6, being CROs a fee-for-service type of business, 
they represent a stable source of income for incubators and are therefore vital to the 
financial sustainability of an incubator. 
Controlling innovation and the quality frame 
Controlling innovation is discussed in this section by looking at the planning and 
budgeting practices performed in the context of R&D and innovation activities within 
incubators and corporate R&D (see Chapters 4 and 6). Similarly to the other types of 
calculative action discussed so far, R&D planning and budgeting is a form of 
distributed action, which means that action is spread across a variety of human and non-
human entities. Human entities include finance directors, chief executive officers and 
scientist, who are held responsible for the R&D and innovation budgets. Finance 
directors, chief executive officers, and scientists are individual actors who participate to 
the action of budgeting together with non-human entities such as accounting devices, 
i.e. budgets, wish lists and financial attrition, and managerial devices, i.e. strategic 
reports and objectives. Not only is R&D budgeting a form of distributed action, but also 
it is calculative because it involves tasks such as listing the R&D activities necessary to 
carry out a R&D project, ranking such activities according to priorities, and costing 
such activities.  
The findings suggest the existence of a pattern in the modalities through which action 
is distributed in the context of R&D budgeting. Such pattern is called here quality 
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frame. Within the quality frame, calculative action is organised according to principles 
of budgeting such as participation, simplicity of objectives, and conservativism. The 
principle of participation organises calculative action by requiring scientists and 
incubator CEOs to list, cost and prioritize R&D activities and to agree on the percentage 
of such activities to be approved in the final budget. Such percentage embeds the 
principle of conservativism in that it is based on historical rates, i.e. financial attrition 
rate. This means that the managerial space of possibilities, which is expressed by the 
R&D activities they wish to undertake in the course of a project, is influenced by the 
principle of conservativism by means of the financial attrition device. 
Furthermore, the quality frame is characterized by a distinctive choice of metrics 
such as the number of IP-related businesses, which is the number of incubator tenants 
owning intellectual properties (e.g. patents), and the number of proof of concepts, which 
represents the number of drugs that have successfully passed Phase I and IIa (see Figure 
4.1 in Chapter 4) of development (i.e. drugs have passed safety, dosage, efficacy, and 
side effects tests). Both metrics encapsulate the budgeting principles of simplicity in 
setting objectives, since they are the lead indicators used to measure the quality of the 
scientific environment within incubators. 
Overall, the role of accounting within the quality frame consists in providing the 
principles, i.e. principles of budgeting, which distribute and organize calculative action 
within and across arrangements. Accounting also provides the devices, i.e. budgets, 
wish lists, and financial attrition, through which calculative action is performed. Finally, 
accounting provides the metrics, i.e. number of IP-related companies and number of 
proof of concepts, which inscribe the idea of a high quality scientific environment. 
Controlling innovation and the investment valuation frame  
Controlling innovation is discussed in this section by analysing the action of assessing 
the commercial value of early stage drugs that arise from university and industry (see 
Chapter 4). The section sheds light on valuation devices by analysing them from their 
capacity to act and influence courses of action. To this aim, valuation processes are 
conceptualised here as forms of distributed action. This means that valuation is 
performed by a variety of entities ranging from R&D costs estimates to the time value 
of money principle. Such entities span across different arenas and go beyond the 
organisation or the individual ‘formally’ responsible for enacting the valuation. Entities 
such R&D costs estimates and success rates, which are drawn upon in order to perform 
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the valuation, are located in the arena of health economics, hence ‘outside’ the 
boundaries of the organisation performing the valuation.  
The findings suggest the existence of a pattern in the mechanisms for organising the 
action of assessing the potential commercial value of drugs. Such pattern, i.e. the 
investment valuation frame, is observable in the interactions occurring between a 
finance principle, i.e. time value of money, and a non-accounting device, i.e. the drug 
discovery and development chain. The section will present the findings related to the 
investment valuation frame by discussing what constitutes source of action within such 
frame and the content of such action, i.e. the extent to which action is calculative and 
distributed. 
The modalities for attributing action within the investment valuation frame are 
distributed across different entities. The time value of money principle and the drug 
discovery and development chain jointly organize calculative action, i.e. the assessment 
of the future commercial value of a drug. The time value of money principle states that 
a certain amount of money at the present time is worth more than the same amount in 
the future due to its earning capacity. In the context of pharmaceutical innovation, such 
future is structured into phases of drug discovery and development (see Figures 4.1 and 
4.2 in Chapter 4) from preclinical till the launch in the market. Time value of money 
and drug discovery and development stages are both embedded in the discounted cash 
flow (DCF) formula according to modalities that will be discussed in section 7.4.  Of 
relevance here is the fact that, while estimating the value of drugs, the DCF device 
organizes the distribution of financial and non-financial resources across the drug 
discovery and development chain. For example, investors will enter and exit 
arrangements (i.e. rounds of investment) on the basis of DCF estimates for a specific 
drug. To be sure, while qualifying a drug by its potential commercial value, the DCF 
device has the effect of influencing the regime of circulation for that drug. The regime 
of circulation is represented by the rounds of funding and the number of public and 
private investors that the developmental drug mobilizes, in virtue of the DCF estimate.  
Overall, accounting performs the investment valuation frame by embedding into the 
DCF formula (see section 7.4 for a more detailed discussion) the entities responsible for 
organizing action, i.e. time value of money and drug discovery and development chain. 
Accounting, through the DCF formula, plays also the role of mediating the exchanges 
between financial resources and developmental drugs. 
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The findings presented so far reveal, first of all, how controlling innovation involves 
multiple calculative actions, such as monitoring, assessing, budgeting, and financial 
modelling. They are calculative because they involve tasks such as listing possible 
states of the world, prioritizing them, and making decisions about the actions to 
undertake in order to realize those states of the world (Callon 1998c, p. 4).  
Second, as evidenced in the section, controlling innovation is a distributed type of 
action because it spreads across human entities such as managers, directors, and 
scientists, and non-human entities such as accounting and non-accounting devices and 
principles.  
Third, the findings show that the forms of economic agency implicated in controlling 
innovation have a collective nature. This holds particularly true in the cases of collective 
agencies such as ERDF, HEIF, REF, and incubators’ financial models. This means that 
the arrangements mobilized within ERDF, HEIF, etc. perform calculative action 
collectively. Although specific arrangements might attribute specific responsibilities for 
calculative action to individuals (e.g. a budget holder), action is ultimately performed 
collectively, i.e. by a multitude of entities.  
Fourth, the architecture of economic agencies of innovation is highly contingent. 
This means that agencies differ in the type of entities, in the interactions occurring 
between them, and also in the mechanisms for attributing action. The findings show 
how such mechanisms can lie in a set of principles, or in accounting devices, or yet in 
the combination of both.  
Fifth, the findings suggest that different arrangements can also share the same 
mechanisms for attributing action. To account for such regularities in the mechanisms 
for organising calculative action, the arrangements composing ERDF, HEIF, REF, 
incubator financial models, and R&D budgets, and DCF agencies have been grouped 
according to different calculative frames, i.e. public intervention, financial 
sustainability, innovation, and investment valuation. The concept of calculative frames 
is advanced to denote a pattern in how action is distributed within arrangements. The 
evidence shows how the principles of management by objectives, market failure, and 
the input-output framework are central to the distribution of action within the public 
intervention frame. While the principle of financial sustainability and the finance model 
device play a central role in the distribution of action within the financial sustainability 
frame. And again, the principle of time value of money and the representation of the 
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stages of drug discovery are central to the attribution of action within the investment 
valuation frame. 
As Callon stated, the notion of socio-technical agencement leaves the 
characterization of agency open, because agency can only be observed in the 
circumstances of action (Callon 2008). The section so far contributed to characterizing 
the calculative agencies of innovation by analysing their source and content. The next 
section will contribute to characterizing the economic agency of innovation in terms of 
the effects it produces. More specifically, the effects of the interactions between the 
calculative frames hitherto discussed will be analysed in the context of the economic 
exchange between money (i.e. public and private funding) and value(s).  
7.1.2   The consequences of controlling innovation 
“Fixing a price is always the outcome of a struggle between 
agencies trying to impose their modes for measuring a good's 
value and qualities”  
(Stark (2009) as cited in Çalışkan and Callon 2010, p. 16) 
 
This section aims to contribute to our understanding of the economic agencies of 
innovation by identifying and categorizing the effects of the interactions between the 
entities involved in controlling innovation. It is in fact by investigating the effects of 
interactions between the economic entities listed in table 7.1 that we can understand the 
role of accounting metrics in creating goods and services (e.g. innovative incubation 
projects, innovative scientific projects, etc.) that can be exchanged in the economy. The 
effects of interaction between entities are here conceptualized in terms of the tensions 
that arise between different calculative frames (i.e. inter-frame) and tensions that occur 
within the same frame (i.e. intra-frame).  
While the majority of tensions found in this study occurs in the context of the 
exchange of public financial resources (in the form of performance-based grants 
allocated by public bodies, or EU regional development funding) for value, a significant 
source of variation within such exchanges was found in the type of value that was being 
negotiated. The type of exchange where public financial resources are exchanged for 
value reminds of the expression "value for money". Often used in public sector context, 
"good value for money" is defined as the optimal use of resources to achieve the 
intended outcome (NAO, 2015).  
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In order to understand what counts as value in the context of innovation, the next 
sections will show how innovation has a set of different repertoires, i.e. frames, for 
constructing value for money. While observing frames to overlap in the exchange of 
value for money, the next sections will account for the tensions arising in the 
negotiation of different versions of value. As summarized in Table 7.2, there are four 
types of tension emerging from the empirical cases and these can be divided into 
tensions between different calculative frames (i.e. financial sustainability frame versus 
public intervention frame, quality frame versus financial sustainability frame) and 
tensions emerging within the same frame (i.e. licensing versus spinning out, 
commercializing versus publishing scientific research).  
Table 7.2: The consequences of controlling innovation 
 
Tensions between financial sustainability and public intervention frames 
The first type of tension to be evidenced emerges from the interaction between the 
financial sustainability frame and the public intervention frame. The effects of such 
interaction are mostly visible at the level of metrics mobilised within each arrangement. 
TYPE OF 
EXCHANGE
CALCULATIVE 
FRAMES
TYPE OF 
TENSION
TYPES OF VALUE
ROLE OF 
ACCOUNTING
Financial 
sustainability frame 
versus public 
intervention frame
Inter-frame
Value as n. of jobs 
and companies 
created versus value 
as profitability
Accounting 
mediates the tension 
through  breakeven 
target
Public intervention 
frame: 
commercializing 
research versus 
publishing research
Intra-frame
Value as n. of 
publications versus 
value as n. of spin-
outs, n. of invention 
disclosures and 
income (£) from 
licensing
Accounting embeds 
the tension through 
the weighted 
average formula 
funding
Public intervention 
frame: licensing 
technologies versus 
start-up creation 
Intra-frame
Value measured in 
terms of n. of start-
ups created versus 
value measured as 
n. of licenses 
Accounting dissolves 
the tension at 
governmental 
agencies level
Value for public and 
private money
Quality frame 
versus financial 
sustainability frame
Inter-frame
Value as n. of 
patents versus value 
as profitability
Embedding the 
tension between 
frames by means of 
a ratio (the IP/CRO 
ratio)
Value for public 
money
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To assess the value of a project (e.g. technology incubation) means listing its properties 
and assigning a value to them.  
The public intervention frame (i.e. ERDF, HEIF) qualifies incubation programmes 
by providing a version of their value that is based on new jobs created and on new 
companies created and assisted. This version of value is one that qualifies the incubator 
in terms of the effect that this can have on the economy and society.   
The form of value arising from the financial sustainability frame, instead, is based on 
profitability measures. Therefore, the financial sustainability frame (i.e. incubators’ 
financial models) qualifies innovation projects in terms of categories of costs, revenues, 
and profits, hence in monetary terms. 
The findings points to the existence of a form of interaction between the financial 
sustainability and the public intervention frame that mainly occurs within organizational 
sites. This means that such type of interaction does not operate only at level of 
principles, i.e. addressing a market failure through public intervention on the one hand 
and making profits on the other hand. Rather, this tension occurs between sets of 
arrangements which can potentially lead to two different types of exchange: public 
money for (the evidence of) new jobs/new companies on the one hand, and public 
money for (the evidence of) profits, on the other hand. The empirical evidence suggests 
that the breakeven indicator is called upon in order to mediate between the construction 
of value as profitability and the construction of value as new jobs and new companies 
creation. This means that, while jobs and companies creation remains the dominant 
form of value, parties agree on breakeven indicator (instead of profits) as an additional 
form of value to be mobilised in the exchange. The role of accounting metrics here 
seems to be one of mediating between two types of arrangements, i.e. financial 
sustainability and public intervention, which emerged in the exchange of value for 
public money.  
Tensions within the public intervention frame 
While remaining within the context of the exchange of public money for value, the 
findings point to two types of tension deriving from controlling innovation. These are 
the tension between commercializing and publishing academic research, and the tension  
between licensing and spinning-out academic research. Compared to the tensions 
analysed so far, these originate within the frame of public intervention. 
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The tension between publishing and commercializing academic research is mostly 
visible in the context of the formula-based funding (see Chapter 5). In this case, the 
formula-based funding (used in HEIF, RAE 2008, and REF2014), by linking research 
and commercialization performances to the allocation of funding creates a number of 
effects. First, the 65% and 20% weights attributed by REF 2014 (70%-20% in RAE 
2008) to research outcome (i.e. academic publishing) and research impact (i.e. research 
commercialization) embed, at governmental level, the political tension toward equating 
purely academic research with applied research carried out with industry, without 
solving it.  Second, the same system of weights contributes to performing, unintendedly, 
localized tension (i.e. within each university) between publishing and commercializing 
paths. 
According to a fairly recent study (PACEC-CBR 2010), there has been a significant 
change between 2001 and 2008 in the perception that academics have of the importance 
of publications for their career, paralleled by a starker change in their perception of the 
importance of commercialization activities for their career (see Table A-3, Appendix 3).  
However, the emphasis on research commercialization has not been paralleled by a 
change in the criteria for academic excellence (i.e. high quality publications), with the 
consequence that collaborating with industry while maintaining a high level of scientific 
publication adds further pressure on individual academics (#29- Licensing executive). 
The findings show that there exists a second tension which occurs within the public 
intervention frame. Such tension occurs between licensing and spinning-out the 
technologies arising from universities emerges in the context of the exchange of value 
for public funding (i.e. funds from the Higher Education Funding Bodies). The tension 
here is between two versions of value that arise within the same frame: value as number 
of spin-outs created and value as number of licenses created. How do multiple versions 
of value come to interact within the same frame? As showed earlier, controlling 
innovation is a form of action that is distributed across multiple entities. In this case 
REF and HEIF agencies on the one hand and local government agencies on the other 
hand translate the principle of public intervention into different forms of value. In short, 
the effects of public intervention are evidenced according to different modalities.  
The findings suggest that the impact that licensing has on regional economies do not 
carry the same weight as the impact that the creation of new companies and new jobs 
has on regional economies. Although within governmental/regulatory agencies such as 
REF and HEIF regulatory texts, licensing and spinning-out a technology carry the same 
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weight (i.e. 20% and 100% respectively), within agencies such as local 
councils/governments and university there lies a tension between licensing and 
spinning-out. The source of such tension lies in the fact that while a license can go 
“anywhere in the world” (#21 –Licensing executive), the benefit that the regional 
economies can gain from new jobs and companies is more straightforward to prove – or 
so the argument goes. Therefore, the choice of creating spin-outs seems more appealing 
to local government agencies (and regional development agencies), which traditionally 
have had a strong public intervention remit, i.e. the development of regional and local 
economies by addressing market failures.  
Tensions between the financial sustainability frame and the quality frame 
A fourth type of interaction, evidenced in the empirics, occurs between the quality and 
the financial sustainability frames. Compared to the interactions considered so far this 
one occurs in the context of the exchange of both public and private funding for value. 
The quality frame is encapsulated in the percentage of tenants that has developed or is 
in the process of developing intellectual property (IPs). The financial sustainability 
frame is instead inscribed in the percentage of Contract Research Organisations (CROs) 
tenants.  
The two targets are combined in one ratio, the IPs/CROs ratio. The ratio, negotiated 
and agreed at board level, inscribed the two different ways of framing incubation, that is 
incubation as a financially sustainable business and incubation as high quality scientific 
environment. The ratio contributes to mediate the tension between the two frames by 
creating a space where negotiation can take place. The IPs/CROs ratio ‘temporarily’ 
solves the tension between the two different frames by creating a space where different 
notions of value, i.e. value as profitability and value as intellectual properties, can be 
represented and negotiated.  
In conclusion, the action of controlling innovation can be better understood if put in 
the context of exchanges of financial resources for value. As emphasized in the opening 
quote, it is in the context of exchange that tensions between different modes of realizing 
value arise.  Since different versions of value inscribe different sets of arrangements, 
understanding the origins of value implies understanding such arrangements. The 
evidence discussed in this chapter suggests that accounting plays multiple roles in the 
negotiation of different versions of value of innovation, i.e. accounting metrics inscribe 
arrangements, accounting devices configure arrangements, accounting devices give 
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voice and rights of experimentation to the parties involved in an exchange, and finally 
accounting allows a type of exchange in which what circulates is not the underlying 
object (e.g. jobs, intellectual properties, new companies, etc.) but their value. Let us 
discuss each of these accounting roles. 
First, by inscribing sets of arrangements such as those categorized in table 7.1 (public 
intervention, financial sustainability, investment, and innovation) accounting metrics 
make it possible to translate into numbers the complex arrangements between 
economic, managerial and accounting devices, principles, and human entities. Once 
inscribed into metrics, such configurations need not to be re-opened unless 
controversies arise.   
Second, accounting provides the material basis for the economic exchange to take 
place by configuring the economic agencies participating in the exchange. As discussed 
earlier, the evidence shows that discounted cash flow device configures economic 
agencies within the investment frame; the input-output indicators and the management 
by objectives principle configure agencies within the public intervention frame; and yet 
the principle of financial sustainability and the financial model device configure 
agencies within the financial sustainability frame. 
Third, accounting is not neutral to the process of realizing value, for accounting can 
either give or deny voice and rights of experimentation to those participating in the 
action. As a consequence, those entities that cannot, or are unwilling to, qualify a 
scientific project in terms of economic value, find themselves in a position of weakness. 
The lack of an inclusive mechanism for negotiating different versions of value is 
possibly the main cause (together with the lack of equipment for calculating value) of 
the rise of positions of dominance in the context of economic exchanges. 
Finally, accounting metrics make it possible a type of exchange where the agent who 
provides the financial resources does not claim property rights on the object, but claims 
instead rights on the value of the object. In simpler terms, government is unlikely to 
claim property rights over the companies created or assisted by those university 
incubators that received government funding. Nevertheless, government is likely to 
claim that jobs have been created and technologies have been licensed as a result of 
public funding. In this respect, accounting metrics allow operating a separation between 
the property of the underlying object and the value of that object. 
The chapter has so far addressed the following questions: how is the action of 
controlling innovation performed and with what consequences? The findings suggest 
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that the governance of innovation as a social and technical phenomenon is enacted in 
the form of collective and distributed action oriented toward realising the multiple 
values of innovation (i.e. value as job creation, value as scientific publishing, value as 
profitability, value as start-up creation, and value as patenting and licensing 
technologies) and with the ultimate effect of constructing economic markets for 
innovation.  
However, this is one side of the coin, for the puzzle addressed in the thesis title, i.e. 
“controlling innovation, innovating control”, also questioned whether accounting 
needed to change/innovate its tools in order to control innovation. The chapter so far has 
showed how accounting metrics and devices play multiple roles in the action of 
controlling innovation, from inscribing complex nexus of arrangements into simple 
metrics to providing the tools for negotiating conflicts and tensions. However, to what 
extent are such metrics and devices ‘new’? The next section will address this question 
by exploring the properties of accounting tools that make them adapt rather than change 
to new accounting rationales (i.e. innovation). 
7.2    Innovating control 
Arguably, the types of accounting devices emerging from the analysis of the forms of 
economic action in the field of innovation can hardly be regarded as new to the 
accounting discipline and practice. Most of the accounting devices mobilized within 
each calculative frame, i.e. budgets, wish lists, performance indicators, and discounted 
cash flow technique might well be classed as traditional accounting tools. Nevertheless, 
a more careful analysis of how these devices interact with other (economic and non-
economic) tools and with actors who deploy them, suggests that accounting tools 
possess intrinsic properties that make them adapt to new accounting rationales, such as 
the innovation rationale. Therefore, controlling innovation seems to be performed not 
by new accounting devices, but by a ‘bricolage’ of traditional accounting devices and 
other non-accounting tools. 
While evidencing this point, the remainder of the section contributes to expanding 
Çalışkan and Callon’s argument according to which: “[V]aluation is no longer the 
effects of structures or regimes, which affect the value through (passive) intermediaries, 
but it is a consequence of how competent and active people engage with specific things” 
(Çalışkan and Callon 2009, p. 22). The thesis shows that not only is valuing innovation 
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performed by competent and active people who engage with accounting devices, but 
valuing innovation is also made possible by distinctive properties of accounting devices. 
To prove this point, the section will discuss how accounting adapts to new 
environments because of its fluid and combinable characters.  
Discounted Cash Flow as a combinable device 
As the empirical evidence discussed in Chapter 4 showed, the discounted cash flow 
(DCF) is a technique often used in drug discovery and development to assess the 
commercial value of drugs and is regarded as a reliable and standard box valuation tool. 
The discounted cash flow technique, which is based on the notion of time value of 
money, allows to move in time the cash flows generated by an investment in order to 
produce an estimate of the present value of said investment. In drugs valuation the 
potential future cash flows generated by a drug are adjusted for the probability of 
success, which indicates the chances that a drug is finally launched in the market after 
passing all the development stages and being approved by the regulator.  
As Figure 4.2 in Chapter 4 showed, the drug discovery and development stages are 
usually rationalised in terms of a phase-gate process that proceeds from pre-clinical to 
clinical phases (until regulatory approval and market launch). The probability of success 
is one of the components of DCF formula that is linked to the drug discovery process. 
R&D costs estimate is another one. Both probability of success and R&D cost increase 
or decrease according to the stage of drug discovery in which the valuation is carried 
out. As a consequence, the value of a drug estimated using the DCF formula increases 
depending on the phase in which the drug is being evaluated. The DCF technique links 
with the drug discovery and development chain via the success rate and R&D cost 
estimates components. The effect of such interaction is the production of value 
inflection points, which capture the change in the value of a drug across the stages of 
development. Furthermore, value inflection points translate the sequence of stages of 
drug discovery and development into a value chain.  
Overall, the interaction between the DCF (i.e. an accounting device) and drug 
discovery and development process (a non-accounting device) through the rate of 
success and the R&D costs estimate is possible not only because of skilled and creative 
individuals who combine the two types of device. The interaction is also made possible 
because DCF components are combinable. Such property makes DCF formula adapt to 
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a context such as pharmaceutical innovation without modifying the structure of the 
formula. 
R&D budget, wish lists, and financial attrition as combinable devices 
The empirical evidence in Chapter 4 showed how financial attrition is an accounting 
categorization that is said to be often used in drug discovery and development. Financial 
attrition responds to the need of the organization to control underspends, which occur 
because of delays or failures in the delivery of the activities of R&D projects. Given the 
difficulty of pinpointing where such underspends would happen, the concept of 
financial attrition is created in order to explain those variances caused by failures and 
delays in carrying out drug discovery projects. Far from being new, financial attrition is 
linked to the practice of applying slippage allowances in capital projects planning.  
Similarly to financial attrition, the concept of slippage in capital projects planning 
indicates that a spending will be incurred on the final delivery of the project (for 
projects which extend over a number of years), but will be delayed beyond the current 
financial year. Financial attrition seems to be the outcome of a re-labelling of the 
concept of slippage allowance.  
Compared to the term slippage, financial attrition recalls the term drug attrition often 
used in drug discovery and development to indicate the rate of those drugs failing to 
move from one development stage to the next. Such operation of re-labelling operates at 
a more aesthetic level and does not change practically and conceptually the already 
existing slippage allowance category. In this case, the adaptation of an existing 
accounting categorization, i.e. slippage allowance, to the environment of drug discovery 
and development where the term (drug) attrition is widely used, consists more in 
changing the vocabulary without modifying the underlying practice. 
Furthermore, financial attrition proves to be a combinable tool when used in 
conjunction with budgetary devices such as wish lists (see Chapter 4). The wish list 
device works in such a way that every time a R&D activity is cancelled or delayed, a 
new activity goes up in the priorities so that the gap between the total cost of the wish 
list and the approved budget decreases. The gap between the total cost of all the R&D 
activities in the wish list and the approved budget is set according to the rate of financial 
attrition. When financial attrition is combined with wish lists the effect is to create the 
appearance of a centralised control over the uncertainties of the R&D process while 
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granting autonomy to budget holders, who can draw wish lists and assign priorities to 
R&D activities. 
As in the case of DCF, the cases of financial attrition and wish lists show how the 
interaction between devices is made possible not only by human entities (e.g. finance 
directors, scientists) who use their skills, creativity and past experience to combine 
different devices. The findings suggest that said interactions occur also because of the 
combinable properties of financial attrition. But what makes financial attrition a 
combinable tool? Let us consider the sequence of actions that leads to the total approved 
budget: re-labelling slippage allowances into financial attrition, calculating historical 
financial attrition rate, listing R&D activities required to complete a project, applying 
financial attrition rate to total costs of (wished-for) R&D activities. The combinability 
of financial attrition rate lies in the fact it summarises the whole history of slippages 
into a single figure (a percentage) that can be applied to future costs in order to 
determine the approved budget figure.   
Performance Indicators as fluid and combinable devices 
Performance indicators continuously adapt to notions of ‘performances’ which are 
contingent to the environment in which they operate. The remainder will discuss how 
the performance indicators mobilised within each calculative frame (see table 7.1) adapt 
to the innovation rationale. 
The main performance indicator mobilised within the financial sustainability frame is 
profitability. While normally the profitability of a business is measured in terms of the 
amount of profits and revenues generated through time, in the early stage of drugs 
development process, given the absence of revenue streams, profitability is judged 
against the ability of the project to attract rounds of funding, the amount of such 
funding, the value of the potential market for the drug, or the intellectual property that 
the project has generated (or could potentially generate). According to de Laet and Mol 
(2000) a device is fluid when its boundaries are not “solid” but adapt to the environment 
in which it operates by including “variants” (de Laet and Mol 2000) taken from that 
environment. Measures of profitability in drug discovery depart from the notion of 
profitability as profits/revenues and experiment with other forms of profitability such as 
the amount of external investments raised. For early stage projects the ability of rising 
funds, whether public or private, is vital for the development of a drug or technology. 
Reliance on external public and private funding is therefore a central characteristic of 
  
250 
 
the drug discovery environment and constitutes a variant that is included in profitability 
performance indicators. 
The performance indicators often mobilised within the public intervention frame are 
the input and output indicators.  Input-output indicators emerge from the interaction 
between two types of device: an accounting device, i.e. performance indicators, and a 
non-accounting device, i.e. the input-output framework. The input-output categorization 
provides a rationale for organizing the measurement of performances. The input-output 
categorization organizes objects, e.g. academic research, according to a linear 
representation where outputs, outcomes, and impacts follow from inputs. Subsequently, 
performances are measured according to such linear representation. Therefore, 
performance indicators combine with other non-accounting tools such as the input-
output representation of processes.   
Performance indicators are combinable also in a sense of linking the same indicator 
to different narratives. This is evidenced by the input/output indicators used in the 
context of public intervention programmes such as ERDF, HEI, and REF. The findings 
here suggest that measures such as the number of new jobs and companies created 
indicate simultaneously the excellence of research, the degree of economic development 
brought about by a project, and innovation. The same can be said for measures such as 
the number of patents developed out of a project. Similarly, the number of patents is 
mobilized to measure the degree of inventiveness of an institution, to measure 
innovation, and yet to measure the quality of research. In these cases, the same 
performance measures become linked to different narratives (e.g. inventiveness, quality, 
etc.). What enables combining the same measure to different narratives is the ability of 
the measure to reduce the complexity of ERDF, HEIF, and REF arrangements to single 
numbers such that all the arrangements behind become black boxes and are opaque to 
those who stand outside such arrangements.  
To conclude this section, the cases of innovation analysed in this thesis show little 
evidence in support of the “innovating control” hypothesis. Rather, the findings suggest 
that controlling innovation is not so much about innovating the devices for controlling 
as it is about adapting existing accounting concepts and devices to the innovation 
rationale. The evidence from the thesis suggests that accounting tools adapt to 
innovation rationale because of a number of properties they feature such as fluidity and 
combinability. Evidence of combinability is provided when accounting tools such as 
DCF, performance indicators, and financial attrition become linked to other accounting 
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and non-accounting devices (e.g. drug discovery and development chain, R&D budget 
and wish list, input-output framework), but still maintain their original components. 
Evidence of fluidity of accounting tools is provided when the same performance 
indicator (e.g. profitability) is measured differently depending on the environment 
where the indicator operates (e.g. external funds raised versus profits). 
While discussing accounting properties, this section aimed to show that the 
interactions between the human entities and non-human entities (e.g. accounting tools) 
that compose a socio-technical agencement do not rely exclusively on actors’ 
competences, creativity, and skills as Çalışkan and Callon argued (2009). Rather, the 
interactions between the entities of an agencement are also made possible by the fluid 
and combinable qualities of accounting. 
The next chapter will summarise the findings and show how the thesis has 
contributed both theoretically and empirically to the study of innovation as a socio-
technical phenomenon. The chapter will also clarify the role of critique in the context of 
this thesis and sketch avenues of future research. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
Over the past four decades, innovation has progressively taken centre stage in national 
economic and science policies and programmes, corporate strategies, universities’ 
mission, and other domains of economic life. While promoting innovation, public and 
private economic agencies such as national and local governments, universities, 
corporations, and charities have become increasingly concerned with making innovation 
manageable, measurable, hence controllable. Evidence for this growing concern is 
provided by the spread of research assessment exercises that have characterised the 
domain of academic research in the UK from the 1980s and by the growing number of 
innovation and R&D statistics being collected through national and European surveys 
(e.g. the HE-CBI survey).  
This thesis has addressed this double concern for promoting and controlling 
innovation by attending to the organisational and institutional domains where such 
concerns have been enacted and the involvement of accounting devices in such 
enactment. Changing government rationalities and the extensive programmes of 
privatizations initiated in the 1980s, also coupled with a growing attention of economic 
theory on issues of R&D productivity, have constructed university-business 
interrelations (and research commercialisation) as a laboratory where the British 
government has experimented with programmes for decentralising innovation, while 
exerting at a distance control.    
In the attempt to research into the laboratory where innovation is assembled and 
configured as an economic actor, capable of changing not only economic landscapes but 
also managerial courses of action, the thesis has investigated and analysed the types of 
action and accounting devices that constitute innovation. 
The following sections provide a summary of the main research findings and then 
proceed with discussing the research contribution and sketching out avenues of future 
research. 
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Summary of research findings 
This thesis sought to identify the multiple accounting and organisational practices that 
contribute to measuring, managing, and ultimately controlling innovation. The thesis 
has placed the analysis of how innovation is controlled through accounting within the 
larger issue of how economic agencies and economic action are configured, organised, 
distributed, and the role of accounting in these processes. While studying the interplays 
between accounting and innovation across three major sites of research 
commercialisation in the UK, namely technology transfer, technology incubation, and 
corporate R&D activities, a number of findings have emerged. 
First, the thesis indicated that assembling, or configuring, innovation as an economic 
actor requires efforts that are distributed and calculative. The thesis showed that 
controlling innovation involves calculative action which is mainly distributed across 
accounting devices (e.g. Discounted Cash Flow, R&D budget, and input-output 
performance indicators), non-accounting devices, and human entities.  
Second, the findings suggested there are patterns of regularity occurring in the 
mechanisms through which economic action within innovation is organized and 
distributed. These patterns, conceptualized as calculative frames (Beunza and Garud 
2007) were the public intervention, financial sustainability, quality, and investment 
valuation frames. While observing calculative frames to overlap in the context of 
exchanges of value for money, the thesis accounted also for the tensions arising in the 
negotiation of different versions of value. The findings suggested that the roles of 
accounting were multiple, namely translating frames into different versions of value, 
embedding and mediating the tension between different versions of value.   
Furthermore, the thesis showed that, while controlling innovation is enacted through 
a variety of accounting devices, the latter are not new to the accounting discipline and 
practice, but rather represent adaptation of traditional accounting tools to the innovation 
rationale. The thesis showed that the adaptation was made possible by accounting’s 
fluid and combinable properties. 
Overall, the thesis showed that configuring innovation as an economic actor and the 
actions of controlling innovation through accounting are intrinsically related. This is 
because to control innovation, in a sense of monitoring, assessing, budgeting for 
innovation, implies a process of qualifying the objects of action, e.g. a drug, a new 
technology, an incubation project. By qualifying these objects of innovation, hence 
attributing value to them, accounting devices are not neutral, but rather are involved in 
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translating innovation objects into goods or services that can circulate within an 
economy. Furthermore, by qualifying the objects of innovation, accounting makes the 
exchange of their value for money (e.g. public funding) possible. In short, accounting 
makes it possible the circulation not only of the object, but also of its value (e.g. almost 
like in financial derivatives). 
Research contribution 
This study contributed to advance our knowledge of accounting and innovation both 
empirically and theoretically. 
First, this thesis contributed to conceptualising innovation by detailing the economic 
agencies that constitute it. Despite the growing influence that innovation has had over 
the past decades on domains of economic and social life (i.e. economic policy, science 
policy, corporate strategies, university missions, charities missions), we still do not 
know what types of entity (accounting, non-accounting, human, non-human) give 
innovation the capacity to influence the courses of action of people and organisations. 
This thesis contributed to opening up the black box of innovation by identifying the 
roles that accounting devices and principles have in providing the content and sources 
of action in the realm of innovation. In so contributing to studies in accounting that 
looked at the constitutive power of accounting, that is the power of accounting 
instruments and ideas to constitute domains of economic life (Hopwood and Miller 
1994; Miller and Power 2013). With regard to this thesis, the findings showed that 
principles of accounting, management and finance such as financial sustainability, 
budgeting, management by objectives, and time value of money, as well as accounting 
devices such as financial plans, R&D budgets, performance indicators, discounted cash 
flow formula are not to be seen as merely neutral devices. Rather, as evidenced in table 
7.1, they provide the mechanisms through which calculative action is distributed and 
organised within the realm of innovation.  
Second, the study contributed empirically to tracing the historical and political 
emergence of innovation and research commercialisation in the UK. Such historical 
tracing did not merely function as a historical background to the material presented in 
the thesis. Rather, it contributed to exploring the conditions of possibilities for changes 
in the modalities of controlling innovation that go beyond the domain of practices 
within which such changes are implemented. Following the claim put forward by 
Burchell et al. (1980) according to which the sources of accounting change are usually 
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distant from the domain of practices where said changes are observed, the thesis 
attended to the historical and political contexts of innovation and to the contingent 
forces that gave rise to discourses of research commercialisation in the UK. In this 
respect, the thesis contributed historically to our understanding of the conditions that led 
to the explosion of calculative practices aimed at controlling innovation. It did so by 
showing that a progressive shift in the principles for governing the allocation of public 
funding to science (e.g. the 1971 Rothschild contractor-customer principle) together 
with regimes of increased accountability created the conditions for the spread of 
instruments of control such as research assessments (e.g. REF 2014, RAE). 
Third, from an empirical point of view this study contributed to the performativity 
programme in social studies of science, and more specifically to the study of economic 
action and economic agency (Callon and Muniesa 2005; Callon 1998c), by identifying 
the content of action and the mechanisms through which action is organised and 
distributed within the arrangements of innovation. From an empirical point of view, it 
was found that controlling innovation involves a range of calculative actions, such as 
monitoring ERDF project, assessing the quality/excellence of research, assessing the 
commercial value of new drugs, financial modelling. It was also found that such actions 
are mostly collective and distributed in that, in order to be carried out, they require the 
collaboration among different entities. Furthermore, it was found that each form of 
action does not necessarily mobilise the same entities across different arrangements. For 
example, the action of monitoring a project funded through ERDF mobilises different 
entities than monitoring a R&D project within a corporate R&D unit. These findings 
resonate with the core objective of the performativity programme, which consists in 
recognizing and attending to the infinite ways of configuring calculative equipment and 
material devices (Çalışkan and Callon 2010). The thesis extended such literature by 
showing that differences in calculative equipment and frames can result into tensions, 
and do not just remain differences. In this respect, not only does accounting configure 
the economic agencies of innovation, but also has a role in creating, mediating, and 
dissolving tensions that emerge across and within sets of arrangements (see Chapter 7). 
This research contributed to the study of agencements (Callon, 2005) also from a 
theoretical point of view by identifying and conceptualizing patterns of regularity in the 
mechanisms through which calculative action is distributed and organized across 
arrangements. As discussed in the previous chapters, the concept of calculative frames 
has been mobilised to account for such regularities. Originally developed by Beunza 
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and Garud (2007), the concept of calculative frames was advanced to account for the 
regularities in the interactions between the categories, analogies, and key metrics used 
by financial analysts. In line with Beunza and Garud’s work, the concept of calculative 
frame deployed in the thesis aims to capture regularities/patterns. However, compared 
to Beunza and Garud, the pattern of regularity is found in the sources or mechanisms for 
attributing action within a set of given arrangements. In this respect, the thesis showed 
how financial sustainability, public intervention, investment valuation, and quality 
frames group different arrangements according to a distinctive mechanism that 
organizes action. Such mechanisms vary across frame and usually consist in stable sets 
of relation between accounting devices and accounting principles. This finding, that is 
the existence of pattern of regularities across arrangements, represents a contribution 
toward bridging the performativity programme (and its search for multiplicities and 
differences) toward the new institutional theory’s concern for isomorphism.  
Finally, this study contributed to the existing body of work in accounting which 
conceptualises accounting as being multiple and fluid (Andon, Baxter, and Chua 2007), 
combinable, immutable, and mobile (Robson 1992), by showing that it is also because 
of accounting properties such as fluidity and combinability, that the interactions between 
the entities of innovation are made possible. With regard to this, Chapter 7 has 
discussed how the interactions between the principle of time value of money and the 
drug discovery and development chain could take place because of the combinable 
property of discounted cash flow formula. The same can be said of the input-output 
framework and the combinable property of accounting instruments such as performance 
indicators. By showing how accounting and non-accounting devices interact and how 
such interactions are made possible by accounting properties, this thesis contributed to 
extend Çalışkan and Callon’s argument (2009) according to which valuation follows 
from the interaction between “competent and active people” (Ibid., p. 22) and things. To 
be sure, the thesis extended Çalışkan and Callon’s argument in that it showed the not 
only the qualities of individuals (i.e. competent, active, creative) matter, but also the 
qualities of devices are central too to the process of valuating innovation. 
Overall, this research was not a comparative study for it did not compare different 
accounting practices and benchmark one against the other. Nor did it assess the strength 
and weaknesses of specific accounting tools. What this study did instead was to identify 
and analyse the entanglements between innovation, as a phenomenon, and the economy 
by attending to the role that accounting plays in economizing innovation. Where 
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economizing meant, in the context of this thesis, to translate the entities of innovation 
(e.g. technologies, incubation projects, new scientific ideas, new drugs, etc.) into 
economic entities which possess economic value(s), that is into entities that can  
circulate and be exchanged within the economy precisely because of that economic 
value(s). 
What this study did not do either was to follow a specific technology (e.g. a new 
molecular entity, a new drug) from discovery to launch into the market. Nor did it 
attend to the ways in which technical and economic considerations shape a specific 
technology throughout the different stages of development. Differently, this study 
focused on the enactment of innovation as a socio-technical phenomenon and how this 
enactment takes place through a network of interactions between accounting devices 
and principles, and human entities. 
Research implications and the role of critique 
In terms of research implications, the type of critique advanced in this thesis is in line 
with the idea of “experimental critique” put forward by Muniesa (2014) and Callon 
(2005): 
“Talking of the performativity of economics […] also means that the role of 
critique is limited to clarifying differences and local asymmetries in order to 
raise the open question of experimentation with new forms of organization” 
(Callon 2005, p. 3) 
In the context of this study, “clarifying differences” in the ways of valuing innovation 
entailed tracing their origins and consequences. As a result of this tracing, there 
emerged a number of unintended and sometimes paradoxical effects of calculating 
innovation, such as the tensions between publishing and commercialising research. 
As discussed in the case of IPs/CROs
12
 ratio and in the case of REF2014 and HEIF
13
, 
ratios and weighting mechanisms constitute calculative spaces where different 
calculative frames confront and compete with each other. However, ratios and formulas 
are hardly complete and this is because not all the entities involved in the action (of 
controlling innovation) are equipped with tools that enable them to translate their 
                                                          
12
 As discussed in Chapter 4 in the context of Incubator#1, IPs/CROs ratio refers to the 
percentage of Intellectual Property related tenants as opposed to the percentage of Contract 
Research Organisations type of tenants. 
13
 As discussed in Chapter 5, REF2014 refers to the Research Excellence Framework 2014. 
While HEIF refers to the Higher Education Innovation Fund. 
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frames into numbers. In this respect, the thesis showed that accounting is not neutral to 
the process of realizing value, for accounting can either give or not voice to and rights 
of experimentation to those participating in the action. As a consequence, those entities 
that cannot, or are unwilling to, qualify a scientific project in terms of economic value, 
find themselves in a position of weakness. The lack of an inclusive mechanism for 
negotiating different versions of value is possibly the main cause (together with the lack 
of equipment for calculating value) of the rise of positions of dominance in the context 
of economic exchanges.  
At the same time, creating calculative spaces (e.g. ratios and weighted average 
formulas) where different actors can give voice to and negotiate their interests do not 
necessarily sweep tensions away. The findings showed that ratios and weighted average 
formulas crystallized or embedded tensions into a participatory valuation process that 
did not, however, dissolve the tensions. Let us take, for example, REF2014 and the 
weights attributed to research outcome (measured in terms of publications) and research 
impact (measured also in terms of research commercialisation initiatives). The thesis 
showed that the emphasis on research commercialization has not been paralleled by a 
change in the criteria for academic excellence (i.e. high quality publications), with the 
consequence that collaborating with industry while maintaining a high level of scientific 
publication adds further pressure on individual academics (#29- Licensing executive).  
Sketches for future research 
A possible avenue for future research will be in the direction of contributing to the 
debate on performativity. Since the performativity programme “starts with an 
ethnography of socio- technical agencements”(Callon 2005, p. 5), this thesis 
contributed to tracing the socio-technical agencements of innovation, that is the 
arrangements of accounting and non-accounting devices, people, accounting principles, 
and metrics. The thesis contributed to identifying the role and effects of accounting in 
the process of configuring such economic agencies. While innovation has come to be 
seen as a central actor of national economies since the second half of 20
th
 century, little 
is known on how its capacity to act and influence the courses of action of governments, 
corporations, universities and so on has been configured through time, and the role of 
accounting in such process. One of the virtues of this thesis was in that it attempted to 
address such gap both empirically and theoretically (e.g. calculative frames).  
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Nevertheless, this thesis did not address fully the debate on the performativity of 
economics (MacKenzie, Muniesa, and Siu 2007) , that is the idea that financial models, 
accounting tools and techniques “do not create the object[s] to which [they] refer ex 
nihilo” (Callon 2007, p. 327), but  have to make them happen. This means that models 
and tools “can be made to work if their corresponding agencement can be constructed” 
(Hardie and MacKenzie 2007, p. 59). Therefore, future work will be in a sense of 
further interpreting the empirical material in order to discuss more fully in detail the 
issue of how accounting devices and models, and calculative frames have performed 
innovation as a socio-technical phenomenon. 
Furthermore, future avenues of research could develop in the direction of exploring 
the interplay between social, technical, and economic forces in the shaping of a specific 
drug throughout the stages of discovery and development. This type of enquiry would 
entail the analysis of the interrelations between the State and the corporation in the 
making of a technology, and the impact of reimbursement (mentioned in Chapter 4) 
considerations into the early stage development of a technology. Another possible 
avenue of research could focus on open innovation and the role of accounting in 
constructing the idea of “openness”. Portals, forums and other platforms built to 
exchange open access technologies and yet unexploited intellectual properties in 
biotechnology and life sciences seem to be a growing phenomenon. The role of 
accounting in creating ‘virtual’ marketplaces where the economic value of openness is 
made visible seems an interesting topic for future investigation. 
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Appendix 1 
Table A- 1: Example of interview schedule 
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Appendix 2  
Table A- 2: Example of invention disclosure form 
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Appendix 3 
Table A- 3: Criteria perceived by academics to be important for academic promotion 
 
Source: (PACEC-CBR 2010, p. 8) 
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Appendix 4 
Table A- 4: Example of capitalisation table 
 
Source: adapted from http://venturehacks.com/articles/cap-table 
Effective Pre-Money Share Price
Pre-Money Post-Money Pool
Post-Money Debt Discount
Investment Shares Ownership
Series A Investor 1
Series A Investor 2
Total Series A
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Total Seed Debt
Common Stock and 
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Pre-Money Post-Money Share Value Exit Value
Founders
Preferred
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Misc Inputs and Outputs
Series A Cap Table
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